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Introduction
From Homer to Dante and Tolstoy to Cormac McCarthy, detailed de-
scriptions of war, murder, and punishment are at the center of the most 
revered works of Western literature. Few topics could claim a literary 
tradition as long and continuous as the representation of physical vio-
lence. Few topics remain more controversial. Does the human capacity 
for violence and destruction pose a greater or smaller risk today than 
ever before? Two recent studies by renowned scholars in their respective 
fields take the long view of human history and come to diametrically op-
posed conclusions. The experimental psychologist Steven Pinker (2011) 
presents statistics and scientific evidence to support his thesis that human 
history is a history of the decline of violence. The sociologist Robert Bel-
lah fails to see such progress in human evolution, and arrives at the fol-
lowing risk assessment: 
Of course we may well blow each other up with atomic weapons 
before we wipe out all species of life, including our own, by more 
gradual means. [. . .] If there is one primary practical intent in a 
work like this that deals with the broadest sweep of biological and 
cultural evolution, it is that the hour is late: it is imperative that 
humans wake up to what is happening and take the necessarily dra-
matic steps that are so clearly needed but also at present so clearly 
ignored by the powers of this earth. (2011, 602)
Not surprisingly, the question of whether and how violence and de-
struction should be represented stands at the core of literary controversies 
as well. This is particularly true for German modernism, for the most 
demanding literary texts written at the time and place when and where 
much of the twentieth-century mass violence originated.1 When W. G. 
Sebald questioned Döblin’s standing as one of Europe’s great modern-
ists, he accused the author of Berlin Alexanderplatz and Wallenstein of 
exhibiting fascist tendencies in his recurrent depictions of violence (1980, 
160). When Karl Heinz Bohrer sought to establish Ernst Jünger as one 
of the few truly modernist writers, he based his argument on Jünger’s 
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portrayals of shock and terror (1978). Helmut Lethen applauds the au-
thors of the militant avant-garde during the 1920s for their ability to 
confront directly the violent historical changes of their time. In the same 
breath, he mocks the supposedly more fragile modernist writers for their 
inability to bear a closer look at violence. Lethen mentions in particular 
Hofmann sthal, Mann, and Musil, and claims that German and Austrian 
modernists could “endure the process of historical acceleration only from 
a healthy distance” (2002, 6).
What then is the relationship between violence and modernism, ex-
cept contentious? Two highly influential responses to this question have 
been given. Neither of them brings into focus the innovative quality and 
central importance of violence for writers like Kafka or Musil. The first 
response is offered by literary historians from Paul Fussell to Modris 
Eksteins. They claim that modernism, especially German modernism, is 
born out of the violence of World War I. The war is understood as Ur-
katastrophe that directed German modernism toward an aesthetics of 
destruction, a development that culminated in the fascist aesthetics of 
the Third Reich. In other words, they make the same reductionist te-
leological claim for German modernism that Siegfried Kracauer made 
for Weimar cinema in his tellingly titled study From Caligari to Hitler 
(1947). In Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age, Eksteins insists that the “Great War was the psychological turning 
point, for Germany and for modernism as a whole. The urge to create 
and the urge to destroy changed places. The urge to destroy was inten-
sified; the urge to create became increasingly abstract. In the end the 
abstraction turned to insanity and all that remained was destruction, 
Götterdämmerung” (1989, 328).
At first sight, it is imminently plausible that the war that caused in its 
first months numbers of casualties that are still shocking and introduced 
tanks, machine guns, trenches, aerial attacks, and chemical weapons into 
modern warfare should have left a deep impact on the literary represen-
tations of violence. But the relationship between the war and modernist 
literature is less linear and more complex. The construction of a causal 
relationship between the experience of the First World War, the rise of 
modernist literature, and its preoccupation with destruction as a harbin-
ger of fascist politics and aesthetics does not hold up to scrutiny. Chro-
nology contradicts Eksteins’s sequence of events. The supposed effect 
preceded its cause by at least one decade. Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Walser, 
Musil, and Döblin published paradigmatic modernist texts well before 
the war, and these novels, stories, and poems exhibit an intense interest 
in representing physical violence. Historical research on the war experi-
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ence undermines further the popular assessment of the war as a modern-
ist Urkatastrophe. This research fails to confirm Eksteins’s narrative of 
a cultural breakdown caused by the war and detects far more continuity 
and even a strengthening of tradition in German postwar society and 
culture. An additional challenge has to be directed against the telos of 
Eksteins’s narrative. Eksteins echoes the Lukácsian idea that German 
modernism leads up to a fascist aesthetics. Such narrative does not ac-
count for most German modernist writers: not for Rilke or Musil, Kafka 
or Mann, Canetti or Brecht. The suggestion of a causal relationship be-
tween historical violence and modernist literature provokes doubts in-
stead of delivering answers.
The second main thesis on the relationship between German mod-
ernism and violence is less historically and more theoretically inspired. 
Even though it often aligns itself with the historical argument, usually 
invoking Benjamin’s observation that the war generation underwent a 
fundamental crisis of experience that led to the demise of traditional 
storytelling, this second account does not require it. In recent years lit-
erary theorists and historians like Peter Bürger, Andreas Huyssen, and 
Helmuth Lethen have expanded significantly Adorno’s narrow canon 
of modernist literature. These new readings supplemented the notion 
of modernist literature with that of a fascist modernism and a militant 
avant-garde. But the attention paid to writers like Ernst Jünger or Gott-
fried Benn or to the avant-garde authors of the new sobriety creates an 
oversimplified, pacified account of modernism. As I argue in the first 
chapter, these innovative and influential rereadings of modernist litera-
ture presuppose distinctly different stances toward physical violence that 
reduce “proper” modernism’s interest in violence almost exclusively to 
explorations of suffering and victimization.
The introduction of the fascist modernist, the modernist tempted by 
the promise of violence, and the daring avant-gardist, the author will-
ing to embrace destruction to create the utopia of a new man and a 
new society, are accompanied by accounts of “proper” modernists like 
Kafka, Musil, or Rilke who either don’t dare to come too close to violent 
phenomena, as Lethen suggested, or whose fascination with violence is 
supposed to be restricted to masochistic self-wounding but never by an 
endorsement of violence against others. The idea of an opposition be-
tween a high modernism on the side of nonaggression and a fascist mod-
ernism and a militant avant-garde on the side of destruction produces a 
convenient notion of modernism that fails to recognize some of the most 
challenging and innovative aspects of German modernism. Rather than 
debating whether Jünger should be considered a modernist, as Berman 
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(1989) and Huyssen (1995) do in their opposing arguments, or dismiss-
ing Döblin’s representations of violence as guilty of fascist ideology, as 
Sebald proposed, this study analyzes the aggressive probing of violence 
by German modernists, in particular Robert Musil, Franz Kafka, and 
Elias Canetti.
The purpose of this study is not to collect and analyze the violent 
fantasies of German modernism and to produce a modernist version of 
Theweleit’s inquiry into the (proto-)fascist imagination. Similarly, the 
following chapters do not pursue the echoes of Nietzsche’s call for the 
“the barbarians of the twentieth century” that reverberate throughout 
the writings of the militant avant-garde of the Weimar Republic and are 
so audible in contemporary theory (Nietzsche 1988, 13:18).2 The long-
ing for the “new barbarian,” as Benjamin called him, and this barbarian’s 
work of destruction remains a powerful and terrifying concept. It recurs 
in many contemporary theoretical projects, including Hardt and Negri’s 
Empire (2000, 212–18) or Žižek’s defense of “the properly leftist proj-
ect of emancipatory rage” (2008, 187). As important as it would be to 
retrace the German roots of Žižek’s attempt to “rehabilitate the notion 
of resentment” (189) in which killing can become an act of mercy—and 
besides Brecht and Benjamin, Žižek refers to Sebald and Améry3—the 
present study is more interested in modernist reflections on violence that 
challenge the avant-garde’s glorification of violence and catastrophe as 
necessary steps and stages toward a new man and a new society. While 
the avant-garde continues to demand that the “multitude, in its will to 
be-against and its desire for liberation, must push through Empire to 
come out the other side” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 218), the modernist 
writers in this study came to doubt that war and revolution could bring 
about fundamental sociopolitical change. They began to question their 
own initial assumption that violence functions as a means to reach this 
“other side.”
These modernists cannot be distinguished from the militant avant-
garde (or the fascist modernists) by their supposed distance from or re-
jection of violence. Their vast majority welcomed the First World War. 
The aggressive stance in favor of violent action was not limited to this 
critical moment in twentieth-century history. As I argue in my reading 
of Musil’s The Confusions of Young Törless, both the novel’s narrator 
and its protagonist justify physical violence, rape, and the humiliation of 
others in their own search for the “other side.” What distinguishes the 
authors discussed in this study from the militant avant-garde and from 
fascist modernists is something other than a clear-cut opposition to vio-
lent action. While the texts of the avant-garde and of fascist modernism 
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tend to conceptualize violence as a means to establish a new society, the 
modernist texts at the center of this study question such a reductionist 
approach to violence and reflect on the phenomenon of violence itself. 
They challenge the widely accepted premise that violence should be ap-
proached and understood as an instrument.
Representations of physical violence are not only at the center of Ger-
man modernist writings, but these writings also belong among the most 
innovative investigations of violence undertaken in the twentieth cen-
tury. Musil’s, Kafka’s, and Canetti’s examinations of physical violence 
and its impact on our conceptions of the self, of language and commu-
nication, and of history and society deserve to be discovered as the sites 
of some of the most insightful and provocative reflections of the role of 
violence in modernity. To recognize the centrality and the complexity of 
these modernist responses to violence, it is necessary to perform close 
readings and to pay attention to the specific historical context of these 
literary texts. Only during such intense readings does one begin to rec-
ognize the full aesthetic and epistemological potential of these canonical 
modernist texts.
Since this approach sets strict limitations on the number of authors 
and texts that can be analyzed in a single volume, the choice of liter-
ary works becomes all the more important. Why two chapters on Robert 
Musil but none on Thomas Mann or Alfred Döblin? Why Franz Kafka 
and not Robert Walser or Hugo von Hofmannsthal? Why Elias Ca-
netti and not Hans Henny Jahnn or Heimito von Doderer? And what 
about Rainer Maria Rilke, Arthur Schnitzler, Stefan George, Else Lasker- 
Schüler, Karl Kraus, Anna Seghers, Veza Canetti, and Hermann Broch? 
The presence of two chapters on Musil is not meant to suggest that Musil 
is twice as important as Kafka and infinitely more significant than the 
absent Thomas Mann. These two chapters do not argue for Mann’s (or 
Broch’s) irrelevance but for Robert Musil’s unique contributions to an un-
derstanding of violent phenomena. The first chapter on The Confusions of 
Young Törless makes the second chapter on The Man Without Qualities 
necessary, because only after the First World War did Musil fully appreci-
ate the challenge posed in his first novel by the figure of Basini and his 
experience of humiliation, rape, and torture. Musil recognized after the 
war that Basini’s malleable self was no rare exception, as The Confusions 
of Young Törless suggested, but a widely observable phenomenon. Musil’s 
The Man Without Qualities becomes a continuation and revision of his 
first literary exploration of the experience of violence, the self, and history. 
Once one reads these two novels as Musil’s sustained attempt to rethink 
violence, the originality of Musil’s antireductionist reflections on violence 
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emerges. While the choice of Franz Kafka and his story In the Penal Col-
ony might be the least controversial—even though the actual reading goes 
against all prevalent interpretations of this central modernist text—this 
choice does not imply that a reading of Robert Walser’s Jakob von Gunten 
or Rilke’s The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge could not provide dif-
ferent but similarly significant examinations of violence in German mod-
ernism. There is no single modernist response to violence, and only if the 
following chapters on Musil, Kafka, Benjamin, and Canetti demonstrate 
the range, depth, and innovations of these modernist reflections on vio-
lence, only if these readings offer new insights into these literary texts 
themselves, is the concentration on these particular writers justified.
The first chapter analyzes the relationships between theories of mo-
dernity, violence, and German modernism. I argue that the question of 
violence is at the center of German modernist literature. In contrast to 
the French, English, or Russian literary histories, this focus on physical 
violence distinguishes modernism from realism in the German tradition. 
In stark opposition to the German realist literature of the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the works of modernists like Rilke and Walser 
or Musil and Canetti are just as filled with images of violence as the 
films of Murnau, Lang, and Pabst, or the works of more popular writers 
like Zweig, Roth, and Kellermann. The emergence of modernism and a 
new fascination with previously marginalized violent and pathological 
acts occurred simultaneously in the German tradition. The significance 
of these representations of violence for German modernism has been 
obscured by predominant theories of modernity that preferred not to 
acknowledge the centrality of violence in modernity. The dominance of 
such theories enabled and supported equally pacified constructions of 
German modernism. I argue that literary-historical and theoretical reflec-
tions on the relationship between violence and modernity, in particular 
those regarding the influence of World War I on postwar literature and 
culture, continue to follow untenable assumptions. With the help of his-
torical research on the war experience, I show that the widely accepted 
narrative of a breakdown of culture and a collapse of tradition during 
World War I and an ensuing crisis of experience underestimates the con-
tinuity of social institutions and traditions. This narrative as it has been 
introduced, expanded, and refined by theorists from Freud to Arendt and 
from Benjamin to Agamben is of limited descriptive value for an under-
standing of the war’s impact on its participants and the representation of 
violence in modernist literature. The other metanarrative on the relation 
between modernity and violence, a story that Nobert Elias developed in 
The Civilizing Process (1939) and that Pinker endorsed enthusiastically 
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in his recent study, calling Elias “the most important thinker you have 
never heard of” (Pinker 2011, 59), avoids the idea of catastrophe and 
collapse entirely and speaks instead of the decline of violence in moder-
nity. These competing narratives of cultural breakdown and of a disap-
pearance of violence in modernity share a disinterest in looking more 
closely at violent phenomena. As I argue in the chapters on Musil, Kafka, 
Benjamin, and Canetti, modernist literature investigates the complexities 
of violence and its effects on the self and society in such detail and with 
a reflective ingenuity that the metanarratives of modernity are lacking.
The argument of this study goes therefore much further than claiming 
that Musil, Kafka, and Canetti validate acts of violence and the harming 
of others in their fiction. Violent acts against others are at the center of 
their literary and aesthetic experiments, and these authors offer unique 
insights into our limited understanding of violence, the self, and the ex-
perience of modernity, and the challenges to perceive and to communi-
cate new risk situations that threaten the continued existence of modern 
societies—insights that are rarely found in the surprisingly narrow scope 
of current theories of violence. The task of my readings of Musil, Kafka, 
and Canetti is therefore not only to demonstrate how provocative and 
often disturbing their different approaches to violence remain, but to dis-
cover their works as some of the most insightful reflections on violence 
the twentieth century produced.
Chapter 2 opens the argument for Robert Musil as the not-yet- 
acknowledged expert on violence in German modernism. Musil’s anal-
yses of violence afford the reader the opportunity to perceive the full 
scope of modernist responses to violence. In contrast to previous read-
ings of his first novel, I examine The Confusions of Young Törless (1906) 
as a novel of violence. Musil’s early masterpiece of German modern-
ism presents and confronts several traditional theories of violence, sac-
rifice, and suffering. Musil’s novel rationalizes the use of violence against 
others—gendered and constructed as the perverse other—as necessary 
acts to complete the main protagonist’s aesthetic education. As a rep-
resentation of the perverse, The Confusions of Young Törless barely 
moves beyond conveying homophobic anxieties about the effeminate 
boy. Rather than analyzing the perverse—as the novel’s narrator, Törless, 
and Musil in his prewar essays repeatedly proclaim to do—the novel 
constructs Basini, the effeminate boy, as a legitimate target of physical 
violence and humiliation. Despite such validation of violence against the 
marginalized other, the novel moves eventually into uncharted territory 
in its reflections on violence and the self. In apparent agreement with re-
cent theories on the effects of torture and humiliation on the self (Elaine 
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Scarry and Richard Rorty), Törless expects to gain insight into the me-
chanics of the individual’s identity by breaking it. He anticipates that 
every victim holds certain core beliefs whose forced renunciation would 
render futile any future efforts to reconstruct his or her self-narrative as 
a coherent and plausible narrative. Against Törless’s expectations and 
Rorty’s and Scarry’s predictions, Basini’s experience of torture defies 
these assumptions. Violence subverts its use as an instrument and, more 
important, the self does not shatter into pieces when exposed to physical 
violence and humiliation. Nothing seems more absurd and frightening to 
Törless and the novel’s narrator than the observation that the experience 
of physical violence might not produce lasting observable effects on the 
self. In Basini’s response to the violence and humiliation he is forced to 
suffer, Musil approaches for the first time the notion of a malleable self. 
This malleable self does not follow the trajectory of the bildungsroman 
according to which “each soul has to perfect its own possibilities into 
reality,” as Musil still expected while writing The Confusions of Young 
Törless (Musil 1983, 161). Instead, the malleable self lacks a stable core 
and adapts without apparent harm to the most extreme circumstances. 
Although the question of the malleable self is left unresolved in Musil’s 
first novel, its challenge to our understanding of the effects of violence 
on the self is one of its major achievements and sets the stage for Musil’s 
postwar reflection on war, violence, and society.
In contrast to his prewar writings, Musil, after Germany’s defeat, no 
longer defends violent action and stops considering it as an effective 
means to an end. Musil continues, however, to acknowledge the om-
nipresent possibility that violent action will occur in modern society, 
and he took seriously its tempting promise to generate an experience of 
unity and clarity for its citizens. Reversing Lethen’s distinction between 
modernists and members of the avant-garde vis-à-vis violence, I argue 
in the third chapter that Musil’s continued interest in the malleability of 
the self, combined with his antireductionist approach to violence, allows 
him to reconsider the role of violence in modernity while the avant-
garde’s functionalist theories of the self (Brecht, Jünger, Benjamin) re-
main captive to more simplified views of violence. The malleable self is in 
Musil’s postwar writings not anymore a notion too absurd and frighten-
ing to entertain but a ubiquitous phenomenon of wartime and postwar 
society. The malleable self’s experiences of violence led Musil to rethink 
the function of causation and progress in history. Acts of violence can 
no longer be approached from their purported function as means to an 
end. By intending to explore the causes of World War I in a world that 
defied the idea of causation, Musil’s revised analysis of violence moved 
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to the center of his postwar writings and their modernist aesthetics and 
can be best understood in comparison to the antireductionist theory of 
violence proposed by the sociologist Heinrich Popitz (1925–2002). Mu-
sil’s engagement with war and violence structures his masterpiece of Eu-
ropean modernism, The Man Without Qualities, and its theories of the 
self, emotion, and history and discloses Musil as one of the most original 
thinkers of war and violence in the twentieth century.
The fourth chapter offers a reading of the most renowned representa-
tion of violence in modernist literature, Franz Kafka’s In the Penal Col-
ony (written 1914, published 1919). As I argue, Kafka’s position toward 
power, war, and violence is far more ambivalent than generally acknowl-
edged. Focusing on these ambivalences leads to insights into Kafka’s writ-
ings and to a more complex understanding of the relationship between 
German modernism and violence. Even though almost all readings of In 
the Penal Colony depend on it, the question of the reliability of the story’s 
central source of information, the officer, judge, and executioner, is rarely 
raised and even less often answered. In contrast to previous readings of 
this story, I argue that the officer is a figure of ambivalence, belonging 
to both the new and the old orders, someone who defends and mistrusts 
the lethal workings of the apparatus. Because of the officer’s position of 
radical ambivalence, the story’s structure mirrors Kafka’s most radical 
reflection on his poetics of the two-edged sword, what I call his poetics 
of the knife. Neither the expectation of finding truth and justice through 
the execution apparatus nor its frustration should be taken as the story’s 
meaning. In models of direct and indirect communication, Kafka decon-
structs in his story the equation of pain and truth, but at the same time 
he is unwilling to renounce the cutting, never abandoning the hope that 
torture and violence could force the right word to be uttered. We are left 
with the repetitions of gestures of radical ambivalence from one level 
of the story to the other. Correspondingly, Kafka refuses with this story 
to choose between the (misleading) alternative between realist storytell-
ing and modernist description, as readers from Lukács to Scherpe have 
claimed. Never allowing for a decision between such alternatives, the 
story collapses and disintegrates like the apparatus at its center. With In 
the Penal Colony Kafka neither renounces the promise of violence nor 
adheres to it but exemplifies his poetics of indecision.
This study moves in its final chapter from a poetics of indecision to a 
poetics of destruction and concludes with two strange pairings: Walter 
Benjamin and Elias Canetti as well as satire and the new risks of chemi-
cal warfare. In response to the employment of poison gas during the 
war and in anticipation of ever more advanced technologies of mass 
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death, Benjamin and Canetti recognized that these new weapons posed 
radically different challenges to perception and imagination. They both 
searched for ways that would enable the public imagination to perceive 
the destructive potential of such triumphs of modernization. And they 
both turned to the genre of satire and developed new models of what 
I call destructive satire. Benjamin and Canetti reached, however, rather 
different conclusions regarding the destructive potential of modernist 
literature. In his essay on Karl Kraus, Benjamin proposes such a radical 
reconsideration of satire that it turns into an apologia for indiscriminate 
physical destruction. His theory of satire is tied to a politics of destruc-
tion that is at risk of losing sight of any limits to its advocacy of political 
violence.
Canetti’s practice of satire, primarily in his novel Auto-da-Fé (com-
pleted 1931, published 1935), is more subversive, extremely focused, but 
also strangely aimless. In contrast to Benjamin, Canetti pronounces no 
end to communicable experience, storytelling, or the role of tradition per 
se but he develops a model of satire that communicates indirectly and 
harmfully with its audience. After the war and in anticipation of another 
man-made disaster, Canetti’s satire presupposes no longer that the sati-
rist and his audience share a common set of values, as theorists and prac-
titioners of satire from Schiller and Hegel to Kästner and Tucholsky have 
assumed. The only common ground that Canetti’s satire presupposes is 
the very ground it seeks to destroy: the reader’s preconceived notions of 
reality, from misogynist and racist stereotypes to class and educational 
prejudices. Canetti’s satire does not already suffocate on the poison gas 
of future chemical attacks, as he claimed for Broch and his novels. And 
it does not deal directly with the destructive potentials of moderniza-
tion. The destructive force of Canetti’s satire is aimed at the reader’s pre-
conceived notions of reality to prepare a catastrophic imagination that 
might not blind itself to new methods and technologies of destruction. 
The fifth chapter does not provide a comprehensive reading of Canetti’s 
Auto-da-Fé but seeks to understand the principles and structure of his 
destructive satire. Rather than providing an answer as to whether mod-
ernism’s most daring experiment with a destructive aesthetics failed or 
succeeded, these readings of Benjamin and Canetti invite the reader to 
explore the outer limits of modernism’s experiments with an aesthetic of 
violence.
Rather than using the interest in and the representation of violence 
as criteria to distinguish between the avant-garde, fascist, and proper 
modernists, this study demonstrates the significance of the phenomena 
of war, violence, and catastrophe for any understanding of German mod-
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ernism in the first half of the twentieth century. The writings by Musil, 
Kafka, Benjamin, and Canetti offer vital insights into the recent history 
of violence. The focus on this central experience of modernity allows for 
new readings of some of the most familiar and canonical texts of Ger-
man modernism. While these readings break with a prevalent pacified 
notion of German modernism and focus on sometimes deeply disturbing 
aspects of these writings, this study hopes to make productive the im-
mense richness of modernism’s exploration of acts of violence and terror 
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Jack the Ripper murders Lulu in Wedekind’s play Pandora’s Box (1902). 
Elektra envisions blood gushing out of a hundred throats in Hofmann-
sthal’s play Elektra (1903) and again in his libretto for Richard Strauss’s 
opera of the same name (1909). The humble Jacob van Gunten, the titular 
protagonist of Robert Walser’s novel (1909), trains to become the perfect 
manservant but dreams that Napoleon’s war machine will transform him 
into a “firm and impenetrable, almost empty lump of body” that would 
destroy all life on the way to Moscow (Walser 1999, 147). Baby rats are 
found and drowned inside the opened corpses that Gottfried Benn revisits 
in Morgue and other Poems (1912). Murnau’s Nosferatu, a vampire on 
a killing spree, spreads the plague in Wisborg (1922). Kafka’s works are 
full of cutting knifes and disgusting wounds. Jünger’s The Adventurous 
Heart (1929) beats fast when it thinks of torture, executions, and the fall 
into the abyss. George Grosz photographs himself as the Ripper; Dix 
and Grosz paint one sexual murder after the other. The story of Franz 
Biberkopf—beating, raping, and killing his girlfriends—is framed as 
the story of spiritual rebirth in Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929). 
As newspapers and the narrator in Musil’s The Man Without Qualities 
(1931) conscientiously report, Moosbrugger stabs his victim thirty-five 
times in the abdomen. The shock of the Bergen-Belsen photographs crip-
ples the worlds of Serenus Zeitblom in Doctor Faustus (1947) and Gesine 
Cresspahl, the protagonist of Uwe Johnson’s Anniversaries (1970–83). 
Lone survivors of the next thermonuclear war fend off or kill the only 
other human they encounter in Arno Schmidt’s Dark Mirrors (1951) and 
Marlen Haushofer’s The Wall (1963). Visiting the former extermination 
camp for one day in 1964, moving relentlessly back and forth between 
the positions that perpetrators and victims took in Auschwitz, Peter Weiss 
recognizes the site of mass murder as My Place (1965), as the one fixed 
place in his life of transitions. Max Schulz, SS-man, mass murderer, and 
rape victim, shoots his childhood friend Itzig Finkelstein, takes his name, 
moves to Palestine, and becomes a celebrated Zionist militant in Edgar 
Hilsenrath’s savagely funny novel The Nazi and the Barber (1977). Elfriede 
Jelinek’s Erika Kohut slashes her genitalia, dreams of rape and bondage, 
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and thrusts a knife into her chest in the novel The Pianist (1983). Like 
Hans Henny Jahnn five decades earlier in Richard III (1917–20), Heiner 
Müller’s rewritings of Shakespeare’s plays zero in on the destruction of 
bodies, erecting for his Macbeth (1971) a throne made out of corpses. 
All the German violence of the twentieth century survives side by side in 
Germania II, the slaughterhouse into which a nameless protagonist strays 
in Wolfgang Hilbig’s Knacker’s Yard (1991).
This list of horrific violence in central texts of twentieth-century Ger-
man literature, art, and film is anything but comprehensive. Any reader 
could add different but no less influential authors (or painters, or film 
directors) to it: Rilke’s The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (1910) 
is a treasure trove of violent imagery and so are the poems of Heym or 
Trakl, as well as the plays and poems by Brecht, or Canetti’s Auto-da-Fé 
(1936) or Günter Grass’s The Tin Drum (1959), and so on. With the same 
ease one might replace any title mentioned above with another one by 
the same writer and further intensify the destruction and violence in the 
panorama of twentieth-century German literature—with Döblin’s Wal-
lenstein (1920), Schmidt’s Kaff (1960), or Peter Weiss’s The Aesthetics of 
Resistance (1975–81).
Even if one accepts that the representation of physical violence is a 
central topic in German modernist writing, one hesitates at first to assign 
too much significance to this phenomenon. Representing violence is not a 
modernist innovation but reaches back to the Iliad and the beginning of 
Western literature. Even the mood and temperature of representations of 
violence are not easily linked to particular epochs. When Flaubert follows 
Frédéric Moreau through the streets of Paris during the 1848 revolution, 
his description of violence strikes us, as James Wood recently observed, as 
“decisively modern” (2008, 45).
There was firing from every window overlooking the square; bul-
lets whistled through the air; the fountain had been pierced, and 
the water, mingling with blood, spread in puddles on the ground. 
People slipped in the mud on clothes, shakos, and weapons; Fré-
déric felt something soft under his foot; it was the hand of a ser-
geant in a grey overcoat who was lying face down in the gutter. 
Fresh groups of workers kept coming up, driving the combatants 
towards the guard-house. (Flaubert 2004, 311)
Avoiding sentimentality, Flaubert’s writing registers the horrifying de-
tail of stepping on something soft with its sudden flash of recognition, 
a hand, and moves on, letting the reader experience the event’s terror 
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through the quickly observed detail. A century later, in October 1944, 
the thirteen-year-old Thomas Bernhard stepped “on a soft object,” 
right after the first air raid on Salzburg (1998, 28). Like his friends, 
he thought it was a doll’s hand. Thirty years later, writing the first vol-
ume of his autobiography, Die Ursache (1975), Bernhard remembers 
the next moment—and not the panoramic sights of bombed-out houses 
and churches—as the moment when his boyish desire for witnessing 
warfare turned into the experience of war and violence. The soft object 
under his foot was a child’s hand, torn off from its body. “Only at the 
sight of the child’s hand this first bombing raid of American planes on 
my hometown had transformed suddenly the sensation of a state of fe-
ver for the boy, who I had been, to a horrifying intervention of violence 
and catastrophe” (Bernhard 1998, 28).1 These two scenes of stepping on 
hands bracket a century of literature, from the disquieting indifference 
of Flaubert’s prose in Sentimental Education (1869) to Bernhard’s un-
nerving attention to the shocking detail.
But as modern as these sudden sights of destruction feel, Horkheimer 
and Adorno detected such similar instances of quick zooming to extreme 
close-ups in representations of violence already in Homer’s Odyssey. Book 
22 describes the slaughter of Penelope’s suitors and the mass execution 
of those of her maids who had not refused to have sex with the suitors. 
Homer reports how young Telemachus roped the girls like birds: “so the 
women’s heads were trapped in a line, nooses yanking their necks up, one 
by one so all might die a pitiful, ghastly death . . . they kicked up heels for 
a little—not for long” (Homer 1996, 453–54). Homer’s remarkable “im-
passibilité” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 61) with which he measured 
how long the dying women’s feet twitched bears a striking similarity to 
Ernst Jünger’s notion of “désinvolture,” his assumption of an unmoved 
and “godlike superiority” toward the described acts of violence (Jünger 
1995, 124). Karl Heinz Bohrer identified this impassive posture as a cen-
tral feature of Jünger’s modernist aesthetics (Bohrer 1978, 423–39). In 
their reading of the Odyssey Horkheimer and Adorno invoked not mod-
ernist representations of violence as a comparison for Homer’s cold atten-
tion to detail but European realism and the “unmoved composure [. . .] 
of the greatest narrative writers of the nineteenth century.” (2002, 61)
Such crisscrossing between European cultures and historical epochs sug-
gests strong continuities in the literary representation of violence. A closer 
look at the German tradition necessitates, however, an important quali-
fication of Horkheimer and Adorno’s claims. In contrast to their French 
and Russian contemporaries, the major German nineteenth-century nov-
elists exhibited little to no interest in depicting physical destruction. If one 
6 Chapter 1
looks for disturbing descriptions of violence in German realism that rival 
the unmoved indifference of Flaubert’s or Tolstoy’s prose one cannot turn 
to the writings of Theodor Fontane, Adalbert Stifter, Wilhelm Raabe, or 
any other major German novelist. One would need to search the pages of 
German popular literature, of writers like Karl May, for similar scenes of 
violence in lesser prose. And May’s widely read tales of rape, murder, and 
robbery tended to locate this violence outside of Germany’s borders. As 
Rudolf Schenda and Eric Johnson have argued, the imagined violence of 
imperial Germany’s Trivialliteratur occurs in Italy, Spain, Mexico, or the 
United States but not in civilized Germany (Schenda 1988, 398; Johnson 
1995, 95–107).
Considering the impossibility of coming up with a comparable list 
of gruesome literary moments for the second half of nineteenth-century 
German literature, the claim for a specific significance of the representa-
tion of violence for German modernist writing suggests itself. German 
realism, emerging in the aftermath of the failed revolution of 1848, can 
be distinguished from its French, English, and Russian counterparts by 
its well-intentioned temperance, “das Pläsierliche,” as Benn dismisses it 
not entirely without sympathy (Benn 2003, 1728). In the programmatic 
announcements of German realists one finds the desire to represent the 
typical side by side with the refusal to include the scandalous, violent, 
and pathological.2 According to Fontane, the extreme and extraordinary 
was the stuff newspapers were made from but not the modern novel: “It 
happens, anything happens. But it is not the task of the novel to describe 
things that take place, or that at least could take place any day. In my 
view, the task of the modern novel is to represent a life, a society, a circle 
of people that is an undistorted reflection of the life that we live” (cited in 
Thomé 1993, 38).3 For Erich Auerbach, Fontane practiced far too faith-
fully what he theorized. Even though he glimpsed in his last novels “ru-
diments of a genuine contemporary realism,” Germany’s greatest realist 
nevertheless failed to measure up to international comparison. Like Benn, 
Auerbach notes that Fontane’s “tone after all never goes beyond the half-
seriousness of pleasant, partly optimistic, partly resigned conversation” 
(Auerbach 1974, 519).
With its refusal to view violence as a worthy phenomenon, Ger-
man realism was anything but out of step with its own times. Even in 
a society in which the social Darwinist glorification of the “struggle 
for life” caught the public imagination, in which popular novels and 
memoirs kept the remembrance of the 1871 war alive, and the strategic 
military lessons drawn from this war furthered a “tendency toward 
extreme warfare” in German military culture, it would be unfair to 
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characterize the portrayal of German society in realist literature as na-
ive and distorted (Hull 2005, 2). In international comparison, Ger-
many had the reputation of being one of the safest and least violent so-
cieties. The observations of American tourists, contemporary scholars 
like Emile Durkheim, and the data of crime statistics tend to support 
this claim for a rather nonviolent Germany (Johnson 1995, 133–34). 
In 1897, when Fontane published his last novel, Der Stechlin, the Eu-
ropean nations kept peace between each other, and the alliances of 
the future war would not align themselves until the next decade. The 
fictional, biographical, and historical war literature at the end of the 
nineteenth century shared Fontane’s stance and shied away from look-
ing too closely at the destruction caused by warfare. More important, 
the view that acts of violence should be considered as sensationalist 
distractions from essential historical developments was taken as well 
by the Social Democratic labor movement, Germany’s fastest growing 
political movement.4
German realism and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), both critical 
voices in Wilhelminian society, anticipated noncatastrophic, nonrevolu-
tionary, and nonviolent historical progress. The political victory of the 
Social Democrats in Germany appeared to them as a matter of historical 
necessity. Eduard Bernstein’s reform proposal for the SPD demonstrated 
the same calm optimism in progress that saturates Fontane’s last nov-
el. In his debate-sparking book The Preconditions of Socialism (1899) 
Bern stein demanded that the SPD finally offer a realistic and undistorted 
portrayal of its political program, one that rids itself of the supposedly 
outmoded anticipation of violent revolutions. Nine years after the lifting 
of Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws (1878–90), the Social Democratic theo-
retician saw no need for radical political posturing anymore. It is high 
time for the SPD, Bernstein writes, to find “the courage to emancipate it-
self from phraseology that is, in fact, obsolete and to make up its mind to 
appear what it is in reality today: a democratic socialist party of reform” 
(Bernstein 1993, 186). Even though he had to suffer Rosa Luxemburg’s 
ridicule in her Reform or Revolution (1899), Bernstein articulated the 
unrevolutionary mood of the SPD majority at the end of the nineteenth 
century.
Conceiving The Stechlin as a political novel, Fontane expressed simi-
lar sympathies for a moderate, nondisruptive social democracy. Politi-
cal and social progresses are presented as continuous advancements that 
proceed at a measured but unstoppable pace by way of reform and not 
of rupture or revolution. Most famously, Fontane states his political phi-
losophy through the character of the cautiously progressive Pastor Lo-
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renzen (Zimmermann 2000, 130). “Rather with the old as far as it goes 
and with the new only as far it is necessary” (Fontane 2001, 34). Pastor 
Lorenzen welcomes a new age “under the sign of a democratic world-
view,” a society that pursues social justice and rejects visions of destruc-
tion and political revolution (324). Both Eduard Bernstein, the voice of 
the SPD’s majoritarian opinion, and Fontane, Germany’s greatest realist 
author, expected an orderly and lawful progress toward a better age in 
which everyone would be able to breathe freely.5 The same complaisance 
that Benn already noticed in Fontane’s writings characterized Bernstein’s 
political philosophy as well. “Fontane was calmed by history and his-
tory calmed everything in his view; whatever still quivered and suffered 
stood outside of his Prussified heart” (Benn 2003, 1729). Forty years after 
the publication of The Stechlin, Fontane and Bernstein would have been 
horrified to listen to a conversation among modernists that reversed the 
realist consensus. In a conversation with Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht 
turned Pastor Lorenzen’s maxim inside out and transformed the realist 
axiom into a modernist one: “A Brechtian Maxim: Don’t start from the 
good old things but the bad new ones” (Benjamin 1991, 539).
The transition from realist to modernist literature was accompanied 
in the German tradition by a new and intense preoccupation with vio-
lent and transgressive acts. The shattering of Fontane’s and Bernstein’s 
calming views of history and the heightened interest in the representa-
tion of violence after a century of unprecedented man-made mass death 
during world wars, revolutions, and genocides provokes no surprise in 
twenty-first-century hindsight.6 If anything, this shift in modernist litera-
ture toward the representation of extremely violent and disturbing acts 
and events is in retrospect almost causally linked to the violent events 
that dominated twentieth-century history. It has become customary to 
refer with Hobsbawm to the last century as the “age of extremes,” and to 
suggest that the experience of twentieth-century mass violence is linked 
to the imagination of violence in literature, art, and film (Hobsbawm 
1995).7 Under this calm surface of plausibility, however, swarms of un-
substantiated claims, undefined concepts, and contradictory theories con-
tinue to swim, lurk, and lure.
As I argue in this chapter, we can follow such seemingly plausible links 
between twentieth-century violence and German modernist literature 
only as long as we work with ill-defined concepts and theories like the 
“break of tradition,” “violence,” and “German modernist writing.” Ex-
cellent work has been done in recent years on the concept of violence as 
well as on German modernism. Rather than providing a widely accepted 
concept of violence, however, the research has led to a more precise un-
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derstanding of the challenges acts of violence pose to theorization and un-
derstanding. Similarly, literary scholars have in the last twenty-five years 
significantly expanded and complicated our notion of German modern-
ism. The concepts of physical violence and German modernist writings 
both gained in irreducible complexity and resisted ever more their use for 
any clear, straightforward, and generalized claims and statements. None-
theless, when “violence” and “German modernism” are brought together 
a deceptive clarity continues to emerge in literary history and cultural 
theory. Conjoining these two concepts, the illusion of a stable constella-
tion remains in sight. We are presented—to rephrase Benn’s judgment on 
Fontane’s view of history—with a pacified and pacifying view of German 
modernism.
Such a result is counterintuitive, to say the least, since the literary his-
torical revision and expansion of German modernism began with the ag-
gressive intention to “explode” any previous models of German modern-
ism (Bathrick and Huyssen 1989, 4). The preceding models were rightly 
viewed as too restrictive—limiting the modernist canon to a select few 
masters, to Kafka, Rilke, Mann, and not many more. The most provoca-
tive aspect of this explosive revision of German modernism was the ques-
tion of whether writers like Benn, Celine, or Jünger are “modernists.” The 
debates continue over whether (some of) Ernst Jünger’s writings are mod-
ernist responses to modernity,8 whether the concept fascist modernism 
will assist understanding of modernism.9 More important than these de-
bates, however, is one of their side effects. They amplify a notion of Ger-
man modernism as nonviolent and passive. With surprising consistency, 
the question of which text and author might or might not be considered 
as properly modernist has been decided with reference to the work’s ap-
proach to the representation of violence. In the course of these debates 
a domesticated understanding of “proper” German modernism emerged, 
one that looks away from the destructive potential of modernist aesthet-
ics and politics.
The otherwise justified models of fascist modernism as well as that 
of the militant avant-garde invite unduly simplified accounts of the rela-
tionship between modernism and violence, filtering out the provocative 
but also destructive energy of modernist literature. The construct of the 
fascist modernist as the one tempted by the promise of violence obscures 
the widespread, intense, and positive fascination with physical violence 
in German modernist writings. A fascination that is not limited to either 
keeping a safe distance or restricting itself to masochistic self-wounding, 
as current theories of German modernism claim (i.e., Adorno, Bürger, 
Huyssen, Eksteins, Lethen et al.), but that, instead, does not hesitate to 
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lash out against the other. The facile constellation of high modernism in 
the middle and the militant avant-garde on its one side and fascist mod-
ernism on its other distorts our understanding of modernist responses 
to violence. One has to move away from any clear-cut models that place 
a seemingly nonaggressive modernism between the two other forms of 
modernism that are distinguished from it by their preoccupation with 
violence. I develop in the following chapters descriptive-analytical models 
of modernist responses to the promise of violence, of the different ways 
in which writers and theorists like Musil, Kafka, Benjamin, and Canetti 
understood phenomena of violence as challenges to representation and 
imagination but also sought to explore the epistemological potential of 
violence. In close readings the subsequent chapters develop new interpre-
tations of these well-known writers and offer a clearer understanding of 
how their modernist aesthetics and politics searched for a catastrophic 
imagination, one capable of perceiving the destructive potential of con-
temporary man-made violence.
Before I develop these models, three preliminary steps have to be taken 
that retrace the difficulties that discussions of modernist responses to 
violence confront. First, I analyze different versions of the story of a 
breakdown of cultural traditions that lend at first sight plausibility to 
the idea that the modernist focus on violence should be directly related 
to twentieth-century man-made mass violence. Next, I address the prob-
lems of defining the concept of violence, and finally I turn to the role that 
representations of violence play in recent discussions and definitions of 
German modernism.
The assumption of a direct relationship between the last century’s real 
and unprecedented mass violence and the suddenly increasing and 
shockingly explicit representations of violence in twentieth-century 
German literature is based on the belief that the intensity and scope of 
the mass violence caused a break in historical continuity and the col-
lapse of cultural traditions. If indeed such a break occurred, a different, 
new, modern response to such violence was needed—not only in the 
form of literature.
As told by Freud, Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Arendt, the sto-
ries of the breakdown of tradition and the death of experience are well 
known. Read in sequence, these theories of discontinuity display an ever 
intensifying distrust of traditional modes of thinking, imagining, and rep-
resenting. From trench warfare and poison gas attacks to concentration 
and extermination camps to the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki, these mass death events delivered blow after blow to the promise 
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of a continuous Western civilizing process (meaning the expectation of 
less aggressive, less cruel, less murderous behavior among individuals and 
between societies in modernity). What began with Freud’s experience of 
disorientation during the First World War culminated in Arendt’s sober 
assessment that after 1945 a complete and irreparable break with the past 
had occurred already and irrevocably.
For the purpose of this study, several aspects of these recurring break-
down narratives have to be emphasized. In contrast to recent repetitions of 
this story, I argue that these authors are less consistent in their assertions 
of an absolute break than previously suggested. All of these writers attest 
not only to the break itself but also to the persistent difficulty of accept-
ing the consequences of their own conclusions. Their hesitations, quali-
fications, and later revisions in drafts, letters, and notes should caution 
against any hasty acceptance of a clear link between twentieth-century 
violence, a collapse of tradition, and new, modernist responses to this vio-
lence. By aligning these stories in chronological sequence, the assessment 
of a breakdown of tradition emerges as a more and more traditional ap-
proach to the intensifying challenges of understanding twentieth-century 
mass violence.
Sigmund Freud experienced the First World War as a profound disillu-
sionment (Enttäuschung). In his Timely Observations on War and Death 
(written in March and April 1915), he explained his experience less with 
war’s return to Europe than with the “brutality shown by individuals 
whom, as participants in the highest human civilization, one would not 
have thought capable of such behavior” (Freud 1957, 280). The war’s fe-
rocious destructiveness, the observation that this war “is at least as cruel, 
as embittered, as implacable as any that has preceded it” shattered his 
belief in a continuous advancement of European cultural development 
(278). As early as 1915 and before tanks, machine guns, airplanes, trench 
warfare, and poison gas attacks became emblematic for the new horrors 
of the war, Freud acknowledged that his expectation of an unstoppable 
civilizing process was founded on self-deception, on his overestimation of 
human Kultureignung. The deconstruction of the illusion of a sustained 
cultural advancement became the only positive Ent-täuschung that the 
war delivered to Freud. The majority of European citizens revealed them-
selves to Freud as “cultural hypocrites” [Kulturheuchler] (284). During 
peacetime, they lived within the socially accepted and expected norms; 
during wartime, however, it became obvious that they never truly inter-
nalized the norms of civilized human interaction. In times of war they 
simply relaxed or disregarded completely cultural norms as inappropriate 
and untimely codes of conduct. Distinguishing the civilized elite from a 
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hypocritical majority, Freud preserved the notion of the truly cultured in-
dividual who resists the desire to act brutally even during wartime.
At the end of Freud’s essay even such a minoritarian concept of cul-
tured progress emerges as untenable during wartime. Truly civilized men, 
Freud argued, have to perform a deliberate regression at times of war. 
They have to move voluntarily backward in their cultural development 
and join the vast majority of cultural hypocrites.
[War] compels us once more to be heroes who cannot believe in 
their own death; it stamps strangers as enemies, whose death is to 
be brought about or desired; it tells us to disregard the death of 
those we love. But war cannot be abolished [. . .]. The question then 
arises: Is it not we who should give in, who should adapt ourselves 
to war? Should we not confess that in our civilized attitude towards 
death we are once again living psychologically beyond our means 
and should we not rather turn back and recognize the truth? [. . .] 
This hardly seems an advance to higher achievement, but rather in 
some respects a backward step—a regression; but it has at least the 
advantage of taking the truth more into account, and of making life 
more tolerable for us once again. (299)
Seeking in 1933 an answer to Einstein’s open letter, Why War? Freud 
ended his letter to the physicist with a similar distinction between a ma-
jority of cultural hypocrites and a few truly civilized individuals. But 
Freud expressed also cautious hope that “the rest of mankind” might 
someday take the next steps in the civilizing process, reject war as a 
method of conflict resolution, and join pacifists like Einstein and Freud 
(Freud 1964, 215).
Freud’s wartime advice for a deliberate regression and his cautious 
postwar reliance on the eventually transformative power of the civilizing 
process are significantly more hopeful than his initial reaction to the First 
World War. In a letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé from November 1914, he 
claimed the war as evidence for his suspicion that mankind is “organi-
cally unfitted” for civilization (Freud and Andreas-Salomé 1972, 21). A 
species other than humans might reach someday a truly civilized stage. 
Humanity, however, would have to “abdicate” (21).10 Compared to this 
private prediction of mankind’s terminal collapse, Freud’s published war-
time essay expressed already a regained confidence in the civilizing pro-
cess. Freud’s wartime essay holds out the possibility that the “truly civilized 
man” might reappear after the war. During the first year of the war, Freud 
corrected his initial assessment of a complete and deserved collapse of 
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tradition and cultural progress and anticipated the possibility of further 
cultural advancements in postwar Europe. Immediately after the war, 
Freud foresaw no negative long-term effects for postwar societies. War 
neuroses would vanish with the war, and the cultural hypocrites would 
once more follow the norms of civilized society.11
In the aftermath of the war, Walter Benjamin noticed, however, pre-
cisely such negative long-term effects for postwar society. Benjamin’s ob-
servations focus not on the ideal of a truly civilized individual but on 
the seemingly widespread inability among veterans to talk about their 
war experiences. According to Benjamin, the returning soldiers failed to 
communicate the most fundamental experience of their generation. These 
veterans returned “not richer but poorer in communicable experience” 
(Benjamin 2002, 144). Benjamin draws wide-ranging and immensely in-
fluential conclusions from this observation (Jay 2005, 312–60). For him, 
and we will return to this in the fifth chapter more extensively, the impact 
of the veterans’ silence went far beyond the ranks of the war generation. 
Their silence denoted nothing less than the destruction of the founda-
tion of tradition. It indicated the fading faculty of communicating expe-
rience among contemporaries and across generations. The figure of the 
storyteller and the ability to tell stories threatened to vanish quickly into 
silence. The war experiences proved unfit for the time-honored forms of 
storytelling that were shaped by past expectations and traditional values. 
Previously, storytelling had been an integral part of the chain that linked 
generations. With this chain broken, the worlds before and after the war 
separated completely. Although this radical assessment of the death of 
experience and the collapse of tradition leads Benjamin to an apologia 
of a politics and aesthetics of destruction, he expressed—in unpublished 
drafts for his Storyteller essay—nonetheless the weak hope that the sto-
ryteller might return.
And just because “storytelling” seemed to occur among humans so 
constantly from eternity to eternity it is exceedingly endangered in 
these decades which vied so sharply and unrelentingly with eternal 
values. And the story [Erzählung] has to return, for now, into the 
abyss [Abgrund]. She is too empty of new wisdom and, above all, 
too full of old wisdom to be able to serve us. (Benjamin 1972–91, 
2:1284)
Benjamin considered the demise of communicable experience not yet as an 
irrecoverable historical fact. In his published essays he welcomed the break 
with the past and outlined the project for a new barbarism that would rid 
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itself proactively from all remnants of tradition. In his notes and drafts sur-
vives nonetheless the anticipation that the end of storytelling, and thus of 
tradition, might be a temporary and not a final phenomenon.
The expectation that Western societies would develop toward more 
humane interaction persevered even among the most careful and sym-
pathetic readers of Freud and Benjamin. After the rise of Stalinism and 
Nazism and during World War II, Adorno and Horkheimer singled out 
the persistence of old wisdom as an obstacle to their analysis of the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). Freeing themselves from received 
expectations of “normal” cultural development proved to be a major 
hindrance to the completion of their project. “What we had set out to 
do was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering 
a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism. We un-
derestimated the difficulty of dealing with the subject because we still 
placed too much trust in contemporary consciousness” (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 2002, xiv).12 Prepared, as readers of Freud and Benjamin, 
to reflect on the breakdown of cultural-historical continuity, they none-
theless experienced the difficulty of avoiding the preconceptions lodged 
in their own consciousness. Like Freud, they set out to free themselves 
from a self-deception that they recognized as caused by traditional ex-
pectations and cultural norms. The complete break with the past had 
not yet occurred since traditional modes of thinking continued to per-
vade even the thoughts of those who sought to analyze this “new kind 
of barbarism.”
Only a few years later—but after the end of the Second World War and 
in full awareness of the Holocaust, Hannah Arendt reaches an end point 
in these narratives of cultural breakdown. Arendt’s narrative differs from 
all previous ones by its lack of drama and its matter-of-fact style. Gone 
is Freud’s sense of disorientation or Benjamin’s surprised observation of 
postwar incommunicability and silence. Gone are the expectation of and 
the desire for a return to tradition. The break can neither be repaired 
during peacetime nor persist as a utopian project. Neither Freud’s sugges-
tion of stepping back voluntarily on the ladder of cultural advancement 
nor Benjamin’s anticipation of the storyteller’s return survived the rise of 
totalitarianism. In her Denktagebuch, Arendt registered in 1953 the col-
lapse of tradition almost as a nonevent, as an event that occurred without 
witnesses.
Break of tradition: properly, meaning in its Roman understanding, 
the interruption of succession (“successio”) of generations who re-
ceived from each other the tradition [das Überlieferte] and passed it 
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on, quasi holding each other by the hand throughout the millennia 
in chronological sequence. The break was foreshadowed by the gen-
erational disruption after the First World War, but not completed 
since the awareness of a break still presupposed the remembrance 
of tradition; thus rendering, in principle, the break reversible. The 
break occurred only after the Second World War when the break 
was not even perceived anymore. (Arendt 2002, 300)
Remnants of traditional thinking no longer pose a time-consuming hin-
drance to reflection. The assumption of such a complete break is at the 
core of Arendt’s political thought. Without the collapse of tradition, her 
famous notion of thinking without banisters would neither be possible 
nor necessary.13 Traditional thinking and storytelling have disappeared 
into the holes of oblivion, namely, the extermination camps created ac-
cording to the destructive logic of totalitarian systems. The unprecedented 
destruction of totalitarianism necessitates according to Arendt’s political 
theory a thinking that follows no precedence.
A few years later, however, Arendt dramatically changed her judgment 
on traditional storytelling. Between Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 
and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), Arendt moved from the Benjaminian 
assumption of the demise of traditional storytelling and returned the fig-
ure of the traditional storyteller to a crucial position in her reflections on 
tradition and storytelling in the age of totalitarian destruction. Like the 
accounts of her predecessors, Arendt’s version of the collapse of tradition 
is anything but a stable and coherent narrative. Moving from the declara-
tion of the most complete and irreversible break, she returns to a far more 
complex assessment of tradition and the communication of experience 
across generations.
Currently, the breakdown of tradition and, as its cause, the death of 
experience is either taken for granted or met with ridicule. In Infancy and 
History, Giorgio Agamben offers the most radical assertion of a disap-
pearance of experience, claiming that “the question of experience can be 
approached nowadays only with an acknowledgement that it is no longer 
accessible to us” (1993, 13). Terry Eagleton, on the other hand, mocks 
such alarmist reports.
Astonishingly, what is in peril on our planet is not only the environ-
ment, the victims of disease and political oppression, and those rash 
enough to resist corporate power, but experience itself. And this is a 
relatively new threat of extinction, one which would scarcely have 
been familiar to Chaucer or Samuel Johnson. (2007, 17)
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Cultural theorists and writers throughout the twentieth century warned 
that the collapse of tradition was an imminent threat, or that the break 
with the past was taking place at the time of their writing, or that the 
break had irreversibly occurred.14
Despite their initial plausibility, each of these narratives of cultural break-
down reveals qualifications, hesitancies, and revisions that invite contradic-
tory readings. In each successive account, the previous version is revised 
as a premature report on the collapse of cultural traditions. The moment 
of the breakdown becomes a moving target and remains chronologically 
indeterminable. While these images of a series of violent ruptures—the 
First World War, the political violence of the Weimar Republic, the Second 
World War, and the Holocaust—remain powerful, it is unclear how the 
events influenced and shaped the cultural imagination. The occurrence of 
mass-death events does not cause predictable or even similar responses in 
literature, art, or film. If one compares the developments in the represen-
tation of violence in German literary history with the sequence of these 
narratives of cultural breakdown, then it quickly becomes obvious that 
these two chronologies are out of sync. When compared to the modernist 
experimentation before and after the First World War, German literature 
after the Second World War and the Holocaust is rather conventional and 
traditional with only a few exceptions like Arno Schmidt or Peter Weiss. 
After the supposed final blow to tradition had been delivered, influential 
writers like Andersch, Borchert, Richter, or Böll were far more entrenched 
in tradition than Kafka, Döblin, Mann, Musil, or Brecht were before and 
after the First World War.15 German literature between 1945 and 1959 pro-
duced only a few examples of a writing without banisters.
In recent years historians of World War I violence have challenged 
the long dominant narrative of the breakdown of tradition, questioning 
each of the core assumptions on which theorists like Benjamin, Adorno, 
and Arendt based their arguments. These historians view the persistence 
of the breakdown narrative among theorists and literary scholars with 
growing frustration (Ziemann 2000, 52–53; Ziemann 2003; Schumann 
2004). Their research on the war experience finds insufficient evidence for 
the Fronterlebnis as a representative generational experience. Benjamin 
Ziemann notes that encounters with the industrial war machinery were 
far less frequent and central experiences for soldiers than previously as-
sumed. A considerable number of soldiers were never or only for a short 
time at the front. At the front, experiences of mass violence remained 
exceptional and rather infrequent (Ziemann 2000, 52–53).
Despite often repeated claims, the most common response to the expe-
rience of war violence was not the shattering of traditionally held values 
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that then was expected to lead to a general brutalization of the First World 
War generation. With his Timely Observations on War and Death (1915), 
Freud is among the first to propose this brutalization thesis. And reading 
Marianne Weber’s “The Special Cultural Mission of Women” (1919), one 
encounters the very real fear by women that a generation of brutalized 
men would return home to their families. As Weber writes, women await-
ed their sons and husbands toward the end of the war “with tremendous 
longing and secret fears” (Weber 1995, 197). This fear stemmed from the 
expectation that in wartime “the form-giving of civilization is nullified” 
and that “the experience and commission of unspeakable things have 
stamped the souls of our compatriots” (197). Weber’s fearful anticipation 
has been echoed loudly by historians like George Mosse (1990) and Eric 
Hobsbawm, who states in The Age of Extremes, “the First World War 
was a machine for brutalizing the world” (1995, 125).16
Recent historical studies on returning soldiers after the First World 
War dispute, however, that the war functioned as a brutalizing machine. 
They demonstrate instead, as Sace Elder summarizes, that “the demobi-
lization of soldiers and the transition to peacetime went rather smoothly 
and that the vast majority of veterans were not, in fact, given to violence” 
(2010, 23). For example, farmers in southern Bavaria constitute a social 
group that for a long time has been suspected of being the prime example 
of a continuously intensifying history of violence and brutalization. Their 
response to the war supposedly created a direct line from the total mo-
bilization of the First World War to the white terror against the leftist 
Munich Republic. A recent analysis of their postwar lives revised these 
assumptions dramatically:
Among Bavarian peasants the front experience, the experience of 
war’s destructive power, did not lead to brutalization nor did it 
cause a deep caesura in an individual’s personal history. The psy-
chological strain, which enacting and suffering physical violence 
brought with it, was taken care of through recourse to old, tradi-
tional patterns of interpretation, patterns which offered stability, 
such as Catholic piety, the farming family and agrarian subsistence. 
(Ziemann 2003, 84)
As the historian Dirk Schumann concludes, the thesis that a significant 
majority of German veterans developed a lasting disposition toward vio-
lent action because of their war experiences is not tenable (Schumann 
2004, 7–28).
The unprecedented forms of mass violence in World War I did not lead 
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in any direct way to the disintegration of cultural norms, institutions, 
and social relations among the participants of the war, their families, and 
their communities.17 Instead of substantiating the notion of clearly dis-
tinct experiential boundaries between the soldiers’ lives at the front and 
civilian life at home, these soldiers felt far more connected with their lives 
at home than their fellow soldiers (Schumann 2004, 19). Under dispute is 
the central importance of the Fronterlebnis, the immediate experience of 
the new forms of man-made mass violence, as an experience that shaped 
a collective identity of the war generation. Rather than leaving a direct 
and deep imprint on postwar society, the social and political significance 
of the front experience results from its discursive construction after the 
fact in postwar Germany.
It cannot be disputed that the war experience has been represented 
continuously on the most different levels of public communication 
in Weimar as a deep caesura. However, it was not a caesura in the 
history of experience [erfahrungsgeschichtliche Zäsur]. Instead, it 
points to the ability of the “front experience” to serve varied po-
litical and cultural discourses of postwar society as a generator of 
meaning and argumentative point of reference. (Ziemann 2000, 
80–81)
The majority of war veterans continued to find stability in traditional pat-
terns of interpretation in postwar society.
Nonetheless, for a minority of young male war veterans, many of 
whom would continue to fight in the paramilitary Freikorps after 1918, 
the war remained a defining experience. But this group had no difficulty 
communicating its version of the war experiences to a second generation 
of young males, “disproportionately students, cadets, athletes, and young 
working class roughnecks,” as the sociologist Michael Mann writes. 
“Without these young military veterans transmitting wartime values of 
comradeship, hierarchy, and violence into a peacetime political move-
ment,” fascism would not have become a mass movement (2004, 259). 
The success of the German and Austrian fascist movements depended on 
their socialization of the first postwar generation. Without this younger 
generation, a generation too young to have participated in the First World 
War, the National Socialist movement would not have come to power. 
The next events of German mass violence would be planned and exe-
cuted primarily by those who did not participate in the First World War. 
Few participants of the Wannsee Conference and not one member of the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) were veterans of the previous war. 
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They were born in the first decade of the twentieth century and there-
fore not old enough to serve during the First World War (Mann 2005, 
244–48). Freudian assumptions of brutalization and primitive regression 
carry little explanatory power for the historical rise of fascist movements. 
As Michael Mann concludes:
In all my case studies the perpetrators formed social movements 
with their own institutions, ideologies, and socialization process. 
Perpetrators were not autonomous individuals liberated from 
their superegos. When hatred and violence erupted, they were not 
so much freed from traditional socialization pressures as encour-
aged by new ones. Primitive theories are not very helpful. (Mann 
2005, 18)
The narrative of a breakdown and collapse of tradition and social insti-
tutions presents an overly simplifying grand narrative that obscures the 
complex ways in which modern events of man-made mass death impact-
ed cultural traditions, patterns of interpretations, and modes of repre-
sentation. Rather than a single break, or an Urkatastrophe that connects 
cause and effect, one has to follow processes of escalation and persistence 
that require dynamic models and multifactor explanations. While histo-
rians and sociologists invite us to find a more complex understanding of 
the role of twentieth-century violence in politics and culture, they join 
other disciplines’ frustration in trying to produce a workable concept of 
violence.
What is violence? If we return for a moment to the catalog of literary 
representations of violence at the beginning of this chapter, one recog-
nizes the immense heterogeneity of the phenomena linked to the word 
“violence”: natural disasters, torture, rape, murder, genocide, war—a 
wide variety of extremely different deeds and events are called violent. 
How can one define, let alone theorize, “violence” if such disparate and 
heterogeneous acts are subsumed under one concept? This challenge to 
a rethinking of violence is so demanding that most theories addressing 
violence prefer to absorb concrete occurrences of physical violence into 
general theories of modernity (from Elias to Bauman), of trauma (from 
Freud to Carruth), or of sacrifice (from Bataille to Girard). Each of these 
theories provides important insights for different contexts, and I employ 
them in the analysis of the literary texts whenever useful. While these 
theories approach violence from a wide variety of perspectives, they 
rarely dwell on concrete acts of physical violence. They offer either large-
20 Chapter 1
scale narratives of the disappearance or persistence of violent behavior in 
modernity (Elias versus Bauman), or they dwell on particular effects of 
the experience of violence among victims and, more rarely, perpetrators 
(Freud, Carruth), or they propose different sacrificial logics of certain acts 
of communal violence (Bataille, Girard). Slavoj Žižek’s recent study Vio-
lence (2008) serves as a rather typical example of the prevalent disinclina-
tion to look directly at physical violence. Like most theorists of violence, 
Žižek considers the causes of violence more interesting than the act of 
violence itself and expects to find them below the surface of observable 
phenomena (Žižek 2008, 8). Concrete acts of violence, which he calls 
subjective violence, serve only as spectacular distractions for more impor-
tant but invisible forms of objective violence. Žižek’s definition of subjec-
tive violence reaches far beyond seemingly random acts of daily violence 
and far beyond the level of the single subject. His notion of subjective vio-
lence encompasses all forms of physical violence, from beatings, rape, and 
murder all the way to the Stalinist purges and the Holocaust. “Subjective 
violence,” Žižek writes, is enacted “by social agents, evil individuals, dis-
ciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds” (Žižek 2008, 11). No 
matter how catastrophic the scale of such acts might be, Žižek perceives 
them as distractions from the more fundamental forms of objective vio-
lence. Instead of succumbing to the fascination with openly violent acts 
and events, Žižek wants to refocus our attention on the violence inherent 
in the capitalist system, especially the “more subtle forms of coercion that 
sustain relations of domination and exploitation” (9). Žižek’s concept of 
violence grows even more diffuse when he adds symbolic violence to the 
aspects of his theory of violence that deserve more attention than any 
instance of physical violence. Symbolic violence includes the ideological 
use of speech—from hate speech to the way habitual use of language 
reproduces social domination—but it encompasses as well “a more fun-
damental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its 
imposition of a certain universe of meaning” (2). Physical violence finds 
its place in Žižek’s study mostly in his threats against those who fail to 
share his approach (39).
Since this study analyzes modernist explorations of the limits of imag-
ination and representation vis-à-vis the phenomenon of violence, I am 
interested foremost in exploring theoretical approaches that do address 
violent phenomena as directly as possible. After confronting some of 
the obstacles in theorizing violence, this search will lead first to Arendt’s 
reflections on violence and then to some of the most recent, antireduc-
tionist approaches in violence research, especially the work of Heinrich 
Popitz.
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Definitions and theories of violence are in high demand but surpris-
ingly short supply. In philosophy, history, sociology, political science, and 
critical theory, one encounters the same dilemma: the rising interest in 
violent phenomena is accompanied by the complaint that no clear defi-
nitions of the concept of violence are agreed upon.18 Despite attempts by 
authors as different as Arendt, Bauman, Canetti, Elias, Foucault, Girard, 
or Popitz, an “undertheorization” of violence persists when compared 
to its impact in structuring the social reality and shaping the collective 
memory of most nations and societies during the past century (Hüppauf 
1997, 2). Comments on the dearth of theories of violence echo through-
out the twentieth century. In 1970, Arendt wrote “what Sorel remarked 
sixty years ago, ‘The problems of violence still remain very obscure,’ is as 
true today as it was then” (Arendt 1972, 134). Almost thirty years later, 
the sociologist Trutz von Trotha renewed Arendt’s basic assessment in 
his survey of theories of violence for the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie 
und Sozialpsychologie (Trotha 1997, 9). The current edition of the Inter-
national Handbook of Violence Research (Heitmeyer and Hagen 2003) 
arrives at the same conclusion: “Violence is one of the most elusive and 
most difficult concepts in the social sciences” (Imbusch 2003, 13). As 
Peter Imbusch observes in the Handbook, the central questions “concern-
ing an appropriate definition, substantive differentiation, sociopolitical 
assessment, and moral evaluation of violence” remain “unresolved” (13).
If one had hoped to identify a widely accepted concept of violence, one 
might as well abandon the engagement with theories of violence. This la-
cuna demands a different approach and offers an opportunity to bring 
into focus the challenges and possibilities that violent phenomena pose for 
theoretical reflection and literary representation. Rather than searching for 
a unified theory of violence, I discuss in this section the changes in the ap-
proach to violence from more traditional theories of violence that are, as I 
argue, inadequate theories of the disappearance of violence, to theories that 
approach acts of physical violence directly and concretely. To examine how 
political theorists and sociologists approach violence means to confront the 
limits of the representation of violence. The most significant shift in recent 
violence research is a move away from the traditional search for the causes 
of violence to the detailed description and analysis of concrete acts of vio-
lence and their social context. Such violence research encounters the chal-
lenge of how to represent acts of physical violence and destruction without 
succumbing to an aesthetization of violence.
To use Habermas’s term, theories of violence have long been plagued by 
the premise that violence is the problem that the project of modernity will 
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solve. Modernity is expected to bring an end to the use of violence as a 
means of conflict resolution. Such a premise transforms these theories of 
violence into theories of a disappearing phenomenon. Indeed, the most 
popular and powerful narrative regarding the relationship of violence 
and modernity follows what Franco Moretti calls the “rhetoric of inno-
cence” (1996, 22). To approach physical violence as a means to solve 
conflicts has been designated as an indication of modernity’s other. The 
rhetoric of innocence regards violence always as being forced upon the 
modern social order, be it by a barbaric outside or by an atavistic inside. 
In either case, violence is not considered as an integral part of modernity. 
The use of violence by modern societies is justified as a means to abolish 
once and for all the use of physical violence by anyone else (Lindenberger 
and Lüdtke 1995, 17). Because of this exclusionary narrative of violence 
and modernity, modernity can continue, as Bernd Hüppauf argues, to 
sustain its self-image as a principally nonviolent project, “Banishing vio-
lence to a contained sphere separated from one’s own is a prerequisite for 
maintaining the cherished image of modernity engaged in redeeming the 
pledge of its own origin” (Hüppauf 1997, 3).
The promise of modernity as the ultimate stage of the civilizing pro-
cess lies in the expectation of a continual advance in the elimination of 
violence as a means to resolve private, social, national, and, finally, inter-
national conflicts. Such theories of modernity isolate physical violence 
as a relic, excess, and exception but not as an integral part of modernity. 
Modernity is supposed to move toward ever more rationally organized, 
nonviolent democratic societies. The increasingly closely woven web of 
social interaction leads individuals to ever more effective forms of self-
discipline and affect control. As Norbert Elias, the most influential propo-
nent of such a theory of modernity, proposes, the wars of the past should 
be understood as necessary steps toward the institutionalization of ever 
larger monopolies of force that curtail the use of physical violence in 
modern societies. In the conclusion to his magnum opus, The Civilizing 
Process (1939), Elias argued that the wars of the past should be under-
stood as steps toward global peace: “wars between smaller units have 
been, in the course of history up to now, inevitable stages and instruments 
in the pacification of larger ones” (2000, 445). Extending these projected 
lines of necessity and inevitability from the past into the future, Elias pre-
dicts in 1939 that modernity will soon reach the stage of nonviolent and 
peaceful globalization:
One can see the first outlines of a worldwide system of tensions 
composed by alliances and supra-state units of various kinds, the 
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prelude of struggles embracing the whole globe, which are the 
precondition for a worldwide monopoly of physical force, for a 
single central political institution and thus for the pacification of 
the earth. (445–46)
In Elias’s view, the internal logic of modern violence leads to its self-
abolition, becoming yet another instance of Hegel’s ruse of history. Still-
occurring acts of violence in modern societies are tagged as atavistic 
throwbacks, bursting bubbles on the surface, mere events that hold little 
significance for the civilizing process in general.19 One might consider the 
date of publication of Elias’s The Civilizing Process as deeply ironic. But 
as a look into the work of one of Elias’s most recent disciples indicates, 
not even the Second World War, including the Holocaust and Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, is accepted as evidence to the contrary for such a long-
term view of human history. As Steven Pinker suggests in The Better An-
gels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined (2011), statistically the 
death toll of war and genocide during the twentieth century is nothing 
more than “an isolated peak in a declining sawtooth—the last gasp in 
a long slide of major war into historical obsolescence” (192). Zygmunt 
Bauman has argued that such accounts of the civilizing process are only 
more recent and influential proposals that follow the lead of Marx, We-
ber, and Freud. They consider the modern state as a “‘gardening’ state,” a 
state increasingly capable of weeding out the violence of daily life (Bau-
man 2001, 13). Such theories of modernity perceive war, violence, and 
genocide as momentary failures, indicating that the civilizing process has 
not yet reached its ultimate goal. But the continuing progress in the civi-
lizing process will prevent further “hiccups of barbarism” (13). Seen from 
such dominant perspective, Arendt’s statement that “violence has been 
singled out so seldom for special consideration” should have long lost any 
inflection of surprise (Arendt 1972, 110).
Elias’s narrative exhibits a close family resemblance to the evolu-
tionary models of progress proposed by the founders of modern soci-
ology, Comte, Durkheim, and Spencer (Haselbach 1996, 331–51). To 
them, physical violence was a secondary phenomenon since industrial 
society’s tendency toward decentralization, differentiation, and reliance 
on contractual relations had to lead to the disappearance of violence as 
an instrument for conflict resolution.20 To make such a narrative of soci-
etal progress plausible, the origin of social organization is conceived as 
emerging from an extremely violent state of nature, while the present is 
portrayed as increasingly nonviolent, and the future anticipated as peace-
ful. Pinker’s recent study follows this paradigm precisely with its “lurid 
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accounts of violence from medieval and early modern times, sometimes 
bordering on a sort of pornography,” as Jeremy Waldron observes (Wal-
dron 2012). Be it the story of the murder of the father or the premise that 
in the state of nature man is a wolf to men, garish violence is associated 
with the origin of social order. In mythical narratives, as told by writers 
from Hobbes to Freud and Locke to Elias and Pinker, the social order is 
founded to prevent the recurrence of such primary violence. It makes no 
difference, as Heinrich Popitz pointed out, whether the origin of the so-
cial order is imagined as a community of potential victims seeking shelter 
and protection from violence (Hobbes) or whether it is imagined as a 
group of brothers who promise each other after the murder and commu-
nal consumption of their father never to do to each other what they just 
did to their father (Freud). Both theories share the same conception: “the 
birth of the idea of order from the experience of violence” (Popitz 1992, 
62). They propose a linear notion of historical progress that equates cul-
tural development with the increasing control and eventual elimination 
of violence.
Although in a very different mode and terminology, system theory—to 
switch to another influential sociogenetic account—tells a similar story 
about the soon to be expected disappearance of violence in modernity. 
Positing violence at the origin of social systems, system theory under-
stands the past violence as crucial for cultural developments but con-
cludes that in today’s society violence has lost its important but risky 
function for the autopoetic process of system differentiation.21 Perceiving 
the role of culture in the social order as an alarm system, Dirk Baecker 
assumes that “it is the function of culture to represent the improbability, 
the threatenedness, the precariousness, the uncertainty of a social order in 
such a way that the measures for safeguarding culture become probable 
and legitimate” (Baecker 2000, 37). Culture thematizes the promises of 
and threats to social order. Whenever culture failed to fulfill this function, 
the social order would thematize itself and would apply, to use system 
theory’s sober terminology, an extremely unattractive form of communi-
cation between the various system levels, namely, violence (38). To secure 
the integration of all three system levels that system theory differentiates 
(body, consciousness, and communication), violence is considered to have 
“the unbeatable advantage that violence fascinates and binds all three 
system-levels equally” (39). Violence’s aptitude for connecting these levels 
loses its attraction when it can be substituted with less dangerous and 
more attractive modes of communication. The connection between cul-
ture and violence dissolves; violence loses its cultural relevance. Should 
one system get caught up in violence, other systems are now ready to 
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safeguard society’s autopoiesis (42). As in Elias’s theory of the civilizing 
process, system theory casts the history of violence as a narrative of self-
obliteration.
Elias’s theory of the civilizing process corresponded in the 1960s and 
1970s to the positive experiences of democratization, social welfare, and 
the domestication of violence in (West) Germany. The wide reception of 
Elias’s ideas reinforced the exclusionary narrative of modernity and vio-
lence that considers violence as a fundamentally premodern phenomenon 
(Imbusch 2005, 450). These theories are driven by the hope that finding 
and exposing the origins and causes of violent interaction will allow mo-
dernity to rid itself of violence. Arendt’s critique of previous theories of 
violence engages precisely this point. Rather than hoping that the iden-
tification of the causes of violence would lead to the discovery of a cure 
for the use of violence in modernity, Arendt analyzes violence strictly as a 
means to an end. In contrast to traditional approaches, Arendt does not 
adhere to the grand narrative of violence disappearing in the course of 
modern history (and she avoids as well the opposite narrative according 
to which all lines of modernity lead to Auschwitz). To extrapolate future 
developments from past and current political trends produces often seem-
ingly plausible predictions but distorts, according to Arendt, how politics 
works. If one searches for the laws of history to make long-term predic-
tions, Arendt argues, then one has to ignore the unpredictable impact of 
violent acts in politics.
Just as Arendt faults exclusionary theories of modernity for avoid-
ing the phenomenon of violence, she criticizes opposing theories of war 
and violence, among them Clausewitz’s idea of war as a continuation 
of politics and Engels’s understanding of violence as an accelerator of 
economic development, for assuming a predictable postviolence con-
tinuity in political and economic processes. She questions the premise 
that social, political, and economical processes remain determined by 
the same circumstances that preceded the implementation of violence. 
Such exclusionary theories achieve “their inner consistency” and their 
“hypnotic effect” only because they close the eyes to the possibility of 
disruption by their own use of violence (Arendt 1972, 110). Arendt 
disputes the premise of these theories and argues that the use of vio-
lence alters future developments in unforeseen ways. “Predictions of 
the future are never anything but projections of present automatic pro-
cesses and procedures, that is, of occurrences that are likely to come 
to pass if men do not act and if nothing unexpected happens; every 
action, for better or worse, and every accident necessarily destroys the 
whole pattern in whose frame the prediction moves and where it finds 
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its evidence” (109). Theorizing politics as an open-ended process, Ar-
endt focuses on the inherent possibility of unintended consequences 
when violence is employed in social and political affairs. She does not 
dismiss violent events as negligible disturbances in the steady advance 
of historical progress. Instead, Arendt understands violent action as the 
prime example of the potential unpredictability of all political action.
By reflecting on the significance of the unintended consequences of vio-
lent action, Arendt’s political theory marks a turning point in violence 
research. In contrast to her fully developed concepts of political action 
and power, however, she has surprisingly little to say about acts of vio-
lence themselves. She defines violence solely by its instrumental char-
acter: “Violence, being instrumental by nature, is rational to the extent 
that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it” (176). Unlike 
peace or power, violence cannot be understood as a political end, as a 
goal that stands on its own. No violent act ever has the legitimacy of 
a political end; it always requires the justification of being a means to 
an (political) end. As such a means, however, violence poses the risk of 
exceeding the limits of its instrumental purpose and of triggering unin-
tended consequences. Every political action harbors elements of unpre-
dictability since political action knows of no self-contained objects, like 
a table, that exist independently for themselves after their fabrication. 
Consequently, the logic of the political process never fits the narrow 
horizon of a means-end relation. Violent acts are never completely ab-
sorbed by their ends but influence their sociopolitical circumstances. 
While any action initiates unforeseen consequences, acts of violence are 
uniquely risky:
The danger of violence, even if it moves consciously within a non-
extremist framework of short-term goals, will always be that the 
means overwhelm the end. If goals are not achieved rapidly, the 
result will be not merely defeat but the introduction of the practice 
of violence into the whole body politic. (177)
While Arendt perceives violence strictly as a political instrument, she con-
cludes that the effects of the violent act will always be in excess of its in-
tended purpose. Rather than following a linear and predictable sequence 
of cause and effect, violent acts always risk missing their objective by 
destroying their own end. In the nuclear age, as Arendt notes, the use of 
violence during global conflicts threatens to destroy all ends.
Her approach to violence as an unreliable means to an end led Arendt 
to two central insights: any instrumental use of violence produces results 
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in excess of its purpose, and violent action sets off self-dynamic processes 
that follow their own dynamics that might undermine, overwhelm, or 
undo the intended ends. Beyond these two important points, Arendt’s po-
litical theory remains largely silent on the topic of violence. In On Revo-
lution (1963), Arendt explains this silence succinctly. Politics is defined by 
speech, and violence defies speech. In reference to concentration camps, 
places where “violence rules absolutely,” Arendt writes:
Where violence rules absolutely [. . .] everything and everybody 
must fall silent. It is because of this silence that violence is a mar-
ginal phenomenon in the political realm; for man, to the extent 
that he is a political being, is endowed with the power of speech. 
[. . .] The point here is that violence is incapable of speech, and not 
merely that speech is helpless when confronted with violence. Be-
cause of this speechlessness political theory has little to say about 
the phenomenon of violence and must leave its discussion to the 
technicians. (9)
Arendt’s notion of violence as incapable of speech recalls classic charac-
terizations of violence, from Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound in which the 
stage character named Violence never utters a word to Karl Kraus’s fa-
mous poem on Hitler’s rise to power, “The word passed away [entschlief] 
when that world awoke” (Kraus 1978, vol. 10, no. 888, 1). Consequently, 
most of Arendt’s essay On Violence is dedicated to power, not violence.
To overcome such speechlessness of violence, recent research has 
attempted to let violence speak by approaching acts of violence more 
directly. Based on the works of Max Weber and Elias Canetti, the soci-
ologist Heinrich Popitz laid the conceptual groundwork for the so-called 
innovators of violence research (Imbusch 2004). Such innovators include 
Wolfgang Sofsky, Trutz von Trotha, and researchers collaborating with 
the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung.22 Like Arendt and in contrast 
to Žižek, Popitz defined violence first and foremost as physical violence 
to avoid the creation of a dematerialized, structural notion of violence, a 
notion always at risk of losing conceptual precision (Nedelmann 1997, 
61–62). Unlike Arendt who strictly separated violence from her theory 
of power, Popitz links his definition of violence directly to his theory of 
power.
Violence is defined as an act of power that leads to the intended 
bodily harm of others, no matter whether the purpose of this act is 
contained in itself (as mere actionable power) or, used as a threat, it 
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is intended to establish a permanent submission (as binding action-
able power). (1992, 48)
Popitz’s definition of violence distinguishes three purposes for violent ac-
tion: violence as (1) an end in itself (bloße Aktionsmacht), (2) as a means 
to an end, and (3) as establishing and preserving power relations (bin-
dende Aktionsmacht) (Trotha 2000, 31–32).
The assertion that violent action can be an end in itself stands at the 
core of Popitz’s antireductionist theory of violence and power. It marks 
the radical turn from mainstream violence research and seeks to overcome 
the traditional silence on violence by observing acts of violence closely. 
Popitz insists against Arendt that acts of violence might have no purpose 
outside the act itself. This observation marks, as von Trotha points out, 
the explicit rejection of theoretical and methodological reductionism in 
violence research (Trotha 2000, 28–29). No cause, no motive, no hostile 
act, no risky situation leads necessarily to violence. Consequently, the suc-
cess of theories seeking to explain aggression and violence will always be 
limited by their search for insufficient and nonnecessary causes.
While Popitz provides a narrow definition of violence, always related 
to the (threat of) hurting of the human body, he defines the possibility of 
violent action by its ubiquity.
Humans never have to but always are capable of acting violently; 
they never have to but always can kill—alone or collectively—to-
gether or collaboratively—in every situation, in battle or while cel-
ebrating—in different moods, in anger, without anger, with lust, 
without lust, screaming or mutely (in dead silence)—for all imagin-
able purposes—everyone. (1992, 50)
Anyone might act violently against anyone, anywhere, anytime, under 
any circumstances. The claim of every situation’s potential openness to 
acts of violence should not be mistaken for paranoia. But acts of violence 
cannot be limited to their assumed instrumental character or be traced 
back to necessary and predictable causes. This is Popitz’s first anthropo-
logical foundation of the delimitation of human violence. Rather than 
looking for causal models that explain the occurrence of violence and 
foster the expectation of an eventual abolition of violence in modernity, 
Popitz’s approach asks for close observations and descriptions of acts of 
violence and their self-dynamic processes.23
Popitz’s second anthropological foundation of the delimitation of 
violence refers to our limitless ability to imagine acts of violence at 
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any moment. Since this imagined violence is not bound by reality, it 
tends to be rather successful. The fact that “representational violence 
can imagine everything” could either diminish or heighten the risk of 
actual violence (51). Imagined violence could compensate for actual 
violence, but especially if it is combined with human technological in-
telligence, it can lead to ever more innovative and effective technologies 
of destruction. The twofold delimitation of violence, one of will and one 
of imagination, opens up boundless potential for violent interaction. 
With its detailed representation of physical violence and its focus on 
the self-dynamic processes of violent situations, Popitz’s theory of vio-
lence promises to be a particularly productive theory for the analysis of 
literary representations of violence, equally productive as it has become 
already in historical research on violence.24 But how does it change liv-
ing in modernity once the expectation is gone that violence will decline 
and disappear from social and political interaction? And how would it 
change our concept of the self if every situation might but never has to 
reveal its violent potential? The analysis of Musil’s reflections on vio-
lence and the malleable self in chapters 2 and 3 of this study especially 
benefit from Popitz’s antireductionist examination of violence. As I ar-
gue, Musil interrogates the limits of any causal approach to violence 
with a thoroughness and sophistication that might not have an equal in 
sociological theories of violence.
For the moment, however, let me summarize major difficulties that vio-
lence poses to theorization and analysis. The first difficulty is to acknowl-
edge acts of violence as relevant phenomena in modernity. Once this ob-
stacle that metanarratives of modernity have put into place is removed, a 
second problem arises. How to speak about violence without reducing it 
to a search for its preventable causes thus reviving once more modernity’s 
self-image as the other of violence? How to disprove the assertions that 
violence defies speech and noncausal analysis? Even if one finds a way of 
letting violence speak by closely describing the dynamics of violent situa-
tions, how can one address the problem of the heterogeneity of violent 
phenomena? Even though Popitz’s antireductionist approach to violence 
offers an intriguing starting point for a new understanding of violent in-
teraction, it should be clear that instances of physical violence are rarely 
easily decoded phenomena.
These intrinsic difficulties in approaching and understanding acts of 
violence make it all the more surprising that in discussions of German 
modernism, violence serves as a criterion to distinguish clearly between 
its various proponents. Indeed, the inherently heterogeneous and bound-
less phenomena of violence provide in debates on German modernism 
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an unexpected sense of stability. But this apparent stability comes at the 
price of oversimplified and pacified accounts of modernism.
In the last twenty-five years, numerous attempts have been made to 
broaden our understanding of German modernism. Even a theorist as 
closely aligned to Adorno’s aesthetics as Peter Bürger began his survey 
of the Prosa der Moderne (1988) from the premise that Adorno defined 
the modernist canon too narrowly. Any expansion of a canon requires, 
however, new definitions. Currently accepted understandings of modern-
ism were developed in the decades after World War II and have been fre-
quently revised and reworked by scholars like Schorske, Willett, and Gay 
as well as Lethen, Anz, and Bürger. Once one looks at these attempts to 
reconceptualize modernism from the perspective of who is included or ex-
cluded from the label “modernism,” one notices one of the debate’s unac-
knowledged but decisive trench lines. Peter Bürger, for example, expands 
Adorno’s canon—which is closely focused on Kafka and Beckett—with 
essays on Rimbaud, Lautreáment, Artaud, Faulkner, Musil, and Johnson 
(Bürger 1988). Just as important is the list of the authors that Bürger ig-
nores. No such survey could be comprehensive, but when Pound, Lewis, 
Céline, d’Annunzio, Marinetti, Jünger, and Benn are absent, one has to 
assume that Bürger made a systematic decision not to include fascist and 
proto-fascist writers.
Modernity and the Text (1989), a groundbreaking collection of essays 
edited by Andreas Huyssen and David Bathrick, moves even farther away 
from postwar versions of modernism. Recontextualize, rehistoricize, repo-
liticize: this was the program of Huyssen and Bathrick’s attempt to “ex-
plode” previous models of a homogenous modernism, “be they Lukácsian, 
new critical, Adornean, Derridean, or de Manean” (Bathrick and Huyssen 
1989, 4). As the essays in the volume indicate, the heterogeneity of the 
German and Austrian modernists resists any desire to squeeze them into a 
single modernist mold. Peter Uwe Hohendahl discusses Benn’s early prose, 
and Russell Berman delineates Ernst Jünger’s fascist modernism. As his ter-
minology indicates, Berman is far from praising Jünger as a great modern-
ist, as has become popular recently (Berman 1989, 60–80). Nonetheless, 
Berman reads Jünger as a prototypical fascist modernist and interprets his 
writings as a modernist response to the experience of modernity.25
This expansion of the modernist canon broadened our knowledge of 
the heterogeneity of German modernism, but its groupings obscure the 
complexity of modernist experiments with representing violence. In any 
account that separates fascist modernism and the militant avant-garde 
from other forms of modernism, the question of where to place the pro- 
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and the antiviolence tendencies hardly arises. The answer seems so ob-
vious. Especially the mere existence of the otherwise justified model of 
fascist modernism provokes oversimplifications when it comes to deter-
mining the relationship between modernism and violence. It filters out 
the representational complexity and analytical acuity that continue to 
emanate from those modernist writings that can be aligned with neither 
the militant avant-garde nor fascist modernism.26 Speaking of the impact 
of the First World War, Modris Eksteins, author of Rites of Spring, has 
little doubt that “people like Marinetti, d’Annunzio, Salomon, and espe-
cially Ernst Jünger, would aestheticize this experience of violent erup-
tion” (Eksteins 2000, 342). On the other side, he places Eliot, Kafka, 
and Chaplin as descriptors of decay, despair, and victimized antiheroes 
(343). Eksteins constructs a deep division between the aesthetes of war, 
violence, and fascism and the supposed high priests of modernism who 
feel no attraction to violence but do represent the suffering and anxi-
ety of their nonaggressive antiheroes. Fascist modernists glorify violence; 
proper modernists give voice to victims who are caught up, like Chaplin’s 
character in Modern Times (1936), in destructive machinery of industri-
alization and abstract law.
More instructive for the purpose of clarifying the fallacy of such binary 
thinking is Huyssen’s seminal study Twilight Memories (1995). Huyssen’s 
masterful analyses of the works of Rilke and Jünger as two opposing 
responses to the experience of modernity form the modernist center of 
his study. These two chapters set out to demonstrate what modernism 
is and what should no longer be considered modernist writing. Huys-
sen’s distinguishing criterion is again the representation of violence. In 
the introduction to Modernity and the Text, which also contained Huys-
sen’s essay on Rilke, Bathrick and Huyssen endorsed Berman’s reading of 
Jünger as a modernist. In Twilight Memories Huyssen still praises Ber-
man’s essay as a “brilliant tour de force” but adds a rather important 
caveat: Berman failed to demonstrate persuasively that Jünger’s writings 
should be considered as modernist literature (Huyssen 1995, 272). The 
specter of Jünger haunts Twilight Memories. The “reinvention of Ger-
man literature” in German debates after the unification has, as Huyssen 
rightly observes, “so far mainly catapulted the centenarian proto-fascist 
Ernst Jünger into the limelight” (92). The need to reclassify Jünger’s oeu-
vre arises yet again not simply because the political and cultural climate 
after 1989 changed so dramatically to transform Jünger’s image from 
a (fascist) modernist outsider to a towering figure of twentieth-century 
European literature. More important, the new approaches to modernist 
literature brought certain features to the fore that threaten to bring mod-
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ernist writings by authors like Rilke and Kafka too close for comfort to 
those by Jünger, Salomon, or Bronnen.
In his essays on Rilke and Jünger, Huyssen discovers that celebrat-
ing the heterogeneity of modernist writings threatens to blur distinctions 
in a manner no longer welcome. Explorations into the heterogeneity of 
modernism threaten to highlight fascist characteristics in modernist writ-
ings, the moment one analyzes their representations of violence. Huyssen 
responds to this risk by reemphasizing the distinctions between fascist 
and nonfascist writings. In view of the recent Jünger renaissance, this 
insistence on clear distinctions might be a useful exercise but not if such a 
search for distinctions leads to untenable oversimplifications of modern-
ist responses to the central experience of modernity, to the experience of 
violence.
As for earlier generations of scholars, Rilke embodies for Huyssen the 
“essence of high modernism” (1989, 106). But with his essay on Rilke 
Huyssen intends to change the meaning of this statement. He attempts 
to replace a Rilke who represents “a modernism of disembodied sub-
jectivity, metaphysical negativity, and textual closure” with a Rilke of 
the fragmented body, suggesting connections “between aspects of early 
childhood experience and the disrupting, fragmenting experience of the 
modern city” (106, 108). Huyssen’s psychoanalytically adjusted focus on 
the fragmented body exposes disquieting features in Rilke’s writings that 
could have unsettling consequences for our understanding of modern-
ism. It is part and parcel of the essay’s brilliance that Huyssen makes this 
discomfort explicit. Rilke’s Malte Laurids Brigge, whom Huyssen views 
as Rilke’s alter ego and as a paragon of the modernist response to the 
experience of modernity, bears a resemblance to another archetype of the 
twentieth century: “one is at first reluctant to admit it,” Huyssen writes, 
but “Malte shares quite a number of traits with the ‘fascist male’ as ana-
lyzed by Theweleit” (124). After quickly enumerating the shared traits in 
six lines (paranoia and delusions of omnipotence, the idealization of the 
mother figure, an incapacity for relationships, a fear of being flooded, dis-
articulated, engulfed, and reduced to nothingness), Huyssen calls his own 
analysis to order and invalidates its observations: “we must immediately 
backtrack” (124).
Huyssen’s argumentative U-turn becomes necessary because Malte 
Laurids Brigge, and therefore Rainer Maria Rilke, and therefore German-
Austrian modernism, are supposed to lack the one crucial feature that 
the fascist male and a member of the militant avant-garde share: acts of 
violence hold no promise to him; he does not seek violence to find authen-
ticity, truth, or the destruction of the alienated world; he does not fight 
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for a revolutionary reorganization of society; he does not seek to blast 
the continuum of history apart. According to Huyssen’s readjusted read-
ing, Brigge remains “non-aggressive” under all circumstances—“Malte 
actually identifies with the feminine,” and even his dreams of violence 
threaten no one but himself: “his violent fantasies are invariably and mas-
ochistically directed against himself only” (1995, 124). Despite striking 
similarities to Theweleit’s fascist male, the protagonist of Rilke’s exem-
plary modernist text is being relocated onto the safe ground of nonag-
gression. Auto-aggressive fantasies can still be acceptable for the essence 
of high modernism; violent fantasies and actions against others are not.
Fascist males, on the other hand, cannot bear to conceive the body as 
fragmented and develop “an image of the male body as armored terror 
machine” (124). They direct their violent fantasies toward the other, and 
Jünger becomes in Huyssen’s account the prototypical fascist male (and 
nonmodernist), as the essay’s title in Twilight Memories indicates: “Forti-
fying the Heart—Totally: Ernst Jünger’s Armored Texts.”
At the risk of being repetitive: the goal of this study is not to locate 
fascist characteristics in “proper” modernist texts and authors or to claim 
that Jünger’s literary oeuvre achieves a similar aesthetic complexity and 
quality as the writings of Rilke, Kafka, Musil, Canetti, Döblin, Mann, or 
Jahnn.27 The claim is a larger one: the opposition between high modern-
ism on the side of nonaggression and fascist modernism and the militant 
avant-garde on the side of destruction reduces central modernist responses 
to violence to the status of auto-aggressive explorations of fragmenta-
tion and suffering. From this perspective it remains of little consequence 
whether one considers Jünger’s writings as modernist, although fascist, as 
Berman does, or refuses to include him in the modernist canon, as Huys-
sen, Bürger, Eksteins, and many other influential literary scholars pro-
pose. The actual analytical damage is done by an unintended consequence 
of these debates on fascist modernism: its production and dissemination 
of a pacified notion of “proper” modernism, one that obscures from view 
the active and aggressive exploration of violence by authors like Musil, 
Kafka, or Canetti.
The problems accumulate if one follows Huyssen’s argument to the 
point where he defines the fascist qualities of a fascist modernism through 
a particular stance toward war, death, and violence. His definition is com-
plicated by the circumstance that neither Jünger nor Benn fantasized like 
Céline about biological notions like “pure blood” and an “Aryan” nation, 
or the mass murder of the European Jewry. It therefore makes strategic 
sense that Huyssen does not define fascism “in the narrow sense of close 
adherence to the racist and völkisch blood and soil doctrine” (1995, 130). 
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His definition of the fascist qualities of a fascist modernism leaves aside 
racial antisemitism and focuses on the sanction of aggression and vio-
lence. He characterizes fascism as a “broad anti-democratic post–World 
War I political culture that validated aggression, death, and violence as 
ultimate meaning” (130).
Jünger’s validation of aggressive, violent destruction and his glorifica-
tion of the moment of death on the battlefield as a moment of ultimate 
meaning has long been established (Herf 1984, 70–108). As disturbing as 
Jünger’s glorification of violence and death remains, it does not represent 
a specifically fascist endorsement of violence and death. The idea that the 
moment of death authenticates the value of a life lived well is so central 
to Western thought, as can be witnessed in the violent deaths of Socrates 
and Jesus, that its designation as a specifically fascist characteristic seems 
questionable. As Edith Wyschogrod argues, the “authenticity Paradigm,” 
the assumption of a reciprocal relation between the profoundness of a 
thinker or a moral authority and the degree to which the acceptance of 
even violent death was integral to their life’s conduct, was a fundamental 
paradigm of Western thought, and remained of particular importance to 
Rainer Maria Rilke (1985, 1–34). Jünger’s aggressive advocacy of war, 
violence, and destruction is not specifically fascist either. As Herfried 
Münkler argues persuasively, Jünger’s existential conception of war and 
violence belongs to a much older tradition, one that could be traced back 
to Clausewitz’s later writings and that was certainly a dominant posi-
tion among German intellectuals from Scheler to Simmel, who enthusi-
astically welcomed the war in 1914 (Münkler 2002, 111–12). War and 
violence were seen by these thinkers as more than the mere instruments 
to reach politically defined war goals. The existential conception of war 
anticipated the war as a generator of its own ultimate meaning; the war 
would create its own ultimate meaning and legitimate itself through its 
transformative power. Such a transformative conception of war and vio-
lence is not restricted to the German tradition, as Münkler notes, but 
present in the anticolonial writings of Frantz Fanon as well (Münkler 
2002, 105–15). And one might add that, in the 1970s, Jean Améry fully 
endorsed Fanon’s (and Sartre’s) idea of a cleansing power of killing and 
destruction in his essay on “Die Geburt des Menschen aus dem Geist der 
Violenz” (Améry 1971, 147–63).28
The validation of aggression, death, war, and violence as ultimate 
meaning is an important aspect of fascist ideology, but it is not unique to 
fascism. During the Weimar Republic, Jünger insisted even that his revo-
lutionary nationalism should be clearly distinguished from Hitler and 
the National Socialist movement because of his more radical endorse-
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ment of violence. Jünger rejected Hitler and the NSDAP because they 
were too populist and not radical and violent enough. He criticized Hit-
ler for recoiling from a truly destructive politics. During the same year 
when he published The Adventurous Heart (1929), the text on which 
his claim as one of Germany’s leading modernists rests, the very year 
that witnessed the events of Black Friday, mass unemployment, the rise 
of the NSDAP, and ever intensifying political violence on the streets of 
the Weimar Republic, Jünger published in the liberal journal Tagebuch 
his essay “‘Nationalism’ and Nationalism” (Jünger 2001, 501–9). He in-
tended to explain to his political enemies, the liberal democrats, the logic 
behind the recent surge of right-wing violence. At this “ideal moment 
of epochal terror” (Bohrer 1978, 9), Jünger derided Hitler as the last 
bourgeois politician and not as the first national revolutionary as the 
Tagebuch’s liberal readership might have expected. For Jünger, Hitler of-
fered no answer in 1929 to the political crisis of the “democratic system” 
but was merely one of its many symptoms. Jünger argued that neither the 
communists nor the Nazis dared to truly break with the bourgeois past. 
Their antidemocratic organizations inside the democratic system were 
not signals for a new fascist or communist society but remained “con-
structive parts of the system” (Jünger 2001, 507). He demanded more 
violence, destruction, and enjoyment from the new nationalists than Hit-
ler, the legalist, dared to offer: “In the current situation destruction is 
the only means that seems appropriate for nationalism. [. . .] Because 
we are the authentic, true, and relentless enemies of the bourgeois we 
enjoy his decomposition” (506–7). Jünger’s emphatic validation of war, 
violence, and death inspired no doubt many of his young readers to join 
extremist national movements like the NSDAP. Since equally enthusiastic 
endorsements of pure destruction can be found in the writings of many 
nonfascist thinkers, including Walter Benjamin and his celebrated “The 
Destructive Character” (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 541–42), the theo-
rist of modernity and modernism upon whom Huyssen relies again and 
again, the validation of violence does not serve as a criterion to distin-
guish fascist modernism from other forms of modernism.
In a coda to his Jünger essay, Huyssen considers the possibility that the 
question of violence permeates modernist aesthetics and should therefore 
not be employed as the criterion to exclude Jünger’s oeuvre from the 
modernist canon. But just as he argued in his chapter on Rilke, Huyssen 
tries to preempt such observation by stating that “everything depends not 
if, but rather how a text responds to the phenomena constituting the dark 
side of modernity” (143). Huyssen’s attempt to preserve the treatment of 
violence as the distinguishing criterion between modernist writing and 
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(non-)modernist fascist writings relies here on the invocation of Kafka 
as the other exemplary high modernist. Of course Huyssen is right to say 
that Kafka’s narratives present a more “compelling and complex treat-
ment of horror” than those by Jünger (Huyssen 1995, 143). But the logic 
of such an argument would lead us back to Adorno’s highly restrictive 
modernist canon. Compared to Kafka, who could be considered as a truly 
compelling modernist?29
In German modernism one has to move away from opposing a figure 
like Jünger who is “comfortably installed in the Grand Hotel Horror 
at the abyss’s edge” to a Kafka who writes “out of the abyss of mo-
dernity” (Huyssen 1995, 143). And one has to move away from an 
equally simplified opposition between the Freikorps man and Rilke’s 
protagonist: “Where the Freikorps man forges his male identity out of 
a fear of the feminine and develops an image of the male body as ar-
mored terror machine, simultaneously longing and fearing to explode 
on the battlefield, Malte deals with the ambivalence between desire for 
fusion and the fear of it in a nonaggressive way” (Huyssen 1995, 124). 
Such comparisons produce an overly simplified understanding of the 
relation between modernism and violence. They obscure a widespread, 
intense, and positive fascination with the phenomenon of violence in 
modernist writings, a fascination with violence that is far from restrict-
ing itself to masochistic self-wounding. Violence against the other is not 
taboo in the writings of Musil, Kafka, Canetti, or Benjamin. Musil’s 
first novel does not shy away from justifying violence against the other, 
Kafka’s poetics of indecision does not claim the safe ground of nonag-
gression, and few novels are more destructive than Canetti’s Auto-da-
Fé. As tempting as it is to use Jünger’s preoccupation with violence 
against others to deflect from other modernist explorations of violence, 
as Huyssen’s readings were meant to indicate, such a move creates all 
too easily an inaccurate and pacified notion of German modernism. The 
“fascist male” and the figure of Jünger soothe all too conveniently our 
understanding of modernism that one would need to invent him (and 
Jünger is of course permanently reinvented) if his writings would not 
lend themselves so willingly to the purpose of constructing a nonaggres-
sive notion of high modernism. 
It is the central premise of Violent Modernists that we should not ap-
proach the writings of authors like Musil, Kafka, or Canetti as limited to 
descriptions of passive suffering. Like the writings of Brecht and Jünger 
(meaning the writings of a political-literary avant-garde and a fascist mod-
ernism), the writings of high modernists probed aggressively and actively 
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the phenomenon of violence. But there is a difference between Jünger’s 
exploration of violence and the writings of Musil, Kafka, and Canetti. 
Quite often they might not have been less welcoming to violence, but 
these writers offer far more complex, compelling, and thought-provoking 
approaches to a rethinking of violence and aesthetics than a writer like 
Jünger. The following chapters will demonstrate that the central feature 
of these approaches to violence is not a nonaggressive exploration of the 
abyss of modernity.
If one would continue to distinguish modernist writers as nonaggres-
sive explorers of the negative effects of violence, of suffering and of trau-
ma, as has been done so consistently, then one would need to remove Mu-
sil, Kafka, and Canetti from the modernist canon. These writers belong 
among the violent modernists. But if one analyzes their representations of 
violence closely, a more important commonality in their understandings 
of violence emerges. Their reflections on violence question reductionist 
understandings of violence. In their accounts, acts of violence can never 
be fully traced back to a preventable set of causes. Consequently, the as-
sumption that violence could be portrayed as a premodern or “foreign” 
concept is discredited in their modernist texts and their concepts of mo-
dernity. Just as importantly, these authors no longer conceive of physical 
violence as an instrument that can be employed to achieve predetermined 
ends and purposes. Violent situations and their effects on the individual 
self and on society are too complex to be grasped with reductionist mod-
els of violence. To approach violence from an antireductionist model of 
violence posed, however, fundamental challenges not only to the question 
of how to represent violence, but also forced these writers to reconceptu-
alize their notions of subjectivity and history. The following chapters not 
only propose that phenomena of physical violence stand at the center of 
these particular modernist texts and German modernism in general but 
also that such a focus on violence leads to new understandings of mod-
ernist theories of the self, of narration, and of history.
The next two chapters on the works of Robert Musil trace the im-
mense difficulties and challenges that such a modernist project has to 
face. In Musil’s essays and novels, one encounters his ever more thor-
ough questioning of an initial reliance on reductionist and instrumental 
understandings of violence. His ensuing antireductionist reflections on 
violence are deeply intertwined with his formulation of a new concept 
of the self, the malleable self. As the third chapter demonstrates, these 
reconsiderations of violence and of the self are of fundamental impor-
tance to understanding the innovative potential of Musil’s interwoven 
theories of history and narrativity. German modernist writings are not 
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only obsessively preoccupied with acts of violence, as we saw at the be-
ginning of this chapter. Analyzing the ways Musil, Kafka, and Canetti 
responded to violence as an integral part of modernity allows for a new 





Robert Musil’s The Confusions of Young Törless and 
the Path to an Antireductionist Theory of Violence
The question of violence stands at the core of Robert Musil’s literary works, 
but his answers offer insights into the relationship between violence and the 
modernist imagination that have remained largely unexplored. The lack of 
interest in Musil’s reflections on and representations of violence will not 
come as a surprise. Even though a case for the centrality of the phenome-
non of violence in Musil’s writings can easily be made, his responses to 
violence underwent dramatic shifts and, more important, his treatment of 
violence grows ever more disturbing and provocative the closer one looks. 
Much of the physical violence that fellow students unleash against Basini in 
The Confusions of Young Törless (1906) is depicted as unproblematic and 
well-deserved punishment, and Musil’s bellicose embrace of the First World 
War points to a deep attraction to violence. The Man Without Qualities, an 
account of Austrian society from August 1913 to August 1914, is widely 
regarded, however, as composed in such a way that it could never reach its 
telos, the war. Continuing to neglect the role of violence in Musil’s oeuvre, 
often oscillating between embarrassing statements and strategies of avoid-
ance, remains tempting but would be nothing less than overlooking one of 
modernism’s most innovative investigations of violence in modernity.
Musil’s groundbreaking approach to violence comes into focus if one 
does not shy away from those disconcerting moments in his works that 
have been previously discounted as immaterial for any deeper under-
standing of Musil’s aesthetics and politics. With regard to physical vio-
lence, three instances in Musil’s works cause deep embarrassment among 
his readers. To take these three moments as starting points for a new 
reading is not meant to diminish Musil’s standing as one of the most 
significant European modernists but to chart the path that led him to a 
new, antireductionist approach to war and violence, and disclose one of 
Musil’s great achievements.
As its youngest editor, Musil published “Europäertum, Krieg, Deut-
schtum” in September 1914 in Die Neue Rundschau, the intellectual 
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flagship of the S. Fischer press. In this essay, Musil decried the existence 
of an international anti-German plot—“from all corners of the conti-
nent a conspiracy erupted in which our extermination [Ausrottung] had 
been decided”—that split the world into two blocs: “German and anti-
German” (Musil 1978, 1021). All distinctions and differences among 
Germans melted away, leaving behind but one collective body “in which 
the individual is nothing again outside of its elementary effort to protect 
the tribe” (1022). Confronted with Musil’s belligerent exuberance at the 
outset of the war, Karl Corino, his most substantial biographer, argues for 
separating the essay from the main body of his oeuvre. Corino discounts 
the essay as a “tribute to the Zeitgeist,” and considers its content as a 
schizophrenic deviation from the real Musil (Corino 2003, 493). The lack 
of English translations for “Europäertum, Krieg, Deutschtum” supports 
the tacit consensus on this point. Musil’s war enthusiasm seems irrelevant 
to the assessment of his literary achievements.1
Quarantining Musil’s war essay from his stories, novels, and essays is 
an unnecessarily protective gesture that only obscures the role of violence 
and war in Musil’s works. No doubt the essay fits the zeitgeist of 1914 
since most German and Austrian intellectuals glorified and justified the 
war all too readily. Thomas Mann would publish his equally belliger-
ent reflections on war two months later in Musil’s journal. Among his 
contemporaries, however, Musil stands out not for his initial war eupho-
ria but for the time and effort he spent on the literary investigation of 
the path leading up to the war. Spanning the time between the summers 
of 1913 and 1914, The Man Without Qualities remains the most ambi-
tious attempt of European literature to portray a society that became 
the “Herd des Weltkriegs,” the “crucible of the World War” (MoE 1438; 
MwQ 1474). Rather than an aberration in his oeuvre, the war essay 
marks a decisive turning point in his literary career.
Musil’s uncritical endorsement of the official German and Austrian 
war position, his fervently expressed belief that the Central Powers merely 
acted in self-defense, might darken Musil’s image as the unfailingly ironic 
and cool observer of his age. His particular gullibility adds, however, just 
another detail to the well-known picture of the widespread war euphoria 
among German and Austrian intellectuals. Musil’s contribution to the 
so-called Spirit of 1914 gains significance because he insisted in his essay 
on a correlation between the aggressive spirit of a modernist imagination 
and the war. He characterized the best prewar literature as “inspired by 
the same bellicose and conquering spirit which we feel today so joyously 
in and all around ourselves” (Musil 1978, 1021). “Europäertum, Krieg, 
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Deutschtum” extols the union between highly individualized literary ex-
periments and the collective war enthusiasm.
Musil’s invocation of a conquering literary spirit was not an ad hoc 
adjustment to the war effort. Already in “The Obscene and Pathological 
in Art” (1911), his first essay on the task of literature, he claimed: “Where 
art has value it shows things that few have seen. It is conquering, not 
pacifying” (Musil 1978, 981). To understand the resemblance between 
Musil’s aggressive prewar aesthetics and his warmongering essay, I will 
read The Confusions of Young Törless (1906) as an expression of this 
conquering spirit and as a novel on violence. Filled with beatings, torture, 
gang rapes, mob violence, a planned lynching, and other acts of human 
degradation, the book becomes a novel on violence less for its taboo-
breaking depiction of homoerotic cruelty than for the investigation of 
conflicting theories justifying the uses of violence.
These acts of violence have been rarely considered relevant for an 
understanding of The Confusions of Young Törless. The novel’s ratio-
nalizations for Törless’s violent deeds, proposed by its narrator, have 
received almost as little attention as Musil’s war essay. The novel’s au-
tobiographical character, its depiction of adolescence and emerging 
sexuality, its relation to Freud and psychoanalysis, its status as an early 
example of expressionism, its social criticism, its theory of education, and 
its aestheticism: all these topics have sparked far more interest among 
literary critics.2 These readings offer little more than passing remarks on 
the novel’s dealings with violence.3 As Stanley Corngold argues, this lack 
of interest indicates Musil’s successful narrative strategy “to ward off 
moral criticism” (Corngold 1998, 103). More precisely, the novel wards 
off any moral critique of Törless and his narrator. Beineberg and Reiting, 
Törless’s companions and fellow torturers, as well as Basini, their victim, 
are judged so harshly for their respective brutality and submissiveness 
that a closer reading of the novel’s representation of violence seems ir-
relevant. As one influential reader put it, Beineberg and Reiting remain 
so far below the minimal standards of modernity that they are unfit for 
novelistic treatment. Caught up in endless repetitions of barbarism they 
are summarily dismissed as “nicht ‘romanfähig’” (Arntzen 1980, 99). 
Beineberg and Reiting are thought to produce nothing but barbaric vio-
lence, and a somewhat masochistic Basini is thought to complement his 
sadistic tormentors neatly. With the violence safely sequestered among 
the premoderns and the perverse, Törless emerges typically as the sole 
subject worthy of study as well as someone who should not be held re-
sponsible for Basini’s victimization.4
In addition to the war essay and the violence of his first novel, there 
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is a third embarrassing moment in which Musil linked violence and aes-
thetics so intimately that his readers prefer to look the other way. Ulrich, 
the protagonist of The Man Without Qualities, insists on a close correla-
tion between war and the other condition. In contrast to Karl Kraus and 
Ernst Jünger, Musil neither scathingly dismissed nor exuberantly glorified 
the August experience in his postwar writings. Instead, he acknowledged 
the war enthusiasm as a central event in need of investigation. Speaking 
in 1921 of the time of mobilization in August 1914 as the “so-called up-
beat to a Great Age,” Musil hastened to add that “I do not at all mean this 
entirely ironically. On the contrary, what was stammered at the outset 
and later allowed to degenerate into a cliché—that the war was a strange, 
somehow religious experience—corresponds undoubtedly to a fact” (PS 
102). Understanding the conditions of possibility for this quasi-religious 
experience of the general mobilization emerged after the collapse of the 
Habsburg Empire as Musil’s main challenge for any representation of a 
path to war. As Musil explained it in 1932, the task of The Man Without 
Qualities became the “description [Schilderung] of an age that had led to 
catastrophe” (MoE 1855). As a severe critic of nationalism and racism, 
Musil dedicated much of his postwar writing to the purpose of under-
standing how Austrian society could find such a shattering end, and how 
individuals not unlike him could have welcomed the beginning of this end 
with such relief and euphoria.
The succinct formulation of this challenge continues to scandalize even 
Musil’s most sympathetic readers: “War is the same as the other condi-
tion” (MoE 1932). Few eyebrows are raised when Jünger or Remarque 
categorize war as another condition. The statement would seem even a bit 
banal. To live in times of war means to live under other circumstances and 
conditions than during peace. Knowing the assertion refers to World War 
I, numerous similar statements and observations can be found, promi-
nently among them Freud’s lucid Reflections on War and Death (1915). If 
one insists on a more literal reading—not times of war, as experienced by 
a civilian like Freud, but the military experience of war; not just another 
condition but the other condition—one would still stay on familiar terri-
tory. The consensus on the experiential impact of the First World War in 
literary studies continues to regard the war as the unprecedented, abys-
mal event, whose disparity from previous experiences and traditions can 
hardly be exaggerated. As we have already seen, Walter Benjamin even 
suggested it might no longer make sense to speak of the war as the other 
condition—since experience itself should be sought among the fallen of 
the war. The war generation that went to school in horse-drawn streetcars 
“now stood in the open air, amid a landscape in which nothing was the 
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same except the clouds and, at its center, in a force field of destructive 
torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body” (Benjamin 1999, 
732). War as the other condition shapes the modern condition in its own 
image.
Musil’s readers remain, however, shocked when Ulrich refers to the 
war as the other condition. In Musil’s writings, the other condition holds 
a central though elusive position. Readers expect the fleeting, almost re-
demptive moments of the other condition in the secluded garden and 
private chambers in which Ulrich and Agathe, his sister, explore intimacy, 
love, and possibly incest, but not in the public arena of modern warfare. 
Musil’s other condition, as Hartmut Böhme writes, is supposed to sublate 
reason and its other, to achieve a union of rationality and the mystical: it 
should be nothing less than a sympathetic participation with Being itself 
(Böhme 1988, 324). The other condition should be the moment when 
time stops, space dissolves: the very opposite of and an alternative to war 
and violence. In a posthumously published chapter, Ulrich and Agathe 
start acting on their incestuous desire but halt at the last moment. They 
stop not out of compliance to social norms but because they feel the 
foretaste of a “more perfect, if still shadowy, union” (MwQ 1178; MoE 
1083). Albrecht Schöne reads the siblings’ experience not as a passing 
moment but a decisive turning point, die entscheidende Wendung, for the 
novel’s concept and structure. To him this instance of the siblings’ other 
condition (or rather the foretaste thereof) implies no less, Schöne argues, 
than Musil’s renunciation of his often repeated plans to end the novel 
with Ulrich’s equation of the other condition with the war (Schöne 1961, 
205). Their shared experience should render obsolete Musil’s long held 
intention to let the mobilization be for Ulrich an even more intense and 
lasting experience than the encounter with his sister.
In 1936 Musil evoked this moment in words clearly echoing his essay 
“Europäertum, Krieg, Deutschtum.”
The will of the individual [Einzelwille] submerges, a new age of 
multipolar relation surfaces before the inner eye. Ulrich sees, what 
is a fascinating moment, one which never quite occurred between 
him and Agathe. Last resort sex and war: but sex lasts 1 night the 
war probably at least 1 month etc. (MoE 1903)
For readers comprehending the novel’s subjunctive mood as its utopian 
potential there is more at stake than a choice between the siblings’ inti-
mate moment and a description of Ulrich’s mobilization experience. The 
other condition as a utopian alternative to the reification of social inter-
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actions would disintegrate in Ulrich’s war experience. If, however, the 
siblings’ encounter is the decisive moment, as Schöne argues, the novel’s 
subjunctive mood and its utopian promise would be preserved. The sib-
lings’ momentary hesitation would be “the decisive turning point, from 
where [the novel] does not have to lead anymore to sex and war as last 
resort” (Schöne 1961, 205; his emphasis).
Forty years later, in an equally brilliant but far more historically and 
politically interested reading, Stefan Jonsson finds himself nonetheless in 
the same blind spot, unable to dwell on the implication of Ulrich’s equa-
tion. Stressing the social and political responsibility of a subject with a 
sense of possibility, Jonsson views Ulrich, like Schöne, as entrusted “with 
the magical gift of understanding reality in the mood of the conjunctivus 
potentialis” (Jonsson 2000, 144). Ulrich recognizes that no form of social 
reality and the self expresses an inherent necessity or follows a coherent 
and unifying narrative. Consequently, he has to shoulder the immense 
responsibility that accompanies such a gift: “The task of the hero is to 
reroute history and force human evolution in a new direction. Reality 
hence becomes a laboratory for experiments with a view to invent Uto-
pia” (145). The charge of the novel and its hero is nothing less, Jonsson 
writes, than a “denunciation of existing reality and a prefiguration, in the 
realm of ideas, of a revolution leading to a new social order” (146). The 
Man Without Qualities turns into a past future, opening “the utopian 
possibility of a supranational and transcultural space” in which Ulrich, 
its model human subject, “cherished the absence of homogenizing ideolo-
gies of nation or culture and recognized the heterogeneity of all identi-
ties”(14). To accept the heterogeneity of identities, to perceive oneself and 
the world with a sense of possibility, and to let go of the (false) sense of 
security that comes with the belief in a necessary, coherent core of iden-
tity, proves, however, too difficult for most contemporaries. Their failure 
to live with the potential and uncertainty of a sense of possibility, with the 
self’s limitless capacity to change, becomes in Jonsson’s reading Musil’s 
main lesson of the First World War: “most persons were unable to bear 
this insight” (255).
If, however, not only most people but Ulrich as well cannot bear this 
insight, namely, if he could fall for the nostalgia of clear distinctions and 
homogeneous identities, then the novel’s utopian potential functions 
no longer as a utopian alternative to the historical catastrophe. Unlike 
Schöne, Jonsson does not speculate whether Musil renounced his plans 
for the novel’s ending. When he comes across Ulrich’s equation—“War 
is the same as the other condition”—Jonsson cannot bring himself to 
consider its implications for Musil’s alleged project to reroute history: 
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“Indeed, it is difficult to think through these scandalous lines, in which 
mass violence somehow comes to equal love and collective solidarity” 
(Jonsson 2000, 261). How can one think through these lines? Ulrich’s 
identification of war and the other condition becomes even more pro-
vocative if quoted in full: “War is the same as the other Condition; but 
(viable) mixed with Evil” (MoE 1932). Considering Ulrich’s fascination 
with the murderer Moosbrugger and his exploits with Agathe, the ac-
knowledgment that evil could be part of the other condition carries not 
that much additional insight. As the siblings’ incestuous desire already 
implied, the breaking of fundamental codes of behavior is part and parcel 
of the other condition. Ulrich provokes, however, with the claim that war 
makes the other condition viable, lebensfähig. The fictive Ulrich elevates 
the war to the status of a sustainable instance of the other condition at the 
very moment, late summer of 1914, when Robert Musil, his author, had 
published “Europäertum, Krieg, Deutschtum.” At the end of The Man 
Without Qualities, Ulrich would have welcomed the coming war in a 
strikingly similar way to Musil’s actual response to the war.
Musil’s scandalized readers look for reprieve in the fact that he never 
completed his novel. The equation of war and the other condition can 
be found only among the drafts and outlines. And even diligent readers 
of this never-ending novel might feel justified in letting drafts be drafts.5 
The popular move to ignore Musil’s war essay, as well as the centrality 
of violence in The Confusions of Young Törless and Ulrich’s reaction to 
the war, however, indicate a convenient incuriosity and, more important, 
such lack of inquisitiveness blurs one of the most fascinating aspects and 
challenges of Musil’s works from his first to his last novel: their thorough 
exploration of war and violence. In his last novel, Musil does not justify 
his or Ulrich’s August experience but analyzes a situation enabling such 
responses to the war. Exploring the analytical connection between the 
war and the novel leads into the center of Musil’s aesthetics where the 
relations between origins, causal thinking, and the narrativity of history 
are probed. It also leads to Musil’s unique postwar theory of violence.
Musil’s prewar aesthetics argued for modernist literature’s unique ability 
to aggressively explore pathological and perverse behavior for the sake of 
a healthier society. But in contrast to such an aesthetic and political pro-
gram, The Confusions of Young Törless does not present a literary analysis 
of the perverse but rather a justification for its violent oppression. Rather 
than exploring supposedly pathological behavior, the novel reinforces 
homophobic stereotypes of the effeminate boy. To read Musil’s first novel 
as a novel on violence means to take a look at rather discomforting aspects 
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of German modernism. The construction of the student Basini as a per-
verse subject worthy of destruction serves a specific purpose for Musil’s 
aggressive aesthetics. Relegating Basini to the status of an irredeemable 
subject allows the novel to compare different legitimizations of violence 
without having to reject the use of violence as unethical. The novel creates 
a situation in which three clearly distinguishable strategies compete to 
justify the use of violence against a designated other. The student Beine-
berg develops a crude antecedent to Bataille’s theory of sacrifice, Reiting 
probes the functionality of violent acts for his rational theory of power, 
and Törless employs violence to probe and examine the experience of 
modernity’s ambiguity on the formation of subjectivity. Despite their dif-
ferences in purpose, these three approaches to violence follow the basic 
outlines of instrumental reasoning. Acts of violence are justified as means 
to achieve particular ends. Even though Beineberg’s and Törless’s uses of 
violence fail, the novel’s narrator avoids siding with Reiting’s successful 
exercise of power. Instead, he offers a fourth justification for Basini’s tor-
ture and rape: Törless’s aesthetic education.
A closer analysis of Törless’s experiment with violence and humiliation 
reveals an even more significant achievement than such a presentation 
of conflicting approaches to violence as well as Musil’s apparent refusal 
to view violence as an atavistic phenomenon without relevance for the 
project of modernity. All four approaches to violence mentioned so far 
presuppose the instrumental character of acts of violence, the assumption 
that acts of violence are best understood as causes of intended effects, as 
means to particular ends. With Törless, however, the novel will move into 
uncharted territory in its exploration of violence. At a crucial moment, 
Törless is forced to consider the possibility that the cause-and-effect ap-
proach to violence might be insufficient to account for the complexity of 
violent phenomena. Törless’s confrontation with unintended consequences 
of his use of violence offers more than an illustration of Arendt’s critique 
of violence as a means always threatening to overwhelm its end (as dis-
cussed in the first chapter). Musil’s novel subverts the validity of tradi-
tional understandings of violence as an instrument, and Törless faces the 
implications of a possibly noncausal relation between catastrophic events 
and the subject’s sense of self. The sudden realization that the effects of 
his acts of violence against Basini defy instrumental logic provokes an 
experience of radical ambiguity. As a means to an end, violence was sup-
posed to resolve Törless’s experience of ambiguity. Instead, the acts of 
violence release an uncertainty that neither Törless nor his narrator can 
bear to contemplate. Rather than rethinking his concept of violence, Tör-
less panics and takes refuge in the memory of a dangerous moment. Such 
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remembrance offers him the rush of an either-or decision during which 
all ambiguity disappears—not unlike Musil’s initial reaction to the First 
World War. Likewise, the narrator avoids analyzing Törless’s experience 
and justifies the use of violence as a means of Törless’s aesthetic educa-
tion, thus shutting down the novel’s debate on violence.
The importance of this momentary uncertainty regarding the instru-
mental character of violence in The Confusions of Young Törless will 
become fully apparent in the third chapter and its analysis of Musil’s 
views on war and violence after Germany’s and Austria’s defeat in the 
First World War. As I argue, Musil returns in his postwar writings to the 
challenge of this very moment during which acts of violence turn incom-
prehensible and invisible to instrumental logic. In his postwar essays and 
especially in The Man Without Qualities, Musil develops a critique of 
reductionist theories of war and violence. His approach to violence as a 
complex situation that does not fit into a linear order of cause and effect 
will prove to be of central importance not only for his theory of violence 
but also for his concepts of narrative, subjectivity, and history.
Robert Musil and the Conquering Spirit  
in War and Aesthetics
Because of its explicit political content “Europäertum, Krieg, Deutsch-
tum” remains an exception among Musil’s early essays. His prewar no-
tions of politics were vague, far more atmospheric than analytical. In 
“Political Confessions of a Young Man” (1913), Musil reflects on his 
budding sympathies for liberal and socialist parties but avoids a closer 
look at their programmatic declarations. His political reasoning oscil-
lates inconclusively between desiring political change and fearing that 
the slightest political modifications might result in unforeseeable disaster. 
“But still it is quiet, and we sit as if in a glass cage and are afraid even 
to try to break out, because if we did the whole thing could immedi-
ately shatter to pieces” (PS 36). Except for the intense frustration with 
the inability to foresee any political change in the near future, little in 
Musil’s early political reflections prepares one for the brute celebration 
of destruction in “Europäertum, Krieg, Deutschtum.” All uncertainty and 
ambiguity vanishes with the war. Not only glass cages shall be shattered 
but everything non-German. The clarity of the situation justifies every 
sacrifice and every death. The mobilization and anticipation of war issued 
forth the experience of “a primal power, of which even love itself is but a 
48 Chapter 2
tiny splinter” (Musil 1978, 1022). Musil celebrates the split of the world 
into two camps as a sudden release from the process of individuation.
While “Europäertum, Krieg, Deutschtum” stands as a political text 
apart from Musil’s pre- and postwar essays, a more persistent picture 
emerges once one moves the focus from his political pronouncements to 
his claims for a relationship between aesthetics and violence. From this 
perspective, the essay loses its exceptional quality and becomes part of 
Musil’s continuous and emphatic validation of destruction in aesthetics. 
Alongside his glorification of war, Musil points to characteristics that war 
and literature share. Both partake in the aggressive pursuit of a stronger 
and healthier race: “Literature is at its core the battle for a higher hu-
man species” (1021). The eugenic slant of Musil’s phrasing is not a mere 
slip but programmatic. Even though modernist literature might represent 
marginal and abnormal behavior, such attention to the pathological, Mu-
sil contends, serves the objective of a “healthier” human race and society.
Our literature was a literature of the obverse, a literature of the ex-
ception to the rule, and often already of the exception to the excep-
tion. In its strongest representatives. And therefore it was inspired 
by the same bellicose and conquering spirit which we feel today so 
joyously in and all around ourselves. (Musil 1978, 1021)
In the summer of 1914 Musil perceived Germany as being under the 
threat of extermination by a hostile outside; in 1911 he analyzed the per-
verse as an inner threat to the social order. In both cases, Musil defended 
the use of violence as remedies, cloaking the aggressive spirit of his aes-
thetics as a response to existential risks for the individual and for society.
Musil aims this aggression beyond the realm of aesthetics and advo-
cates the identification and elimination of the supposedly pathological in 
the name of a healthier society. In “The Obscene and Pathological in Art” 
(1911), he championed the literary representation of the supposedly sick 
and perverse as an intelligence operation expanding society’s knowledge 
of the human soul. “Art too seeks knowledge; it represents the obscene 
and pathological by means of their relation to the decent and healthy, 
which is to say: art expands its knowledge of the decent and the healthy” 
(Musil 1990, 6). In contrast to scientific investigations that search for 
general laws, rules, and causalities, Musil envisioned literature as better 
qualified to examine the intricate pathologies of individual cases. Only 
literature could dwell on the level of the individual and dissect suppos-
edly perverse and abnormal behavior in all its complexity. Because of 
its attention to detail and irregularities, he considered literature better 
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equipped for such research than science. Musil’s choice of words reveals 
the aggressive spirit of his proposed method. Artistic reflection penetrates 
its perverse object, and in “this way pathways are created and connec-
tions exploded, and consciousness drills new accesses for itself” (Musil 
1990, 6). Looking at the remaining shards of the exploded pathological 
material, the writer looks for similarities to what he considers normal. In 
Musil’s essay the pathological and the normal consist of related but not 
identical elements. The relation enables the literary reconstruction of the 
perverse. “Any perversity can be depicted; it can be depicted through its 
construction out of the normal elements, since otherwise the depiction 
would not be understood” (8).6 After the disarticulation of the pathologi-
cal, the artist constructs an image of it from elements of the normal and 
acceptable. “What in reality remains fused together like a molten drop is 
here dissolved, untangled, interwoven—made divine, made human” (7). 
The artistic procedure destroys the perverse character of the pathological 
and transposes it onto a net of relations, associations, and comparisons 
with the normal. The pathological object and its representation have to 
be clearly distinguished. Purified and made human, the represented path-
ological is cleansed of any perverse qualities: “what is depicted—not the 
depiction itself but what is represented as obscene and pathological—is 
no longer either obscene or pathological” (Musil 1990, 5). Neither the 
representation of the perverse nor the represented perverse remain per-
verse. Because of its aesthetic reconstruction, the pathological becomes 
comprehensible to normal consciousness.
Musil’s distinction between the pathological and its representation 
lies at the heart of modernist aesthetics. Analyzing Benjamin and Trakl, 
Rainer Nägele contends that the “radical separation of aesthetics and the 
pathological as well as identification of any trace of the empirical subject 
with the pathological are held up by their own pathos that constitutes the 
core of the aesthetics of modernity” (1998, 79). If one renames the per-
verse and pathological as the barbaric, then one encounters Musil’s claim 
again in Adorno’s analysis of Richard Wagner: “The barbaric ceases to be 
barbaric once it is reflected in great art; it becomes distanced and is even 
made the object of criticism” (Adorno 2003, 326). The artistic process 
transforms the perverse into an acceptable replica; its aesthetic recon-
struction becomes in Musil’s argument a useful instrument for society’s 
fight against the actual pathological.
Writing to oppose state censorship and to defend literature’s right to 
represent the pathological, Musil espouses aesthetics as a realm in which 
moral or legal claims have no place.7 Embedded in his claims of literature’s 
unique ability to expand the knowledge of human behavior is an im-
50 Chapter 2
mensely aggressive approach to the so-called pathological in modern so-
ciety. The writer and state share the goal of isolating and eliminating the 
perceived perverse. The aesthetic process examines and obliterates its ob-
ject of interest in the course of vivisection, or, in Musil’s medical language, 
the artistic treatment sterilizes its contaminated object. Regarding the 
perverse, Musil speaks of the “desensualization of the depiction” (Musil 
1990, 8). The artistic treatment prevents an infection of aesthetics with 
the perverse and promises society a vaccination against the pathological.
An aggressive spirit no doubt pervades Musil’s early fiction and es-
says as well as his welcoming of the war. But its target is far more dif-
ficult to determine in his first novel than his essays suggest. The Confu-
sions of Young Törless should be a prime example of Musil’s aesthetic 
reconstruction of perverse acts and behaviors. Commenting on the novel 
shortly after its publication, Musil assured a potential reviewer in 1906 
that he could represent “any abnormality”—not just those depicted in 
his first novel—without becoming affected by the aberrant desires of 
his protagonists (Musil 1981b, 24). Transgressive acts from thievery to 
rape and humiliation to torture abound in this novel, and they intensify 
and deepen the confusions of young Törless. The shocking discovery of 
Basini’s thievery provokes Törless to doubt the very stability of society’s 
normative order. Basini now embodied this challenge to order for Tör-
less, and “all the strangeness was transferred to that one human being” 
(YT 67; VZ 61). Törless experiences Basini as a molten drop of the per-
verse (YT 102; VZ 91). But Musil’s novel does not dissolve and untangle 
the supposedly perverse. As the reading of The Confusions of Young Tör-
less will demonstrate, the novel justifies the attack against the perverse 
other. Its narrator supports the scapegoating of Basini because it enables 
a higher good, Törless’s aesthetic education. Musil’s war enthusiasm and 
the sacrificial logic of his first novel share a rhetoric of innocence that 
shields perpetrators and aggressors alike from responsibility for their 
acts of violence. While the war essay obscures its destructive agency in 
the name of a primal defense of the tribe, the novel argues, as we will see, 
for the destruction of the perverse for the sake of another individual’s 
aesthetic maturity.
The Confusions of Young Törless: A Novel on Violence
The Confusions of Young Törless presents itself not as a novel on vio-
lence but as a late example of the bildungsroman. Through the novel’s 
Lehr jahre, Törless becomes a respected member of Habsburg society, “a 
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young man with a very fine and sensitive mind” as the narrator points out 
(YT 126; VZ 111). The maturing Törless accomplishes a synthesis of self-
determination and socialization, the genre’s telos (Moretti 2000, 15). All 
grown-up and adapted to the realities of his society, Törless fits Hegel’s 
sarcastic portrayal of a bildungsroman’s hero.
For the end of such apprenticeship [Lehrjahre] consists in this, that 
the subject sows his wild oats, builds himself with his wishes and 
opinions into harmony with subsisting relationships and their ratio-
nality, enters the concatenation of the world, and acquires for himself 
an appropriate attitude to it. (Hegel 1975, 593; Hegel 1986, 220)
The adult Törless embodies the imaginary solution of the bildungsroman 
by reconciling the two realities in which modernity forces the subject to 
live simultaneously: the outside world, in which the subject has to objec-
tify itself to find its place in the social order, and the inner world, seem-
ingly free, in which the subject might play out its individuality.8
When his parents left Törless at the institute at the novel’s beginning, 
the outside world appeared to him as a dreary, monotonous, and unin-
habitable place (YT 3; VZ 7). Only Božena, the prostitute, offered him a 
disreputable refuge for secret enjoyment (YT 30; VZ 29). At the novel’s 
end, the mother takes an almost grown-up Törless home. Božena’s house 
looks now “so insignificant and harmless,” while the world of his parents, 
the world of order and daylight, attracts Törless’s attention (YT 160; VZ 
140). Rather than replacing one world with the other, the maturing Törless 
merges aspects of both worlds into one. He developed an aesthetic sense 
that no longer required the strict separation of desire from social order. 
Leaving Božena’s world behind, he detects the possibility of pleasure in 
regions that previously were either taboo or seemingly devoid of it. In 
its last sentence, the novel encourages the reader to recognize Törless’s 
sensibility as sufficiently sophisticated to experience aesthetic gratification 
anywhere in the world, even in the scent rising from his mother’s waist: 
“And he breathed in [prüfte] the faintly perfumed fragrance rising from his 
mother’s waist” (YT 160; VZ 140).9 He epitomizes the bildungs roman’s 
utopian objective for which “there is no conflict between individuality 
and socialization, autonomy and normality, interiority and objectification. 
One’s formation as an individual in and for oneself coincides without rifts 
with one’s social integration as a simple part of a whole” (Moretti 2000, 
16). Törless seems to achieve what Ulrich will denounce as the subject’s 
impossible task in modernity: to move and to perceive oneself as a whole 
in the world (MoE 744; MwQ 808).
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The novel’s narrator insists on the success of Törless’s education and 
declares a “stage of development had reached its conclusion, the soul had 
begun a new ring like a young tree, and that silent, overwhelming feeling 
excused everything that had happened” (YT 150; VZ 131). And the adult 
Törless concurs wholeheartedly and assures the reader he “never felt any 
remorse for what had happened in those days” (YT 127; VZ 112). The de-
monstrative emphasis on Törless’s exemplary aesthetic education justifying 
all the novel’s events begs the question why one might require such reas-
surances. Several answers suggest themselves. A reader might be expected 
to object to the fact that every step of Törless’s rational, emotional, ethical, 
and aesthetic learning process is marked by the infliction, observation, or 
experience of violence. One could recoil from the references to acts of ho-
mosexual violence, particularly the serial raping of the prepubescent Basini 
by Reiting, Beineberg, and Törless. Put this way one might be surprised 
that these scenes of humiliation, torture, and rape are generally accepted by 
readers as disreputable but beneficial steps toward Törless’s education. By 
inducing a continued suspension of judgment, the narrative invites its read-
er to adhere to Ulrich’s moral theory of the next step. In The Man Without 
Qualities, Ulrich explains: “It’s never what one does that counts, but only 
what one does next!” (MwQ 798; MoE 735). When Agathe challenges him 
as to whether this theory could justify even murder, Ulrich is tempted to 
argue the murderer might write a poem that would “enrich the inner life of 
thousands of people” (MwQ 799). But he quickly corrects himself: “Only a 
lunatic could imagine it. Or an eighteen-year-old aesthete. God knows why, 
but those are ideas that contradict the laws of nature” (MwQ 799; MoE 
735). In The Confusions of Young Törless, the narrator—neither a lunatic 
nor an eighteen-year-old aesthete, one hopes—still insists that Törless’s suc-
cessful aesthetic education absolves the protagonist of responsibility for its 
violent means. Even a rigorous reader like Jean Améry accepted Basini’s 
abuse as less significant than Törless’s learning process.10
Avoiding Analysis: Constructions of the Perverse in  
The Confusions of Young Törless
The novel’s defenses against likely moral objections could allow for a 
detailed analysis of the perverse. Indeed, Törless tried to perform such a 
careful examination of human nature, choosing Basini as his specimen. 
Sitting in class behind Basini during free time, Törless started writing 
a philosophical treatise entitled De naturam hominum. Despite its all-
encompassing title, Törless approached the topic from a strictly personal 
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angle. Recent experiences as varied as his introduction to concepts of 
imaginary and irrational numbers, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, his 
visits to Božena, and especially the Basini case have left Törless in a state 
of confusion. While his classmates find nothing extraordinary in occa-
sional visits to prostitutes or the appearance of the imaginary in the ra-
tional world of mathematics, Törless observed without comprehension a 
strange and incongruous feeling about all these matters. Or, as the nar-
rator fine-tunes Törless’s phrasing: “it was not a feeling at all, more of 
an earthquake deep within the core of him, which caused no percep-
tible waves and which nonetheless made the whole of his soul tremble 
with such restrained power that the waves of even the stormiest feelings, 
seemed in comparison harmless ripples on the surface” (YT 101; VZ 90). 
The experience of such inner quakes and trembles convinced Törless of 
his own exceptionality. During their occurrence he senses a different re-
ality lurking beneath the everyday world.
To his frustration, this “feverish physical feeling” indicates only the 
possibility of another reality but offers no entry into it (YT 99; VZ 88). 
During these quaking moments his superior perceptiveness “makes its 
presence felt, but doesn’t work” (YT 100; VZ 89). He feels like someone 
“who is supposed to be able to lip-read a paralyzed man’s words from 
the distortions of his mouth, and is unable to do it” (YT 100; VZ 89). 
Notwithstanding such disappointments, the experience is so intense that 
Törless views himself as a chosen one (Auserwählter), someone akin to “a 
saint who has heavenly visions,” even though his undeveloped aesthetic 
sensibility is incapable of making much sense of these visions (YT 103; 
VZ 92). To develop his aptitude more fully, Törless sets out to investigate 
human nature by analyzing the boy sitting in front of him, the boy who 
becomes Törless’s prime example for the perverse other.
Törless conceives of Basini as a concrete link to the other world. Con-
founded by Basini’s normal appearance, he thinks about what a thief and 
victim of rape and humiliation like Basini should look like. Imagining an 
outer appearance that would be appropriate for the disgraced student, 
Törless senses a whirling, spinning motion “momentarily bending Basini’s 
image into the most incredible contortions, then tearing it apart into the 
most unimaginably dislocated postures, so that he himself grew dizzy” 
(YT 101; VZ 90). This description of his vision is, however, only a retro-
spective construction of what he might have seen. Törless fails to perceive 
what he sees; he has only a “vision of a vision” of Basini’s contorted 
body (YT 101–2; VZ 91). The mere presence of Basini is too powerful 
and causes Törless’s inner core to quake and tremble. Basini is Törless’s 
molten drop of the perverse that he hopes to penetrate and untangle. His 
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presence promises Törless access to another reality and a deeper under-
standing of human nature. He experiences Basini as a “hot, darkly glow-
ing mass” emitting an undifferentiated vibration around him (YT 102; 
VZ 91). To keep his mind sharp and protected while he attempts to get in 
contact with the perverse other, Törless keeps a copy of Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason at hand. He plans to observe Basini “with his eyes fixed 
on [Basini], boring through him” (YT 107; VZ 95). After such an ocular 
penetration of his research subject, Törless would read a page by Kant 
and then train his eyes again on the student, “immersing himself further 
in Basini after each page” of Kant’s Critique (YT 107; VZ 95). Not sur-
prisingly, Törless’s literal attempt to execute Musil’s aesthetic program of 
penetrating the perverse fails miserably. And the annoyed Törless startles 
and scares the unsuspecting Basini by throwing Kant’s Critique on the 
ground. One should note, however, that Törless’s wrongheaded attempt 
to examine Basini and his supposedly perverse character is a rare excep-
tion in the novel that makes hardly any effort to understand Basini.
Instead of boldly exploring Basini, as Musil’s aesthetic prewar pro-
gram suggested, the novel enacts the fear of any close contact with this 
figure of the perverse. Throughout The Confusions of Young Törless and 
from all of its narrative perspectives, Basini is denigrated and disparaged. 
This occurs with such consistency that the narrator’s occasional use of the 
epithet Mensch for Basini becomes very nearly a much needed reminder 
for the reader. Reiting likens Basini to a defenseless little animal (VZ 44; 
YT 47), to a caught criminal who had already “the face of a hanged man” 
(VZ 45; YT 48), a slave (VZ 45; YT 48), and a mere object (VZ 101; YT 
114). For Beineberg, Basini is nothing but a swine, a dog, a worm, and a 
stone (VZ 56, 101, 102; YT 61, 114). Törless considers him as an unclean 
insect (VZ 51; YT 55), and either he or the narrator recognizes Basini’s 
body as belonging to a leper (VZ 124; YT 142). The narrator calls Basini 
a trained lackey, a stupid and vain liar, and a murderess (VZ 98, 51; YT 
110, 55). Describing and denouncing Basini as inhuman and perverse, the 
narrator keeps the reader and himself at a far distance from the student. 
While Törless fears occasionally that he bears a resemblance to Basini, the 
narrator disputes the existence of any such similarities from beginning to 
end of the novel. The withering characterizations of Basini and the nar-
rator’s need to rush to Törless’s defense are triggered by the threat that 
Basini could indeed become comprehensible through comparisons with 
Törless, his supposedly normal counterpart.
Rather than offering an analysis, the novel transforms Basini into an al-
legorical sign of vice, a figure of capture.11 Basini’s supposed pathology is 
not dissolved and interwoven with the normal, not “made divine, made hu-
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man” but condensed into a “molten drop,” too hot and too perverse to be 
redeemable (Musil 1990, 7). The narrative transforms him from a medio-
cre, nondescript student—Reiting never even notices him before his theft 
among the other students (YT 45–46; VZ 43)—into an effeminate, mor-
ally inferior, passive homosexual. Joining Reiting, Beineberg, and Törless in 
constructing Basini as an abject other, the narrator judges Basini’s features 
as “feminine” and comments on his “coquettish charm” (YT 54; VZ 50). 
Gazing at Basini’s naked body, Törless notes he is “almost entirely lacking 
in masculine forms”; Basini looks like a “young girl” (YT 110–11; VZ 98). 
No matter how often these male gazes sexualize his body, Basini has not 
yet developed sexual interest. As the narrator says in his typical tone of 
voice: “Given [Basini’s] retarded development, any real desire would still 
have been entirely alien to him” (YT 54; VZ 51). Such lack of desire dis-
tinguishes Basini from his classmates. Reiting, Beineberg, and Törless visit 
Božena regularly, and there is no reason to assume that they lack sexual 
desire. Starting from the novel’s first day, the reader learns that Törless, the 
youngest of the three, is haunted by sexual desire and sudden erections (YT 
15, 20, 23–25, 78; VZ 17, 21, 24–25, 70). As Božena notes, Basini lacks vi-
rility when he visits her, and she ridicules him for merely playing the part of 
a man (YT 36, 54; VZ 35, 50–51). The narrator agrees with her conclusion 
and suggests to the reader that Basini’s efforts to appear masculine result 
from nothing but a “compulsion” to do what Basini assumes obligatory 
and appropriate for acting like a man (YT 5455; VZ 51). Always perceived 
by the judging other, Basini is forced into the effeminate stereotype.
Identified as an effeminate boy, Basini is perceived as a grave risk to 
any community, and the novel encourages its readers to accept even the 
most severe punishment as a justified response to his deviancy.12 After 
his tormentors inform Basini that he lost his right to exist, the narrator 
pushes his Basini characterization quickly beyond misogynist stereotypes 
(weak, soft, inert, dumb, vain, “weibisch,” etc.) and equates Basini with 
the most cowardly and dangerous female he can imagine, the Giftmisch-
erin. Impersonating an imaginary public prosecutor, the distinctly male 
narrator issues a harshly worded death sentence as the only sentence that 
fits the crimes of a female poisoner and of being Basini (YT 55; VZ 51). 
Rapidly transformed from a morally and intellectually slow boy into a la-
tent submissive homosexual and from a mere thief ino a poisoner, Basini 
becomes so overdetermined as a threat to society that the narrator has no 
need to spell out whether Basini should be sentenced for his passivity or 
his base activism as Törless’s alleged seducer.
The novel moves clearly and with great determination in the oppo-
site direction of Musil’s programmatic declarations regarding literature’s 
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task of investigating and representing the obscene and the pathological. 
Pressed into the mold of the effeminate boy, Basini serves as the story’s 
“haunting abject” (Sedgwick 1993, 157). Neither the narrator nor his 
classmates pay any compassionate attention to him, and the reader is in-
vited to match their indifference.13 Marginalizing and stigmatizing Basini, 
the narrative offers the effeminate boy as scapegoat for widely differing 
experimental uses of violence. After constructing Basini as abject other, 
neither the narrator nor the narrative takes much further notice of his 
experience of violence and humiliation. The focus stays with the perpetra-
tors and their competing social and epistemological expectations for their 
various experiments with violence. The supposedly daring exploration of 
abnormal behavior emerges as a justification of violence.
The novel’s disparaging portrayal of Basini prompts the question whether 
The Confusions of Young Törless should indeed be read as a novel on vio-
lence. If homophobic sentiments cause the violence against Basini, then 
a focus on violence would be misplaced. The acts of violence could be 
simply noted, denounced, and regretted. But despite the novel’s construc-
tion of Basini as an effeminate boy, Musil’s novel is not a straightforward 
articulation of its homophobic zeitgeist. The violence against Basini is not 
motivated by homophobia. The novel employs its homophobic context 
to shield its disturbing enactment of conflicting theories of violence from 
ethical objections. As disturbing as this might sound, by constructing Ba-
sini as an effeminate boy the novel creates for its audience an ethically 
secure situation to explore and perceive freely conflicting theories of vio-
lence. By employing stereotypes of the effeminate boy, the novel circum-
vents ethical judgments on its enactments of violence.
Compared to its political and cultural context, one could even argue 
that the novel’s representation of sexuality displays signs of relatively 
progressive interventions in contemporary German debates on homo-
sexuality. The complexity of the novel’s representation of homosexual 
experiences is rather daring for its time and contrasts sharply with its 
one-dimensional denunciation of the effeminate boy. The social climate 
toward the end of the nineteenth century was marked in Europe by ho-
mophobia and scientific curiosity about same-gender sexuality. Declaring 
1870 as the birth year of homosexuality, Michel Foucault traced the clas-
sification of individuals as different species, homosexuals, to the taxo-
nomic case studies of the psychiatric and judicial discourses of the late 
nineteenth century. Previously, homosexual acts had been condemned as 
irregular activities, but they did not determine necessarily the social and 
sexual identity of its practitioners. In the wake of rising scientific inter-
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est, however, the homosexual act was recognized as the expression of 
“a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul” (Foucault 
1978, 43). While the “sodomite” had been treated as a “temporary aber-
ration,” the “homosexual” began to be considered a different “species” 
(43). This process of scientific classification went hand in hand with legal 
persecutions and public humiliations. The trials of Oscar Wilde caused 
an international scandal in 1895, and in 1902—while Musil worked on 
his novel—the Social Democratic newspaper Vorwärts stunned the public 
with its article “Krupp auf Capri,” denouncing one of Germany’s rich-
est industrialists as a homosexual. Six years later, Maximilian Harden 
cast suspicion on advisors of the emperor Wilhelm II, the so-called Lie-
benberger Tafelrunde. Unable to attack the constitutionally protected 
em peror, he sought to expose Prince Philipp zu Eulenberg and Count 
Kuno von Moltke as threats to national security. Exploiting the era’s ho-
mophobic sentiment to undermine the current political order, Bismarck 
used Harden and his journal Die Zukunft to take revenge on the emperor 
who had forced him into retirement. In a society built on homosocial 
relationships, the homosexual taboo lingered as permanent threat in its 
shadows.14
Even though homosexual relations were nothing unprecedented at 
Törless’s boarding school, the topic remained taboo. When Beineberg tells 
Törless about Reiting’s sexual relations with Basini, he refers obliquely to 
comparable events that had already entered the school’s secret oral his-
tory. Simply reminding Törless of “that business” sufficed to let Törless 
understand what he was talking about (YT 59; VZ 54). Although un-
namable and taboo, homosexual acts do not taint the social standing of 
every student in the same way. By raping Basini, Reiting discloses vulner-
abilities in his struggle for a leadership position among the students. But 
he is at no risk of being ostracized from the community of students. Glad 
to know a compromising fact about his competitor for a leadership posi-
tion, Beineberg has no intention of blackmailing him: “[Reiting is] too 
valuable to be allowed to come unstuck over something so stupid” (YT 
62; VZ 57). Reiting’s sexual violence remains no more than a temporary 
aberration to his friends and rivals. Having intercourse with Basini might 
tarnish his reputation for a while, but it does not transform Reiting into 
a different species.
This distinction in the representations of Basini and Reiting (and soon 
after of Beineberg and Törless as well) bears more than a passing similar-
ity to Benedict Friedländer’s separatist model of homosexuality. Friedlän-
der, cofounder of the Community of the Special (1902), argued against the 
transitive view of homosexuality that theorists like Magnus Hirschfeld 
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and Otto Weininger proposed.15 Hirschfeld considered the homosexual, 
the Urning, as a third sex, exhibiting the physical characteristics of both 
genders.16 Correspondingly, Weininger imagined homosexuals as having 
both male and female characteristics. During the sexual act, a homosex-
ual couple would complete itself as one man and one woman (Weininger 
1980, 34). In Friedländer’s separatist model, the homosexual man is the 
most virile of men. He exemplified to Friedländer “the highest, most per-
fect evolutionary stage of gender differentiation” (Mager 1985, 35–36). 
He distinguished strictly between the effeminate homosexual and the su-
pervirile man. The latter was revered, as Steakely writes, “as the founder 
of the patriarchal society and ranked above the heterosexual in terms of 
his capacity for leadership and heroism” (Steakley 1975, 54). The effemi-
nate man, however, was placed at the bottom of Friedländer’s hierarchy 
of manliness.
No doubt Friedländer would be horrified to recognize his supervirile 
man in homosexual rapists like Reiting and Beineberg, but in Musil’s novel 
they appear as violent prototypes of a superior masculinity. Refusing to 
admit their sexual attraction to other males, they enact the masculine 
hierarchy with physical and sexual violence. To prove his virility beyond 
reproach, Reiting beats Basini after each sexual encounter (YT 114; VZ 
101). Beineberg and Reiting are portrayed as “wild and unruly,” and Tör-
less is attracted to their brutal virility, judging their behavior as “healthy, 
sturdy, life-embracing” (YT 9; VZ 12). Together the three students form 
a triumvirate with Törless playing the part of the “secret chief of staff” 
(YT 44; VZ 41). While the self-identification as virile leaders remains 
their ideal, they violently enact and deny their sexual attraction to the 
effeminate boy. As the least virile of the three aggressors, the narrator 
shields Törless repeatedly against the suspicion that he might be attracted 
to Basini. Insisting that Törless’s desire for Basini was temporary and 
insubstantial, he dismisses it as “something like passion” and assures his 
audience that “love was certainly only an arbitrary, approximate name 
for it, and Basini the human being was no more than a substitute, a pro-
visional object for that desire”(YT 123; VZ 109). As disconcerting as the 
novel’s representation of homosexual acts and desires remains, especially 
its depiction of the effeminate boy, these varied representations of sexu-
ality set the stage for the violence, but the novel very rarely employs them 
as causes for the represented violence.
The Confusions of Young Törless neither analyzes Basini as an em-
bodiment of the perverse nor investigates the feelings of attraction and 
repulsion that Reiting, Beineberg, and Törless experience toward him. 
Instead, the reader encounters the consensus shared by his tormentors 
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and the novel’s narrator that Basini has lost his right to exist. As Reiting 
argues, they can “drop the idea that anything connects us with Basini 
apart from the pleasure we get from the fact that he is vile” (YT 51; 
VZ 48). Once Basini is forced into the role of their slave, the students’ 
violent imaginations know no ethical boundaries. Rather than explor-
ing the wide spectrum of human sexuality, the novel’s interest lies with 
the students’ seemingly limitless ability to imagine acts of violence and 
their conflicting models for violent action. Beineberg fantasizes about 
exotic execution methods, suggesting they might “drive a pointed bam-
boo through his guts; at least that would be fun” (YT 52; VZ 48), and 
Törless indicates repeatedly that he has no interest in ending the vio-
lence (YT 43, 52; VZ 49, 41). The question of whether or not to use vio-
lence against Basini initiates no discussion among Reiting, Beineberg, 
and Törless. Nonetheless, the novel distinguishes sharply between the 
conflicting purposes that each of these three students pursues with their 
acts of violence. By transforming Basini into a mere sign of the perverse 
that deserves to suffer every imaginable form of violence, the novel cre-
ates an imaginary space necessary to explore and analyze the conflicting 
rationales that these perpetrators offer for Basini’s destruction. Suffused 
with the imagery of sacrifice, alluding alternately to the myth of Dio-
nysus and the crucifixion of Christ, the novel stages a debate among 
competing theories of sacrifice as justifications for violence. Each of 
Basini’s abusers offers a different model to explain why Basini should 
be sacrificed to violent action.
Beineberg offers an antecedent to Bataille’s theory of sacrifice for his 
rationale to torture and possibly kill Basini. Leaving behind the poli-
tics of retribution to uphold the social order, he seeks Basini’s punish-
ment as a means to access cosmic truth. Beineberg considers the law 
just as insignificant as Basini who is nothing but “an empty, accidental 
form” (YT 65; VZ 59). Compared to the intangible law, Basini holds 
one advantage: “Basini is, in the end, a human being as well.” His re-
sidual humanity offers Beineberg the opportunity to feel injury; he calls 
it a “particular feeling,” when he mistreats Basini. By sacrificing him, 
Beineberg would expose himself to empathic pain—“But that’s exactly 
what this is all about! A sacrifice!” (YT 64; VZ 59). The experience of 
empathic pain during the sacrificial spectacle would afford him, Beine-
berg expects, with a sense of continuity that points beyond the finitude 
of his human existence. As in Bataille’s account, Beineberg believes that 
the sacrificial spectacle confronts perpetrators and spectators alike with 
their own mortality but promises a transcendental experience of infinite 
existence as well.
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The victim dies and the spectators share in what his death reveals. 
This is what religious historians call the sacramental element. This 
sacramental element is the revelation of continuity through the 
death of a discontinuous being to those who watch it as a solemn 
rite. A violent death disrupts the creature’s discontinuity: what re-
mains, what the tense onlookers experience in the succeeding si-
lence, is the continuity of all existence with which the victim is now 
one. (Bataille 1986, 82)
Beineberg expects to forge such a bond between himself and the universe, 
to become a cosmic being (kosmischer Mensch) by performing the sacri-
ficial killing of Basini. Basini’s death would access the truth of existence; 
it would offer Beineberg a thread “which runs to my soul, to innermost 
knowledge, and binds me to the cosmos” (YT 65; VZ 59). As the novel 
progresses, Beineberg’s mystic quest for a cosmic union reveals itself as a 
farce. To his and Törless’s disappointment, the attempt to separate Basi-
ni’s soul from his body to gain a “moment of immortality” fails miserably. 
Afterward Reiting gets a good laugh, and Beineberg whips Basini with his 
leather belt until exhaustion stops him (YT 138; VZ 121).
Reiting’s rationale for sacrificing Basini has nothing to do with ritual, 
spectacle, or aspirations for cosmic truth and metaphysical certainty. He 
takes a phenomenologist’s approach to power, keeps detailed records 
about “the cause, staging and development of the many intrigues that he 
instigated among his classmates,” and trains for a future in politics with a 
special emphasis on the art of coups d’état (YT 42; VZ 40). In hindsight 
Reiting’s political acumen proves superior to Törless’s and possibly even 
to the narrator’s grasp of politics. To them, the “age of revolutions” at the 
end of the nineteenth century is consigned to a distant past while Reiting 
prepares for a new dawn of violent upheaval (YT 43; VZ 40).
Basini’s situation presents Reiting with the opportunity to move his 
experiments with political manipulation far beyond intrigue and toward 
the use of violence as an instrument of power. As Beineberg observes early 
on in the story,
Reiting would sacrifice Basini and feel nothing but interest in the 
process. He would dissect him morally to discover what such un-
dertaking would involve. And, as I have said, he would deal with 
you or me just as roundly as he would with Basini. (YT 64; VZ 59)
Reiting’s approach to power and violence is sober, amoral, and analytic. 
With his mastery of the intrigue, Reiting isolated his rival Beineberg for a 
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leadership position even before he discovered Basini’s theft. And he realized 
immediately the new possibilities for his research that Basini’s transgres-
sion opens up to him. Systematically, he probes the different instrumental 
opportunities of physical violence on Basini.
In Vertrauen und Gewalt (2008) Jan Philipp Reemtsma distinguishes 
three forms of physical violence and introduces a new terminology: plac-
ing (lozierend) violence, raptive violence, and autotelic violence (2008, 
104–24). To differentiate these forms of violence, he pays particular at-
tention to their stance toward the other’s body. Placing violence seeks 
spatial control over the other’s body. The body is not a target of destruc-
tion but treated as a removable obstacle or as an instrument to reach 
a defined goal. The modern justice system practices placing violence by 
imprisoning criminals rather than inflicting mutilation and other tradi-
tional forms of physical punishment; the temporary removal of enemy 
combatants during a military conflict and their release after the end of 
hostilities offers another example of this form of violence. The point of 
placing violence is not to kill all enemy soldiers but to prevent them from 
interfering with one’s objectives.
While placing violence has no interest in the body as such, raptive vio-
lence seeks possession of the other’s body, generally for the purpose of 
sexual gratification. The other’s body is neither obstacle nor instrument, 
but immediate target for exploitation. The other’s physical destruction 
might occur during acts of placing and raptive violence, but such destruc-
tion is not their purpose. Autotelic violence aims at the destruction of 
the physical integrity of the body. Autotelic violence seeks no discernible 
purpose beyond the body’s utter devastation. Occurrences of autotelic 
violence are generally dismissed as barbaric aberrations during the pro-
cess of civilization (Norbert Elias). Even though modern society offers 
no place to legitimize such violence, Reemtsma insists that theories of 
modernity should never dismiss this phenomenon as insignificant.
Reiting understands Basini as his chance to investigate these three 
forms of physical violence. An aspiring tyrant who exerts his influence 
by creating constantly new majorities by switching alliances, Reiting is 
most interested in the instrumental use of placing violence (YT 43; VZ 
40). For not reporting him as a thief, Reiting receives Basini’s “blind 
obedience” and gets complete spatial control over his movements. He 
explores the limits of forced loyalty to the point of Basini’s slavery (YT 
45; VZ 43). Reiting is also the first to experiment with raptive violence. 
The moment he realizes, however, that the continued sexual abuse gives 
rise to Basini’s fantasy that his abuser might become his friend and pro-
tector, Reiting ends his experiments with raptive violence. Its long-term 
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use diminishes the efficiency of placing violence (YT 59, 142; VZ 54, 
114, 125). As mentioned previously, Beineberg fantasizes immediately 
about using autotelic violence against Basini (driving sharp bamboo 
through his guts). Reiting contemplates this terminal form of violence 
only during the final stages of the Basini case. At that point, the lessons 
in blind obedience have reached a dead end. Basini already eats his own 
excrement, and his body is covered with sores from the beatings to 
which he submits willingly (YT 142–43; VZ 124–25). Reiting creates a 
situation that ends almost with Basini’s lynching by a crowd of students, 
and the next night Basini shall be tied to his bed and whipped with the 
blades of foils by all of his classmates, a mutilation he was not expected 
to survive (YT 130, 148–49; VZ 114, 130). Although such communal 
beating could constitute an act of autotelic violence, one might argue 
that Reiting probes the possibility of whether he can incite his class-
mates to use autotelic violence. Reiting’s own interest would not be in 
the destruction of the victim’s body but remain within his instrumental 
theory of violence. In contrast to Beineberg, Reiting never loses control 
during his experiments with violence and power. Even when Basini gives 
himself up to the school authorities and thus prevents his execution, 
Reiting delivers one last example of his masterful ability to manipulate 
others. With the blame steered toward Basini, the administration expels 
the victim from the boarding school while the abusers survive the epi-
sode without a blemish on their reputation.
The novel’s narrator refuses to distinguish between Beineberg’s farci-
cal search for a cosmic union and Reiting’s recklessly analytical experi-
ments with physical violence. He endorses Törless’s eventual denun-
ciation of both models: “what you two are doing now is nothing but 
thoughtless, dreary, disgusting torture” (YT 143; VZ 125). Törless’s 
qualifications are of critical importance to understanding his refusal 
to condemn torture per se. Basini’s continual degradation has lost its 
power to entertain and fascinate by the end of the novel. They are just 
as mechanical and lifeless as the world appeared to Törless during the 
novel’s first scene (YT 3; VZ 7). Törless rejects further violence against 
Basini not out of ethical considerations but because his rationale for 
torturing Basini has failed. More of the same violence serves no pur-
pose anymore, as he tells Reiting. “You make me sick! Your nastiness is 
meaningless. That’s the repellent thing about you” (YT 145; VZ 127). 
His unsuccessful search for meaning causes his break with Reiting and 
Beineberg.
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Suffering from what Zygmunt Bauman identifies as a central experience 
of modernity, Törless encounters objects, concepts, and people as distress-
ingly doppelsinnig (VZ 90). In contrast to Bauman, Törless equates the 
experience of ambiguity with the threat of chaos, disorder, and loss of 
control but is fascinated by the predictability with which ambiguous con-
cepts can be relied upon in calculations. To learn that a system as rational 
as mathematics contains imaginary numbers that engineers might apply 
to built objects as reliable and sturdy as bridges fascinates and disturbs 
Törless to the point of obsession.
In that kind of calculation you have very solid figures at the begin-
ning, which can represent meters or weights or something similarly 
tangible, and which are at least real numbers. And there are real 
numbers at the end of the calculation as well. But they are con-
nected to one another by something that doesn’t exist. [. . .] But 
the really uncanny thing about it is the strength that exists in such 
a calculation, holding you so firmly that you land safely in the end. 
(YT 82; VZ 74)17
Törless’s response to mathematics contrasts sharply with Heidegger’s 
reading of the Greek origin of this word, μάθημα, as the always already 
known (das Immer-schon-Bekannte). In The Age of the World Picture 
Heidegger calls mathematics the ground plan of nature (Grundriß der 
Natur): “that which man knows in advance in his observation of whatev-
er is and in his intercourse with things” (Heidegger 1994, 80; Heidegger 
1977, 118). Relating the mathematics of infinity to the physical world, 
Törless senses that Heidegger’s word could turn against itself: the Grun-
driß might become a Riß im Grund. Törless experiences such a possibility 
not as an existential risk but as the opportunity to take a glimpse at the 
force he expects to hold the world of appearances together. Obsessed 
with potential points of rupture in the logical structure of mathematics, 
Törless develops “a real mania,” as his teacher comments, “for seeking 
out only things which seemed to signify—for [Törless] at least—a gap in 
the causality of our thinking” (YT 154; VZ 135).
Törless perceives such gaps in causality not solely in mathematics but 
in nature and the social world as well. A sunny opening between clouds 
turns into a terrifying encounter with nature’s infinity, an abyss upside 
down. After numerous uses of infinity in equations, infinity had “sud-
denly been woken to life and grown terrible before him” thanks to one 
look into the sky (YT 69; VZ 63). Similarly disrupting experiences with 
imaginary numbers and Kant’s Critique of Reason feed his desire to ac-
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cess reality’s underlying force, but these instances remain elusive and in-
tangible. Only the Basini encounter offers a concrete physical presence as 
a link to this other dimension of existence: “Everything had now become 
real, embodied in a single human being” (YT 67). Basini’s Doppelsinnig-
keit—a normal appearance concealing a core of perversity—defies, as we 
have seen earlier, Törless’s initial attempt to comprehend this molten drop 
of the perverse. Rather than practicing philosophical understanding and 
aesthetic reconstruction, Törless initiates a series of violent and humiliat-
ing acts to transform Basini into an access point to the other reality.
Törless’s rationale for violence is not to understand the perverse but to 
examine his victim’s experience of pain and degradation. Reiting investi-
gates the extent to which another human being can be violated before the 
violator would lose control over his subject. Törless seeks the same shat-
tering point for a different purpose. He wants to explode Basini’s sense of 
self and observe if another self emerges from its ruins. Unlike Beineberg, 
Törless never fantasizes about inflicting autotelic violence, and he does 
not expect any communal experience from Basini’s sufferings. He antici-
pates for Basini the opposite of a martyr’s experience. A martyr is thought 
to suffer bodily destruction while “its core, the soul, remains all of one 
piece” (Brown 1981, 83). Such spiritual perseverance testifies to the truth 
of the martyr’s belief and strengthens the coherence of the martyr’s com-
munity.18 Since the abject Basini forfeited his right to remain part of their 
community, Törless expects the disintegration of Basini’s core of identity 
and hopes for an eyewitness report of what happens when the surface of 
normality rips apart and its underlying force is revealed.
To study the shattering and replacement of a self-image Törless turns 
into Basini’s cruelest and most imaginative torturer. Törless’s expectations 
regarding the effects of torture mirror Richard Rorty’s account of acts of 
torture with surprising precision. In a significant turnaround, however, 
Basini’s experience will frustrate these expectations and challenge any 
instrumental theory of violence. Following Elaine Scarry’s analysis of The 
Body in Pain, Rorty distinguishes the infliction of pain and the interroga-
tion as the two primary acts of torture. As Scarry argues, physical torture 
transforms the victim’s body into an instrument for the tormentor. The 
pain severs the victim’s links to his or her former world. The torturer’s 
first blow does away with the victim’s faith in the written and unwritten 
rules of social interaction. It destroys the basic trust in the world (Welt-
vertrauen), as Améry writes (1977, 56). No subsequent social interaction 
will ever fully restore it again. The interrogation—consisting of “ques-
tion” and “answer”—exacerbates a similar experience of alienation. The 
purpose of the “question” is not gaining information but supplying the 
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torturer with an air of justification. The victim’s “answer” is framed as 
a betrayal, making “[the victim] rather than the torturer, his voice rather 
than his pain, the cause of his loss of self and world” (Scarry 1987, 35).
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) Rorty presents a detailed 
argument as to how the torturer thwarts with his interrogation the victim’s 
future attempt to reconstitute his or her self. Since Basini’s experience chal-
lenges precisely this account, we need to take a closer look at Rorty’s deter-
mination of the relationship between violence, humiliation, and the victim’s 
sense of self. Rorty distinguishes between human pain and animal pain. 
While humans and animals share the feeling of physical pain, only humans 
experience humiliation, a form of pain that affects the subject’s language, 
self, and social reputation. Bodily pain is understood as a means to cause 
such humiliation: “the worst thing you can do to somebody is not to make 
her scream in agony but to use that agony in such a way that even when 
the agony is over, she cannot reconstitute herself” (Rorty 1989, 177). In 
the same way as Scarry describes how the torturer transforms the victim’s 
body into an instrument of pain, Rorty stresses how the tormentor turns 
the victim’s core beliefs into his instruments of humiliation. He searches 
for the victim’s “key sentence” and forces him to deny its truth (179). Such 
a renunciation of core beliefs renders futile the victim’s future efforts to 
reconstruct a self-image in a coherent narrative.
Now that I have believed or desired this, I can never be what I 
hoped to be, what I thought I was. The story I have been telling 
myself about myself—my picture of myself as honest, or loyal, or 
devout—no longer makes sense. I no longer have a self to make 
sense of. There is no world in which I can picture myself as living, 
because there is no vocabulary in which I can tell a coherent story 
about myself. (179)
Reading Orwell’s 1984, Rorty analyzes a torturer’s use of such key sen-
tences. O’Brien identifies the fear of rats and the love for Julia as Winston 
Smith’s core beliefs. To break Smith he forges these two “sentences” to-
gether. Terrorized by the threat of physical pain, Smith desires briefly that 
rats should not chew on his but rather on Julia’s face. The memory of this 
wish to let her be mutilated shatters Smith’s sense of self. The victim is left 
with the shards of a self-image that will never again fit together. In 1984, 
O’Brien reconfigures Smith’s remaining shards according to the design of 
the totalitarian order.
Törless searches for Basini’s “key sentence” during the first torture ses-
sion and proves his talent for degrading another human being. After a 
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first flogging of Basini neither Reiting nor Beineberg knows what further 
harm they could inflict on their victim. Törless introduces the idea of hu-
miliation: “Törless said quietly, almost kindly, ‘Say: I’m a thief’” (YT 80; 
VZ 72, 102). After the threat of more physical pain, Basini repeats these 
words, but Törless realizes his failure to identify Basini’s key sentence. 
When Beineberg and Reiting try to push the humiliation further—Basini 
has to denounce himself now as their swinish, thieving beast—the boy 
responds “without hesitation” (YT 80; VZ 72). Regretting to have shared 
his idea of humiliating Basini, Törless stops playing guessing games about 
key sentences and interrogates Basini henceforth alone. He heightens Ba-
sini’s sufferings by forcing him to describe in detail his feelings during 
torture and sexual abuse.
Törless shares Rorty’s expectations of the effect of Basini’s transgres-
sions and abuse on his self-image. The longer he interrogates Basini, the 
more leading Törless’s questions become. When Basini begs not to have 
to talk about his experiences—“No, don’t make me tell you! Please don’t 
ask me to do that! I’ll do anything you like. But don’t make me tell. . . . 
Oh, you have such a special way of tormenting me . . . !” (YT 112; VZ 
99)—Törless considers Basini’s despair as evidence that he has found a 
path to his (already shattered?) inner core. With Basini preferring to be 
raped and beaten rather than answer any more questions, Törless senses 
the opportunity to secure a detailed eyewitness report of the shattering of 
a self-image. In his questioning, Törless proceeds carefully in three phases, 
focusing on ever more devastating events. Expecting that the act of thiev-
ery should have ruined Basini’s self-image, Törless asks Basini about the 
psychological effects of this transgression. Instead of an existential crisis, 
Basini recalls simply his need for money and the lack of willing lend-
ers. An exasperated Törless points him toward the anticipated answer. 
“That’s not what I mean. [. . .] I’m asking how come—how could you do 
that, how did you feel? What was going on inside you at that moment?” 
(YT 116; VZ 103). To his frustration, Basini claims not to have noticed 
anything out of the ordinary. “It was just a moment, I didn’t feel anything, 
I didn’t think about anything, and all of a sudden it had simply hap-
pened” (YT 116; VZ 103). The memory of his theft inflicts no irreversible 
harm to his self-narrative.
Undeterred, Törless proceeds to the second phase and commands 
Basini to remember the first time Reiting raped him. As if he had just 
finished reading Rorty’s theory of humiliation, Törless spells out the 
expected answer.
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Look, all of a sudden someone asks you to perform a humiliating 
service like that, and the same moment you feel you’re too cow-
ardly to say no: didn’t your whole being feel torn asunder [ging da 
nicht durch dein ganzes Wesen ein Riß]? Wasn’t there some vague 
terror, as though something unspeakable had happened inside you? 
(YT 117; VZ 103)
Instead of pleasing Törless with a fitting response, Basini objects to Tör-
less’s underlying premise that singular events cause identifiable effects on 
the self. “God, I don’t understand you; I don’t know what you’re after; I 
can’t say anything to you, anything at all” (YT 117; VZ 103).
Understanding Basini’s reaction as resistance, Törless moves the inter-
rogation into the third phase. Rather than asking Basini to remember 
the physical pain and humiliation, Törless threatens to recreate these 
situations and force Basini to reexperience them. Törless pursues a simi-
lar goal as Claude Lanzmann during his interview with Avraham Bomba 
in Shoah. Placing Bomba in a barbershop, Lanzmann asks him to re-
peat the gestures and movements he used in Treblinka to cut the hair of 
those who would be gassed. As Lanzmann argues, “it is starting from 
this moment that the truth is incarnated and [Bomba] relives the scene, 
that suddenly knowledge becomes incarnated” (cited in LaCapra 1998, 
123). For the same purpose, Törless plans to reenact Basini’s abuse. He 
threatens to spit at Basini, choke him, prick him with needles, force him 
to masturbate while sighing “Oh, my dear mother,” and so on (YT 117; 
VZ 103). This showing of the instruments forces Basini to the brink of 
despair. Claiming the legitimacy of a scientific researcher conducting a 
vital vivisection, Törless rejects Basini’s plea and informs him in detail of 
what he expects to hear.
Yes, I’m tormenting you. But that’s not the important thing for me; 
I just want to know one thing: if I push all that into you like knives, 
what is inside you? What is happening inside you? Does something 
explode in you? Tell me! Suddenly, like a piece of glass that sud-
denly explodes into a thousand splinters before it’s shown so much 
as a crack? The image you’ve made of yourself, isn’t it extinguished 
by a breath? Doesn’t another one leap to appear in its place, as 
magic-lantern pictures leap out of the darkness? Do you not under-
stand me at all? I can’t explain it any better than that; you have to 
tell me yourself . . . ! (YT 117; VZ 104)
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Törless mistakes Basini’s collapse as an auspicious sign for the effective-
ness of his questioning. But Basini does not offer the spectacle of a retrau-
matized victim who relives past humiliations. His breakdown signals the 
absence of trauma and not its truth incarnate. He does not plunge into 
Dionysian depths, and his identity does not shatter like a mirror. Neither 
haunted by traumata nor driven by appalling desires nor graced with 
epiphanies, Basini collapses just like a suspect who does not understand 
his interrogator’s line of questioning.
I don’t know what you want; I can’t explain anything to you. It 
happens on the spur of the moment; it can’t happen any other way; 
you would do exactly the same as I do. (YT 118; VZ 104)
By not revealing a self-shattering traumatic truth, Basini makes no claim 
for heroic resilience and exemplary fortitude. Likewise, he is not a soul-
less, postpsychological subject whose abilities to feel and experience are 
numbed beyond repair. He suffers the pain and humiliation. At the novel’s 
end, the pain nearly immobilizes Basini’s body, and the outward signs of his 
former personality almost completely disappear. As the narrator observes: 
“only in his eyes a remnant of [Basini’s personality] huddled together, and 
seemed to cling, fearful and pleading, to Törless” (YT 141; VZ 124).
Nonetheless, Basini’s experience does not fit into Rorty’s framework. 
Instead of exhibiting the symptoms and impediments Törless (and theorists 
of pain and trauma) anticipate, Basini remembers and fears in all clarity 
what his three tormentors have done to him. No matter how many repul-
sive and humiliating acts he has to perform, they are linked as continuous 
steps toward his survival. Rather than revealing traumatic ruptures that 
defy any coherent narration of his experiences, Basini’s narrative of the 
events “was presented as a simple necessity, peaceful and undistorted” (YT 
118; VZ 104). Törless’s experiments with violence end in disappointment 
just like Beineberg’s experiments. But there is a crucial difference between 
these two failures. Beineberg’s probing of Basini’s soul anticlimaxed in ridi-
cule. Törless’s encounter with Basini ends with an epistemological shock so 
powerful that neither Törless nor his narrator can contemplate its implica-
tions. Törless’s experience ends with a challenge to the novel’s notion of 
subjectivity that Musil’s first novel cannot accept but that moves after the 
war to the center of Musil’s reflections on war and violence.
Causing Violence 69
The Basini Challenge
“‘If you were in my situation, you’d do exactly the same,’ Basini had 
said” (YT 118; VZ 104). Basini’s challenge moves beyond the mere disap-
pointment of a failed experiment. He exposes a particular precariousness 
of human identity to Törless. By forcing Basini to relive an unmaster-
able past, Törless intends to observe the disintegration of Basini’s former 
self-image as well as its replacement with one reflecting his monstrous 
deeds. The crumbling of Basini’s disturbingly normal appearance and the 
spectacle of his horrified self-recognition as a monster would split the 
inner core of his identity and expose to Törless the underlying force that 
holds together the world of appearances. The experiment’s unintended 
result leaves Törless with the alternative of rejecting Basini’s experience 
as unreliable and unrepresentative or of reconsidering the premise of his 
experiment. Convinced that he has “more character” than Basini and acts 
always out of a sense of “respectability,” Törless seeks to reassure himself 
initially that he would never have to face Basini’s situation and therefore 
never experience comparable humiliations (YT 118; VZ 104). Although 
he considers himself as a model product of Bildung—a strong character 
in harmony with society’s norms and conventions—Törless suffers from 
the nagging suspicion of missing Basini’s point.
Sensing a challenge to his notion of a self consistent and solid enough 
that it could shatter under extreme pressure, Törless glances at a possi-
bility too horrifying to contemplate.
No, what matters isn’t how I would act, but the fact that if I really 
did act like Basini, I’d feel it was every bit as normal [ebensowenig 
Außergewöhnliches] as he does. That’s the important thing: my 
sense of myself would be just as straightforward [einfach], just as 
unambiguous [von allem Fragwürdigen entfernt] as his. (YT 118; 
VZ 105)
Törless dreads that Basini might state a fundamental fact about the rela-
tion between self-image and the experience of extreme situations: the 
possibility one might live through catastrophic events without being 
permanently marked and transformed by them. The self should not be 
imagined as a single solid core (or one coherent narrative) that might 
crack (or unravel) but as so malleable that it could adapt to any situa-
tion without losing its sense of continuity and normality. Törless could 
accept ambiguity as a source of disorientation and a challenge to his cu-
riosity. His world consisted of two realities: the rationally ordered world 
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of appearances and an underlying reality—irrational, imaginary, and 
aconceptual—that despite its elusive otherness held the surface world 
together. Occasionally, Törless has confusing but never traumatizing 
glimpses of this second reality.
The implication of Basini’s experiences that anyone’s sense of self could 
pass through extreme situations and remain just as normal, straightforward, 
and unquestionable instills Törless with the horror of a very different 
notion of ambiguity. Rather than “experiencing objects, processes and 
people as things with ambiguous meanings [als etwas Doppelsinniges]” 
(YT 70; VZ 64), the sense of the self emerges as so flexible and adaptable 
that its very continuity becomes the locus of ambiguity. Neither respect-
ability nor Bildung protects against the permanent malleability of the 
self. Instead of becoming and remaining a different species—an unclean 
insect, the perverse other, or a shattered self—Basini challenges any stable 
notion of identity in favor of the continuity of adaptations to the various 
situations he encounters. Horror is, as Stanley Cavell suggests, “the per-
ception of the precariousness of human identity,” the awareness that “we 
may be, or may become, something other than we are, or take ourselves 
for” (1999, 418–19). To Törless’s horror, the debased Basini does not be-
come inhuman, a monster, but merely adapts to the monstrous situation 
his abusers created. The malleability of the self allows him to return to 
his former personality, tell about his experiences in a calm undistorted 
narrative, and expect that Törless would adapt to similar circumstances 
in much the same way.
Törless did not expect that Basini’s torture and abuse would challenge 
his preconception of a stable (but breakable) human identity. A thorough 
reconsideration of the effects of catastrophic experiences on the sense of 
the self will take a central place in Musil’s postwar writings. The Con-
fusions of Young Törless warns of the dangerous potential of the Ba-
sini challenge only indirectly in Törless’s and the narrator’s inability and 
avoidance to dwell on the implications for the constitution of the modern 
subject. The idea of the malleable self shocked Törless to such an extent 
that the narrator edits the scraps and fragments of his thoughts into a 
coherent form. More significantly, the narrator seeks to convert the hor-
ror Törless feels once he realizes the possibility of a malleable self into 
evidence for a fundamental difference between Törless and Basini.
This thought—coming to him in scraps of sentences, superimposed 
on one another and constantly going back to the beginning—added 
to his contempt for Basini a very intimate pain, one which was quiet 
Causing Violence 71
but which touched his innermost equilibrium more profoundly 
than any morality could do. (YT 118; VZ 105)
The narrator’s interpretation morphs Törless’s idea of the self’s unending 
malleability into evidence for the claim that Törless’s sense of self has 
been permanently affected by (almost) having had this thought. While 
the absence of lasting harm to Basini’s self-image inspires Törless’s new 
idea of the self, his higher sensibility originates supposedly from his own 
alleged experience of denigration. The narrator reduces Törless’s horror 
to a minute amount of pain that passes imperceptibly below Törless’s 
experiential threshold. By claiming this intimate experience for Törless’s 
innermost equilibrium—too intimate for Törless to notice—the narrator 
lays the ground for his claim that Törless gains a superior sense of the self 
and the world. Törless’s shock becomes another instance of the mere diz-
ziness he felt when he set out to write his essay on human nature, another 
“earthquake deep within the core of [Törless], which caused no percep-
tible waves and which nonetheless made the whole of his soul tremble” 
(YT 101; VZ 90).
The adult Törless offers a similar response when asked if he felt de-
graded by the Basini episode. He concedes the denigration but claims it 
left behind only “a tiny quantity of poison” in his soul (YT 128; VZ 112). 
Its small dosage allowed him, Törless believes, “to rid the soul of its overly 
calm, complacent health, and instead to give it a kind of health that is 
more refined, acute and understanding” (YT 128; VZ 112). The three 
metaphors—imperceptible waves, slight pain, weak toxin—are meant 
to explain the unfolding of Törless’s superior aesthetic sensibility. This 
metaphoric argument, however, offers only a rationale for Törless’s use 
of violence and diverts attention away from the insight that he might act 
like Basini in a similar situation without experiencing anything out of the 
ordinary either. His research into the sense of the self culminates and ends 
abruptly because neither Törless nor his narrator can bear to contemplate 
the possibility of the self’s unending malleability. Törless terminates his 
experiments the moment this possibility surfaces, simply declaring there 
was “nothing more to be hoped for from Basini” (YT 120; VZ 106).
Despite Törless’s explicit disavowal of the Basini challenge, the conflict 
between the malleability of a person’s subjectivity and the expectation of 
an irreparable shattering of one’s self-image returns once more in Musil’s 
novel. This time Törless, not Basini, acts upon a desire that he believes to 
be irreconcilable with his sense of self. The night after the interrogation 
Basini slips into Törless’s bed, professes to love his abuser, and Törless 
sleeps with him after an initial bout of revulsion turns into desire. One 
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moment disrupts the ecstatic enjoyment and echoes precisely the Ror-
tyian expectation of a shattering self-image during deepest humiliation: 
“Only at the moment when he was carried away did he awaken for a 
second and clutch desperately at a single thought: ‘This isn’t me! . . . isn’t 
me!’” (YT 122; VZ 108).
The consequences of Törless’s This-isn’t-me! moment bears, however, 
scant similarity to Winston Smith’s breakdown in Orwell’s 1984. Törless 
immediately affirms Basini’s notion of the malleable self: “It won’t be me 
again until tomorrow! . . . Tomorrow . . .” (YT 122; VZ 108). The following 
day Törless appears indeed unchanged by the experience, and his intimate 
encounters with Basini preserve and reinforce his prevalent self-image as an 
individual of exceptional aesthetic sensibility. The narrator remains so pre-
occupied with his defense of Törless’s heterosexuality that he does not note 
the malleability of Törless’s self.19 The feeling of shame and denigration Tör-
less experiences after his secret trysts with Basini—not because he acted on 
his homosexual desire but because he chose the “despised and humiliated” 
effeminate boy as his sexual partner (YT 123; VZ 108)—turns into new evi-
dence for his aesthetic superiority over Reiting and Beineberg. Already dur-
ing the first torture session he enjoyed the “malicious pleasure [. . .] that [. . .] 
he was absorbing these events more fully than his companions were” (YT 
79; VZ 71). To denigrate himself by acting on his homosexual desire offers 
more such malicious pleasure since his friends would never fully experience 
the suffering of shame while pursuing their desires: “They seemed to lack 
the crown of thorns that his own pangs of conscience had placed upon his 
head” (YT 125; VZ 110). His reaction follows Basini’s pattern of an elastic 
subjectivity that returns to its shape after extreme experiences. Törless’s self-
image did not shatter but reemerged, bolstering its profile.
As a novel on violence The Confusions of Young Törless offers a variety 
of contrasting positions on the justification and the effects of inflicting 
and suffering physical harm. The conflict of the effects of violence is left 
unresolved at the end of Musil’s first novel. This conflict, even as an un-
settled one, remains one of its major achievements. As a representation 
of the perverse The Confusions of Young Törless moves barely beyond 
stereotypical homophobic anxieties against the effeminate boy. Rather 
than analyzing the perverse—as the narrator, Törless, and Musil in his 
prewar essays repeatedly set out to do—the novel participates in its con-
struction as a legitimate target of violence. Beineberg, Reiting, and Törless 
shared the assumption that violence was an instrument that causes pre-
dictable effects. The novel exposed Beineberg’s mystic goals for a cosmic 
union as empty and reveals his continued beatings of Basini as an aimless 
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and senseless use of violence. Reiting’s investigation of violence as an in-
strument of power is rejected as equally distasteful but represented none-
theless as the most skillful use of violence. Like Beineberg and in contrast 
to Reiting, Törless’s experiment with violence failed to achieve its objec-
tive. Instead of the expected and desired result—the shattering of Basini’s 
self-image—Törless was confronted with a sense of self far more durable 
and malleable than his concept of subjectivity predicted. Törless’s experi-
ment with violence shifted momentarily the perspective from a purely in-
strumental concept toward a situational analysis of violence. Rather than 
revealing Törless’s pursuit of his ends as wrongheaded—as in Beineberg’s 
case—the novel opens the possibility that the cause-and-effect approach 
to violence might be insufficient to account for the complexity of these 
phenomena. Törless himself underwent an episode of humiliation, and his 
sense of self proved as malleable as Basini’s. But the narrator and Törless 
shied away from any further exploration of their observations.
To conclude the discussion of violence in The Confusions of Young 
Törless, one has to mention a moment in the novel that points in a dif-
ferent direction than its overly neat conclusion (and justification of vio-
lence), one that points already toward Musil’s own initial embrace of the 
war in August 1914, and possibly even his postwar preoccupation with 
the malleable self. When frightened by the possibility that his self would 
not shatter but that he would feel “every bit as normal” in Basini’s situa-
tion, Törless experienced not simply difficulties in formulating this idea. 
He reacted intuitively to this new unexpected ambiguity. Not feeling the 
intimate pain the narrator noted only afterward, Törless attempts to re-
member at this moment of crisis the effects of a feeling of real danger that 
he had once before experienced.
Simply terrified as though he had been ambushed, and without re-
flection he had rapidly sought a way of parrying the attack and 
covering himself. That had happened at a moment of real threat, 
and he was irritated by the sensation he had felt then. Those quick, 
thoughtless impulses. In vain he tried to unleash them once again. 
But he knew that they had within an instant taken away from the 
danger everything that was strange and ambiguous about it. (YT 
118–19; VZ 105)
Rather than contemplating the implications of a possibly noncausal rela-
tion between catastrophic events and the subject’s sense of self, implica-
tions that would render his notion of subjectivity deeply uncertain, Tör-
less sought to relive a moment of danger. The fear of an attack delivered 
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in the past a sudden certainty and clarity as if everything could be seen by 
“eyes that had awoken from a hundred years of sleep” (YT 119; VZ 105). 
Fearing the possibility of the malleable self within himself, Törless hoped 
to find safety in the memory of a more primal moment of existential risks, 
a moment of clear oppositions, shapes, and borders.
Törless failed to access such a moment at will. But did Robert Mu-
sil find himself in August 1914 in precisely such a situation of sudden 
certainty and clarity? The moment when all distinctions and differences 
among Germans seemed to have melted away, leaving behind but one 
collective body “in which the individual is nothing again outside of its 
elementary effort to protect the tribe” (1022). Only after Musil lived 
through the experience of the mobilization, and after he recognized the 
catastrophe in which Europe had found itself subsequently, did he return 
to the notion of the malleable self. But now it was no longer a feared 
though rare possibility for certain individuals. After the war, as we will 
see in the next chapter, it became for Musil a central phenomenon of 




War, Violence, and the Malleable Self
Robert Musil’s Postwar Critique of Violence in  
The Man Without Qualities
In his two novels, Musil investigated violence from fundamentally differ-
ent directions. Acts of physical violence are at the core of The Confusions 
of Young Törless (1906), but they are infrequent and peripheral to his 
great, unfinished novel The Man Without Qualities (parts of which were 
published in 1930, 1932, and 1943). Törless participates in the systematic 
torture and abuse of another student. Ulrich, the protagonist of Musil’s 
second novel, neither rapes others nor is he prone to violence in the pub-
lished sections of the novel.1 Except for the brief moment when Törless 
encounters the possibility of the malleable self, Musil’s first novel is pre-
occupied with imagining, anticipating, and observing the lasting effects 
caused by violence and humiliation. Traumatic experiences should inflict 
irreparable harm on the victim’s sense of self or result in an enduring re-
finement of at least one of Basini’s tormentors. Törless would mature into 
a Nietzschean subject, capable of perceiving and justifying the destruc-
tion of another being as an aesthetic phenomenon.
Nothing seemed more absurd and frightening to Törless, his narrator, 
and their contemporaries than the idea that physical violence might not 
produce lasting effects on its victims (and perpetrators). To translate this 
from the level of the individual to society, from private biographies to his-
torical developments: catastrophic events of mass violence like World War 
I should be turning points and transform forever the lives and societies of 
those who experienced its devastation. They should change the course of 
history. In “To the Planetarium,” the final section of One-Way Street (1928), 
Walter Benjamin expressed this expectation with awe-inspiring grandiosity. 
For the first time “on a planetary scale” and “in spirit of technology” the 
world war became “an attempt at new and unprecedented commingling 
with the cosmic power” (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 1, 486–87):
In the nights of annihilation of the last war, the frame of mankind 
was shaken by a feeling that resembled the bliss of the epileptic. 
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And the revolts that followed it were the first attempt of mankind 
to bring the new body under its control. The power of the prole-
tariat is the measure of its convalescence.
Whether “the frenzy of destruction” will be conquered in “the ecstasy 
of procreation” and mark a new beginning for mankind, as Benjamin 
hoped (487); or whether one expects that the first truly global war will 
eventually prove itself to be another step in the civilizing process toward 
the pacification of the earth, as Norbert Elias argued; or, more darkly, 
whether Freud recognized that his generation had to take a step back in 
this civilizing process because the majority of his contemporaries exposed 
themselves as cultural hypocrites; or whether Adorno and Horkheimer 
understood such catastrophic events as evidence for a dialectic of en-
lightenment, as instances of the “reversion of enlightened civilization to 
barbarism in reality” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, xix), all these crit-
ics agreed that the deep difference between prewar and postwar times 
required a fundamental reconsideration of the history of mankind. Rob-
ert Musil’s postwar reflections came, as we will see, to a very different 
conclusion.
Even mass violence on the scale of a world war does not cause neces-
sarily traumatic breakdowns among its participants, collapse tradition, 
and break historical continuity. Such man-made disasters might not mark 
a new beginning of a new mankind or reveal the barbaric face of our 
true self, but their observable effects could be surprisingly inconclusive 
and volatile. As Musil noted in 1923 with equal parts of surprise and 
conviction: “no one will seriously believe that the German republican of 
1923 is a different person from the submissive German subject of 1914” 
(PS 164; ERK 1369). The postwar evidence contradicted Musil’s initial 
expectation that the mass violence would prove to be devastating for the 
self-image of the modern subject. Musil was fascinated by the same war 
and postwar phenomena that Hermann Broch described later in his novel 
The Sleepwalkers (1931–32).
Fantasy has become logical reality, but reality evolves the most a-
logical phantasmagoria. An age that is softer and more cowardly 
than any preceding age suffocates in waves of blood and poison-
gas; nations of bank clerks and profiteers hurl themselves upon 
barbed wire; a well-organized humanitarianism avails to hinder 
nothing, but calls itself the Red Cross and prepares artificial limbs 
for the victims; towns starve and coin money out of their own hun-
ger; spectacled school-teachers lead storm-troops; city dwellers live 
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in caves; [. . .] and in the end, once they are back in safety, apply 
their artificial limbs once more to the making of profits. (Broch 
1947, 373)
Confronted with a surprising continuity in the lives of those who suffered 
and inflicted violence on an unprecedented scale, Broch considered this 
upside-down world as symptomatic of the decay of values in modernity. 
Musil was less interested in developing a theory of values. He focused 
instead on the bank clerks and schoolteachers who could become storm 
troopers, live in caves, launch poison gas attacks, and then return home 
and carry on with their lives as if nothing out of the ordinary had oc-
curred.
Investigating the implications of this observation in his postwar writ-
ings, particularly in The Man Without Qualities, Musil reassessed his no-
tions of the self and of history. Against his own initial expectations after 
Austria’s defeat, Musil realized that the malleable self was no longer an 
idea too absurd and frightening to contemplate but a ubiquitous and 
central postwar phenomenon. The malleable self’s experience of violence 
led Musil to rethink the function of causation and progress in history. By 
intending to explore the causes of the world war in a world that seemed 
to defy the idea of causation, Musil’s antireductionist analysis of violence 
became central for his postwar writings and their modernist aesthetics. 
As I argue, Musil’s engagement with war and violence structures not only 
this masterpiece of European modernism, The Man Without Qualities, 
and its theories of the self, of emotion, and of history, but Musil becomes 
one of the most original thinkers about war and violence in the twentieth 
century.
At first sight, Robert Musil’s statements about the relationship between 
the war and The Man Without Qualities will strike readers of historical 
novels as surprisingly naive. Musil promised a causal analysis of the war. 
Five years before the publication of its first volume, he announced in a 
rare interview that his forthcoming novel—still titled The Twin Sister (Die 
Zwillingsschwester)—would end during general mobilization and recon-
struct Austria’s path to war: “That war came, had to come is the sum of 
all the conflicting developments and influences and movements which I 
show” (PuS 941). Beginning on a beautiful summer day in August 1913, 
The Man Without Qualities portrays “Austria’s last year of life [Lebens-
jahr],” moving ever so slowly toward August 1914 (PuS 950). In one of 
many similar notes outlining the structure of the novel, Musil writes in 
1932: “Basic idea: war. All lines lead to the war” (MoE 1851). The same 
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claim returns in notes from the late 1930s, after all authorized chapters 
of the novel had been published (MoE 1902). Musil’s insistence on the 
centrality of the war and its origins for the novel runs like a red thread 
through the fabric of his comments on The Man Without Qualities.
Can a work of fiction succeed in the causal analysis of a historical event 
as multifaceted and historically important as war? The most celebrated 
predecessor to Musil’s project of analyzing a major European war, Tol-
stoy’s War and Peace (1868–69), predicts the futility of any such enterprise. 
The further this novel of the Franco-Russian War progresses, the more in-
sistently its narrator interrupts the plot with reflections on history, neces-
sity, and freedom. The tone of these essayistic intrusions turns ever more 
urgent because the narrator recognizes insurmountable challenges to this 
project. No aspect of the cultural, social, political, or economical situation 
appeared wholly relevant or irrelevant for revealing the roots of the war. 
The reductionist method of understanding war by isolating its origins and 
causes seems to miss the phenomenon the narrator sought to explain. Find-
ing no alternative, Tolstoy’s narrator explains the occurrence of the Franco-
Russian War in the end with nothing more than the fact of its occurrence.
Therefore, all these causes—billions of causes—coincided so as to 
bring about what happened. And consequently none of them was 
the exclusive cause of the event, but the event had to take place 
simply because it had to take place. (Tolstoy 2007, 604–5)
Such tautological teleology reveals the limits of the narrator’s war analy-
sis. The reader is left with an alternative between one (nonexistent) suffi-
cient cause for the war and the pseudo-Hegelian assumption that because 
the war happened, the war had to happen. Tolstoy’s narrator terminates 
his search for the war’s origins and proposes a Copernican paradigm shift 
in understanding the path of history. Copernicus proved the earth’s move-
ment around the sun even though no one could feel the earth moving. 
The laws governing the earth’s orbit had to be accepted, Tolstoy observes, 
even though they seemed to contradict direct observations. Similarly, Tol-
stoy encourages his readers to abandon the search for concrete causes and 
motives steering the course of history. They must recognize that history is 
governed by laws even though these laws remain hidden from direct expe-
rience, even though no sequential path of history could be reconstructed. 
In the epilogue to War and Peace, Tolstoy accepts the existence of (unfelt) 
laws of history and abandons the idea of historical change based on hu-
man freedom. What was true for the course of the planets was true for 
the course of history, and “it is just as necessary to renounce a nonexistent 
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freedom [in history] and recognize a dependence we do not feel” (1215). 
Tolstoy rejects the idea that human actions are expressions of freedom 
that change history. Historical change occurs for far less visible reasons.
When Musil declared sixty years after War and Peace that his novel 
would succeed where Tolstoy’s had failed and retrace all the lines that 
led to the First World War, then it is rather tempting to ignore Musil’s 
announcement. Most readers of The Man Without Qualities have done 
just that and focused on the work’s other themes and obsessions: from its 
essayistic qualities to the exploration of Musil’s famed other condition. 
Readers who discuss the novel’s relationship to the war tend to reject the 
claim that The Man Without Qualities pursues the path to war. They find 
no trail leading from its pages to the catastrophic beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Considering the novel’s incompleteness—the storyline of its 
published parts never reaches the moment of general mobilization—such 
a reaction is understandable. Only drafts and notes indicate how some of 
the novel’s characters might have acted during the summer of 1914. In 
early stages of his project, Musil toyed with the idea of writing war epi-
sodes, but none of these plans came to fruition. Considering the dearth of 
evidence, Alexander Honold concludes in Die Stadt und der Krieg (1995), 
his study of Musil’s novel, that no direct relation between the war and 
The Man Without Qualities exists.
Vienna and the world war are absent [fehlen] in this novel, from 
the start they remain out of fiction’s reach. By missing both the 
historical reality of the world war and the geographical reality 
of the capital Vienna—which can only be noted if the points of 
reference and intention have been constructed in advance—Musil 
created a model of chronographic and topographical self-will [Ei-
gensinn], whose reality remains underdetermined and out of grasp.  
(1995, 23)
Instead of offering a sum total of the war’s causes, the novel lacks a direct 
relation to the war. Any claim to the contrary, Honold argues, is the de-
ceptive superimposition of a historically informed reader.
Despite the wide-ranging consensus that Musil’s statements regarding 
the analytical purpose of the novel are misleading, no consensus exists 
about the indirect relationship between The Man Without Qualities and 
the war. The two most interesting proposals for the novel’s oblique re-
sponse to the war are mutually exclusive. Both emphasize the significance 
of Musil’s concept of the Möglichkeitssinn, the sense of possibility, for rep-
resenting history.2 Both readings emphatically reject Musil’s claim that a 
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path leads from the novel to the war or from the war back to the novel. 
Nevertheless, these explorations of the war’s impact on the novel’s struc-
ture and content propose irreconcilable alternatives regarding the role of 
history, politics, and aesthetics in Musil’s unfinished project.
According to Michael André Bernstein, the novel’s pivotal quality is 
its “rejection of backshadowing in favor of sideshadowing” (1994, 103). 
Instead of seeing all of the novel’s strands stretching toward war, Bern-
stein praises the novel’s openness, its presentation of “conflicting voices 
and multiple, contradictory possibilities for the future” (103). The war 
remains only one of many possible outcomes to a specific historical situa-
tion; no necessity links the political and cultural developments from the 
summer of 1913 to the 1914 general mobilization: “It is as though The 
Man Without Qualities were all sideshadows, glimpses of diverse but 
equally credible futures, without any one of them being granted the aura 
of inevitability that is indispensable to foreshadowing” (99). Musil wrote 
a historical novel without falling prey to the idea of historical inevitabil-
ity, and this singular achievement, according to Bernstein, secures Musil’s 
key position in modernist literature. Consequently, the war had to remain 
absent from The Man Without Qualities. With the inclusion of mobiliza-
tion and war, Musil would have privileged historical actuality, lending 
the war an air of historical necessity. Bernstein reaches the paradoxical 
conclusion that Musil’s method of “sideshadowing” achieves far greater 
historical accuracy than the traditional historical novel because it never 
represents, and never could have represented, the historical event at its 
center. By rejecting any postfactum construction of historical necessity, 
Musil is thought to remain true to the fundamental openness of history. 
Compared to Bernstein’s ingenious merging of the Musilian sense of pos-
sibility and the concept of history, Musil’s own statements on the relation 
between the war and the novel appear to be a rather simple (mis)under-
standing of history.
Other readings emphasizing the sense of possibility in The Man Without 
Qualities insist that Musil used it for “backshadowing,” not “sideshadow-
ing” history. Rather than presenting a historically accurate prewar Aus-
tria, the novel is shaped by postwar experiences. The novel professes only 
to take place in the recent past. Rather than a historical novel, The Man 
Without Qualities is a utopian novel set in an imaginary past. As Hon-
old suggests, the absence of war in the novel’s published parts testifies to 
Musil’s belief that the war harmed our very “sense of time,” thus setting 
off a Benjaminian demise of traditional storytelling (Honold 1995, 19). 
Responding to the war as a catastrophe and a break in historical continu-
ity, Musil’s novel envisioned an alternate reality. Stefan Jonsson argues The 
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Man Without Qualities is as a postwar novel about a prewar Austria that 
steered clear of tracing the path to war.
[The Man Without Qualities] is the result of Musil’s experience of 
the war and its aftermath. The novel’s representation of the events 
in 1913 and 1914 refracts, through an act of backshadowing, the 
situation in postimperial Austria. With the wisdom of hindsight, 
Musil revisits the Dual Monarchy in order to sketch a world order 
that would have rendered the war and its aftermath unnecessary. 
(2000, 253)
Rather than analyzing the causes and origins of the war, as Musil assured, 
Jonsson reads the novel as the reverse of these authorial intentions.3 In-
stead of employing the sense of possibility to account for a wide range of 
past futures present in prewar Austria, as Bernstein suggested, The Man 
Without Qualities offers, Jonsson argues, one utopian alternative that 
would have avoided the past catastrophe.
Despite their fundamental differences, these readings agree the war 
could never have taken place in the novel. Musil’s sense of possibility is 
irreconcilable to the idea of historical continuity because it rejects the no-
tion of historical necessity (Bernstein) or because the war as catastrophic 
breakdown of tradition might not hinder the construction of an alternate 
past, but bars its access to the actual historical event (Honold, Jonsson). 
Contrary to these two approaches, Patricia McBride suggests that Musil 
perceived the war as a disaster that failed to break historical continuity. 
Musil’s exceptionality among contemporary modernists consists precisely 
in his refusal to consider the war as an abyss separating the past from the 
present. McBride writes, “The very idea of the war as a radical rupture 
was for Musil a delusion that blinded many contemporaries to the fact 
that they were treading in the old paths of destruction” (2005, 76).
Writing a novel on prewar Austria remained an essential task since the 
patterns of thought and behavior leading to the war persisted in postwar 
society, as McBride agrees with Musil. The Man Without Qualities offers 
no (utopian) alternative to historical reality but confronts its readers with 
traditional ways of thinking and acting. McBride does not explore how 
the war shaped the novel or which old paths lead once again to destruc-
tion. Instead, she relies on statements by Musil like this diary entry from 
1920: “The age: All that emerged in and after the war had been already 
present earlier” (TB 1, 353). No path seems to connect Musil’s promise 
that the novel reveals the origins of the war with either his poetics of pos-
sibility or the completed sections of The Man Without Qualities.
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In contrast to these readings, I approach The Man Without Qualities 
from Musil’s analysis of the malleable self and the conclusion he draws 
from it for his concepts of violence, history, and aesthetics. Instead of rep-
resenting history as a retraceable chain of events, Musil presents shifting 
social and political situations whose significance remains in conflict with 
the readings discussed above. Neither mobilization nor war remains out of 
the novel’s reach, as Bernstein suggests, nor is The Man Without Qualities, 
as Jonsson argues, a utopian countermodel to the catastrophic past. Instead 
of searching for preventable causes of past and future wars, as McBride 
suggests, or celebrating the war as a higher union between the individual 
and the collective, between reason and mystical experiences, as Ulrich sug-
gests in his equation of war and the other condition, Musil’s novel offers 
instead a critique of any causal analysis of war, violence, and the self. While 
exploring the malleable self and the sense of possibility, Musil does not 
present these concepts as successful responses to the experience of moder-
nity. Ulrich does not become the utopian model of a new man. From its 
position of radical ambivalence, Musil’s novel argues for discarding linear 
models of reality construction and, at the same time, exposes the risks for 
the malleable self to live a life shaped by a sense of possibility.
The Confusions of Young Törless and The Man Without Qualities are 
linked as well as separated by Musil’s preoccupation with violence and 
the malleable self—a notion that emerged initially as a threat to Törless’s 
identity. Törless’s panicked flight from the possibility of the malleable self 
and toward the memory of a dangerous moment, his use of this memory 
as a shield against the experience of ambiguity, points beyond Törless 
and Musil’s first novel. Musil repeated Törless’s escapist flight into vio-
lence during August 1914 and recorded his mobilization experience as a 
transformation of ambiguity into clarity. Musil abandoned the dangerous 
moment as a desirable alternative to ambiguity only after Austria’s and 
Germany’s defeat, after the collapse of the Wilhelmine and the Habsburg 
Empires, and amidst the social, political, and economical uncertainties of 
the postwar world. By probing the relationship between violence and the 
malleable self, Musil distanced himself from comparable contemporary 
projects.
Like the authors of the Weimar avant-garde that Lethen explores in his 
study Cool Conduct, Musil was fascinated by instances of “instantaneous 
transformation” that postwar Germans and Austrians performed (Lethen 
2002, 2). With its prior reliance on ideas of development, continuity, and 
progress, the modern subject experienced, Lethen argues, a profound dis-
orientation when confronted with the sudden instability of social and 
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political institutions and their demands and opportunities for immedi-
ate adaptation. With sudden changes of personae, individuals seemed to 
respond to a crisis of experience and thus fascinated the avant-garde, as 
Lethen demonstrates. While focusing on the same phenomenon of sudden 
transformations, Musil’s approach separated him from the avant-garde. 
Reversing Lethen’s distinction between modernists and members of the 
avant-garde vis-à-vis violence, I argue that Musil’s antireductionist ap-
proach to violence enabled his reconsideration of the role of violence in 
modernity, while the avant-garde’s functionalist theories of the self re-
mained largely captive to their far more traditional views of the use of 
violence.
Lethen differentiates modernist from avant-garde writers according to 
their response to violence. According to his seminal study, modernists 
refused to engage with the phenomenon of physical violence while the 
more adventurous and danger-prone avant-garde confronted destruction 
and change unflinchingly. Modernists like Musil were not robust enough 
to tolerate war’s challenge to modern subjectivity. Lethen commends 
the avant-garde for embracing a less sophisticated sense of self, one that 
welcomed the ability to change from one persona to another without 
dreading self-destruction. Freed from the bourgeois notion of an “inner-
directed subject operating within the horizon of humanistic values,” the 
militant avant-garde developed new rules of conduct for a new type of 
subject (Lethen 2002, 72). While the avant-garde (ranging from Brecht to 
Jünger and from Benjamin to Plessner and Schmitt) accepted the necessity 
of switching from one social role and function to another, the modernists 
evaded supposedly an immediate exposure to catastrophic experiences to 
preserve their more delicate notions of subjectivity.
In the decades separating the first futurist manifesto from Ernst 
Jünger’s Der Arbeiter (1932), the avant-garde gives shape to a 
type displaying all the essential elements of a prebourgeois sub-
jective constitution. This reach back to a “subcomplex” subject 
distinguishes the avant-garde from modernists like Robert Musil, 
Thomas Mann, or Hugo von Hofmannsthal, whose intricately diffi-
cult subjects are able to endure the process of historical acceleration 
only from a healthy distance. The artistic figure of the prebourgeois 
subject was as if magnetically drawn to the military, less in pursuit 
of enlightenment than a kind of wake-up call. (6)
Lethen reproduces the by now familiar portrait of the modernist as either 
far removed from violence or as its passively suffering victim. The mili-
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tant figure of the cool persona—Lethen constructs it from the writings of 
the new objectivity intelligentsia—might or might not heed any wake-up 
call (to arms?) (2002, 101–86). Either way, modernists like Musil kept no 
healthy distance from the war experience or its implications for a recon-
sideration of the self. Musil’s examination of violence and the self does 
away with the safe distance that the avant-garde established between 
violence and the self. Because Lethen’s avant-garde considered physical 
violence and the malleable self as a means to achieve predictable and 
desirable ends, they gained very little, as we will see, from taking a closer, 
analytical look at violent phenomena or the malleable self.
Lacking a clearly defined utopian project, Musil reassessed the modern 
subject after the war by dropping the pretense of a safe distance from his-
torical change. Without the sense of certainty pervading Brecht’s antici-
pation of a “new human type,” Musil examines violence and subjectivity 
by staying with the phenomena and not by predicting the next battle for 
social progress (Brecht 1977, 236). Musil’s reflections on violence chal-
lenge the instrumentalist framework of a militant avant-garde that ex-
pected a new society to emerge from the ruins of the war. The terrifying 
but fleeting possibility of a self switching quickly from one persona to 
another, as it surfaced in Musil’s first novel, had become an omnipresent 
presence. Rather than distancing himself from the phenomenon, the mod-
ernist Musil demanded in 1922 an inclusive “we” as the starting point for 
its analysis.
I begin with a symptom. For the past ten years we have doubt-
less been making world history in the most strident fashion, but 
without actually being able to see [wahrnehmen] it. We haven’t 
really changed much [sind nicht eigentlich geändert worden]—
a little presumptuous before, a little hung over afterwards. First 
we were bustling good citizens, then we became murderers, killers, 
thieves, arsonists, and the like, but without really experiencing [er-
leben] anything. [. . .] So we have been many things, but we haven’t 
changed; we have seen a lot and perceived nothing. (PS 116–17; 
ERK 1075–76)
What consequences could be drawn from this series of rapid and ex -
treme transformations? Compared to Nobert Elias’s theory of the civi-
lizing process, Musil’s observations undercut assumptions of long-term 
changes in affect control among citizens of Western modern societies. 
Like Musil, Elias participated in the war, but he saw the readiness of 
Western soldiers for cruelty and killing in a very different light. In con-
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trast to “Abyssinian warriors” and other premodern soldiers, “the ag-
gressiveness of even the most warlike nations of the civilized world [. . .] 
is confined and tamed by innumerable rules and prohibitions that have 
become self-constraints” (Elias 2000, 161). Similarly to Broch, Musil ob-
served instead the sudden transformation of the spectacled schoolteacher 
into the murderous storm trooper. Elias’s theory of modernity consid-
ers such swift transformations nearly impossible in modern societies be-
cause affect control has become part of the modern subject’s identity. 
Even during war and revolution—Elias calls them “temporal or spatial 
enclaves within civilized society in which aggressiveness is allowed freer 
play”—a member of such a society would be unable to simply leave his 
civilian persona behind and become a murderer and arsonist. He writes, 
“The necessary restraint and transformation of aggression cultivated in 
the everyday life of civilized society cannot be simply reversed, even in 
these enclaves” (2000, 170). Unlike Freud and Elias, Musil spoke neither 
of cultural hypocrisy nor of “pathological outburst” when he noted the 
apparent instabilities in self-formations (Elias 2000, 162). Musil rejected 
the assumption of a civilizing process that had produced lasting changes 
in affect control. The malleable self never solidifies to a permanent self 
with an inner sense that could be impervious to sudden changes of its 
sociocultural situation.
Musil’s views on these behavioral alterations distinguish him as well 
from Brecht’s and Benjamin’s skepticism toward a continuous notion 
of historical and cultural progress. The comparison to Brecht and Ben-
jamin suggests that it is not Lethen’s alternative between “robustness” 
and “fragility” that separated the modernist Musil from his avant-garde 
contemporaries but his open exploration of violent situations and their 
aftereffects. Musil let go of the avant-garde framework that subsumed 
the instantaneous transformations all too smoothly into the instrumental 
logic of their political and cultural aspirations.
With phrases like “without actually being able to see” and “without 
really experiencing anything,” Musil appeared to anticipate the Benja-
minian thesis of the destruction of experience and tradition in World War 
I. Considering experience as “inseparable from the representation of a 
continuity, a sequence,” Benjamin would argue a few years after Musil 
that the war destroyed the very condition of possibility for the experience 
of continuity and the continuity of experience (Benjamin 1999, 802). In 
a move that Benjamin would not be willing to follow, Musil sets the lack 
of experience side by side with the observation of a continuous sense of 
self: “We haven’t really changed much.” In the course of his essay “Help-
less Europe” (1922), Musil converted the description of the symptom into 
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a thesis that put him at a far distance from Benjamin’s and Elias’s ap-
proaches. The war, Musil writes, “demonstrated to all of us in one mon-
strous experiment how easily human beings can move to the most radical 
extremes and back again without experiencing any basic change [ohne 
sich im Wesen zu ändern]. They change—but what changes is not the 
self” (PS 121; ERK 1080). Musil does not align the radical changes in 
the Austrian and German political systems with a fundamental change in 
the way the pre- and the postwar subjects communicate experience. Mu-
sil neither postulates a vanishing of experience, nor calls for the arrival 
of a “new man.” The malleable self became ubiquitous only with the war. 
Musil considered the emergence of the malleable self as the unveiling of 
preexisting potential but not as a clean break with the past. “Since 1914, 
humanity has revealed itself as a mass that is astonishingly more mal-
leable than we have been accustomed to assume” (PS 120; ERK 1080). 
With the notion of the malleable self, Musil rejected postwar narratives of 
a radical break with previous forms of experience, communication, and 
social interaction.
A look at Brecht’s play A Man’s a Man (1926) clarifies Musil’s challenge 
to the functionalist appropriation of the malleable self. In his play, Brecht 
staged the rapid transformation of a good citizen into a bloodthirsty war-
rior in a way that at first strikingly resembles Musil’s and Broch’s postwar 
observations. Even though the gentle family man Galy Gay believes that 
his desire to sink his teeth into an enemy’s neck stems from a primal drive 
(Urtrieb), Brecht does not present Gay’s transformation as an atavistic 
regression. Instead, Gay becomes a prototype of a “new human type” 
(Brecht 1977, 236). His loss of personal identity is fully compensated by 
the new functional identity Gay acquires when he joins a collective that 
carries out the “wish of a great mass of people” (237). Standing on stage 
next to Brecht’s image, one of the play’s characters explains what “Mr. 
Bertolt Brecht” intends to prove with Gay’s reassembly: 
Mr. Bertolt Brecht goes on to show
That you can change a man from top to toe.
You’ll see a man remodeled [ummontiert] like a car
Without incurring the slightest loss or scar. (35)
Like Musil, Brecht did not lament the loss of a stable notion of identity. 
Unlike Musil, Brecht stayed with his endorsement of the individual’s sub-
jugation to a collective securely installed in a functionalist framework. 
Brecht had no need to be interested in these transformations themselves 
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since he expected they would be controlled and channeled by political 
movements and institutions.
The project of shaping the new man offered Brecht the same clarity of 
purpose that Musil experienced during the mobilization but no longer 
trusted after the war. Brecht evaluated everything according to its useful-
ness in advancing toward a new society. Consequently, neither Gay’s reas-
sembly nor his violent acts posed a challenge to his functionalism. Brecht 
instructed the radio audience of A Man’s a Man in 1927:
The guns that are to hand and the guns that are still manufactured 
are turned for [the new human type] or against him. The houses 
that exist and are being built are built to oppress him or shelter him. 
All live works created or applied in our time set out to discourage 
him or to put courage in him. And any work that has nothing to do 
with him is not alive and has nothing to do with anything. (236)
Brecht calculated the political potential of the malleable self as a “func-
tionalist cynic,” as a means to serve the ideological purposes of a funda-
mentally new and just society (Sloterdijk 1987, 434–59). Fitting perfectly 
into the matrix of victory and defeat, Brecht presented Gay’s transforma-
tion as a model of how to reassemble meek individuals into triumphant 
collectives.
A militant avant-gardist like Brecht regarded the malleable self from 
the safe distance of his ideological position. He saw raw materials to be 
shaped into powerful instruments that would secure social and political 
change.
This Galy Gay is by no means a weakling; on the contrary, he is the 
strongest of all. That is to say he becomes the strongest once he has 
ceased to be a private person; he only becomes strong in the mass  
[. . .]. No doubt you will go on to say that it’s a pity that a man 
should be tricked like this and simply forced to surrender his pre-
cious ego, all he possesses (as it were); but it isn’t. It’s a jolly busi-
ness. For this Galy Gay comes to no harm; he wins. And a man who 
adopts such an attitude is bound to win. (Brecht 1977, 237)
While the outcome of such transformations has never to be the same—the 
malleable self might be fitted to a marauding posse as in A Man’s a Man 
or a militant collective fighting for a new human society—Brecht’s “hard 
commitment to psychological functionalism” remained safely embedded 
in the paradigm of means and ends (Sloterdijk 1987, 442). Any means are 
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justified to establish a new and just society. Be it the remodeling of those 
who could be used for political struggle, or the elimination of those who 
stood in the way because they improved upon society’s secondary fail-
ures (poverty, health care, education, etc.) but refused to attack its root 
problem, capitalism.4 Neither the malleable self nor violent action raised 
doubts in Brecht’s adherence to the functionalist paradigm. Its psycho-
logical functionalism lends this approach the semblance of daring robust-
ness. However, with the goal of a new society in sight, Brecht had no need 
or great interest in taking a closer look at the sudden transformations of 
the malleable self.
Without the benefit of the prospect of a new man, Musil questioned the 
functionalist paradigm once he began to rethink his concept of the self 
and developed his theory of the malleable self. In the immediate after-
math of the war, Musil continued to expect that the loss of war and the 
new political order would have affected the inner core of the Germans. 
His path to the notion of the malleable self was not a short one. He pre-
dicted that the unprecedented scale of destruction and the humiliation 
of defeat would have the same shattering effect on the Austrians’ and 
the Germans’ sense of identity that Törless foresaw for the tortured and 
raped Basini. The experience of war and defeat should have broken their 
inner trust in social conventions and institutions, destroyed the horizon of 
their social expectations, and exploded every self-image Germans might 
have cherished in the past. Any apparent return to preexisting norms and 
conventions, Musil suggested, was nothing more than a provisional mask 
to hide the generational trauma, a pretense of normality and continuity 
that would soon fall apart.
One must also not avoid the question of what this war actually 
was. One cannot simply go away as if one had simply shaken off 
some state of intoxication, in which millions of people had lost 
their nearest relatives or their livelihood. This must tear the people 
apart, it is one of those repressed experiences that take revenge in 
the form of hysteria. (Musil 1998, 270–71)
A few years later, Musil reconsidered his predictions on the impact of war 
violence. The absence of hysteria and the persistence of preexisting social 
customs prompted Musil to look at The German as a Symptom (1923). 
In response to the people’s apparent ability to walk away from the war 
experience, Musil formulated his “theorem of human shapelessness,” a 
theorem that finally broke with the assumption of a stable human nature, 
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a permanent self, or an innermost individuality that the subject could un-
fold and realize during the bildungsroman of his life (PS 167).
Instead of hoping for a new man to shape society in his own image, as 
Benjamin and Brecht did, Musil focused with his theorem on the seem-
ingly inexhaustible human ability to adapt to ever changing social situa-
tions (Amman 2007, 22). The theorem of human shapelessness leaves 
little space for an individual psychology of inner motivation and self- 
directedness and questions any “new” man’s agency to create a new 
world among the ruins of the old. Whether someone will build a new 
world, write modernist poetry, or prepare a cannibalistic meal is not de-
termined by retraceable inner motivations and decisions. It is dependent 
on, as Musil writes, but never fully explained by the historical situation.
I would argue that a cannibal transplanted to a European environ-
ment as an infant would probably become a good European, and 
the sensitive Rainer Maria Rilke would have become a good can-
nibal. (PS 167)
Rather than proposing an intricately difficult and inner-directed notion of 
subjectivity that requires shelter from exposure to historical catastrophes, 
as Lethen claims, Musil’s notion of the self emerges as difficult because 
of its bloblike indeterminacy and its lack of inner directedness (Lethen 
2002, 6). As Stefan Jonsson convincingly argues, Musil broke after the 
war with “an expressivist notion of the human subject” (2000, 7). Musil 
came to reject the idea that every person has an inner core of identity and 
that its beliefs, actions, and social positions were the expressions of such 
centered and coherent identity.
Even Musil’s most intricately represented subject, Ulrich, the protago-
nist of The Man Without Qualities, was projected to undergo an instan-
taneous transformation in August 1914. Ulrich’s metamorphosis into an 
elated bellicist should not be read as an indication of the failure of the 
Musilian subject when exposed to suddenly accelerating historical situa-
tions (MoE 1932). Just as The Man Without Qualities is not a utopian 
novel, Ulrich represents no utopian model of subjectivity.5 He is not a 
new man who could exist apart from his historical surroundings but re-
mains part and parcel of Musil’s exploration of human shapelessness in a 
sociopolitical environment that let World War I become both a possibility 
and a reality.
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Robert Musil and the First World War
Einheit! Einheit! Brust an Brust, ein Reigen des Volkes, Blut, nicht 
mehr eingesperrt im kärglichen Kreislauf des Körpers, sondern süß 
rollend und doch wiederkehrend durch das unendliche China.
—Kafka, NS 291
To appreciate how Musil arrived at the notion of the malleable self, a 
reading of his atypical analysis of the war experience might be the best 
approach. Musil is not set apart from his contemporaries by his initial war 
enthusiasm or his postwar disillusionment. He differs from them with his 
analysis of the war experience and his eventual break with the instrumen-
tal paradigm of violence. To determine Musil’s unique achievement one 
can compare his reflections to those of Jünger and Benjamin. These two 
writers mark the outer limits of a wide-ranging consensus among Weimar 
intellectuals and their theories of war, experience, and violence.
Musil’s initial glorification of war and its dissolution of the individual 
into a national collective displays important similarities to Jünger’s war 
writings. A closer look reveals equally significant differences in the con-
clusions they drew from their war experiences. In 1914, Musil renounced 
individualism, and was exhilarated that all Germans formed just one col-
lective with one purpose: the defense of the German tribe (Musil 1978, 
1022). Mass death was no threat to the collective’s existence but tes-
tified to its immortality. Jünger’s war diaries speak of a similar “inner 
unity” [innerliche Geschlossenheit] among soldiers that reached an inti-
macy unattainable by verbal communication: “we don’t seem to be sepa-
rate human beings anymore but merged into one, guided by instinct and 
therefore superior, in this minute, to any imaginable intelligence” (Jünger 
1926, 212–13). Death became the joyful homecoming to a primordial 
collective. “With the last quiver,” Jünger claimed, the dying soldier re-
turned “from a personality to a larger being that carries everything within 
itself” (Jünger 1922, 122). Musil and Jünger regarded the individual’s 
dissolution into a sort of collective body as a death-defying event. Invok-
ing the cliché that those who die defending their nation will live forever, 
Musil wrote, “today, this is no exaggeration but an experience” (Musil 
1978, 1022). Compared to this glorious experience of transcending the 
boundaries of individuality and life, even love paled in significance. In 
September 1914, love was, in Musil’s eyes, no more than “a tiny splinter” 
compared to what he felt during mobilization and expected from warfare 
(Musil 1978, 1022).
But the differences between Musil and Jünger are just as notable. Musil’s 
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collective comprised all Germans; Jünger spoke only of soldiers. Jünger’s 
war experiences united the front generation but separated soldiers from 
civilians: “Like a primeval forest, the war keeps us year for year more 
and more in its ban; we begin to doubt whether anything beyond its 
borders exists” (Jünger 1978–2003, vol. 1, 304). For Jünger, war vio-
lence engendered a new brotherhood, a new community, from which a 
new man could arise, but his war did not create a national collective. 
Insisting on such an abyss between those who faced war and those who 
stayed home became one of the most divisive founding myths of the 
Weimar Republic—be it as the Dolchstoßlegende in postwar politics or 
the idea of a collapse of tradition and the anticipation of a new man and 
new society.
Musil’s reluctance to accept the idea of a fundamental break in histori-
cal continuity is based on his own war experience. His letters to his family 
offer a far more ordinary representation of the war than the one Jünger 
stylized and Benjamin theorized. Musil’s diaries and correspondence in-
dicate his continued close contact with family and friends throughout the 
war. His diary offers no evidence that he experienced any higher union 
with his fellow soldiers (Corino 2003, 497–592). Rather than suffering 
an irreparable rupture between home and front, past and present, Robert 
and Martha Musil visited each repeatedly at home and at his war stations. 
Such sustained dialogue on social matters and family affairs was typical 
for soldiers during the First World War. Instead of depicting soldiers as 
lost in war’s primeval forest, the historical research of military mail con-
cluded that front soldiers kept in regular contact with their families and 
stayed involved with the day-to-day activities at home. The rift between 
the civilian and military life appears far less significant than previous re-
search had assumed (Schumann 2004, 19).
In contrast to popular postwar literature, death and destruction re-
mained a rare exception in Musil’s war experience. Musil experienced 
these rare moments of imminent danger not as becoming part of a new 
collective but as extremely personal experiences. Such a singular experi-
ence stands at the center of Musil’s story The Blackbird (1936). From 
the early notes and sketches to its final form, the story reflects Musil’s 
dissociation from the dominant war discourse in postwar German litera-
ture. In its final version, the close encounter with death forges no un-
breakable bond among soldiers but separates the story’s narrator from 
his comrades. An unnamed Austrian veteran recounts an Italian attack 
with “aerial darts” [Fliegerpfeile], sharp iron rods that pilots dropped 
on soldiers—a primitive, imprecise, but lethal weapon. After surviving a 
similar aerial attack near Tenna, Italy, Musil wrote an early sketch, en-
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titled “A Soldier Narrates” (1915–16). In several aspects, Musil’s narrator 
adheres to standard accounts of front experience and depicts the war as a 
religious experience: “I received my baptism of fire and was admitted to 
the invisible church” (PuS 752). Nonetheless, this early draft introduced 
important deviations from the popularized images of war violence. The 
narrator describes the experience of lethal danger as a deeply personal 
and even egoistical event. He alone notices the airplane, hears the singing 
sound of the falling stick, and decides not to alert his comrades to the 
mortal danger of their situation.
I asked myself: should I warn the others? Should we scurry for 
cover like mice? I didn’t want to; I was caught up selfishly in my 
experience, should the others get hit, without getting anything from 
it. (PuS 753)
The dart hits the ground, throws him off his feet, and the narrator re-
ceives the rewards for his selfishness. His experience was nothing short 
of a “private consecration” (PuS 753). If this soldier entered the invisible 
church of war, then he left his fellow soldiers behind.
Rewriting the event for The Blackbird, Musil removed the religious 
references but kept the narrator’s atypical account of self-centeredness.
Cautiously I looked at the other faces, but no one else was aware of 
its approach. And at that moment when I became convinced that I 
alone heard that subtle singing [feinen Gesang], something rose up 
out of me to meet it, a ray of life, equally infinite to that death ray 
descending from above. (1988, 137; PuS 556)
Again, the other soldiers are merely bystanders, stunned by the spectacle 
of the narrator’s contorting body, but not transformed by any collective 
experience. While the narrator awakes from his trance, his whole body 
blushing, the others start simply looking for the aerial dart as a war sou-
venir (1988, 138; PuS 557).6
Contrary to Jünger’s or Remarque’s war literature, Musil did not de-
pict war as a unique opportunity to access an otherwise unattainable 
experience, be it sublime or horrifying. When Musil’s narrator desires 
repetitions of such inner experience, he finds correspondences to the ex-
periential impact of the aerial attack in far less dramatic circumstances. 
Associating the flying dart episode with two strange encounters involving 
blackbirds, one before and one after the war (i.e., these episodes are not 
traumatic flashbacks to war incidents), Musil’s story rejects the idea of 
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an experiential uniqueness to the war experience. These innocuous birds 
evoke experiences that seem just as exceptional and intimate to the nar-
rator as the aerial attack (Musil 1988, 132–33, 143–44).
Rather than showing signs of war nostalgia or a longing for the ca-
maraderie among soldiers, Musil rejected any substantive conception of 
social collectives in his postwar writings. The war did not split Germans 
into Frontkameraden standing on the one side, unable to speak, and on 
the other side civilians, unable to understand. In his essay “Nation as 
Ideal and as Reality” (1921), Musil maintained that claims to collectively 
shared national or racial traits were based on false premises:
“We Germans” is the fiction of a commonality among manual la-
borers and professors, gangsters and idealists, poets and film direc-
tors, a commonality that does not exist. The true “we” is: We are 
nothing to each other. (PS 111)
The disillusionment with his own nationalist euphoria led Musil to criti-
cize concepts like “nation,” “race,” and “culture” severely in his postwar 
essays (Jonsson 2000, 254–55). Rather than accepting them as basic so-
ciological elements, Musil appreciated these constructs as complex out-
comes of specific situations.
It appears that the question of the European: What am I? really 
means: Where am I? It is not a matter of a phase in a process gov-
erned by laws, and no matter of a destiny, but simply of a situation. 
(PS 169)
Or, as the narrator in The Man Without Qualities confirmed, “for what 
is called ‘nation’ and ‘race’ is results and not causes” (MoE 1437; MwQ 
1475).
What then is such a Musilian situation? A situation is characterized 
by its ultimate openness and indeterminacy; even as actual occurrences, 
they cannot be reduced to predictable outcomes of clearly identifiable 
chains of necessity. Musil’s concept of a situation is not the opposite of 
continuity itself, as Bohrer argued in his aesthetic theory of suddenness 
(Bohrer 1981, 189). The experience of an epiphany, the sudden disruption 
of stability, as described by Joyce, Hofmannsthal, and Musil as well, is 
not a necessary ingredient of the Musilian situation. The opposite of the 
Musilian situation is the lawful historical progression Tolstoy’s narrator 
attempted but failed to retrace in War and Peace. “People are not capable 
of changing laws,” Musil wrote, “but they certainly can change situations 
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in this sense, no matter how many imminent laws may have contributed 
to them” (PS 169). While acknowledging the continuity of causal rela-
tions, the Musilian notions of situation and of history remain open to 
unpredictable change.
Situations cannot be fully explained by their causes, but they can be 
compared to other situations. As in The Blackbird, Musil’s postwar re-
flections on war and violence are fueled by the desire to demonstrate 
that no situation is truly exceptional, no experience incomparable. Rather 
than treating the war as an unprecedented catastrophe, Musil used the 
war as a point of reference for the postwar situation. While his compari-
sons border on the unacceptable—and he never intended to publish these 
notes—they indicate his refusal to mystify the war as an incommunicable 
experience. Two years after the war, he complained, “All atrocities of the 
war are excusable when set against the indifference with which one has 
left the Central States in postwar misery” (T 359). Twenty years later, 
Musil remembered one of “the strongest old impressions from the war” 
(T 945). He does not refer to scenes of mass death but recalls a moment 
that revealed to him the nonexistence of a “We, the Germans” collective 
and the persistence of regular life during wartime. Observing his fellow 
soldiers, Musil noticed that hardly anyone did what he did: read books. 
Musil evoked this “unexpected and wide-ranging contact with average 
life!” as his most powerful war memory (T 945).
Regardless of his insistence on experiential continuity, Musil did not 
envision the circumstances of future wars as predetermined by previous 
war situations. The next war, Musil predicted in an article from 1925, 
would literally come out of the blue and be decided in a few days. Its path 
of destruction would not offer any contact with average life to any mem-
ber of the military, nor would it follow Ludendorff and Hindenburg’s 
strategic blueprints. New technologies of mass death would revolutionize 
modern warfare, determine its planning and strategies, and decide its out-
come. Musil imagined a swift victory for the first state to launch massive 
aerial poison gas attacks against enemy civilian populations, not a return 
to the trenches (PuS 674).
In Musil’s situational approach to history, learning lessons from the 
past neither prevents the next war nor does it have to be an entirely futile 
exercise. One way to approach Musil’s understanding of the influence of 
political actors, large-scale events, and long-term social developments for 
the course of history is to contrast it to other contemporary undertakings. 
Musil did not share Norbert Elias’s expectation that the conflicts of the 
past, moving from tribal fights to modern world wars, were necessary 
steps toward “the pacification of the earth” (2000, 446). No metanarra-
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tive of a civilizing process connects past events to a final and global stage 
of peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, Musil did not look at 
the past through the eyes of Benjamin’s angel of history; he did not de-
velop a catastrophic or messianic view of history (Benjamin 1996–2003, 
vol. 4, 392). Events of the greatest magnitude might not produce lasting 
disruptions in the lives of their participants. If large-scale events are no 
more than ripples on the surface of history, then one could have expected 
that Musil treated the history of events as “surface disturbances, crests of 
foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs,” like Fernand 
Braudel and the Annales school did (cited in Trevor-Roper 1999, 26). But 
Musil insisted emphatically on staying focused on concrete situations and 
their surface. At a central moment in The Man Without Qualities, a rare 
moment that made its postwar perspective explicit, the narrator corrected 
the historical reflections of one of his characters.
Had Arnheim been able to see only a few years into the future, he 
would have seen that 1,920 years of Christian morality, millions 
of dead men in the wake of a shattering war, and a whole German 
forest of poetry rustling in homage to the modesty of Woman could 
not hold back the day when women’s skirts and hair began to grow 
shorter and the young girls on Europe slipped off eons of taboos 
to emerge for a while naked, like peeled bananas. (MwQ 442–43; 
MoE 408)
Musil’s narrator denies neither the importance of cultural traditions 
(Christianity, the traditional Western image of women) nor the singu-
lar destructive scope of the world war. But none of these developments 
and events sufficed to explain even comparatively banal developments in 
woman’s fashion. Particular historical situations are influenced by long-
term developments (or “imminent laws” as Musil called them earlier) and 
large-scale events, but considering the “creative energy [. . .] generated by 
the surface of things” (MwQ 443; MoE 408) they clearly do not deter-
mine them.
Consequently, the possibility of war can never be eliminated, but both 
sweeping and incremental steps in particular situations can make its ac-
tualization more or less probable. To minimize the risk of becoming a 
target for aerial poison gas attacks, Musil advocated in 1925 for Austria’s 
unilateral disarmament. Too small to offer adequate protection, its army 
could only serve potential aggressors as a pretense for attack. Even the 
drastic step of abolishing one’s military would afford merely a reduction 
of the risk, but it would not secure peace.
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There is no radical means against war. Because there is no radi-
cal means against human stupidity, imagination, and bestiality. But 
there are a few dozen small means that should not remain untried. 
(PuS 674–75)
No particular political action delivers consistent and reliable war de-
terrence. As his disarmament proposal indicates, Musil’s anthropologi-
cal foundation of violence resulted in neither resignation nor passivity. 
Rather than concentrating on the identification, isolation, and elimina-
tion of ever more potential causes of social and political violence, Musil 
focused on the complexity of social situations so overdetermined that 
their ever-present violent potential eschewed predictability.
Current antireductionist violence research shares Musil’s anthropo-
logical grounding of the ever-present possibility of violence and adopts 
a Musilian sense of possibility.7 Heinrich Popitz stated most concisely 
why the focus of traditional violence research on (preventable) causes of 
violence had to remain inconclusive. Avoiding the moralistic language 
of stupidity and bestiality, he agreed with Musil’s central point on the 
ubiquitous possibility for violent action in human affairs. “Humans never 
have to but always are capable of acting violently; they never have to 
but always can kill [. . .] for all imaginable purposes—everyone” (Popitz 
1992, 50). The occurrence of violent acts is not dependent on identifiable 
causes or motives that in turn could be controlled or prevented. Every 
situation is open to nonnecessary violence, and violence opens situations 
to never fully predictable outcomes. As we have seen in the first chapter 
on Musil, Popitz emphasized like Musil human imagination as a second 
anthropological foundation, further delimiting the potential for violent 
acts. The limitless human ability to imagine violence comprises more than 
observation and remembrance of actual violence. Musil’s own imagina-
tion could leave the path of recent trench warfare and anticipate an aerial 
warfare of still not yet realized devastation. Imagined forms of violence 
expand the “horizon of possibility” for actual violence (Popitz 1992, 51). 
In conjunction with human technological intelligence, this twofold de-
limitation of violence—one of will and one of imagination—opened up 
the truly boundless capacity for violent interaction.
Taking for granted the omnipresent possibility of violence, Musil and 
the antireductionists consider the search for controllable or preventable 
causes and motivations of war and violence as a naive misconception of 
the interplay between anthropological foundations of human behavior, 
imagination, and intelligence. Both reject the hope for an eventual aboli-
tion or domestication of violence as a dangerous dream of modernity. 
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Antireductionist violence research substitutes the etiological why ques-
tion with an interest in how violent situations unfold. As Wolfgang Sofsky 
suggested in his Traktat über die Gewalt (1996), “if one wants to under-
stand the procedure and progression of a massacre, one has to pay atten-
tion to how it is carried out, and not for what reason it has been carried 
out” (Sofsky 1996, 178). With its new emphasis on violent situations and 
their dynamic character, antireductionist violence research seeks to open 
up the rather static and deterministic approach of traditional research 
(Trotha 1997, 22).
Musil’s fundamental disagreement with antireductionist violence re-
search lies in this assessment of the analytical importance of acts of vio-
lence. Antireductionist violence research starts from the description of 
violent situations and continues with an examination of its self-dynamic 
processes. Sofsky, one of its most radical practitioners, moves barely be-
yond the thick description of violent events while researchers like Popitz 
and von Trotha place such descriptions in the context of larger power 
formations and new global violence markets.8 Musil, however, exhib-
ited little interest in describing physical violence. Initially, he intended 
to include war scenes in his novel, but his enthusiasm for depicting such 
violence faded during the 1920s. Still planning to continue the plot of 
The Man Without Qualities beyond August 1914, he cautioned himself: 
“Don’t put so much weight on military aspects,” and he dismissed war 
episodes as “ornaments” in his outlines (T 586).
With all of the novel’s storylines leading up to the war and the scenes 
of destruction as mere ornaments, one might conclude that Musil’s novel 
—despite his antireductionist intentions—offers a reductionist analy-
sis of the war. Rather than looking at war and violence directly, as the 
antireductionist research suggests, Musil would be preoccupied with a 
search for the war causes. But the novel pursues the opposite path. It of-
fers not only a sustained critique of the reductionist search for the causes 
of war and violence but also an antireductionist critique of theories of 
the self, of emotion, and of narration. This antireductionism is, as the 
war itself, “the thought that is implicit in everything” depicted in The 
Man Without Qualities (MwQ 1748). The antireductionist impetus of 
Musil’s reflections on war and violence allowed him to focus on the one 
phenomenon that had remained too horrifying to contemplate in The 
Confusions of Young Törless. The possibility that violence and humili-
ation might not shatter the self, the idea that the effects and dynamics 
of violent action did not fit into the functionalist paradigm of cause and 
effect, action and result, moved to the center in Musil’s conception of 
The Man Without Qualities.
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Ulrich, the novel’s narrator, and Musil, the novel’s author, search for 
responses to the challenge of the malleable self. While their interests 
and arguments are often overlapping, there is one crucial difference to 
note. Ulrich will not be able to sustain a life structured by the sense of 
possibility, and he responds at central moments with a longing for vio-
lent singularity and disruption. In the novel Ulrich develops a theory of 
emotion that blurs the boundaries between the “I” and the world of ex-
perience, between inside and outside, beginning and end. Ulrich argues 
against the assumption that emotions are retraceable to their moment 
of origin, against the idea that emotions are triggered mainly by outside 
stimuli. Ulrich’s genealogy of emotion insists on their temporal undeter-
minedness.
The arousing stimulus does not actually strike an existing state, 
like the ball [Kugel] in the mechanical contraption that sets off a 
sequence of consequences like falling dominos, but continues in 
time, calling forth a fresh supply of inner forces that both work 
according to its sense and vary its effect. And just as little does the 
emotion, once present, dissipate immediately in its effects, nor does 
it itself remain the same even for an instant, resting, as it were, in 
the middle between the processes it assimilates and transmits; it 
is connected with a constant changing in everything to which it 
has connection internally and externally, and also receives reactions 
from both directions. (MwQ 1259–60; MoE 1157)
The model of the malleable self structured Ulrich’s theory of emotion. 
Instead of establishing a linear sequence between cause and effect, be-
tween the outside stimulus and its interior experience, Ulrich observes 
an overlapping series of reactions and repercussions for which no precise 
moments of origin and dissolution can be identified.
Just as no unclouded origin of an emotion exists, no single emotion 
ever determines the subject’s behavior. Emotions (and the actions they 
propel) remain in a Deleuzian state of becoming. As Ulrich writes, there is 
“never this or that specific emotion that is present at the beginning—say, 
in a weak state—together with its mode of action, but only something 
that is appropriate and has been destined to become such an emotion 
and action, which however, it never becomes in a pure state” (MwQ 
1274; MoE 1170). Only in a pure state—Ulrich defines it as an “atti-
tude entirely under the domination of a single emotion” (MwQ 1297; 
MoE 1190)—would the malleable self escape constant change and reach 
a state of unchanging rest. During the experience of ecstasy the self comes 
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closest to such a pure state. Ulrich acknowledges the desire for reaching 
such a pure state, for experiencing a timeless disruption of continuity, 
but he regards it as unattainable. Pure states are Gedankenbilder, “men-
tal constructs,” since “true ecstasies—whether mystical, martial, or those 
of love groups or other transported communities—always presuppose a 
cluster of interrelated emotions and arise from a circle of ideas that re-
flects them” (MwQ 1298; MoE 1191). No experience reaches this notion 
of singularity to extract itself from its context; the Musilian subject can 
at no point in time break away from its actual situation. The pure state, 
as Ulrich quotes Swedenborg, belongs to angels and not humans (MwQ 
1310; MoE 1202).9
Ulrich discovered a similarly impossible desire for linearity in the sub-
ject’s attempt to structure its life as a narrative. In the often discussed 
chapter “Going Home” (“Heimkehr”), Ulrich notes that “most people 
relate to themselves as storytellers” (MwQ 709; MoE 650). They compel 
the flurry of their biographical data into an “orderly sequence of facts,” 
link them with “because” or “in order that” to create a sense of coherence, 
purpose, and meaning (MwQ 709; MoE 650). To produce such a story 
of one’s life creates a calming, reassuring effect, the semblance of a self’s 
consistency. Rather than being an intersection of coincidences, intentions, 
and circumstances, one’s life gains the comforting structure of a narra-
tive with a beginning and (eventually) an end. Each detail is supposed to 
correspond meaningfully to another so that one’s life story reveals one’s 
inner nature. Ulrich recognized such a narrative of order, purpose, and 
unity for the self as a popular self-deception and became aware that he 
“lost the elementary, narrative mode of thought [das primitiv Epische]” 
(MwQ 709; MoE 650). Aware of his own malleability, Ulrich accepts that 
his life unfolded not along the lines of a bildungsroman but developed 
like a rhizome into a multitude of changing directions. Knowing that no 
one is the author of one’s life does not seem to disturb Ulrich. Without 
any sign of shock or irritation he moves effortlessly from the traditional 
linear mode of self-narration to the metaphor of an “infinitely interwoven 
surface” for any life story (MwQ 709; MoE 650). As we will see, how-
ever, the ease with which he lets go of the idea of an inner core of identity 
is deceptive and becomes less and less tenable once Ulrich contemplates 
the role of the malleable self in the course of history. While Ulrich ac-
cepted the conclusion that no single red thread of meaning connects the 
events of one’s life, he could not bear the consequences that resulted from 
the notion of the malleable self for an understanding of the course of his-
tory. This inability resulted in a new form of self-deception for the man 
with a sense of possibilities.
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The Path of History and the Causalities of War in  
The Man Without Qualities
The malleability that characterizes Musil’s notion of the self reappears 
in his concept of history. Musil represented the structural similarity be-
tween the self and history not as a possibility for harmonious coexistence 
in The Man Without Qualities but as an increasingly untenable situa-
tion for its protagonist. Rather than becoming a model for a utopian 
new man, Ulrich, as the self-aware malleable self, desires the singularity 
of a pure state and fantasizes about becoming a man of brute coherence. 
Musil approached the writing of history in The Man Without Qualities 
not by establishing a genealogy of war but by representing a wide range 
of individual responses to changing situations. Like Tolstoy’s narrator 
in War and Peace, he does not identify a sufficient cause for the war but 
neither does he denounce the possibility of human freedom even when 
considering the idea of (unfelt) laws of history. In Musil’s perception, 
history takes on a malleable shape without a firm core, without a pre-
dictable path to follow. History moves for Musil and Ulrich like clouds 
and not billiard balls. This metaphor for historical development carries, 
however, different meanings when first the essayist Musil and later the 
protagonist of his novel associate the course of history and nephology, 
the science of clouds and its movements. Musil introduced the parallel 
between the historians’ attempt to construct a causal progression of 
history with the rather futile attempts of meteorologists to trace and 
predict cloud movements in 1923 while working on his essay The Ger-
man as Symptom.
The path of history is in fact not that of a billiard ball, which, once 
struck, follows a predictable course, but resembles rather the path 
of a cloud, which also follows the laws of physics but is equally in-
fluenced by something that can only be called a coinciding of facts. 
(PS 169; ERK 1374)
Cloud movements escape traceable causality—nephology is no promising 
issue in meteorology—but they neither defy the laws of physics nor are 
they mere accidents. Musil’s metaphor suggests that historical events are 
linked by intelligible causality but predicts that the reductionist approach 
to history will get lost quickly in imprecision and overgeneralizations 
when it sounds out the past or makes long-term predictions. Due to an in-
exhaustible multiplicity of causes and facts, Musil’s concept of history fits 
on neither side of the alternative between representing historical continu-
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ity or discontinuity. Too unstable to move along any straight or curved 
path, it deviates from the realist model of linear time, of neatly ordering 
events according to the logic of before and after, cause and effect. Musil’s 
concepts of history and the malleable self do not fit the idea of a civiliz-
ing process that Benjamin ascribed to the German Social Democrats and 
his concepts are not in keeping with their premise of “an infinite perfect-
ibility of humanity” (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 4, 394). In contrast to 
Benjamin’s theses on history, however, Musil’s path of clouds does not 
allow for a “tiger’s leap into the past” or anticipate a historical materialist 
grasping the revolutionary moment and exploding “the continuum of his-
tory” (394). Just as the malleable self follows no trajectory according to 
which “each soul has to perfect its own possibilities into reality,” as Mu-
sil still believed while writing The Confusions of Young Törless, so Mu-
sil’s postwar notion of history does not anticipate a “redeemed mankind 
[that] is granted the fullness of its past” (T 161; Benjamin 1996–2003, 
vol. 4, 390).10 But Jonsson goes too far by claiming that “Musil’s narra-
tive effectively negates a continuous view of history” and “attempts to 
render discontinuity” (Jonsson 2000, 239). Neither the malleable self nor 
the sense of possibility nor the clouds of historical movement can be rec-
onciled with the images of break, rupture, and discontinuity. Just as they 
do not fit any concept of linear teleology.
The Man Without Qualities follows situations that are partly struc-
tured by discernible sequences of cause and effect but that are also in-
fluenced, modified, and redirected by chance, choice, and reverberations. 
Rather than grasping “for a historical moment without intelligible causal-
ity” (Jonsson 2000, 239), Musil and his novel’s narrator grasp for a his-
torical moment with too many causalities. As cheerful as it might sound, 
this search for causalities will never be fruitless but always futile.
That I suddenly stand where I am is a fact, a result, and if one calls 
it necessary, because in the last analysis everything has its causes, 
then this bears the character of preserving something in the name of 
causality; but it is quite useless, since we will never be able to make 
good on it. (PS 169; ERK 1374–75)
Such a last analysis, as a full account of the causalities of a historical 
event, would be possible only on Judgment Day when for “a redeemed 
mankind [. . .] its past [has] become citable in all its moments” (Benjamin 
1996–2003, vol. 4, 390). In contrast to Benjamin, however, Musil knows 
of no such standpoint of redemption, no end of history, but always ex-
pects that the next moment and a new circumstance might steer history 
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ever so slightly into an eventually momentous but unpredictable direc-
tion.
Consequently, the novel’s search for the cause of war moves in a mul-
titude of directions. Musil’s announcement that all of its threads lead to 
war might very well be correct, but they cross and intersect so that no 
deterministic path to war emerges. War is an extreme but not a neces-
sary outcome—just like Rilke, the cannibal, and Musil, the warmonger. 
Instead of a retraceable chain of events, the novel presents shifting situa-
tions that remain in conflict with all the readings discussed above. Nei-
ther mobilization nor war remains forever out of its reach, as Bernstein 
suggests, nor does The Man Without Qualities present a utopian counter-
model to the catastrophic past, as Jonsson argues. Musil’s novel offers its 
critique of the causes of war without expecting their identification might 
prevent another, already looming war, as McBride proposed. Nor does 
the novel validate Ulrich’s equation of war with the other condition. Mu-
sil’s insistence on the complexity of situations and his theorem of human 
shapelessness undermine Ulrich’s equation of war and the other condi-
tion just as they oppose the postwar consensus from Benjamin to Jünger 
that interpreted the war as a break of continuity while raising the hope 
for new redemptive beginnings. As with his theory of emotions and his 
reflections on narrating the self, Musil argues in his analysis of war and 
violence against traditional linear models—and the notions of break and 
discontinuity remained dependent on these models—and in favor of the 
interwoven nets of complex situations.
With historical hindsight, any reader of the novel can detect signs and 
causes of the eventual war.11 The failure of the Habsburg Empire to keep 
the multiethnic state together surfaces in the Hungarian distrust against 
German-Austrians and the intensifying desire of the Slavic minorities to 
leave the empire to join Russia or claim independence. The so-called Par-
allel Campaign—the search committee for a grand idea celebrating the 
seventieth anniversary of the emperor Franz Joseph’s peaceful reign in 
1918—becomes the target of anti-German demonstrations. The signing 
of mutual defense treaties in Europe sanctioning the swift escalation to 
open hostilities is brought up in discussion, but the treaties’ implications 
are never taken seriously. The news of “the world famous Swedish actress 
Vogelsang’s confession that she had never in all her life slept as well as on 
this, her first night in Kakania,” appears to be as of equal magnitude with 
an Austrian military action against Serbia (MwQ 488; MoE 449). The 
number of Parallel Campaign members who know of Arnheim’s secret 
interests in the Galician oil reserves, crucial for any German-Austrian war 
games, increases continuously, but the participants respond with surprise 
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and delight at finding themselves among those in the know, rather than 
showing an awareness of a looming war (MwQ 1091, 1094, 1096, 1106; 
MoE 1005, 1008, 1009, 1019).
As they occur, none of the novel’s characters linked these events to a 
chain of necessity. Among the earliest drafts, this one dating from 1920, 
Musil wrote that the war should come unexpectedly and as a surprise 
“especially to the more acute observer,” and he planned to contrast such 
a seasoned political observer with a right-wing German nationalist who 
would not be surprised by the war (T 357). In The Man Without Quali-
ties the well-connected but politically naive figure of Diotima is such a 
person of sometimes surprising prescience, especially with regard to the 
novel’s sole representative of the Austrian military. Diotima goes, as she 
says, “into a panic every time [General Stumm von Bordwehr] comes 
up to me,” and she characterizes the general as a figure of death and a 
“hyena,” as the one member of the Parallel Campaign who just waits 
until its “best efforts come to nothing” (MwQ 507; MoE 466). When 
she offers her harsh judgment on General Stumm von Bordwehr’s gen-
teel personality, she seems patently unfair, and is completely unaware 
that General Stumm von Bordwehr is deeply infatuated with her. Ul-
rich and the narrator dismiss her fearful premonition outright. Half a 
year later, a few weeks before the war, Diotima’s assessment appears 
in a different light when Stumm von Bordwehr tells Count Leinsdorf, 
“Give me the newspapers, the radio, the film industry, and maybe a few 
other avenues of cultural communication, and within a few years—as 
my friend Ulrich once said—I promise I’ll turn people into cannibals!” 
(MwQ 1107; MoE 1020). At the same time, Musil takes care not to 
transform Diotima into a Viennese Cassandra. In contrast to Ulrich, she 
completely ignores and misreads the long-term interests and intentions 
of the Prussian industrialist von Arnheim as he seeks to secure the oil 
and fuel resources for the German industrial-military complex (MwQ 
509; MoE 468).
Ulrich, the novel’s brilliant protagonist, frequently taken to be Musil’s 
“New Man” (Bartram and Payne 2004, 107), should be an acute political 
observer, but he is depicted as a rather careless analyst of the European 
crisis. The possibility of war at Austria’s border is of no particular concern 
to him during the first weeks of 1914.
Was there a war actually going on in the Balkans or not? Some 
sort of intervention was undoubtedly going on, but whether it was 
war was hard to tell. So much was astir in the world. (MwQ 390; 
MoE 359)
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So many events occur simultaneously—an earthquake in Japan, a new 
high-altitude aircraft record, Jack Johnson becoming world boxing cham-
pion, record fees for tenors, French-Russian negotiations—that a war in 
the Balkans might get lost in the mix (just as the news of Johnson’s suc-
cess reaches the surface of Ulrich’s attention six years after the fact). The 
multiplicity of local, national, and international news overwhelms his ca-
pacity to filter and weigh their potential historical importance.
Because of his highly developed sense of possibility, Ulrich is best pre-
pared to resist the reductionist urge to delve below the surface of histori-
cal circumstance and go fishing for origins and first causes. To understand, 
however, that he lives under sociopolitical conditions that defy complete 
causal analysis does not shield Ulrich from the frustrations resulting from 
the disjunction between cognitive appetite and an acknowledgment of the 
limits of reason. Lichtenberg defined the human as the “causal animal,” 
the “Ursachen-Tier.” While animals and humans share instincts for self-
preservation and propagation, Lichtenberg identified the causal instinct 
as uniquely human. This instinct compels humans “to seek out relations 
that it entitles causes, and to concern itself with a multitude of things 
that appear not to affect it at all in God’s wide world, as though perhaps 
because there are causes there for the causal animal to hunt, to which it is 
continually spurred on by a sort of spiritual hunger, by curiosity” (cited in 
Blumenberg 1985, 426). Ulrich is just as aware of the excessive quality of 
this causal instinct as his author. Like Musil and his narrator, Ulrich views 
causal explanations of historical events as reckless oversimplifications of 
multifaceted situations. Unlike his narrator, however, Ulrich exhibits signs 
of exasperation because of the weak notions of agency and purpose this 
view of history entails. Because of this difference between narrator and 
protagonist, the meaning of Ulrich’s historical reflections differ greatly 
from theirs, even, and in particular when Ulrich cites almost verbatim 
Musil’s comparison of the passage of clouds and the movement of history. 
To accept the absence of a red thread in anyone’s self-narrative does not 
shield Ulrich from experiencing powerlessness in his own situation. Un-
like the narrator, Ulrich longs repeatedly for historical situations that call 
for the straightforward linearity of cause and effect.
While Ulrich feels superior to those failing to recognize and accept 
the lack of authorship over their own lives, he is repulsed by his own 
“helpless contemporaneity,” by the lethargic acceptance of changes and 
conditions to which he like everyone has to submit while traveling on the 
path of history (MwQ 391; MoE 360). The insight into the messiness of 
personal, social, and political events fits so well with Ulrich’s theory of 
subjectivity that his insistence on a path of history comes as a surprise. If 
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no storyline runs like a red thread through the events of a single life, then 
no pathway should lead across the muddle of historical occurrences. To 
his distress and surprise, Ulrich notes, however, the very existence of such 
a path. Clearly, he perceives no easily discernible one-way street of his-
torical progress, but even though history looks up close like a “morass” 
Ulrich is convinced that “there does seem to be a path across it, that very 
‘path of history’ of which nobody knows the starting point” (MwQ 390–
91; MoE 360). While Ulrich could adapt to the lack of authorial control 
on the level of his personal life, the same lack of agency nauseates Ulrich 
on the level of historical change.
Ulrich’s path of history bears no resemblance to a Hegelian unfolding 
of reason and lacks the tragedy of Benjamin’s angel of history to whom 
history appears as one single catastrophe. Sitting in a streetcar on his way 
home, Ulrich recognizes his present situation as a metaphor for being 
transported down the path of history.
The luminous, swaying box in which he was riding seemed to be a 
machine in which several hundred kilos of people were being rat-
tled around, by way of being processed into “the future.” A hundred 
years earlier, they had sat in a mail coach with the same look on 
their faces, and a hundred years hence, whatever was going on, they 
would be sitting as new people in exactly the same way in their 
updated transport machines. (MwQ 391; MoE 360)
Forever stuck in history’s always changing streetcars, Ulrich experiences 
a “truly demeaning stringing along with the centuries” and is infuriated 
by having to serve as the “stuff of history” (MwQ 391; MoE 360). He 
is “revolted by this lethargic acceptance of changes and conditions,” by 
the idea that depending on the shape of the streetcar, he would be a can-
nibal, an ancient Greek, or some version of a future man (MwQ 391; 
MoE 360). Ulrich gets off the streetcar, decides to walk home, and on the 
way analyzes history as a flux of perpetually underdetermined situations. 
Ulrich’s walk and his reflections on history have to be understood as criti-
cally commenting on each other.
Ulrich’s theory of history focuses on repetition and difference, partly 
reiterating Musil’s ruminations in The German as Symptom (1923). He 
uses the Habsburg Empire as a metaphor for history itself. As an empire 
with a center and a wide periphery, Ulrich observes at the core of histori-
cal development an abundance of authors with no original ideas who 
plagiarize each other incessantly. Change originates at the margin but 
without authorial intent. While repetition regulates the center, difference, 
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in the form of small incidents at the periphery, propels unforeseen reper-
cussions to the center. Transplanting a generation of modern-day children 
to ancient Egypt would not seem to change world history. If these chil-
dren were exposed to Egyptian religion, culture, economy, politics, and 
social traditions then, Musil and Ulrich argue, world history would start 
repeating itself from 5000 BC onward (MwQ 392; PS 164; MoE 361; 
ERK 1368). After an initial period of repetition, however, history’s trajec-
tory would “for reasons nobody could fathom, gradually begin to deviate 
from its established course” (MwQ 392; MoE 361).
Shaped by his own historical circumstances, Ulrich identifies the “law 
of world history” as the “muddling through” that Musil recognized in 
1923 as Austria’s governing principle (MwQ 392; PS 169; MoE 361; 
ERK 1374). Such ambling movement anticipates neither radical turns 
(catastrophes) nor predictable steps (of an unfolding of reason) but turns 
to Musil’s metaphor for the path of history: the movement of clouds. Ul-
rich’s reiteration of Musil’s theses on history and the self introduces small 
but far-reaching differences, and changes the direction and meaning of 
these clouds of history. Ulrich concludes his reflections on history:
The course of history was therefore not that of a billiard ball—
which once it is hit, takes a definite line—but resembles the move-
ment of clouds, or the path of a man sauntering through the streets, 
turned aside by a shadow here, a crowd there, an unusual architec-
tural outcrop, until at last he arrives at a place he never knew or 
meant to go to. Inherent in the course of history is a certain going 
off course. (MwQ 392; MoE 361)
Ulrich’s metaphorological reflections on history are brilliant to the point 
of self-deception; they afford him a similarly calming sense of security 
that the people around him get when they create their self-deceivingly 
linear life narratives.
Viewing history as a natural phenomenon, Ulrich transforms the path 
of history into something that is, at least theoretically, just as explainable 
as the movements of the visible mass of frozen crystals floating in the at-
mosphere above him. But by moving the comparison between clouds and 
history from the abstract context of an essay on history and the self to Ul-
rich’s concrete situation in one of Vienna’s streetcars, Musil changed the 
meaning of his metaphor. Ulrich gets off the frightening streetcar of his-
tory and observes from a safe distance and with both feet on the ground 
the path of history as a distant and rather harmless movement of clouds. 
By safely placing history into the sky, he recoups his earlier “feeling that 
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he was on his way somewhere” and regards himself again as “the instru-
ment of a not unimportant purpose” (MwQ 160; MoE 151). Rather than 
staying passively stuck in history’s streetcar, on his walk Ulrich regains 
the semblance of agency, orientation, and safe distance from the pro-
cess of history. Even though he veers slightly off course on the streets of 
Vienna—just as his cloudy notion of history—he recovers his bearing im-
mediately, never losing sight of his intended destination. Even an excellent 
reader like Honold stops the moment when Ulrich “lost his way” and de-
clares that Ulrich “confirms exactly” on his walk home his reflections on 
historical progression and digression (Honold 2004, 118). In contrast to 
history, however, Ulrich has no difficulty adjusting his direction. It takes 
him no more than “a moment to see where he was and find the best way 
home” (MwQ 392; MoE 362). While not refuting his reflections on his-
tory, the novel exposes simultaneously Ulrich’s need to feel temporary 
relief from the experience of helpless contemporaneity and his attempt to 
gain the semblance of control over his own path across time. Rather than 
affirming Ulrich’s sense of inner directedness, Musil discloses the modern-
ist subject’s tendency to take flight to outmoded notions of the self when 
confronting its own unstable place in history.
The novel’s narrator is never at risk of losing his analytical sovereignty 
or his antireductionist stance. The perpetual inability to fixate origins, 
causes, and necessities does not challenge his self-understanding but of-
fers opportunities to satirize those driven by their causal instinct to hunt 
for necessities everywhere. In the early 1930s, Musil drafted a chapter 
for the last part of the novel that addressed directly the question of the 
causes of war. Where could one track down the “Herd des Weltkriegs,” 
the “crucible of the World War” (MwQ 1474; MoE 1436)? As the nar-
rator notes, depending on the observer’s age and education, the war’s 
origin moves with great agility from place to place. It had been found in 
Sarajevo, in the world capitals, in the armaments industry, or on the Gali-
cian oil fields. The search for the war’s cause arrived at the “extremely 
positive negative result that the cause was everywhere and in everyone” 
(MwQ 1476; MoE 1438). Like the narrator in War and Peace, Musil’s 
narrator finds a billion probable causes but no sufficient ones. Instead of 
experiencing a historian’s frustration, however, he depicts this situation 
with satirical exuberance and renders absurd this reductionist expecta-
tion with a startling example of genealogical logic:
For “origins” and “causes” are like a person who goes searching for 
his parents: in the first instance he has two, that is indisputable; but 
with grandparents it’s the square of two, with great-grandparents 
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two to the third, and so on in a powerfully unfolding series, which 
is totally unassailable but which yields the remarkable result that 
at the beginning of time there must have been an almost infinite 
number of people whose purpose was merely to produce a single of 
today’s individuals. (MwQ 1474; MoE 1436)
Neither an individual’s life nor the origin of war is explainable by trace-
able causalities. Both are results of specific situations, spread out on the 
“infinitely interwoven surface” (MwQ 709; MoE 650).
In contrast to the amused narrator, Ulrich is a hyperintelligent pro-
ponent of such antireductionist theories of war and subjectivity but also 
its appalled, frustrated, and resistant object. While the narrator sustains 
an ironic distance from the world, Ulrich experiences himself as a mere 
particle in the “stuff of history.” The narrator exposes without signs of 
irritation the excessive quality of the causal instinct. Ulrich grows increas-
ingly aggravated when his sister Agathe forces him to explicate the role of 
causality in human interaction. In their extensive conversation in one of 
the novel’s last finished chapters, Agathe pushes Ulrich to clarify whether 
every human act can be justified and whether any act is ever caused by ne-
cessity. Rather than answering the first question directly, Ulrich proposes 
a theory of the next step. He argues that Agathe’s inquiry—and with it the 
method of “backshadowing”—is based on a false presupposition: “It’s 
never what one does that counts, but only what one does next!” (MwQ 
798; MoE 735). No action can be judged on its immediate merits but 
only retrospectively, from the position of a subsequent action. Every ac-
tion is, however, fraught with perpetual instability since no action escapes 
its place in the shadow of yet another action. Ulrich’s theory of the next 
step presupposes a never-ending series and keeps the justification of any 
single action in a state of perpetual tentativeness.
When confronted with an act of ultimate violence and finality, Ulrich 
hesitates to answer Agathe’s question about whether the state of per-
petual tentativeness applies to the act of murder as well. In contrast to 
the narrator who takes events of extreme violence as his example for 
rejecting notions of beginning and end, Ulrich neither sustains nor re-
nounces his moral theory of the next step when challenged by Agathe’s 
hypothetical murder. Initially, he is tempted to defend his theory. The act 
of murder might allow new insights into the constitution of subjectivity; 
the perpetrator could develop his aesthetic talents and communicate his 
experiences in “a poem that would enrich the inner life of thousands of 
people” (MwQ 799; MoE 735). But Ulrich decides to keep such a justi-
fication for murder to himself since only a lunatic or “an eighteen-year-
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old aesthete” would not see that such egregious justification for murder 
would “contradict the laws of nature” (MwQ 799; MoE 735). Uncertain 
about the existence of such laws of nature, Ulrich decides not to answer 
his sister at all.
While the narrator in The Man Without Qualities sustains his ironic dis-
tance from the ethical implications of the theory of the next step, Ulrich 
rejects Agathe’s assumption that this theory suggests a life of no remorse 
since every successive step might fundamentally change the meaning of 
the preceding action. For Ulrich, the theory of the next step exposes the 
risks of a life shaped by a sense of possibility. The constant possibility of 
reevaluating past deeds frustrates his desire of “achieving reality” (MwQ 
799; MoE 735). “The truth is, we have no proper method of dealing with 
unending series. Dear Agathe,” he said abruptly, “I sometimes regret my 
entire life” (MwQ 799; MoE 735–36). Ulrich is caught in an alternative of 
all or nothing. With every act always fitted into an infinite series of possible 
reassessments, regretting a single act might erupt suddenly into regretting 
an entire life. To live one’s life with a keen sense of possibility is a danger-
ous proposition.
This risk of living with a sense of possibility surfaces even more promi-
nently once the siblings’ conversation shifts from retrospective justifica-
tion and “backshadowing” to the question whether any action can be 
qualified as necessary. Their conversation foreshadows Ulrich’s enthusias-
tic response to the general mobilization, as Musil sketched it in notes and 
drafts. Agathe demands to know from Ulrich “in which moments does 
something in life strike us as necessary?” (MwQ 801; MoE 737). Ulrich’s 
brusque answer combines his rejection of causality with an acknowledg-
ment of a desire for necessity. The mundane activity of turning over in 
one’s bed serves as his example of how necessity occurs in a situation 
lacking a clear sequence of cause and effect:
You’re in an uncomfortable position [Lage]; you incessantly think 
of changing it and decide on one move and then another, without 
doing anything; finally you give up; and then all at once you’ve 
turned over! One really should say you’ve been turned over. That’s 
the pattern we act on, whether in a fit of passion or after long reflec-
tion. (MwQ 801; MoE 737)
Ulrich elaborates his theory of (passive) action when he and Agathe are 
neither in bed nor in a fit of passion but during an excursion to a hilltop, 
the so-called Swedish ramparts. Local legend associates the place with 
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a Swedish siege during the Thirty Years’ War. Even though the narrator 
doubts that the huge mound ever was a Swedish fortification, Ulrich re-
members the spell this hilltop held on him in his youth. While he discusses 
the logical impossibility of exempting any act from retrospective judg-
ments and the failure to identify any decisive action as necessary and 
predictable, Ulrich longs for “something as end in itself, authentic,” for 
a situation that releases him from all deliberations and determinations 
(MwQ 801; MoE 737). Ulrich anticipates the act of violence as a mo-
ment of certainty and authenticity. The Swedish soldiers, he imagines, 
were “involved in events valid, absolute, without the everlasting tenta-
tiveness they have when a person is superior to his experiences” (MwQ 
801; MoE 737). Such happy loss of reflective control and the dissolution 
of uncertainty is, according to Ulrich, identical with the moment before 
an attack in war. Like Musil in August 1914, Ulrich desires this event as a 
release from the process of individuation, as a moment more primal than 
love or death, a moment during which the regret for one’s entire life never 
enters the equation.
“What a glorious feeling it must have been for those Swedish ad-
venturers to reach such a place after trotting relentlessly for weeks, 
and then from the saddles catch sight of their quarry,” he said to 
his sister after telling her the story of the place. “It is only at such 
moments that the weight of life, the burden of our secret griev-
ances—that we must all die, that it’s all been so brief and probably 
for nothing—is ever really lifted from us.” (MwQ 800; MoE 736)
With Ulrich as The Man Without Qualities but with a sense of possibility, 
Musil offers a sustained critique of causality in his theory of subjectivity, 
of emotion, and of history. Such an awareness of the nonnecessary se-
quence of events—which the traditional subject orders only in hindsight 
and the historian constructs as the path of history—does not, however, 
equal a utopian concept of subjectivity nor does it render war impossible. 
In Musil’s noncausal, antireductionist concept of violence, the potential 
for violence remains always present even for the novel’s protagonist who 
developed such trenchant critiques of historical causality. The Man With-
out Qualities traces neither a path leading with any necessity to war and 
violence, nor does the novel allow itself the utopian pretense of offering 
its readers a path that will circumvent the next war.
Even though no reader of the unfinished novel can be certain that Ul-
rich would indeed welcome war as a viable version of the other condi-
tion, such an equation clearly has precedence in Ulrich’s life of perpetual 
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tentativeness and underdetermination. The episode at the Swedish ram-
parts is one example. Ulrich ascribes to these intense moments of joy and 
certainty such exceptional importance that no subsequent event of his life 
even approximated: “What single-minded and happy experiences have 
I had since then? None” (MwQ 800; MoE 737). A closer look at these 
imagined battle scenes at the Swedish rampart reveals that Ulrich’s fanta-
sies were neither unique nor incomparable experiences in his life. Ulrich’s 
choice of simile connects the moments to other situations during which 
the possibility of battle and mass violence promised the mature Ulrich a 
sudden release from the moral tentativeness of his theoretical insights.
Standing with Agathe on the Swedish ramparts, he remembers that 
as a boy he imagined how the soldiers might have experienced the 
sight below. The town was still laying there, far below in the dis-
tance, anxiously huddled around a few churches that looked like 
hens herding their chicks, so that one suddenly felt like leaping into 
their midst with one bound and laying about one, or scooping them 
up in the grip of a giant hand. (MwQ 800; MoE 736)
A few weeks before this conversation with his sister, Ulrich anticipated 
the release and joy such “senseless moments” of violence and destruction 
could offer him (MwQ 800; MoE). Standing at a window of Count Leins-
dorf’s Palais, he watched an agitated crowd of demonstrators outside. 
The Parallel Campaign stirred up antagonisms among the empire’s na-
tionalities, and Count Leinsdorf, the campaign’s gray eminence, became 
the target of ever more aggressive pro-German protestors. Observing the 
crowd below him, Ulrich envisioned to lead once again a band of soldiers 
and to command them to scatter the people like another herd of hens.
It would take only one company to make a clean sweep of the 
square.” He could imagine all those gaping mouths turning into a 
single frothing maw suddenly succumbing to panic, growing slack 
and drooping at the edges, lips slowly sinking over teeth; his imagi-
nation transformed the menacing black crowd into a flock of hens 
scattering before a dog rushing into their midst. (MwQ 686; MoE 
629)
In Ulrich’s detailed fantasy, violent domination and humiliation requires 
an absolute single-mindedness that places the perpetrator momentarily 
well outside the boundaries of Ulrich’s theory of the next step. This mo-
112 Chapter 3
ment of violence promises to stand on its own, to remain unqualified by 
its aftermath.
Ulrich’s imaginary violence ignores the notion of the malleable self, 
leaves behind his sense of possibility, and dreams up a return to a primor-
dial identity that recalls Musil’s celebration of a primal core of identity 
at the onset of World War I. Ulrich enjoys the certainty of the dangerous 
moment. As Ulrich describes it, he feels “the old satisfaction in watching 
moral man retreat before brute violent man” (MwQ 686; MoE 629). 
The Man Without Qualities imagines acts of violence as relief from the 
burdens of modern subjectivity. Ulrich relishes the idea of a brute core 
hidden inside modern man. This stepping forward of violent man is not 
just a figment of Ulrich’s imagination but grounded in yet another of his 
memories. Standing at the window when “all his anger [Böse] had con-
tracted again into a hard knot,” Ulrich recalled recent military actions, 
not childhood fantasies. His reexperience of the old satisfaction derived 
from “his own days in the army” (MwQ 686; MoE 629).
With increasing frequency, Ulrich remembers during the months before 
the general mobilization both imagined and actual acts of violence as 
temporary relief from the perpetual tentativeness of human interaction. 
Even though these instances foreshadow his welcoming of the war and 
prepare his equation of war and the other condition, Ulrich’s narrator 
never justifies these acts and fantasies. Unlike Musil’s first novel, The Man 
Without Qualities is not structured in defense of its main protagonist. 
These moments of actual and imaginary violence are not portrayed as 
necessary steps for Ulrich’s aesthetic or moral education. Indeed, Mu-
sil’s drafts for the novel’s climatic end during the general mobilization 
strongly indicate that Ulrich would have done more than just remember 
and imagine acts of violence. In a 1936 outline, Musil mentions a garden 
party during which several of the novel’s characters would discuss the 
rapidly rising likelihood of war (MoE 1396). At the party’s end, Ulrich 
is alone with his cousin Diotima, the hostess and guiding spirit of the 
Parallel Campaign. The talk of war and his sexual desire for her mix 
aggressively. Ulrich suddenly confesses to her that for months he could 
not think of anything else but “to beat you until you scream like a small 
child” (MoE 1620). He hits Diotima twice, and the scene ends in a sexual 
encounter that is placed on a very thin line between rough consensual in-
tercourse and rape. Waking up naked, lying on her knees, with her cheeks 
covered with saliva, Diotima no longer remembers what happened after 
the beating, and Ulrich is nowhere to be seen (MoE 1621).
While General Stumm von Bordwehr believed that the actions of 
“highly cultivated individuals” are under all circumstances motivated 
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by rationality, neither Ulrich nor the novel shares his trust (MwQ 1107; 
MoE 1020). Ulrich’s actions toward the end of the novel provide more 
and more evidence for Musil’s argument that no one is exempt from his 
or her historical circumstances; no utopian position and perspective can 
be sustained. Even Ulrich, the self-aware malleable self who knows that 
“nation,” “religion,” and “race” are ideological constructs that express no 
essences, could march joyfully to war, filled with the satisfaction of feeling 
once again like a primitive man stepping forward.
Musil’s narrator never endorses or celebrates this emergence of the 
primitive man. Musil does not rewrite his own initial enthusiasm for the 
war as the birth of a new man. Unlike Jünger, Musil’s novel does not 
portray barbarism as “a necessary consequence of civilization” (cited in 
Lethen 2002, 211). The novel does not expose Ulrich as an example of 
Freud’s “cultural hypocrites” whose adherence to cultural norms sud-
denly relaxes and vanishes in times of crisis (Freud 1957, 284). Unlike 
Benjamin’s conclusion to One-Way Street (1928), Musil noticed no first 
glimpse of a true telos of history amidst total destruction. Rather than the 
necessity of barbarism, the return of the primitive self, or an anticipation 
of a utopian future, Musil’s narrator observed the reawakening of almost 
forgotten cultural myths, like Ulrich’s brute violent man. The phrases and 
clichés of the present are replaced by their outdated but reenergized pre-
decessors.
Every day the newspapers casually write certain sentences that they 
habitually use to characterize habitual happenings, but if a revo-
lution threatens or something new is about to happen, it suddenly 
appears that these words no longer suffice and that in order to ward 
off or welcome, one must reach back for the oldest hats in the store 
and the spooks in the closet. The mind enters every great general 
mobilization whether for peace or for war, unequipped and laden 
down with forgotten things. (MwQ 1662; MoE 1600)
Rather than signaling the breakdown of tradition or announcing the 
birth of a new future, such moments of crisis become instances when 
“life—bursting with conceit over its here-and-now but really a most un-
certain, even downright unreal condition—pours itself headlong into the 
few dozen cake molds of which reality consists” (MwQ 645; MoE 591).
Unlike Ulrich and in contrast to Musil’s own experience of August 
1914, Musil’s narrator rejects the myth of the “dangerous moment” and 
the aesthetics of terror as “cake molds.” From Nietzsche to Jünger these 
moments of crisis and mobilization were celebrated as sudden expe riences 
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that disrupt the laws of causality and break with the security, boredom, 
and rationality of daily life (Bohrer 1978, 138; Herf 1984, 98). Con-
fronted with the sudden cancellation of the reality principle, Jünger cele-
brated the experience of shock and horror because it demanded a cold, 
impassioned, even cruel perspective that took the “radical consequence 
of a solely aesthetic form of attention” (Bohrer 1978, 57). In the opening 
section of The Adventurous Heart (1929), Jünger lays claim to a “second, 
finer, and impersonal consciousness,” one that controls and registers even 
the most dreadful experiences from a higher vantage point. This detached 
consciousness appreciates the moment of terror aesthetically and with “a 
mocking smile” (Jünger 1995, 9). As Lethen pointed out, Jünger’s (and 
Bohrer’s) aesthetization of the dangerous moment presupposed the gaze 
of a singular figure “still believing himself to be king of his castle” (2002, 
7). Musil’s concept of the malleable self does away with Jünger’s securely 
positioned second consciousness that is thought to remain independent 
of its circumstances. Instead of providing a utopian break from stifling re-
ality as Jünger suggested (Bohrer 1978, 342), Ulrich’s dangerous moment 
is a return to an outmoded cliché, a moment when Ulrich proves to be no 
longer the “king of his castle.”
Musil never questions the sincerity of those (like him) who experienced 
the general mobilization as a quasi-religious experience (Amann 2007, 8). 
But it is telling that the young Gerda Fischel and not Ulrich was supposed 
to describe the upheaval of August 1914 in almost the same nationalist 
language of love and death that Musil had used in his essay “Europäer-
tum, Krieg, Deutschtum.” Having seen the young men at the mobilization 
stations, she tells her skeptical father, the banker Leo Fischel, about the 
war euphoria on Vienna’s streets. She greets the mobilization as one “big 
wedding” (MwQ 1676; MoE 1621). Rather than being concerned for the 
loss of life or limb, she feels intense happiness.
You have no idea how much love and emotion of a sort we’ve 
never experienced before are (to be seen) in the streets today! 
We’ve been living like animals, brought down one day by death; 
it’s different now! It’s tremendous, I tell you: everyone is a brother; 
even death isn’t an enemy; a person loves his own death for the 
sake of others; today, for the first time, we understand life! (MwQ 
1677; MoE 1622)
One could read Musil’s transference of his war enthusiasm onto a minor 
female character as a gesture of distancing. Considering his theory of 
the malleable self and Ulrich’s rediscovery of the act of violence as an 
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act of certainty, Musil’s more radical and daring gesture emerges. After 
subordinating reality to the sense of possibility, after exposing the core of 
subjectivity as a shapeless self, after revealing the search for the causes of 
war and violence as a futile longing for origins and predictability, after 
likening the path of history to the path of clouds, Musil repeats his most 
daring gesture and affords no one a cross-situational stability for their 
acts and beliefs. Rather than finding any safe way home to peace, even 
The Man Without Qualities will pour his malleable self into one of re-
ality’s few “cake molds.” Knowing that the certainty promised by violent 
action is just an old “spook in the closet” does not diminish its allure for 
the malleable self at the time of mobilization. In contrast to The Confu-
sions of Young Törless, Musil no longer defends violent action, no longer 
conceives of it as an means to an end, but he acknowledges the omnipres-
ent possibility of its occurrence and the powerful promise of unity and 
clarity it carries in modernity.
As we have seen in these last two chapters, Musil’s persistent preoccupa-
tion with violence and war underwent dramatic shifts and developments. 
It moved from an understanding of violence as an instrument that could 
cause the achievement of particular goals to an antireductionist approach 
that focused instead on the variability of situations that could but did 
not have to erupt into violence. Musil’s discovery and analysis of the 
malleable self is the turning point in his writings, connecting and distin-
guishing his radically different concepts of violence. While exploring the 
malleable self and the sense of possibility, Musil analyzed the inherently 
risky potential of these responses to the experience of modernity and 
its undetermined openness and uncertainty. From its position of radical 
ambivalence, Musil’s final novel argued for discarding linear models of 
reality construction and, at the same time, exposed the risks for the mal-
leable self of living a life shaped by a sense of possibility. Violence holds 
the promise of escaping briefly from the undecided openness of social and 
political situations as well as from the shapelessness of the malleable self. 
As Musil experienced it during the time of general mobilization, violence 
can promise to dissolve radical ambivalence in an experience so intense 
that love, death, and truth might be no more than tiny splinters from its 
block. And it provides the malleable self with choices from a variety of 
“cake molds,” rigid patterns of perception and firm constructions of re-
ality that promise well-defined shapes and contours to a self that experi-
ences its malleability as a burden.
In the following two chapters, I argue that Franz Kafka and Elias 
Canetti deal in their explorations of violence precisely with the tasks of 
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finding different answers to these two promises of violence. The fourth 
chapter argues that Kafka’s writings, in particular his story In the Penal 
Colony, offer one of the most radical interrogations of the relationship 
between ambivalence, truth, and violence in German modernism. His 
story exposes the ambivalences inherent in the discourses on violence and 
truth, silence and communication. As I argue, Kafka recognizes the search 
for truth with violence as futile, and the continuation of any such search 
as forms of self-deception, but at the same time he offers no escape, no 
alternative to this deceptive discourse on pain and truth. Kafka’s story 
moves back and forth between the promise to reveal truth through vio-
lence and the renunciation of any such hope, and the story ends in ges-
tures of radical ambivalence.
The fifth chapter turns to models of satire that aim their destructive 
force at seemingly outdated traditions and rigid patterns of perception, 
Musil’s “few dozen cake molds of which reality consists” (MwQ 645). 
Anticipating the next war as a war won by the most modern weapons 
available, chemical weapons that defied perception, a wide range of au-
thors and theorists feared that the ubiquitous popularity of such old “cake 
molds” would prevent societies from even perceiving the new threats of 
modern warfare. Looking at the writings of Kraus and Benjamin, this 
chapter will analyze especially the structure of Elias Canetti’s satire and 
argue that it is intended to subvert or even destroy such inflexible pat-
terns of perception that block the observation of the most urgent risks to 
modern society. At the center of his novel Auto-da-Fé stands Peter Kien, 
an embodiment of rigid tradition who fears the malleability of the self 
even more than Musil’s young Törless. Canetti developed a form of satire 
that inflicts harm on its audience to shatter its rigid molds of perception 
and reality. Canetti’s satire is, as I argue, a satire that seeks to prepare the 
ground for a positive concept of the malleable self, of a self that lives the 
passion of metamorphosis, and might become capable of perceiving and 
assessing the new threats of mass violence.
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Chapter 4
Kafka’s Poetics of the Knife
On Violence, Truth, and Ambivalence in  
In the Penal Colony
Few twentieth-century writers explored violence and power more pas-
sionately than Elias Canetti. No stranger to superlatives, he found even 
higher praise for Franz Kafka: “Of all writers, Kafka is the greatest expert 
on power. He experienced, and gave shape to, each of its aspects” (Canetti 
1979, 111). A reading of Canetti’s essay on Kafka, however, contradicts 
this claim, and the fault lies not with Kafka. The great value of Kafka’s 
work as writings on power stems, Canetti writes, from their distinct and 
unyielding perspective. “There is something deeply exciting about this 
obstinate attempt of a powerless man to escape power in any form” 
(111). Kafka has become German modernism’s icon of powerlessness— 
and not just for Canetti. Adorno assures us that Kafka “resists [the world] 
through nonviolence” (Adorno 2003, 237); his writings came directly, 
Huyssen claims, “out of the abyss of modernity” (Huyssen 1995, 143). 
Stanley Corngold borrows Canetti’s dictum that “Kafka’s work is dipped 
in the color of powerlessness” as an epigraph in his Kafka study (Corn-
gold 2004, 13). Even when Kafka writes from the perspective of a per-
petrator, his readers keep viewing him as a victim in disguise. Reading 
Kafka’s most gruesome description of murder, seen and heard from the 
murderer’s position, Winfried Menninghaus decodes the passage as one 
of Kafka’s fantasies of self-immolation (Menninghaus 2003, 300).
Our perception of Kafka is particularly one-sided, so it seems, when it 
comes to his representations of violence. Canetti’s study, The Other Trial 
(1969), offers a particularly instructive example. Canetti cites at length 
a passage from Kafka’s unfinished story Memoirs of the Kalda Railroad.
For the rats, who sometimes attacked my food, my long knife was 
enough. During the early time, when I seized curiously upon every-
thing, I once skewered such a rat and held it up on the wall at 
eye-level; if one bends down to the ground for them and looks at 
them there, one gets a false and incomplete idea of them. The most 
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conspicuous thing about these rats were the claws, big, slightly hol-
low, and yet sharp at the end, they were very suitable for digging in. 
In the final struggle in which the rat hung before me on the wall, it 
extended its claws stiffly, apparently against its living nature, they 
were like a small hand stretching out to someone. (Cited in Canetti 
1979, 120; KKT 689–90)
The narrator’s focus on the rat’s stiffly extended claws might invoke the 
impassibilité of Homer’s narrator when he pointed to the maids’ feet after 
Telemachus strung them up like birds, observing that the girls “kicked 
up heels for a little—not for long” (Homer 1996, 454). But identifying 
Kafka with the story’s narrator, Canetti does not notice the killer’s cold 
attention to detail. Instead, he praises the passage as an example Kafka’s 
respect for smallness.
One has to have smaller animals at eye-level to see them accurately: 
it is as though one were making them one’s equal by raising them. 
Bending down to the ground, a kind of condescension, offers a 
false, incomplete idea of them. The raising of small animals to eye-
level recalls Kafka’s habit of magnifying such creatures: the bug in 
“Metamorphosis,” the molelike creature in “The Burrow.” (Canetti 
1979, 120)
Missing in Canetti’s reading is Kafka’s fixation on skewering rats and on 
the sounds rats make when they are slit open. In a letter to Felice Bauer, 
he remembers a good meal of “juicy Jewish sausages” that were “plump as 
water rats” and tells his girlfriend that it does him a “great deal of good” 
to have “the sound of the taut sausage skin being cut [. . .] in my ears since 
childhood” (LF 163). The same sound can be heard in Kafka’s story “A 
Fratricide” (1917). Schmar, the murderer, wields his knife against a man 
called Wese “and lets him have it, once in the throat, and twice in the throat 
and a third time low into the belly. Water-rats, slit open, emit similar sounds 
to Wese” (M 220).
Also missing from Canetti’s reading of this passage is its historical con-
text. Kafka wrote Memoirs of the Kalda Railroad a few months after the 
beginning of the First World War, around the same time he worked on 
“Theatre of Oklahoma,” a chapter from Amerika: The Man Who Dis-
appeared, which his translator, Michael Hofmann, considers as an eerie 
premonition of the Holocaust (Kafka 2002, xi). And Kafka wrote at that 
time his shocking masterpiece In the Penal Colony. Missing as well is any 
mention of the knife—and Kafka’s poetics is, as I will argue, a poetics of 
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the knife—as well as the skewering of the rat, the casual cruelty of hang-
ing a dying rat on the wall, and above all the close interest in every detail 
of the rat’s last struggle, as if the narrator expected that the rat should 
reveal in its moment of death some essential meaning.
I do not want to portray Kafka as a sadistic modernist, but this chap-
ter will take his claim seriously that his interests in torturing and being 
tortured are intimately linked to his poetics (LM 216; BM 291). Kafka’s 
position toward power, war, and violence is far more ambivalent than 
generally accepted. By focusing on Kafka’s ambivalences one gains new 
insights into his writings and a more complex understanding of the rela-
tionship between German modernism and violence. The attention to such 
ambivalences requires close readings that can bring about fundamentally 
different interpretations of even the most canonical texts.
This chapter analyzes Kafka’s In the Penal Colony because it is the 
most obvious and, at the same time, the least likely choice to explore Kaf-
ka’s ambivalent approach toward violence. As one of a few longer texts 
he deemed worth publishing, In the Penal Colony is without a doubt of 
central importance to Kafka’s poetics. The story is also Kafka’s principal 
text on violence, which, as Michael Löwy writes, of all of Kafka’s writings 
“presents Authority with the most murderous and unjust face” (1992, 
87). In the Penal Colony has been praised as a prescient document of 
the new orders of terror. Ernst Pawel identified the officer as an uncanny 
portrait of Adolf Eichmann, and readers from Adorno to Traverso con-
sidered it a prophetic anticipation of the processes of annihilation during 
the Holocaust (Traverso 2000, 69–81). Other readings consider the story, 
as we will see, as a clear indictment of colonial violence while readings 
that take the side of the officer and his apparatus find absolute certainty 
in its production of justice. Judging from secondary literature, In the Pe-
nal Colony should be the last story to search for evidence of ambivalence 
in Kafka’s exploration of violence.
But one key to Kafka’s story on violence is the recognition of the penal 
colony’s officer as a figure of ambivalence. He belongs to the new and the 
old order; he defends and mistrusts the lethal workings of the appara-
tus. Moreover, the story’s structure belongs among Kafka’s most radical 
reflections on his poetics of the knife, or, considering that it always cuts 
both ways, his poetics of the two-edged sword. Neither the expectation 
of establishing truth and justice with the execution apparatus nor the 
frustration of such expectations should be taken as the story’s meaning 
or “truth.” Kafka leaves his readers alone with the repetitions of gestures 
of radical ambivalence, moving from one level of the story to the next. 
By the same token, In the Penal Colony refuses on the level of its form to 
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make a decision between realist storytelling and modernist description, as 
readers from Lukács to Scherpe have argued. With a strange storyteller at 
its center who extols and mistrusts his own descriptions of the apparatus, 
Kafka’s story collapses under its own repetitious movements, never reach-
ing a conclusion but disintegrating finally like the apparatus itself. With 
In the Penal Colony, Kafka neither renounces the promise of violence nor 
adheres to it. The story exemplifies Kafka’s poetics of ambivalence and 
indecision.
To let this ambivalent image of Kafka emerge, an image that shares a 
few disquieting features with the penal colony’s officer, a few steps have 
to be taken in preparation. First, one has to look at the political context 
in which Kafka wrote In the Penal Colony. Kafka worked on his story 
during the first months of World War I, and his stance toward the war 
offers a first correction to the popular identification of Kafka with non-
violence and powerlessness. A look at Kafka’s poetics will reveal its fasci-
nation with cutting and stabbing knives and point toward its aggressive 
aesthetics of an incisive and wounding literature. The reading of In the 
Penal Colony will focus on the officer’s narration at its center and disclose 
the officer’s deeply ambivalent position—a position that undermines the 
standard readings of this story—and demonstrate that Kafka’s story is 
one of the most radical interrogations of the relationship between truth, 
ambivalence, and violence in German modernism.
Kafka Goes (Not) to War
Unlike Musil, Kafka felt no enthusiasm during general mobilization in 
August 1914. His all too dry diary entry on August 2—“Germany has 
declared war on Russia. Swimming in the afternoon” (T 543; D 301)—
does not, however, provide evidence of his indifference or opposition to 
the war. But it points to the distance he kept from demonstrations of war 
euphoria on the streets of Prague. His diaries show him as a rather hostile 
observer of the world around him. On August 6, 1914, he watches with 
an “evil eye” the artillery’s public send-off to the front, and he has no 
sympathies for the other patriotic demonstrations (KKT 546). “With a 
passion,” he wishes these departing soldiers “everything evil” (KKT 546; 
D 302). The next night he hears loud choral singing from a restaurant 
across the street and hopes the police will soon end all late night manifes-
tations of communal joy during wartime (KKT 547; D 303).
Kafka’s hostility targets expressions of collective enthusiasm for the 
war—“one of the most disgusting accompaniments of the war” (KKT 
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547; D 302)—but not the war itself. While saddened by Austria’s early de-
feats in September 1914, Kafka envies the soldiers who had been drafted 
to the front and hopes to join them soon. Unlike the majority of his liter-
ary contemporaries, Kafka never fell for or participated in propagandistic 
glorifications of danger, death, and war. He did not long for finding a 
primordial unity in battle. Kafka had other reasons for joining the war. As 
Kafka’s biographer Peter-André Alt observes, Kafka told his former (and 
future) fiancée Felice Bauer repeatedly that life at the front would cure his 
headaches and other ailments (Alt 2005, 433). Musil’s visit to Kafka in 
1916 served as further evidence for his peculiar medicinal theory regard-
ing the health benefits of warfare. While Kafka suffered once more from 
headaches, Musil looked rather well despite his current sick leave from 
the military service. Kafka concluded: “I would be better off at the front” 
(LF 465; KKBr II 156). When called up to the medical examiner in 1915, 
he expected Bauer to agree that it would be his “good fortune to become 
a soldier” (LF 454; KKBr II 133).
To his delight, Kafka passed the health exam but suffered the “mis-
fortune” that his employer, the Worker’s Accident Insurance Institute, in-
tervened at the war ministry, and declared his work essential and Kafka 
irreplaceable.1 Kafka regretted the result of this intervention as the loss 
of a remedy, a “Heilmittel” (LF 458; KKBr II 141). Unable to go to war, 
Kafka invested a significant share of his annual income in war bonds. In 
November 1915 he enumerated at first feverishly and then rather calmly 
the monetary gains he might receive after Austria’s victory. By signing the 
war bond, he achieved what he avoided otherwise: he became part of the 
war community (KKT 771; D 351).
Never, however, did Kafka consider the war as a remedy to anyone 
else’s ailments. While he wished those who went to the front in 1914 
everything evil, he was actively engaged in providing psychiatric help 
to those returning veterans who were traumatized by their experiences. 
Kafka wrote and published open letters to collect money for the estab-
lishment of a public veteran’s psychiatric hospital. Kafka was so heavily 
involved in these matters that he was recommended to receive in 1918 
a medal for his service for the Public Crownland Agency for Returning 
Veterans.2
Kafka’s ambivalence toward the war collective was most pronounced 
during the general mobilization and in the first months of war. Through-
out July 1914, Kafka’s world oscillated between catastrophe and am-
bitious plans. On July 3, in a letter to Musil, he had to withdraw his 
story Metamorphosis from publication in Die Neue Rundschau. Musil’s 
journal had asked him to cut a third of the story (Br II 97; L 109). The 
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disastrous dissolution of his first engagement to Felice Bauer happened 
ten days later. On July 21, he announced to his parents that he would 
terminate his employment at the Worker’s Accident Insurance Institute, 
leave Prague, and move to Berlin or Munich to pursue for two years the 
career of a writer of fiction (Br 101–3). One week later, he noted his in-
ability “to share an experience [mitzuleben],” his difficulty working at the 
office and participating in discussions (Tb 663; D 295). When the Austri-
an emperor ordered the mobilization on July 31, his brothers-in-law were 
drafted to the military. Kafka moved out of his parents’ house, not to start 
a life as a writer but to make room for one of his sisters and her children. 
Feeling indifferent to the suffering around him, he complained about his 
lack of time to write. His inability to join the war collective caused a deep 
personal crisis, but Kafka was determined to make this crisis productive 
for his literary work. “But I will write in spite of everything, absolutely, it 
is my struggle for self-preservation” (Tb 543; D 300).
Kafka’s battle for self-preservation—it is the only time he uses this 
term in his diaries—became “the second great period in his existence as a 
writer” (Canetti 1969, 82). Taking stock at the end of 1914, Kafka showed 
rare satisfaction with his accomplishments. During the first five months 
of the war, he started on a new novel, The Trial, he worked on several 
short stories including Memoirs of the Kalda Railroad, and he paid par-
ticular attention to two completed texts, the last chapter of Amerika: The 
Man Who Disappeared and In the Penal Colony (Tb 714–15; D 324).
These texts written at the beginning of the war continue to shock 
readers with their violence. Particularly In the Penal Colony continues to 
disturb—so much so that few readers focus on its description of violence 
and instead prefer to debate the possible meanings of the apparatus. If 
one looks closely at its representations of violence, and expects the story 
to perform according to Kafka’s iconic status as someone who sides with 
the powerless and who denounces brutality, then one is bound to repeat 
Ulrich Stadler’s frustrating reading experience. Stadler chose In the Penal 
Colony for a comparative study of representations of violence in modern-
ist and postmodernist literature. The safe modernist Kafka was supposed 
to contrast favorably to the representations of violence by postmodernist 
writers and theorists like Tabori, Schwab, Streeruwitz, and Lyotard that 
Stadler deemed irresponsible (Stadler 1995b, 77). To Stadler’s surprise, 
In the Penal Colony presented a cold indifference to the impact of vio-
lence and a bleak prognosis for the coexistence of fundamentally dif-
ferent cultures and civilizations: because of intercultural communicative 
disjunction, Kafka’s story allowed according to Stadler’s reading only for 
an alternative between segregation of national communities and violent 
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conflicts (Stadler 1995a, 97–98). Facing this breathtaking choice, Stadler 
ended his analysis of In the Penal Colony abruptly (Stadler 1995a, 92).
An analysis of Kafka’s poetics that does not identify Kafka and his 
writings with powerlessness will interpret and evaluate such stark alter-
natives differently. Distortion and disjunction are omnipresent in Kafka’s 
reflections on communication. But instead of faulting language itself, as 
Stadler suggests, Kafka’s poetics focuses on the violent ambivalence with-
in individual acts of communication. This means that any reading of In 
the Penal Colony has to pay close attention to the officer’s speech acts and 
analyze what they reveal about him and his belief in violence. The officer 
does not tell the truth, but Kafka’s story tells its truth through the officer’s 
narration. His lies and distortions reveal a meaning he avoids knowing, 
a meaning in accordance with Kafka’s poetics of the knife. But what is 
Kafka’s poetics of the knife?
Kafka’s Knives
Kafka spoke of his desires, of his relationship to family and lovers, and of 
his understanding of language and literature in images of cutting knifes.3 
In his diary of 1911, he imagined the pleasure of a knife twisting in his 
heart (D 101; Tb 220), two years later, he told Felice Bauer about his 
fantasy of being
a large piece of wood, and to be pressed against her own body by 
the cook, who with both hands draws the knife toward her along 
the side of this stiff log (approximately in the region of my hip) and 
with all her might slices off shavings to light the fire. (BF 310; LF 
201–2)
A bloodier, more carnal version of such a knife fantasy reappeared several 
months later (D 221; Tb 560). The use of this knife loses its masochistic 
inflection; Kafka describes himself as someone who brandishes knives 
before his family, simultaneously wounding and protecting them (LF 526; 
BF 731). Elizabeth Boa previously noted the sadistic aspect in Kafka’s 
definition of love when he transformed his lover Milena Pollak into the 
knife he uses against himself. “Love is that you are the knife with which I 
dig inside me” (BM 263; Boa 1996, 95). The equation of reading and get-
ting wounded is one of Kafka’s earliest comments on literature: “I think 
we ought to read only the kind of books that wound and stab us” (KKBr 
I, 27; L 16). A few years later he expects the same from writing: “I’ll jump 
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into my story though it should cut my face to pieces” (Tb 126; D 28). It 
is high praise when a book has the effect of a knife, a “Messerwirkung” 
(BF 659).
Why does Kafka connect literature with such violent experiences? 
Starting with his friend Max Brod, readers from Sokel to Pasley invest 
Kafka’s fascination with pain, wounds, and violence with a purifying and 
transcending notion of truth. Avoiding their religious undertones, Men-
ninghaus detects in Kafka’s writings a similar equation of pain and truth:
In fully detached abstraction, Kafka reads torture, “according to 
tradition,” as a method of finding hidden layers of language: as with 
his own poetics, the true or, at least, the desired word is forced from 
a body by means of knife cuts. (Menninghaus 2003, 308)
Instead of forcing truth from pain, Norris argues that Kafka’s knives re-
veal the truth of pain in its meaninglessness. “Kafka restores physical, 
‘animal’ pain to its real and incontestable ‘truth’ by de-moralizing, de-
mythifying, and de-signifying it” (Norris 1985, 111).
This alternative between pain as a generator of a transcendent truth or 
(at least) the mot juste and the mute “animal” pain projects nonetheless 
a false clarity onto Kafka’s conceptualization of violence and language. 
Rather than stabbing in one of these two directions, Kafka’s poetic knives 
move constantly back and forth between these alternatives. Rather than 
resolving the relationship between violence and language, these poetic 
knives refuse the either/or decision. Kafka slashes the idea that torture 
could force the right word, but he refuses to renounce the cutting, and he 
proves unwilling to stop toying with the false equation of pain and truth.
The officer’s apparatus is not the only execution machine Kafka de-
signed. After the publication of In the Penal Colony, Kafka discussed his 
view of pain and truth with Milena Pollak. He sent her a sketch of an 
apparatus that slowly splits the delinquent while its inventor observes the 
procedure with unmoved composure (LM 204; BM 271). In another let-
ter to Pollak, Kafka explained his obsession with torture.
Yes, torturing is extremely important to me, I am preoccupied with 
nothing but being tortured and torturing. Why? For much the same 
reason as Perkins was and equally thoughtlessly, mechanically, 
and according to tradition—i.e., in order to learn the cursed word 
from the cursed mouth. The stupidity inherent in this (realization 
of stupidity doesn’t help) I once expressed as follows: “The animal 
wrenches the whip from the master and whips itself so as to become 
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master and doesn’t realize that it’s only a fantasy caused by a new 
knot in the master’s thong.” Of course torturing is pathetic, too. 
Alexander didn’t torture the Gordian knot when it wouldn’t come 
untied. (LM 216; BM 291)
Menninghaus extracts from this passage Kafka’s “traditional” view of 
torture as a method to find the truth and the right word (Menninghaus 
2003, 308). But Kafka stresses as well the fantastic futility of this tradi-
tional expectation, not its success.
The reference to Perkins leads to a representation of torture that com-
bines the two opposing relations between pain and truth that Menning-
haus and Norris argue for in Kafka’s writings. Officer Perkins appears 
in Upton Sinclair’s lengthy war story Jimmie Higgins (1919), a book 
Pollak translated in excerpts for a Czech newspaper. In Sinclair’s story, 
torture testifies simultaneously to a transcending truth and reveals pain 
as meaningless “animal” pain. In the novel’s final chapters, the bewil-
dered American socialist worker Higgins no longer fights the Germans 
in the First World War. He is now stationed in Archangel and charged 
with suppressing the Russian Revolution. After being arrested for pos-
sessing antiwar propaganda, Higgins meets Officer Perkins. Tasked to 
uncover Bolshevik conspiracies among American soldiers, the officer tor-
tures Higgins with a “primitive hand-process of torture,” a process Sin-
clair describes in excruciating detail (Sinclair 1919, 267). Despite hours, 
days, and weeks of beatings and “water-cures,” the officer never hears 
the cursed word from his victim’s mouth. Jimmie Higgins’s silence testi-
fies in Sinclair’s story to the power and truth of his socialist ideals; or as 
Sinclair’s officer worries:
What the hell was this idea that could keep a little runt of a work-
ingman stronger than all in authority? And how was this idea to be 
kept from spreading and wrecking the comfortable, well-ordered 
world in which Perkins expected soon to receive an army commis-
sion? (278)
Incapable of breaking Higgins’s silence, the officer kills his spirit. Rath-
er than letting Higgins survive the torture as a socialist hero or hero-
ically die a martyr’s death, the officer breaks Higgins, transforming him 
into “some kind of furbearing animal” caught in the burrow of its own 
thoughts (281). Uncannily similar to Kafka’s In the Penal Colony, the 
prisoner in Sinclair’s Higgins acts like a dog at the end. The tortured 
Higgins turns into a “good doggie” and crawls about on all fours; he 
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“eats his food out of a tin platter without using his gnawed-off fingers” 
(282). Higgins’s pain became pain without meaning, animal pain, as 
Sinclair writes: “being a beast, he suffers only the pain of the moment, 
he does not know that he is going to suffer to-morrow, nor worry about 
it” (282).
Kafka’s own position is deeply ambivalent. He considers the equation 
of pain and truth foolish, but he refuses just as well to accept the experi-
ence of pain as meaningless. He finds himself in Perkins’s position but 
knows about its stupidity even though, as he said, the “realization of 
stupidity doesn’t help” (LM 216; BM 291). Kafka recognizes the search 
for truth with violence as futile, and the continuation of this search turns 
thus into a form of self-deception, but at the same time Kafka offers 
no escape, no alternative to this deceptive discourse on pain and truth. 
Through his narrative technique, Kafka holds these impossible options 
in ambivalent abeyance. He presents no way out of self-deceptions and 
distortions—neither through violence nor through the denunciation of 
violence—and offers only a recognition of their necessity (although such 
recognition provides no help either).
To clarify Kafka’s poetics of violence one needs to look at his under-
standing of the relationship between language and its user. Acts of com-
munication expose the lack of clarity and unity inside the speaker but not 
the limits of language. No longer wanting to jump into his own poetic 
knives, Kafka returns in one of his last notations on writing to the incisive 
capacity of language.
More and more fearful as I write. It is understandable. Every word, 
twisted in the hands of the spirits—this twist of the hand is their 
characteristic gesture—becomes a spear turned against the speaker. 
(Tb 926; D 423)
The communicative act discloses what its speaker would have preferred 
to conceal. It is a knife that cuts both ways, as Kafka wrote to Bauer: “It’s 
not a knife that stabs only forward but one that wheels around and stabs 
back as well” (BF 754; LF 544).
Even at moments when Kafka is most assured of writing literally what 
he hoped to express, the words reveal still more. They become involun-
tary metaphors and expose hidden aspects of the self. Language per se 
poses no obstacle to conveying what one intends to say:
I am not of the opinion that one can ever lack the power to ex-
press perfectly what one wants to write or say. Observations on the 
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weakness of language, and comparisons between the limitations of 
words and the infinity of feelings, are quite fallacious. The infinite 
feeling continues to be as infinite in words as it was in the heart. 
What is clear within is bound to become so in words as well. This 
is why one need never worry about language, but at sight of words 
may often worry about oneself. After all, who knows within himself 
how things really are with him? This tempestuous or floundering or 
morasslike inner self is what we really are, but by the secret process 
by which words are forced out of us our self-knowledge is brought 
to light, and though it may still be veiled, yet it is there before us, 
wonderful or terrible to behold. (BF 305–6; LF 198)
The subject, the morass-like inner self, but not language lacks inner clar-
ity. Kafka finds himself amidst not a Sprachkrise but a crisis of the self. 
Instead of being short on mediative function, language conveys rather too 
much in communication. The inability to control language does not point 
to language’s insufficiency but to the subject’s failure to use language as a 
fortification against its inner morass.
With this relation between subject and language, Kafka assumes a spe-
cial position in the context of the Sprachkrise, the moment when writers 
of the fin de siècle in Vienna, Berlin, and Prague questioned the represen-
tational capacity of language. In Hofmannsthal’s A Letter, the renowned 
literary expression of crisis of language, one encounters the precise oppo-
site of Kafka’s assessment of self and language. Lord Chandos is a unified 
self who refuses to let his experiences be soiled by disintegrating words. 
For Lord Chandos, the crisis of language is not one of subjectivity and ex-
perience but one of the insufficient mediative capacity of language. Even 
the most banal object—a watering can, a harrow, a dog in the sun—can 
become “the vessel of my revelation” but not language (Hofmannsthal 
2005, 123).
Any of these things and the thousand similar ones past which 
the eye ordinarily glides with natural indifference can at any  
moment—which I am completely unable to elicit—suddenly take 
on for me a sublime and moving aura which words seem too weak 
to describe. (123)
Objects, even absent ones, might serve as vessels for divine experiences, 
“filled to the brim with this smoothly but steeply rising tide of heavenly 
feeling” (123). Words hold nothing but putrefy like “rotten mushrooms” 
in his mouth (121). Lord Chandos reiterates Maeterlink’s sentiment that 
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Musil used as an epigraph for Young Törless: “As soon as we put some-
thing into words, we devalue it in a strange way” (Musil 2001, 1). Words 
are denounced as incompetent servants that fail to serve their masters; 
they can’t carry the messages from a world of superior experiences. As 
a master, Lord Chandos finds no fault with himself, but withdraws into 
aristocratic silence, searching for an unknown language: “a language in 
which mute things speak to me” (Hofmannsthal 2005, 128). He searches 
for a language that would not diminish the invaluable treasure trove at 
the depth of experience and turn them “to false stones and shards of 
glass,” as the young Musil quoted Maeterlink (Musil 2001, 1).
An equally young Kafka started from a similar denunciation of lan-
guage as a crude tool, incapable of communicating deep experiences and 
beautiful memories. In 1900, two years before Hofmannsthal’s A Letter, 
the eighteen-year-old Kafka sighed dramatically in a friend’s memory al-
bum:
How many words in this book. They are meant for remembrance. 
As though words could carry memories. For words are clumsy 
mountaineers and clumsy miners. Not for them to bring down trea-
sures from the mountains’ peaks, or up from the mountains’ bow-
els. (L 1)
Words reach neither the depths nor the heights of experience; they are 
nothing but experience’s “ashes” (L 1). Even in this early notation, how-
ever, Kafka lacks Lord Chandos’s and Maeterlink’s preciousness. He does 
not assume the position of an aristocratic master but that of a dissatisfied 
bourgeois who complains because he does not get his money’s worth from 
the work of these mountaineers and miners. And Kafka blames himself 
as well; his “unskillfull hand” shares the blame together with language’s 
crudeness (L 1).
Two decades later, after the war, Kafka finds his most extreme expres-
sion for demarcating the limits of communication. And now the fault lies 
not with language but with its speaker. Summing up the total of human 
history, Kafka equates speaking with lying and claims that, on the one 
hand, “mankind has been overflowing with speech and, on the other hand, 
speech is possible only where one wants to lie” (WP 338; KKNSF II, 348). 
Without lying, speaking is impossible. Everyone (including Kafka) speaks 
and therefore lies. Unlike Lord Chandos, Kafka neither believes that truth 
can be experienced through the spectacle of pain—Chandos’s sublime vi-
sion of dying rats and their screams (Hofmannsthal 2005, 123–24)—nor 
does he dismiss language to withdraw into silence. Kafka rejects the elit-
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ist disdain for the supposed commonness of language as one finds it even 
in Mauthner’s philosophy of language. Sarcastically, Mauthner praised 
language as society’s first and only socialist institution. Everyone uses it 
just like the water and sewage system: “Language is common property. 
Everything belongs to everyone—everyone bathes in it, everyone drinks 
it, and everyone excretes it” (Mauthner 1906, 27). As Menninghaus ob-
serves, Kafka feels no disgust for having to share language with every-
one else. Kafka’s disgust is provoked by individual speech acts, not by a 
commonness of language: “What is disgusting, in [Kafka’s] mind, are not 
words per se, as they get chewed up and spat out by all and sundry, but 
always only specific, individual speech acts” (2003, 337). Menninghaus 
underestimates the scope of Kafka’s critique—only particular speech acts 
were not disgusting to him—but he is right to emphasize that Kafka is not 
suspicious of language itself but of its users, especially if a speaker claims 
to confess his most intimate truth.
Kafka’s poetics of the knife twists the relationship between the self 
and language one more time. Individual speech acts reveal the self’s lack 
of unity. This lack of shape and coherence is, however, always already 
a protective mechanism, shielding the individual from the feared and 
ever-present possibility of self-awareness. The lack of inner clarity, unity, 
and coherence does not result from a lack of self-knowledge, but pro-
tects against its constant availability. In a letter to Bauer, Kafka wants to 
reach inside himself and clear up the inner chaos: “I wish I had a strong 
hand for the sole purpose of thrusting it into this incoherent construc-
tion that I am” (BF 306; LF 198). His peculiar choice of the word “con-
struction” indicates something self-made rather than existentially given. 
But he has no control over it. This construction of his inner self remains 
too malleable to control; it does not control these constructions. When 
he envisions this construction, he finds it “obscure and still in flux” (BF 
306; LF 198).
Five years later, 1918 in Zürau, during his most sustained theoretical 
reflections, Kafka returns to metaphor of inner constructions. Reinter-
preting Genesis, he starts from the assumption of a human capacity to 
know good and evil. The difficulty for Kafka is not the knowledge of 
good and evil itself but the question of what to do with it.
Nobody can be content with knowledge alone, but must strive to 
act in accordance with it. But he is not endowed with the strength 
for this, hence he must destroy himself, even at the risk of in that 
way not acquiring the necessary strength, but there is nothing else 
he can do except make this last attempt. [. . .] Now this is an 
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attempt he is afraid to make; he prefers to undo the knowledge of 
Good and Evil. (Kafka 1991, 38; NSF II 74)
The Socratic goal of an examined life is not an elusive goal, no lifelong 
task, but a strategy to avoid the dire consequences of an already avail-
able self-knowledge. Knowing oneself and knowing what one should do, 
one shies away from such knowledge because of a lack of strength to live 
accordingly. Humans don’t use reflection for self-examination, but to de-
construct and disarticulate the self and to build auxiliary constructions, 
“Hilfskonstruktionen” (NSF II 74).
These auxiliary constructions preserve for the individual a semblance 
of self and world by creating alternate realities.
But what has once happened cannot be undone, it can only be made 
turbid. It is for this purpose that auxiliary constructions arise. The 
whole world is full of them: indeed the whole visible world is per-
haps nothing other than an auxiliary construction of man’s wish to 
rest for a moment. A means to falsify the fact of knowledge, to try 
to turn the knowledge into the goal. (Kafka 1991, 38; NSF II 75)4
Truth is for Kafka no goal, as Gerhard Kurz already observed, but always 
already present and of deadly consequence (Kurz 1980, 194). Transform-
ing such readily available self-knowledge into the seemingly impossible 
goal of a lifelong quest deflects its destructive potential into the safe space 
of imaginary narratives.
The fable “The Truth About Sancho Panza,” written during the stay 
in Zürau and praised by Benjamin as Kafka’s “most perfect creation,” 
offers an example for a successful creation of a lifelong quest (Benja-
min 1996–2003, vol. 2, 815). Panza encounters his (destructive) self-
knowledge as a devil and names it Don Quixote. As a reader of chiv-
alrous tales, he sends Quixote off on one quest after the other, and 
this Quixote “performed the craziest deeds, which however, for lack 
of a predetermined object, which should of course, have been Sancho 
Panza, did nobody any harm” (Kafka 1991, 18). Rather than suffering 
instant death, Panza survives comfortably thanks to his auxiliary con-
structions and “perhaps out of a certain sense of responsibility, followed 
Don Quixote on his travels and had much and profitable entertainment 
from this to the end of his days” (Kafka 1991, 18). Panza’s construc-
tions prove stable enough to follow his Quixote in all tranquility on 
one quest after the other, never fearing Quixote should suddenly turn 
around and force Panza to face his own truth.
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As I argue, the officer of In the Penal Colony is a precise counterex-
ample to Panza’s lifesaving use of auxiliary constructions. His inability 
to speak coherently points to his failure to use language as a fortifica-
tion against his inner disunity. The officer’s narration is a prime example 
of Kafka’s poetics of the knife. The officer’s words become knives that 
turn against him. And In the Penal Colony becomes an example of Kaf-
ka’s poetics of the back-and-forth-moving knife. A close reading of the 
officer’s narration reveals his self as a turbid mass of ambivalences and 
Kafka’s story as a staging ground for a reconsideration of the relation-
ship between subjectivity, truth, and violence at the moment of social 
and institutional crisis.
By now, it should be possible to recognize Kafka not solely as an au-
thor of powerlessness and suffering. Kafka is just as much a writer with 
an “evil eye” who has a keen (and Stadler might say cold) interest in 
observing an individual’s fear of truth and death, someone who describes 
with unmoved composure the slow collapse of this individual’s no longer 
lifesaving auxiliary constructions. What remains unclear is how the of-
ficer of the penal colony who is generally perceived as a straightforward 
representative of an authoritarian order could be the embodiment of such 
a conflicted self; and how In the Penal Colony, Kafka’s alleged indictment 
of war, violence, and colonialism, never abandons the truth revealing 
promise of violence. The aggressive and self-destructive streak of Kafka’s 
modernist story has still to be laid bare.
The Meanings of Violence in Kafka’s In the Penal Colony
One of the most astonishing features of Kafka’s In the Penal Colony is 
the fact that so many of its readers seem to know what the story is about 
and understand it. After all, even the young officer who knows the execu-
tion apparatus at the story’s center more intimately than any other living 
being calls it a “strange piece of equipment” (M 149; KKDzL 203). Every 
bit as peculiar but not as harmless as Odradek, the apparatus performs 
the most torturous carnage in Kafka’s oeuvre, an oeuvre rich in killings, 
whippings, and oozing wounds (Menninghaus 1999, 333–484). Readers 
expect from such a violent procedure a clearly decipherable meaning. Re-
viewing the story in 1920 for Die Weltbühne, Kurt Tucholsky drew such 
a conclusion from his own reading experience:
And now this complicated machinery sets itself slowly in motion, 
the needles write, and out of small hollow needles water spurts the 
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blood away—when I’ve read this far I swallowed a faint taste of 
blood and searched for a justification and thought: Allegory . . . 
military justice. (Tucholsky 1979, 94)
As an allegory of a cruel military justice system, the story would be 
charged with meaning, point beyond its gruesome details, and protect the 
reader against the disconcerting impact of the violence described. Even 
though Tucholsky objected to any such flight into meaning, the majority 
of successive interpreters followed his first impulse, and discovered ever 
more meanings for the story’s supposed allegorical structure (Krusche 
1974, 130–31).5
While Kafka’s enigmatic construction named Odradek might be left 
inscrutable, the penal colony’s peculiar apparatus has to mean something. 
Even though the story has been declared as translucent as the glass from 
which parts of the apparatus have been manufactured, no consensus 
about its meaning can be established. The story has been praised for an-
ticipating the terror of the Holocaust; read in the context of deportation, 
colonialism, and postcolonial theory; or analyzed as Kafka’s central text 
on the acts of writing, reading, or listening.6 Other readings paid atten-
tion to its violent libidinal economy. Politzer considered Kafka a “mystic 
of masochism” (1965, 166), and Norris read him as a “pornologist,” who 
unmasks in his obsessional fantasies of cultural cruelty our enthrallment 
to them as “libidinal perversion” (1985, 101).
All of these readings share one basic assumption without which none 
of them can be sustained, the only consensus that is to be found in the 
multitude of this story’s readings. The officer’s narration is accepted as 
truthful, and in whatever direction In the Penal Colony is interpreted, 
these readings are based on the officer’s account of the colony’s past and 
present, his presentation of its legal procedures, and his description of the 
apparatus’s functioning. Once In the Penal Colony is approached with 
an awareness of Kafka’s poetics of the knife, such clarity has to be ex-
changed for a less satisfying but more complex and compelling account 
of Kafka’s modernist approach to representing violence.
Even though every allegorical and almost all literal readings of In the 
Penal Colony depend on it, the question of the officer’s reliability is rarely 
raised and even less often answered. His truthfulness is taken for granted, 
and readers move quickly to the all-important deciphering of the grue-
some apparatus. Ingeborg Henel made the core argument for trusting 
the officer’s narration explicit. The reader can rely on the officer because 
the traveler never doubts him, even though the traveler rejects everything 
the officer represents.
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If the Officer’s boldest claim is taken to be true by someone who 
is more or less his opponent then the reader is allowed as well to 
believe the Officer and to take everything he says as objective truth. 
(Henel 1973, 484)
The traveler should be a particularly reliable and objective judge of the 
officer’s claims since he has no intention to interfere in the penal colony’s 
politics; after all, he came to the island only “to see things for himself” 
(M 162; KKDzL 222). Because of the traveler’s acceptance of the officer’s 
claims, Kafka’s reader might be allowed to believe the officer but he or 
she would be wrong to do so.
Arguments like Henel’s fail to appreciate the traveler’s many faults as 
an observer. He is inattentive (M 151; KKDzL 206), gets lost in details 
(M 152; KKDzL 208), jumps to foregone conclusions—“‘Well, I suppose 
I know everything now,’ said the traveller” (M 158; KKDzL 217)—be-
comes impatient, casts merely a “glance” into the pit (M 150; KKDzL 
205), is absentminded (M 152, 157, 163; KKDzL 213, 223), listens to the 
officer “with his eyes lowered” (M 163; KKDzL 224), or looks “aimlessly 
around” (M 166; KKDzL 227). To focus his attention, the officer grabs 
him once “to catch his eye” (M 166; KKDzL 227). During the officer’s 
self-execution, the smooth run of the apparatus is blamed for the trav-
eler’s failure to observe: “By operating so silently, the machine seemed to 
make itself unnoticeable” (M 176; KKDzL 243). Rather than watching, 
the traveler merely stares, not registering what happens before him (M 
176; KKDzL 242). Caught by one surprise after another—culminating in 
a “new, even more unpleasant surprise” (M 178; KKDzL 244)—he fails 
to notice much of the officer’s gruesome end. Captivated by the spectacle 
of the disassembling apparatus—he gawks at it until “the last wheel had 
come out of the engraver” (M 178; KKDzL 244)—he misses the officer’s 
brutal treatment inside of it. Only when it is too late the traveler notices 
that the apparatus “was not writing, it was merely stabbing” (M 178; 
KKDzL 244). As James Rolleston notes, in addition to his inattentiveness, 
the traveler increasingly loses his impartiality and becomes ever more 
sympathetic toward the apparatus.7 Instead of being an expert witness, 
the traveler reveals himself as a not particularly trustworthy observer.
Considering his impatience, inattentiveness, and confusion, the trav-
eler’s faith in the officer’s stories as objective truth should not be accepted 
by readers. The traveler’s questionable record as a witness proves, how-
ever, nothing on its own against the officer’s truthfulness. Only recently, 
Richard Gray offered a reading recognizing the centrality of the officer’s 
act of narration for any understanding of In the Penal Colony. He argues 
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persuasively that Kafka’s story deals less with the acts of writing, reading, 
or listening as the readings by Koelb, Kittler, or Deleuze and Guattari have 
suggested, but the story explores instead “the act of narration as a funda-
mentally mediative event” (Gray 2002, 217). While this shift in reading 
In the Penal Colony remains important, Gray’s approach is not fully per-
suasive. Like most readers of the story, he does not look closely enough at 
the officer’s narration and trusts its claims; Gray stays on the same shaky 
hermeneutical ground on which most readings stake out their territory.
An analysis of the officer’s narration reveals the shakiness of such a 
trust and dissolves any binary oppositions between the observing traveler 
and the narrating officer, between the old and the new commandant, be-
tween the society of the apparatus and the new commandant’s modern 
politics of deliberation, binaries that have structured the standard read-
ings of In the Penal Colony. As it has been noted before, In the Penal Col-
ony stands out among Kafka’s works for its dual narrative perspective. 
Unlike Metamorphosis, The Trial, or The Castle, In the Penal Colony is 
narrated from not one but two identifiable main perspectives, the trav-
eler’s and the officer’s. As Axel Hecker suggests, most readers of the story 
become either officers or travelers (Hecker 1998, 115). This distinction 
is (not necessarily) tied to particular sympathies for either position but 
linked to the hermeneutical closure or openness of their readings. Gray 
defines such officers as identifying with a “specific, often narrow meaning 
for the story,” while the travelers “are less definitive, refuse to take a clear 
side, and seek judiciously to weigh the evidence of the text” (2002, 214).
Despite his self-description as a traveler, Gray constructs a very spe-
cific, overly narrow meaning of In the Penal Colony, arguing that Kafka the-
matizes “nothing other than disjunction itself” (2002, 217). According to 
him, the story moves between two clearly distinct and incommensurable 
positions (236). The officer and the traveler share no common ground, 
“no semiotic mediation, no meeting of the minds, ever takes place” (220). 
They are dialectical opposites with no possibility for a synthesis; they 
move “on parallel tracks in a Euclidian world, so that they speak or even 
think past one another” (218). The story is structured by a fundamental 
conflict, “the conflict between myth of immediacy and transparency, pred-
icated on ideological identity, and the reality that in a world defined by 
ideological difference, mediation is either imperfect or impossible and se-
miotic disjunction is the norm” (233).8 Like all of the allegorical readings 
he rejects, Gray describes the officer as the last unbending adherent of a 
particular ideology. The officer lives supposedly in the old commandant’s 
sphere, and none of his communications register in the traveler’s sphere; 
their separate worlds remain “almost entirely discontinuous” (217). Like 
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Stadler, Gray finds in Kafka’s story a radical and absolute critique of in-
tercultural understanding that leaves only the alternative between violent 
conflict and a politics of segregation. The officer’s failure to persuade the 
traveler provides the evidence for a mediative disjunction between cul-
tures; the prisoner and the soldier prove, on the other hand, that commu-
nication remains possible if one precondition is fulfilled. Only the soldier 
and prisoner, “who from the outset share a common ground, have any 
hope of shared understanding” (223). Not only do they communicate 
successfully, but the prisoner and soldier “discover almost nothing but 
intimate, immediate solidarity” (219). In the Penal Colony depicts—in 
Gray’s reading—a stark contrast between these two couples and a clear 
argument against intercultural cooperation and communication.
But the story demands severe qualifications for both of these claims. 
Even though the officer’s narration fails to convert the traveler, the trav-
eler understands and approves of his most radical decision. After listening 
to the officer for no more than an hour, the traveler agrees with the of-
ficer’s decision to commit suicide by apparatus.
If the justicial procedure to which the officer adhered was really so 
close to being abrogated—possibly in consequence of the interven-
tion of the traveller, and which he felt obliged to make—then the of-
ficer was now behaving perfectly correctly; the traveller in his place 
would not have behaved any differently. (M 175; KKDzL 240–41)
The traveler never attempts to prevent the presumably slow and tortur-
ous self-execution because he is certain that he understands the officer’s 
position. Whether a reader agrees with both of their decisions or not, 
the traveler and officer experience in the end an intimate moment of un-
derstanding and solidarity. The traveler’s noninterference in the officer’s 
suicide even compares favorably to the soldier’s intimate solidarity with 
the prisoner since he never seemed to waver in his readiness to execute the 
newfound friend who never desired to die.9
While perfect mediation might always be out of reach, Kafka’s story 
neither presupposes a mediative disjunction for those of different cultural 
and ideological backgrounds nor anticipates intimate solidarity among 
those of similar upbringings. Kafka deconstructs precisely the most basic 
assumption that Gray shares with the vast majority of Kafka’s readers: the 
hypothesis that the officer can be predicated on a single ideological identity. 
As will be seen, Kafka uses precisely this apparently unbending figure of the 
officer to explore the ambivalences of modernity and to investigate the false 
utopia of clarity and coherence. In the Penal Colony demonstrates the dual 
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impossibility of adhering to either a visual regime of absolute immediacy 
(the officer’s ideology) or a politics of deliberation (the new commandant’s 
ideology). Kafka’s story neither supports nor renounces the revelatory 
promise of violence. His poetics cannot replace the last but failing hope for 
the mediative function of violence with any other alternative to avoid the 
lie at the core of human self-representation. But the story makes the func-
tioning of its auxiliary constructions visible. In the Penal Colony destructs 
binaries not only on the level of storyline but also in its form, presenting 
Kafka’s refusal to side with traditional storytelling or the modernist libera-
tion of description. Neither storytelling nor description, Kafka implies with 
his story from October 1914, can respond to the crisis of violence. But with 
their mutual disintegration, In the Penal Colony becomes one of modern-
ism’s most revealing reflections on the ambivalence of violence.
The officer speaks for the penal colony. Up to the moment of his death, 
the traveler and the reader receive almost all their information about the 
penal colony from his direct speech. As the island’s superior judge, his 
version of the penal colony’s history is accepted as authoritative by read-
ers from Henel (1973) to Lyotard (1993) and Scherpe (2006). From the 
outset, however, the story provides details that subvert the officer’s self-
portrait as an unbending representative of the colony’s old order, and 
another image of him emerges, one of ambivalence, hybridity, and dis-
unity. Kurz (1980), Mladek (1994), Piper (1996), Hecker (1998), and also 
Gray (2002) have identified several inconsistencies in the officer’s speech, 
but when noted, these discrepancies and contradictions are usually men-
tioned as curious facts and relegated to the footnotes.
Kurz offers so far the most complete account of the officer’s inconsis-
tencies (1980, 54–55). As far as I know, he is the only reader who calls 
the officer a “shady character” (66) and suspects something hidden be-
hind the officer’s speech. He undertakes, however, no systematic attempt 
to understand In the Penal Colony through these discrepancies (54). An 
excellent reader like Gray observes that the chronology in the officer’s 
account of events is incorrect but places such evidence of the officer’s un-
stable narration in a footnote; in the main text Gray suggests that such in-
stances mean “nothing but ideologically motivated salesmanship” (Gray 
2002, 229, 242). But if the officer would indeed engage in salesmanship, 
then he would no longer believe in the “myth of transparency.” Under 
such an assumption Gray could no longer argue that the officer and the 
traveler exist in two incommensurable spheres. At best, the officer would 
end up as an unsuccessful salesman who would have no reason to commit 
suicide just because he failed to close the deal with the traveler. Instead, 
these inconsistencies open up a direct pathway into the center of Kafka’s 
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poetics. They are the moments when the officer’s words turn against him 
like knives and reveal a truth he cannot accept knowing.
The traveler’s first impression of the officer is one of incongruence. 
The uniform is “too heavy” and unsuitable for the island’s tropic climate 
(M 150; KKDzL 204). Sweating and out of breath, the officer refuses to 
adapt his dress code to the penal colony’s weather because of its nostalgic 
function: “to us they [the uniforms] signify home, and we don’t want to 
lose touch with home” (M 150; KKDzL 204). While the uniform indi-
cates his rank in the new commandant’s colony, it reminds the officer of 
two different pasts, two additional homelands and loyalties. The uniform 
stands as well for the empire overseas and the past regime of the old com-
mandant. The old commandant appointed the officer as judge despite his 
youth, conferring on him the dress uniform he wears so stubbornly in the 
tropical sun (M 151; KKDzL 212). Rather than representing one society, 
be it the one of the new or the old commandant, the officer is from the 
outset marked by disjunction and hybridity, belonging to and longing 
for at least two different communities. Rather than lending him a clearly 
defined identity, the uniform subverts his heroic self-portrayal as the last 
survivor of a past order as nothing but a wishful fantasy.
Uniforms are designed to signify with utmost precision and cer-
tainty the order to which its wearer belongs and what rank he or she 
holds in this particular order. A uniform replaces messy civilian identi-
ties with a prescribed functionality. Hundreds of thousands of draftees 
and volunteers expected to attain a definite identity when they put on 
their new uniforms while Kafka wrote In the Penal Colony in October 
1914. In Broch’s The Sleepwalkers (1931–32), another fictional officer 
of German modernism outlined his theory of the uniform. By wearing 
his uniform, Eduard von Bertrand found a powerful sanctuary amidst 
the seemingly ubiquitous uncertainty and ambiguity of prewar society. 
Amidst withering religious values, all stability threatened to slip away 
from him without the uniform. With its sharp lines and creases, the uni-
form offered a protective shell against the risks of inner and outer rot.
It is like a hard casing against which one’s personality and the world 
beat sharply and distinctly and are differentiated from each other; 
for it is the uniform’s true function to manifest and ordain order in 
the world, to arrest the confusion and flux of life, just as it conceals 
whatever in the human body is soft and flowing. (Broch 1947, 21)
Concealing the inconsistencies of body and mind, the order of the uni-
form provides an impersonal but solid life. As an exoskeleton makes the 
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soft body disappear, its carrier becomes part of the rigid and powerful 
mechanism of the social order. Gregor Samsa’s father transformed into a 
hardened figure of authority only after he dressed up and put on his new, 
gold-buttoned bank uniform.
But for the penal colony’s officer, the uniform does not represent such 
clear and unambiguous meanings. It denotes his rank in the new com-
mandant’s society (in which he lacks a sense of belonging) but links him 
to two absent homelands, spatially to the far away center of the empire 
and temporally to the past order of the old commandant. His only avail-
able Heimat remains the uniform itself. But a single uniform without a 
collective order is no uniform, and its wearer has no defined identity. 
Once the officer arrives at this conclusion, he sheds this uniform. Having 
failed to persuade the traveler, his last hope for the apparatus’s future, he 
takes off his uniform, breaks his short sword, throws everything down 
the pit, and is once again nothing but a vulnerable body (KKDzL 240).
The uniform points to the officer’s conflicting selves, but the way he 
wears it belies his claim to be “the sole defender [Vertreter] of the for-
mer commandant’s legacy” (M 163–64; KKDzL 224). While the traveler 
accepts the officer’s proud self-description, a small detail sticks out of 
the officer’s collar, indicating his surrender to the temptations of the new 
commandant’s regime. The officer denounces nothing more than the 
soothing influence women exert in the penal colony. Against official regu-
lations, they feed prisoners candy and thus increase the volume of vomit 
that despoils the apparatus during executions (M 163; KKDzL 223); they 
distract men with their sexual advances (M 170; KKDzL 234); and, in 
one nightmarish vision, he foresees how a lady’s hand covers the trav-
eler’s mouth at the very moment he stands up to defend the apparatus, a 
gesture that dooms once and for all the old commandant’s work (M 167; 
KKDzL 230). Despite these denunciations of female influence, the officer 
wedges a “couple of ladies’ cambric handkerchiefs” down his collar to 
soften the uniform’s rigid edges (M 150; KKDzL 204). Rather than prov-
ing his resolve against the inner and outer vagaries of life, he submits to 
the softening pleasures of the new order and connects his sweaty body to 
the feminized new order.
A uniform stands for a disciplined collective. And the nameless offi-
cer describes himself initially as a member of a larger anonymous “we,” 
the loyal friends and followers of the old commandant (M 151; KKDzL 
206). Instead of speaking as the voice of the collective, however, the of-
ficer never stops saying “I” until the last pages of the story. The word “I” 
is uttered about 110 times in In the Penal Colony. The prisoner is said 
to have used the word once (M 156; KKDzL 213), the traveler says it 
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about twenty times, but the officer uses it close to ninety times. He also 
claims personal ownership of the colony’s legal system and speaks of “my 
court” (M 155; KKDzL 212), “my judicial proceedings” (KKDzL 225), 
“my procedure” (M 167; KKDzL 228, 229), and “my plan” (M 169, 171; 
KKDzL 231, 232). If anyone in the story has adapted to the age of indi-
vidualism and does not behave like a part of an impersonal collective, it 
is the officer (Kurz 1980, 54). Not only is the quantitative difference in 
the use of the first-person pronoun instructive, but the sequence in which 
the officer and the traveler utter the word mirrors closely the struggle 
between them. Initially, only the officer says “I” (KKDzL 203–16), and 
the traveler asserts himself only momentarily (KKDzL 217). For the fol-
lowing twelve pages, it is again just the officer who utters the pronoun 
(KKDzL 218–30). Once more the traveler interjects (KKDzL 231), but 
the officer reclaims again the sole use of the “I” (KKDzL 232–34). Only 
then does the power shift, and the traveler takes charge of the first-person 
pronoun (KKDzL 235–38). Ironically, the word “I” disappears from the 
story once the officer fully realizes that he belongs to no collective. The 
nameless but self-centered officer never says “I” again after he decides 
to take his life; and no one uses the first-person pronoun after his death 
(KKDzL 239–48).
The officer’s seemingly strict distinction between the penal colony’s 
old order and the new order proves so suggestive that readers take this 
distinction as a starting point for their interpretations, usually placing the 
old order into a timeless past. A stark opposition between these two re-
gimes provides fertile ground for the story’s religious and cultural-political 
meanings. The old and the new society have been linked to the differences 
between the Old and New Testament (Henel 1973; Heller 1975; Thiher 
1990), between Eastern and Western European Judaism (Pan 1994), or 
between a forgotten aesthetics of cruelty and a modern aesthetics of rep-
resentation (Lyotard 1993). Such readings ascribe to the regime of the old 
commandant an ahistorical timelessness for which Lukács already faulted 
Kafka’s stories (Lukács 1957, 535). But the officer’s own narration con-
tradicts such clear distinctions.
The old commandant’s order belongs to no traditional local culture 
but is a recent Western import. The famed reign of the apparatus has 
been a very brief one, almost as fleeting as the alleged semblance of jus-
tice on the face of the executed. When the officer explicates his position 
in the legal system, he expects the traveler to be surprised to hear that 
he was “appointed judge in the penal colony. In spite of my youth” (M 
155; KKDzL 212). The young officer was involved in the development of 
the execution apparatus “from the very first trials, and worked on every 
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stage to its completion” (M 151; KKDzL 205). The new commandant 
has already governed the colony for several years when the traveler ar-
rives, but the officer still looks too young to be the superior judge. The 
old commandant’s reign cannot have lasted for more than a few years, 
maybe a decade. His regime turns timeless only when the officer imagines 
its future. And even in the officer’s vision of never-changing existence, this 
future is comically foreshortened to a few years.
At the time of his death, we, his friends, already knew that the or-
ganization was so seamlessly efficient that his successor, even if he 
had a thousand new plans in his head, would be unable to change 
anything of the old design, at least not for several years. (M 151; 
KKDzL 206)10
During his visit to the commandant’s grave, the traveler learns, however, 
that the old commandant’s administration and system of government 
outlived him, even to the day of his funeral. Instead of receiving an of-
ficially sanctioned funeral, the old commandant’s body is buried rather 
indecorously in a teahouse.
The new commandant succeeds to all appearances in very quickly re-
forming the penal colony. His harbor projects connect the colony to the 
world, and end its hermetic self-containment. The public has lost interest 
in the silent observation of executions and watches public policy delib-
erations instead. The reform has even reached the apparatus. The new 
commandant banned the use of acid during executions (M 163). The ap-
paratus’s funding is cut to the point of disrepair, making its proper func-
tioning nearly impossible (M 162). Because of the widespread dislike for 
the machine, the officer is relieved that the traveler will be the sole witness 
of the execution. In a larger audience he would have been influenced by 
“the lying whispers and contemptuous demeanours of others” (M 168).
More significant for the actual role of the officer in Kafka’s story is 
his own abandonment of the previous order. The old order had been so 
fragile and short-lived that the penal colony’s priest could prevent the 
old commandant’s official burial. He had to be laid to rest in a run-down 
teahouse. Ashamed of this arrangement, the officer repeatedly “tried to 
dig him up overnight” (M 179; KKDzL 246–47). Always chased off, the 
officer failed to secure his commanding officer an honorable funeral. In 
other words, he committed the very crime for which he would later sen-
tence the prisoner to death. Like the prisoner, the officer failed to honor 
the same command: “Respect your commanding officer” (M 179, 154; 
KKDzL 247, 210). As Kurz already noted, the officer shows more disre-
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spect for the old commandant’s order when he describes past executions. 
He does not hide his disgust when he says that hundreds of people gath-
ered “like flies” around the old commandant during these events (Kurz 
1980, 55; KKDzL 227).11 Rather than alluding to the parousia of justice, 
the officer’s metaphor invokes excrement and rotting corpses. His dis-
missive remembrance of the past and his already mentioned possessive 
attitude toward the practice of justice—“my court,” “my procedure”—
indicate that the relationship between him and the old commandant has 
been far more antagonistic than he dares to acknowledge.
The officer’s conflicting loyalties, his identification with and rejection 
of the old commandant’s order, are further exposed in his incoherent nar-
ration. His unreliability surpasses even the traveler’s fallibility as an eye-
witness. The irreconcilable inconsistencies of his narration cast doubt on 
every aspect of the colony’s past and the supposed functioning of the ap-
paratus. To uncover the conflict at the core of In the Penal Colony one has 
to focus, as Gray suggested, on the officer’s act of narration. His speech 
reveals, however, no persistent mediative disjunction in intercultural com-
munications. With its switching back and forth between (unreliable) sto-
rytelling and description, Kafka explores in the officer’s speech modern-
ism’s difficulties with tarrying with the ambiguity of violence, cruelty, and 
humiliation, namely, the difficulty of not seeing a “good” versus “bad” 
violence.
What role do the officer’s descriptions of the apparatus play in this 
story? What is the function of description in Kafka’s In the Penal Colony 
as one of the signature texts of German modernism? These questions are 
anything but new. With an awareness of the officer’s precarious position 
between the old and the new order, however, a new answer can be offered. 
Georg Lukács criticized the preponderance of descriptions in Kafka’s writ-
ing as a flight from reality. Presenting Thomas Mann and Kafka as the 
two extreme poles of bourgeois realism, Lukács conceives this alternative 
as one between storytelling and description. In contrast to the works of 
Mann, Lukács found no purpose for the extensive descriptions in Kafka’s 
stories because they seemed to lack a sense of totality. Without a mean-
ingful global horizon, Kafka’s descriptive passages no longer served the 
task of storytelling. Instead of aiming at a unified system of meaning and 
narrative closure, Kafka’s descriptions disrupted the narratival principles 
of chronology and causality, providing, as Lukács argued, merely an addi-
tive and correlative structure. The historical roots of the fear expressed in 
Kafka’s writings, a fear Lukács traced to the alienated world of capitalist 
society, had been severed by their author. By abandoning the sequential 
logic of narrative, Kafka transformed this historically specific fear into a 
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“timeless fate of human existence” (Lukács 1957, 535). His protagonists 
lack a sense of purpose and a vision for historical change. Fragmenting 
reality into detailed descriptions, Kafka became “the classic of standstill” 
(534).
Lukács’s critique of Kafka has been rejected, but his observations on 
the disruptive power of description in modernist literature gained new 
significance in Scherpe’s inversion of Lukács’s assessment of Kafka’s 
works.12 Offering an intriguing argument for the centrality of description 
in modernist literature, Scherpe defines modernism’s axiom in a lecture 
as “describe, don’t narrate!” (Scherpe 1995). In times of crisis and war, 
narrative loses its “uniting and binding strength,” and the binary struc-
tures of storytelling—the chronologies and causalities of beginning and 
end, of rise and fall, and of life and death—fray and dissolve (Scherpe 
1995, 3). Without definite answers as to the causes and origins of the 
crisis, storytelling takes refuge in descriptions. In the modernist writings 
of Döblin, Musil, and Kafka as well as Peter Weiss and Claude Simon, 
Scherpe detects an “aesthetic militancy” and a “cultural fundamentalism” 
that repeal the traditional subordination of description to narration (3, 
10). He uncovers
a will to unconditional representation [Darstellung], lodging itself 
precisely, so my thesis, where the narrative cannot move any fur-
ther, has no advice but leaves room and offers space. What happens 
right there, not at the narrative’s end but right at its center, where 
the narrative comes suddenly to a standstill and description occu-
pies the empty place. (Scherpe 1995, 10)
One will be tempted to identify the deep, sandy valley in which the 
apparatus stands and the officer’s endless explanations of its construction 
as the perfect example of modernism’s usage of description as standstill. 
And in his essay on “Kafka’s Poetics of Description” (2006), Scherpe pro-
vides a detailed case study for modernism’s proposed response to war and 
violence via description. In the Penal Colony serves as principal evidence 
for Scherpe’s theory of modernist representation.
Somewhat softening the stark alternative of his earlier lecture Be-
schreiben, nicht Erzählen! [Describe, Don’t Narrate!], Scherpe argues 
that Kafka’s stories are not reducible to descriptions. But the descriptive 
passages hold the key to the strange and particular way of Kafka’s story-
telling. Description suspends the plot and “operates in the ‘time-out’ of 
storytelling,” but puts no end to storytelling (Scherpe 2006, 90). In his read-
ing, nearly half of In the Penal Colony is taken up by the officer’s expert 
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instruction, but storytelling survives because of operational malfunctions: 
“The narratibility of Kafka’s stories is often saved by the fact that in the 
highly objective experimental setting [höchst sachlichen Versuchsanord-
nung], established initially by description, a dysfunction occurs” (Scherpe 
2006, 97). By focusing on the officer’s actions rather than on what his 
words reveal, Scherpe mischaracterizes the officer’s narration as a prime 
example of “a rhetoric of description reduced to a standstill,” delivered by 
someone without self-interest (selbstvergessen) (98). The officer is charac-
terized as driven by an immanent urge for ever more precise and perfect 
descriptions. His mistake, the dysfunction in the story’s system, occurs only 
when the officer inexplicably straps himself onto the apparatus and the ap-
paratus is “set in motion for the wrong object and collapses” (97). The 
officer’s self-execution restarts the storytelling, Scherpe argues, and In the 
Penal Colony escapes the standstill of its descriptive center. Never regain-
ing the formal unity and an inner sense of traditional storytelling, Kafka’s 
modernist tale leaves the traveler and his readers behind without resolv-
ing their confusions. Very evocatively but without clear meaning, Scherpe 
describes Kafka’s response to the representational crisis of modernity as 
fiction consumed by its descriptive procedure (102).
While the conflict between narration and description is indeed at the 
center of Kafka’s modernist poetics, it does not follow such a neatly sepa-
rated sequence but, as always, constantly blurs distinctions and produces 
ambivalence. Kafka’s descriptions sustain no standstill, but they are al-
ways already infested by storytelling. Description in Kafka’s writings of-
fers no escapist flight from the realities of alienation, as Lukács suggests, 
nor a time-out from the near impossible task of narrating moments of 
crisis. In the Penal Colony posits a complex tension between storytelling 
and description. Description never shields the officer from the traps of 
narration, from establishing a before and after, a cause and effect. The of-
ficer might search for Scherpe’s free zone of description, but he never finds 
such refuge. He incessantly interrupts his explanation of the apparatus 
with short stories of the colony’s glorious past, its corrupted present, and 
its doomed future.
Let us look, then, at the officer’s narration. Like Ulrich in The Man 
Without Qualities, the officer loses “the elementary, narrative mode of 
thought” without, however, finding refuge in description, or in replacing 
the red thread of linear narrative with an infinitely interwoven surface 
of essayistic reflections, as Musil’s protagonist attempted (MwQ 709). A 
close look at the net of lies and inconsistencies in which the officer finds 
himself entangled directs us to the underlying problem that might have 
provoked his self-destruction. Kafka’s officer cannot relate to himself as a 
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storyteller and fails repeatedly at the most fundamental task of establish-
ing a coherent sequence of events. His narration contains irreconcilable 
chronological confusions—and it does not speak well for the traveler’s 
reliability as an observer that he never notices them.
The traveler arrived in the penal colony only one day before the reader 
encounters him in Kafka’s story. To honor the guest, the commandant 
organized a reception for the same evening and invited the traveler to 
witness an execution on the following day. As the officer reminds the 
traveler: “I happened to be near you yesterday when the commandant 
invited you to come. I heard the invitation” (M 166; KKDzL 227). Since 
both were present at the reception, and since the traveler listens to the 
officer without objections, the reader has no reason to question the of-
ficer’s statement. So far, so good, one might say. But the reader has to ask 
whose execution the traveler is supposed to witness. It cannot have been 
the prisoner who will be led the next day to the apparatus. That prisoner 
committed his offense, according to the officer, after the traveler had been 
invited to attend an execution. Outlining a precise timeline, the officer re-
ports that the prisoner committed his crime at two in the morning, on the 
same day that would become the day of his execution. His captain found 
the soldier asleep even though he had been ordered to perform hourly 
salutes. The captain whipped the sleeping man, who then threatened to 
“gobble up” his superior (M 156; KKDzL 213). The following morning, 
“this morning” (M 156; KKDzL 212), the morning after the reception for 
the traveler, the captain reported the incident. The officer decreed the sen-
tence immediately: “An hour ago, the captain came to me, I took down 
his report and wrote out the judgment. Then I had the man clapped in 
irons. It was all very simple” (M 156; KKDzL 213).
But during the reception in honor of the traveler’s arrival in the penal 
colony on the previous evening, the new commandant had known al-
ready crucial details about the case—“insubordination and insulting an 
officer” (M 149; KKDzL 203)—details that allow the reader to recognize 
that the new commandant spoke indeed about the same soldier that the 
officer claimed to have arrested and sentenced several hours after this re-
ception. How could the new commandant have known that the execution 
would take place the next day if neither the crime nor the sentencing had 
already occurred as the officer claims in his version of the soldier’s tran-
gressions? Any assumption of a conspiratorial cooperation between the 
new commandant and the officer against the traveler would render the 
story absurd. The officer must be confused, or he lies for some unknown 
reason to the traveler.
To add to the confusion, another of the officer’s stories indicates that 
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the sentencing might not have occurred just a few hours previously. 
Shortly after the prisoner is tied to the apparatus, he throws up and the 
annoyed and disgusted officer blames the new commandant and his ladies 
for this disturbance.
And haven’t I spent hours trying to get the commandant to under-
stand that prisoners shouldn’t be fed on the eve of an execution 
[einen Tag vor der Exekution]. But no, with their new mild ap-
proach they do things differently. The commandant’s ladies stuff 
the man full of sugary sweet things on the eve of his marching off. 
(M 163; KKDzL 223)
His complaint could make sense if a day has passed between the arrest 
and the execution. But the blamed ladies would hardly have had a chance 
to break this rule and feed the condemned man if the captain first re-
ported the crime only an hour before.
The chronological incoherence of the officer’s narrative is confusing 
enough. But it is even worse that these discrepancies lack any purpose. 
The officer’s sped-up version of the legal proceedings is counterproduc-
tive to his plan of converting the traveler into a defender of the appara-
tus. He expects the traveler to be “caught up in European perspectives” 
(M 166; KKDzL 228), to oppose torture and capital punishment. His 
alternate account of the prisoner’s arrest and sentencing puts his legal 
proceedings in an even harsher light, moving his system of justice ever 
closer to Standrecht and murder. While he gains nothing with his story of 
instant sentencing and capital punishment, he risks everything with these 
inconsistencies. If the traveler had noticed the officer’s confusion of the 
most basic facts, he should have become suspicious of all of his claims. 
The officer would have severely harmed his chance of converting the visi-
tor into an ally against the new commandant’s regime.
No rational basis for the officer’s lies seems to exist but various expla-
nations remain for his peculiar storytelling. He could be a careless liar. 
But his suicide as a response to his failure to persuade the traveler is far 
too serious a consequence to make such a scenario probable. As a man of 
conflicting loyalties who faces the loss of power and influence, the anx-
ious officer might have lost his ability to distinguish truth from lie. His 
inconsistent speech would be a symptom of his identity’s rapid disintegra-
tion, ending in suicide. Yet this would be a rather unsatisfactory explana-
tion as well, since the strange apparatus, his peculiar notion of justice, 
and the battle between description and narration would all become need-
less details in Kafka’s story. Furthermore, such a reading cannot account 
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for the officer’s sudden “bright eyes” and his mysterious smile once he 
decides to die (M 172). Interpreting In the Penal Colony as the story of a 
lying officer and a traveler who never becomes aware of these lies reduces 
this highly disturbing story to a rather simplistic core. Most importantly, 
such a reading fails to address the most fundamental inconsistency of the 
officer’s speech: its very existence.
If the officer could be ideologically predicated on his faith in the ap-
paratus and his loyalty to the old commandant’s regime, as Gray argued, 
then he should let the execution machine speak for itself. Instead of trust-
ing in its ability to make justice visible, the officer delivers, however, a 
protracted oral defense of the apparatus. His speech fits the new order of 
deliberation much better than the past order of silent observation. The 
task of persuasion was deferred to the apparatus, but with his speech the 
officer lacks such deference and relies instead on his way with words. 
Language entered the workings of the apparatus only in the form of de-
signs that remain inscrutable to the uninitiated. Since the tortured bod-
ies of the condemned were tasked with decoding them, judgments were 
not pronounced publicly. The old commandant’s legal system rendered 
any form of narrative superfluous. The rules and regulations of law en-
forcement remained unknown to delinquents. The accused never heard 
the charge, was never asked to confess, never allowed to defend himself. 
Judgment was reached in his absence. Granting the accused the right to 
speak would have obstructed the quest for truth, as the officer told the 
traveler.
If I had called on the man first, and questioned him it would have 
produced nothing but confusion. He would have lied to me; if I’d 
managed to catch him lying, he would have told different lies, and 
so on. (M 156; KKDzL 213)
The impossibility of gaining a truthful verbal confession from a prisoner 
is self-evident to the officer.
With his distrust of the value of confessions, the officer-judge could 
have found himself in agreement with the legal theory of Kafka’s time. To 
accept a confession as truthful was to Hans Gross, an international au-
thority in the emergent science of criminal psychology and one of Kafka’s 
law professors, a sign of the susceptible layman but not of a judge, well 
versed in new science. “The making of a confession, according to lay-
men, ends the matter, but really, the judge’s work begins with it” (Gross 
1911, 33). A judge had to distrust the sense perceptions of witnesses and 
the confessions of the accused. Only after careful psychological examina-
Kafka’s Poetics of the Knife 147
tion could he decide whether to believe their stories. Criminal psychology 
was a new science of evidence, “not of finding evidence but of rendering 
evidence evidential. This is particularly true with regard to confessions” 
(109). His method allowed Gross to identify entire social groups as par-
ticularly unlikely candidates for truth telling (and a writer like Kafka had 
to be counted among the unreliable witnesses). Gross found a widespread 
disregard for truth among those who did nothing worthwhile, and “to 
this class belong peddlers, street merchants, inn-keepers, certain shop-
keepers, hack-drivers, artists, etc., and especially prostitutes” (17). The 
purpose of the apparatus in the penal colony was, as the officer describes 
it, to dispense entirely with the need to submit confessions to psychologi-
cal scrutiny.
The officer’s ideology distrusts direct communication as a dangerous 
impediment to truth. Truth, justice, and self-knowledge can be established 
through the medium of pain, but not in direct speech. Language, even on 
its most basic communicative level, undermines the finding of truth. The 
condemned prisoner is hardly a refined orator, whose eloquence might 
twist the events of the alleged crime into a mesmerizing narrative of in-
nocence. Portrayed as a rather listless and subservient soldier of low rank, 
he appears to have few communicative skills. But entering into any dia-
logue with any defendant, the officer proclaims, would never lead to truth 
since every defendant lies. Unlike Gross, the officer as judge requires no 
criminal psychology to evaluate confessions or claims of innocence. To 
perform justice and to allow the condemned man to reach self-knowledge 
at last, the officer’s course of action does away with all verbal communi-
cation.
The legal process and the apparatus were designed to erase the con-
demned man’s ability to speak and to experience death as part of a narra-
tive continuum. By keeping the accusation and the verdict secret, the pro-
ceedings sever the link between crime and punishment. The opportunities 
for narratives of crime and punishment, guilt and innocence, have either 
been excised from the penal colony’s legal system (interrogation and trial) 
or occur without the prisoner’s knowledge (sentencing). The legal proce-
dure disorients the condemned man and the apparatus pursues during 
its first six hours the clearly defined task of undoing the main functions 
of the mouth: to speak, to express feelings, and to eat. The moment the 
apparatus begins to work its victim can only shriek in pain—but felt muf-
fles his screams. Two hours later, the felt can be removed since “the man 
has no strength left with which to scream” (M 160; KKDzL 219). The 
desire and ability to eat lasts four more hours. Once the felt is removed, 
the officer claims, the condemned eats warm rice pudding. The interest 
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in food disappears around the sixth hour, and then the condemned man’s 
reading of the sentence commences. He is meant to begin comprehending 
the verdict’s justice at the very moment the apparatus succeeds in elimi-
nating his ability and desire to speak or eat (M 160; KKDzL 219). Only 
then, the officer claims, does his appreciation of the judgment’s righteous-
ness become visible around his eyes (and not his mouth). His life ends in 
silent self-awareness, his audience is led to believe, just before the appara-
tus hurls his body into the pit.
The lack of narrative during the procedure is also notable to the au-
dience. As the officer tells it, the violent spectacle entails no retelling of 
the crime, no public proclamation of the sentence, and no dramatic con-
fession at the scaffold. All the audience hears are the victim’s muffled 
screams, followed by silence. According to the officer, the audience never 
voiced interest in the particulars of the crime or questioned whether the 
crime fit the punishment. They came not to listen but to observe a fleeting 
expression on the face of the executed. To them this expression belonged 
to no particular crime and punishment story but was evidence for the 
most impersonal conviction: “all knew: justice is being enacted” (M 165; 
KKDzL 226). At the height of its popularity, the officer says, people did 
not even look at the apparatus or the victim’s face. So great was the faith 
in the silent procedure that “some of the crowd didn’t even bother to 
watch, they lay there in the sand with eyes shut” (M 166; KKDzL 226).
If the officer believes his version of past proceedings, then the great 
enigma at the center of In the Penal Colony comes into focus (and it 
is not the old commandant’s indecipherable sentences). Any adherent of 
the old order would notice that the officer fails to persuade the traveler 
because the officer lacks confidence in the apparatus’s ability to make jus-
tice visible. Rather than presenting the spectacle of justice, he never quits 
talking. The officer halts the execution only moments after the apparatus 
is set in motion. He never offers the traveler the opportunity to observe 
the signs of understanding justice on the face of the condemned man. In-
stead, the officer relies on the persuasive force of speech. His precarious 
position in between the orders of spectacle and rhetoric is apparent when 
he blames the procedure for the failure of his narration: “so the process 
has not convinced you” (KKDzL 236). Instead of relying on the old or-
der’s strategies of persuasion, the officer depends in his encounter with 
the traveler on descriptions, explanations, stories, petitions, lamentations, 
and gossip. The officer argues like a member of the despised order of the 
new commandant.
If the officer had been a consistent figure, a last representative of the 
old order to which he pledged allegiance, then he should have followed 
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the principle Scherpe detected at work in modernist writings during times 
of war and crisis. The officer should have sought the safe ground of de-
scription and abided by the old commandant’s precedence and restricted 
his speech to mere descriptions of the apparatus (M 153; KKDzL 209). 
The officer once explained this model of “describe, don’t narrate” to the 
traveler: “Allow me to explain the machine first, and then demonstrate its 
use to you. That way, you’ll be better able to follow it” (M 152; KKDzL 
207). When he compares and contrasts the traveler to the condemned 
man, the narrator suggests as well that one should understand the appa-
ratus by first listening to descriptive explanations and then by observing 
the machine at work. The condemned man looks at the same parts of the 
machine as the traveler, but he does not understand the officer’s French 
explanations. As the narrator says, “because he didn’t have an explana-
tion, he was unable to make sense of it” (M 158; KKDzL 216).
According to the detectable principles of the old order, the officer’s 
task had been to provide descriptive explanations of the apparatus and 
the legal system that were not subordinated to storytelling. Repeatedly, 
he advises the traveler to focus his attention on the machine and to dis-
regard everything else as distractions: “Now, have a look at this appara-
tus” (KKDzL 204).13 The officer’s explanations begin with phrases like 
“you will see” (M 151, 152; KKDzL 206), “as you see” (M 156; KKDzL 
213), “You see” (M 157; KKDzL 213, 215), and “I’ll show you” (M 159; 
KKDzL 217), and he sets the apparatus into motion with an urgent “Take 
a look!” (M 159; KKDzL 218). The officer exudes confidence whenever 
he tarries with the intricacies of the not-yet-working machine and de-
scribes what is visible. Pointing to and naming one detail after the other—
“the bed,” “the engraver,” “the harrow” (M 153; KKDzL 206)—he even 
sparks a first interest in the traveler. He expects the traveler to become 
a defender of the apparatus just by inspecting it. Should the traveler still 
have doubts, the spectacle of the execution would put them to rest: “If 
there are any little grey areas of indecision, the sight of the execution will 
clear them up” (M 168; KKDzL 231). Since the officer can never restrict 
himself to descriptive explanations, however, he keeps exposing his own 
gray areas of indecision. He is well aware of his inability to follow the old 
commandant’s principle of mere description and demonstration. When 
the officer strayed for the first time from the present tense of description 
into the past tense of narration to praise the old commandant’s accom-
plishments, the officer paused and chided himself: “‘However,’ the officer 
brought himself up short, ‘here I am gabbling away, and his machine is 
in front of us’” (M 151; KKDzL 206). Incapable of solely describing and 
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never narrating, the officer is well aware of the risks that come with his 
departure from the safe ground of description.
In his adaptation of In the Penal Colony (1992), Heiner Müller dem-
onstrates that Kafka embedded a version of the officer’s speech in his 
story that would be entirely in accordance with Scherpe’s poetics of de-
scription. But the differences between Kafka’s and Müller’s officers reveal 
the story’s distance from such a poetics. Heiner Müller added not a single 
word to Kafka’s story, and he kept the sequence of the officer’s speech 
intact. But he cut Kafka’s story radically. Müller retained only the of-
ficer’s direct speech and excised all of his deviations from description. 
The officer no longer addresses the traveler. Neither the old nor the new 
commandant is mentioned anymore. The stories of the glorious execu-
tions of the past and the corrupting power of the ladies are gone, as are 
his predictions for a doomed future. The doubtless guilt of the accused 
disappears together with the officer’s reports on the semblance of justice 
on the faces of the executed. Müller deleted every sentence in which the 
officer said “I,” and thus de-individualized and subordinated the officer 
to the status of a servant of the apparatus. In his abbreviated version 
of Kafka’s story, Müller removed all the inconsistencies, contradictions, 
and hallucinations from the officer’s speech. Although he “only” edited 
Kafka’s story, the difference between his and Kafka’s officer could hardly 
be greater and more revealing.
Müller’s officer speaks as the last true representative of the old order 
and remains throughout in the calm and safe standstill of description. By 
sealing every crack in the officer’s speech, Müller’s adaptation calls atten-
tion to the presence of these cracks in Kafka’s own version of the story. To 
extract a version of the officer’s speech that actually adheres to a poetics 
of description, Müller could keep no more than 20 percent of the officer’s 
narration.14 The other 80 percent had been inextricably bound to the of-
ficer’s storytelling, his lies, and his inconsistencies. The difference between 
Müller’s and Kafka’s two officers is not only between the possibility and 
the impossibility of a standstill of description but also one between life 
and death. At the end of Kafka’s story, the officer’s speech disintegrates 
and collapses: he kills himself. Müller’s officer survives safely ensconced 
in his descriptions.
Kafka’s story is a parable about the impossibility of seeking refuge in 
description even as it exposes the vagaries of storytelling. Description 
neither grants a time-out in Kafka’s In the Penal Colony nor is it undone 
by a single dysfunction, as Scherpe suggested. Kafka portrays descrip-
tion as dysfunctional and unsustainable in a crisis situation. Description 
might have provided a safe space during the old commandant’s reign 
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when no one seems to have challenged society’s faith in the apparatus 
(if one accepts the officer’s stories of the magnificent past as true). The 
officer’s speech, however, fails to sustain the standstill of description for 
any extended period of time. Instead of relying on the apparatus’s power 
to persuade—a machine deserted by everyone else, convincing no one 
anymore—the officer disrupts his technical descriptions with even more 
digressions into the penal colony’s history. Every time he digresses into 
stories about the past and the future of the apparatus and the penal col-
ony, one hears the jarring sounds of inconsistencies, the same sound the 
actual apparatus makes when set in motion (M 159; KKDzL 218). The 
officer disintegrates in his stories just as the machine self-disassembles at 
the story’s end.
Let us twist the knife of Kafka’s poetics one more time. According to 
his words and deeds, the officer belongs to several different orders and 
proves unable to resolve the ambiguities that result from these conflict-
ing loyalties. He speaks disrespectfully of a past he glorifies. He abhors 
the current regime but follows its politics of deliberation. He admires 
silence, distrusts direct communication, but talks constantly. He claims 
the apparatus makes justice visible but never demonstrates its function-
ing. The last question in this line of inquiry would be whether the of-
ficer knows that his loyalties are ambivalent, that his statements are 
unreliable and his actions self-contradictory. This question cannot be 
answered with certainty—and how should this be possible in a story 
that unfolds with cruel ambivalence? But there are indications that the 
answer might be yes—and such an affirmative answer would point to 
a disquieting proximity between the officer, the master of the torturous 
apparatus, and Kafka, his author.
Once the officer realizes that he failed to persuade the traveler, he 
smiles, and the narrator describes this smile as a rather peculiar smile. 
The officer “smiled in the way a grown-up might smile at a foolish 
child, keeping his own serious reflections to himself behind the smile” 
(M 172). Shortly before his death, the semblance of knowledge appears 
on the officer’s face (not around his eyes but his mouth). We never learn 
the content of his reflections, but we know the conclusion he draws 
from them. The officer decides to die. From his decision to die, we infer 
another fact, casting yet another shadow of ambiguity across Kafka’s 
story. We learn that the officer had made the traveler’s decision about 
the apparatus into a decision about his own life and death.15 By putting 
himself and his narration at the risk of death the officer took, from the 
story’s beginning, the position of a defendant accused of a capital crime. 
Either he succeeds in justifying his actions or he will be sentenced to 
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death. According to the officer’s professed legal philosophy, the legal 
philosophy of the old order, his speech should become as unreliable as 
any defendant’s confession.
The same distrust of confessions is at the core of Kafka’s poetics. In 
law, religion, and personal life, confessions are supposed to be the mo-
ments of truth, the act of laying bare the most intimate details of one’s 
self. In secular society, confessions bear, as Peter Brooks writes, this 
“special stamp of authenticity” (Brooks 2000, 9). Foucault noted the 
increased investment in confession as a central characteristic of Western 
societies when he summed up the changes in the Western production 
of the self in this way: “Western man has become a confessing animal” 
(Foucault 1978, 59). Günther Anders linked the increasing alienation 
and isolation of the individual in modernity to the ever-greater need for 
confession, self-expression, and self-exposure. But he found in Kafka a 
remarkable exception to this rule.
For if the desire for self-expression is intensified by isolation, then 
surely Kafka, the supremely isolated artist, might be expected to 
have developed some extreme mode of romantic expression. But 
the very opposite is the case: a less romantic, less subjective, less 
expressionistic style than Kafka’s is scarcely conceivable. (Anders 
1960, 64)
Kafka’s increasing discomfort with the unintentionally revealing charac-
ter of words, words that turn like knives against the self, accounts for his 
avoidance of self-expression, not just in works intended for publication. 
The knowledge of good and evil is always available but because of our 
inability to live in accordance with such knowledge Kafka sees us con-
structing one false facade after the other. Facing the truth of our inability 
to live in truth would have lethal consequences, as the officer and Kafka 
conclude. Kafka expected confessions to be false.
Confession and lie are one and the same. In order to be able to 
confess, one tells lies. One cannot express what one is, for that is 
precisely what one is; one can communicate only what one is not, 
that is, the lie. Only in the chorus there may be a certain truth. (WP 
338; NSF II, 348)
Language never precludes truth from coming to the fore, but the indi-
vidual’s speech act has to be distrusted because of the self’s morass-like 
lack of inner clarity and unity. A collective might speak the truth. Confes-
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sion, the speech act defined as defining the individual, remains, however, 
a lie because one’s own survival depends on the construction of false fa-
cades. Don’t expect anything but betrayal from confessions, Kafka wrote 
to Milena Pollak. The moment he wrote “I confess” in a letter to her, he 
interrupted himself and warned her against the confessional mode (LM 
176; BM 215).
You know, when I try to write down something like the following, 
the swords whose points surround me in a circle, begin slowly to 
approach the body, it’s the most complete torture; when they begin 
to graze me, I don’t mean pierce, when they merely begin to graze 
me it’s already so terrible that I immediately, at the first scream, 
betray you, myself, everything. (LM 177; BM 215)
And rather than telling her anything directly, Kafka begins to speak in a 
“deliberately blind metaphor” (LM 177; BM 215).
The agreement between Kafka and his officer on confessions instills 
the latter’s ambivalences, lies, and inconsistencies with yet another mean-
ing. At the moment of crisis, the officer’s faith wavered. He no longer be-
lieved in the perfection of the apparatus or the old commandant’s design 
for a just society. Just as he fails to stay in the pure presence of description 
and explanation so the apparatus suffers from an inherent flaw and can-
not sustain its procedure’s transparency. Built of glass and constructed 
to wash away the victim’s blood to preserve a clear view of the lethal 
spectacle, the apparatus lacks a mechanism to wipe away the vomit. To 
the great frustration of the officer, the old commandant’s design cannot 
prevent the humans inside of it from spoiling and dirtying the apparatus 
during execution (M 163). Torn apart by his conflicting loyalties, doubts, 
and ambivalences, the officer no longer trusts the apparatus to deliver 
positive proof of its superiority, of its ability to make truth visible and 
avoid all direct verbal communication.
There is one explanation that could make sense of the officer’s speech 
full of inconsistencies and apparent lies. Doubting the power of the 
spectacle, the officer’s speech pursues a negative strategy of persuasion. 
Rather than relying on the workings of the apparatus, the officer demon-
strates the individual’s inability to speak its own truth. The officer informs 
the traveler of the basic tenets of his (and Kafka’s) theory of communica-
tion—a subject cannot speak its own truth, confessions are lies, guilt is al-
ways doubtless. At the same time the officer submits himself and the future 
of the apparatus to the traveler’s judgment, a judgment over the officer’s life 
or death, over the future of the old commandment’s legal system.
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As the last defendant of a vanishing tradition, the officer forces him-
self into the situation of an accused during interrogation. While he de-
scribes and explains the apparatus with apparent conviction, his words 
and gestures turn against him, and reveal, just as he would have pre-
dicted, the inability of a confessor to stay with his truth. The officer 
would expect the traveler to notice his inconsistencies and conflicting 
loyalties. Not to expose him as a liar but to demonstrate the central 
point of his poetics. Anyone who is put on the defensive will lie; the in-
dividual is (or might be) his truth, but he cannot communicate this truth 
directly. Because of their inconsistencies, the officer’s speech remains 
in accordance with his fundamental theses on communication. The of-
ficer’s speech would become a symptom of his disintegration but also 
part of his strategy to reveal the limits of the communicative function of 
language, evidence against any individual’s expectation to reveal truth 
in direct communication.
But the unsuspecting and unobservant traveler fails to appreciate the 
officer’s enactment of this theory of language and communication. Just as 
he concentrates on the apparatus’s engraver until its last wheel has fallen 
off instead of watching the officer during his self-execution, the traveler’s 
attention stays out of focus. He never recognizes the self-revealing lies 
and inconsistencies of the officer’s speech. The officer’s attempts to com-
municate indirectly fail just as much as his performance of direct commu-
nication. Realizing his failures, the officer smiles, keeps his last reflections 
to himself, falls silent, and kills himself.
Kafka’s story does not resolve but reveals the ambivalences between vio-
lence and truth, description and storytelling, and silence and communica-
tion. The reign of the apparatus ends in gestures of ambivalence. Kafka’s 
story demonstrates the impossibility for individuals to communicate di-
rectly with each other and the failure of indirect communication. Conse-
quently, the officer and the traveler are both last seen in positions of the 
in-between. Since the apparatus failed to expel his body, the officer dangles 
with his head pierced by an iron spike above the pit (M 179). Hanging dead 
in the air, his corpse exhibits a second in-between position: the expression 
on the dead man’s face is still “that of the living man” (M 179). The traveler 
has left the ground of the colony but not yet reached the ship home. He 
is last seen standing on the rocking floor of a small boat (M 180). Panic 
stricken and speechless, he wards off the soldier and the prisoner with the 
story’s last gesture of violence—the raising of the heavy knotted rope to 
prevent the soldier and the prisoner from entering his rocky boat.
Like the machine’s last run, the story empties itself out without decid-
ing on or ending anything. In Kafka’s poetics one never hears “the damn 
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word out of the damn mouth,” as Menninghaus suggested for Kafka. 
Neither the pain in the story nor the story’s narration reveals a truth. But 
neither does any alternative to this equation of pain and truth emerge in 
Kafka’s story. As the officer moves back and forth between description 
and storytelling, Kafka’s story moves back and forth between the promise 
to reveal truth through violence and the renunciation of any such hope. 
This back-and-forth movement, the constant movement of radical am-
bivalence, never comes to an end, and the story disintegrates like the ap-
paratus without renouncing the promise of violence and without fulfilling 
it. Kafka’s poetics finds its limit in showing how words reveal more truth 
about their speakers than the speaker can accept if he wants to stay alive. 
But it never pretends to communicate truth itself and it ends in silence, 
just like the smiling but dead officer.
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Chapter 5
Chemical Warfare and Destructive Satires
Canetti and Benjamin’s Search for the Murderous 
Substance of Satire
This chapter explores the link between weapons of mass destruction 
and the satirical writings and writings on satire by Karl Kraus, Walter 
Benjamin, and in particular Elias Canetti. Among the many firsts of the 
First World War was the large-scale use of poison gases on battlefields. 
This equally innovative and shocking application of chemical engineer-
ing shaped not only, as we will see, the way the war was remembered but 
posed troubling questions for future postwar societies. A wide-ranging 
consensus existed that the next war would be decided with aerial gas 
attacks on Europe’s capitals. Chemical warfare demanded a new cata-
strophic imagination and a nontraditional approach to represent the 
omnipresent risk of mass death events. Not the new mass media, how-
ever, but satire, one of the oldest and most traditional literary genres, 
responded most radically to this challenge to representation. As I argue in 
this chapter, it was Walter Benjamin’s theory of satire (as he developed it 
in his readings of Karl Kraus [1874–1936]) and Elias Canetti’s novel Die 
Blendung (written after Canetti went through Kraus’s school of satire) 
that offer some of the most far-reaching responses to the acknowledged 
limits of traditional and contemporary literary and artistic representa-
tions of the new risk situation. To make visible the extent of Benjamin’s 
and Canetti’s achievements it becomes necessary to explore how other, 
more direct attempts at envisioning chemical warfare fell far short of 
finding an appropriate response to this challenge to representation and 
understanding. The innovative transformation of satire in Benjamin’s 
theory and Canetti’s praxis of destructive satire emerge fully only when 
seen in this context.
At 6 p.m. on April 22, 1915, German troops opened 5,730 cylinders 
filled with 150 tons of chlorine along a six-kilometer front near Ypres. Be-
cause of ever-changing wind conditions, the attack had been rescheduled 
seven times (Szöllösi-Janze 1998, 329). A vast greenish-gray wall, slowly 
turning yellow, drifted across the no-man’s-land into the French trenches. 
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Twenty minutes later, German soldiers armed with bayonets followed the 
gas. The sight of the fleeing French troops terrified the eyewitnesses:
Then there staggered into our midst French soldiers, blinded, cough-
ing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple color—lips speechless with 
agony, and behind them, in the gas-choked trenches, we learned 
that they had left hundreds of dead and dying compadres. (Cited in 
Croddy and Wirtz 2005, 328–29)
In 2001, shortly after September 11, Peter Sloterdijk identified this mo-
ment as the primal scene of the twentieth century. As if one could pinpoint 
fundamental historical changes precisely in space and time, Sloterdijk sets 
both the actual beginning of the twentieth century and the arrival of mod-
ern terrorism onto the stage of global politics on this day in 1915 (Sloter-
dijk 2002, 7–45). The large-scale use of poison gas introduced a radically 
new approach to killing into warfare. Weapons from swords to guns to 
missiles are aimed directly at the opponent’s body. Even the long-distance 
use of artillery could be still considered as a duel with both sides target-
ing each other’s soldiers with the highest precision available. The use of 
poison gas follows a different principle. Chemical weapons are not aimed 
at individuals but poison a whole environment. Every living being will be 
affected in the target zone, and the poisoned area can remain lethal for 
days, weeks, or months. Chemical warfare threatened to render irrelevant 
the traditional distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, be-
tween war and peace, between warfare and terrorism.
Because of its potential to change the face of war, poison gas gained a 
far more prominent place in postwar memory than its actual use during 
the war could justify. Militarily, chemical warfare was of limited signifi-
cance during the First World War. Chemical weapons were responsible for 
less than 4 percent of the total war casualties and provided neither side 
of the conflict lasting strategic advantage (Croddy and Wirtz 2005, 326).1 
Conventional arms like bullets, bombs, and shells posed throughout the 
war a far deadlier risk to the health and life of soldiers. But the terror of 
chemical weapons shaped the remembrance of the war. Wilfred Owen’s 
Dulce Et Decorum Est (1918), still the most famous poem written about 
the First World War, centers on this new terror of a surprise gas attack:
Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling,
And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime . . .
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Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning. (890)
The soldier wearing a gas mask became the symbol for all of the war’s hor-
rors. G. W. Pabst’s film Kameradschaft (1931) provides just one example 
of Weimar cinema’s remembrance of the war in a traumatic flashback to a 
gas attack. Far more ominously, Hitler connected in Mein Kampf (1925) 
his own suffering of a gas attack at the end of the First World War to his 
decision to enter politics as well as to his hatred of Jews, Marxists, and 
everyone else he held responsible for Germany’s defeat in 1918.2
Just as gas warfare shaped the remembrance of the recent war so it 
shaped the expectations for the wars to come. Military theorists, chem-
ists, journalists, and artists alike anticipated that the next war would be 
decided by aerial gas attacks. Through the use of chemical weapons, the 
leading postwar strategists intended to prevent a repetition of the disas-
trous stalemate of trench warfare (Förster 2002). The Italian military 
theorist Giulio Douhet (1869–1930), one of the first proponents of total 
warfare, proposed a strategy of surprise and shock through aero-chemical 
raids against the enemy’s civilian centers. Sudden and relentless devasta-
tions of major cities should force the terrified opponent to declare defeat 
quickly and thus avoid the much higher casualty figures of trench warfare 
(Gat 2001, 561–98). In The Command of the Air, first published in 1921, 
Douhet argued that such unprecedented disregard for the conventions of 
modern warfare “may yet prove to be more humane than wars in the past 
in spite of all, because they may in the long run shed less blood” (Douhet 
1972, 61). The combination of aerial bombing and poison gas would 
reintroduce the possibility of a quick and decisive victory into modern 
warfare. Thanks to the use of chemical weapons another costly war of 
attrition could be avoided.
In The War of 19— (1930), Douhet presented a detailed scenario of 
future warfare to the general reader (Douhet 1972, 293–394). Accord-
ing to his plans, even a post-Versailles Germany could defeat France and 
Belgium in just two days. Flying one air raid after the other, the Ger-
man planes would asphyxiate dozens of cities. Terrorized by atrocities, 
French and Belgian morale would break quickly, and Germany would 
have undone its recent military defeat. Such enthusiastic assessment of 
the strategic potential of aero-chemical warfare was not limited to fascist 
generals like Douhet who had joined Mussolini in 1922 on his “March 
on Rome.” Military theorists across Europe took it almost for granted 
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that the next war would be decided by air power, poisonous gas, and 
incendiary bombs. In Paris or the Future of War (1925), Basil H. Liddell 
Hart, often regarded as the most influential liberal military theorist of 
the twentieth century, advocated the strategy of aerial gas attacks as well, 
hoping that “gas may well prove the salvation of civilization from the 
otherwise inevitable collapse in case of another world war” (Liddell Hart 
25, 45).3 Because he expected that chemical weapons would radically 
shorten the length of future wars, he considered poison gas as the “least 
inhumane of modern weapons” (Liddell Hart 1930, 130).
These scenarios of fast and unremitting depopulation of cities, scenar-
ios that would end and reverse all former prohibitions against attacking 
civilians, achieved their brilliant clarity because of their lack of political 
and military imagination. In a remarkable article to which we will return, 
Walter Benjamin, in “The Weapons of Tomorrow: Battles with Chloraze-
tophenol, Diphenylaminchlorasin and Dichloräthylsulfid” (1925), identi-
fied several flaws in such military scenarios.4 Most notable about the new 
military scenarios, Benjamin wrote, was “human imagination’s refusal to 
catch up with them, and the monstrosity of the looming fate turns into 
a pretext for laziness of thought [Denkfaulheit]” (Benjamin 1972–91, 
vol. 4, 475). The scenarios demonstrated laziness of thought when they 
ignored the possibility of worldwide responses and reactions to the gas-
sing of cities. They failed to anticipate the opponent’s second- and third-
strike capacity, a capacity that undermines Douhet’s anticipation of low 
casualty figures and a swift end to the war. Aero-chemical attacks would 
achieve victory quickly only if the location of all of the enemy’s airplanes 
would be known. But as Benjamin pointed out, “that is not the case” 
(475). An air force does not have to be stationed inside of a nation’s 
boundaries. Ready on aircraft carriers out on the ocean, Benjamin writes, 
planes could be launched from ships that “constantly change their posi-
tion in international waters” (475). Already anticipating war scenarios 
that resemble those of the nuclear age, Benjamin imagined that both sides 
of the conflict could continue the war even after their own destruction. 
Unlike the military theorists of his age, he doubted that chemical weap-
ons would achieve their military and political goals. They might kill their 
targets effectively, but the very existence of such weapons threatened to 
undermine the very distinction between war and peace. Instead of end-
ing war quickly, allowing for a speedy return to peacetime, the targeted 
cities would remain death zones long after the war: “Even months after 
a region has been attacked with mustard gas every step on the ground 
and every touch of a doorknob or bread knife could prove lethal” (475). 
In Benjamin’s view, chemical warfare would no longer allow for fast and 
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clear transitions from war to peace. In “Theories of German Fascism” 
(1930), he warned once again that chemical weapons of mass destruc-
tion would transform the coming war into “an endless war” (Benjamin 
1996–2003, vol. 2, 314).5
As glaring as the gaps in the war scenarios of these military strategists 
might be, their authors failed to address an even more pressing question 
posed by the new potentials of chemical warfare. The possibility of sud-
den aerial gas attacks changed not just the future of warfare but life in 
peacetime society. What did it mean to enter an age in which cities and 
nations could be attacked at any moment with weapons of mass destruc-
tion? Europe’s mass media, from articles in the Illustrated London News, 
Vu in Paris, and the Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung to popular science fiction 
novels, were filled with apocalyptical visions of aero-chemical warfare.6 
Only in Weimar cinema one encounters almost no attempts to imagine fu-
ture warfare as chemical warfare. The imagery of poison gas attacks was 
employed almost exclusively to recall the horrors of the past but not the 
next war. Heinz Pol, the influential film critic of the Vossische Zeitung, 
asked in 1925 in Die Weltbühne:
Where is the film director who makes a whole film about the fu-
ture war, with bacterial bombs, poison gases, gas clouds? Nobody 
would need to pursue pacifist propaganda anymore if such a film, 
produced in a sober and matter-of-fact style would be shown in 
Europe’s cinema palaces. (Pol 1925, 812)
But Weimar cinema never produced such a film.7 Strangely enough, it is 
Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau’s Faust (1926) that comes closest to showing 
the gassing of a city. At its beginning Mephisto appears suddenly above 
an unsuspecting medieval city, spreads his enormous wings, and releases a 
black cloud that wafts through the city. While the panicked crowds in the 
film identify the event as the outbreak of the plague, postwar audiences 
could recognize the scene as a truly devilish poison gas attack. Murnau’s 
allusion to chemical warfare makes the past terror of the black plague 
shockingly comprehensible.
Read as a visualization of a contemporary war scenario, however, 
Murnau’s catastrophic imagination would fall short. Already in 1915 
chemists on both sides of the frontlines developed poison gases that de-
fied perception and representation. They reacted with their new gases to 
the introduction of gas masks in 1915. Once soldiers detected gas clouds 
or noticed signs of irritation, they could now protect themselves and 
avoid panics. Fritz Haber, the preeminent chemist and so-called father 
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of gas warfare (Szöllösi-Janze 1998, 316), considered two responses to 
the diminished effectiveness of his chemical weapons: the development of 
chemicals that penetrate the protective gear or lethal gases that soldiers 
would not see, taste, or smell until it was too late to put on masks. As 
Haber writes in “Zur Geschichte des Gaskrieges,” both sides of the con-
flict pursued the second alternative. The newly developed dichlorathylsul-
fid remained imperceptible to all human senses, and soldiers noticed the 
weapon only once it started to kill them. By spring 1916, both sides of the 
war launched imperceptible gases for the sole purpose of killing enemy 
troops: “The intention is no longer to drive the foe out of his position but 
to annihilate him with gas contained in the projectile” (Haber 1924, 90).
The imperceptibility, suddenness, and lethality of aero-chemical war-
fare demanded a new catastrophic imagination to understand what it 
meant to live in the presence of such weapons. Curiously, it is in the lit-
erary genre of satire where one finds the most innovative and ingenious 
responses to the new reality that imperceptible weapons could devastate 
whole cities at any moment. The writings of Kraus, Benjamin, and Canetti 
contain some of the most far-reaching responses to the acknowledged 
limits of traditional and contemporary literary and artistic representa-
tions of the new situation’s unprecedented destructive potential. Each of 
these writers addressed chemical warfare directly in their writings. But 
these explicit considerations are only starting points for their advances 
toward an aesthetics of imperceptibility, for their reconsiderations of 
more traditional forms of storytelling and representation in a situation 
in which the very triumphs of modernization pose an existential threat 
to modernity’s survival. To understand the achievements of Kraus, Benja-
min, and Canetti, it becomes necessary to explore how other, more direct 
attempts of envisioning chemical warfare fell far short of finding an ap-
propriate response to this challenge. 
The earliest attempt in German modernism of imagining oneself sud-
denly in a poisoned environment can be found more than a decade before 
the First World War. With the hindsight of the war, one discovers a ter-
rifying vision of gassing in Hofmannsthal’s “A Letter” (1902), the first 
and most important literary document of the language crisis in German-
Austrian modernism (Kiesel 2004, 189–98). Riding across tilled farm-
land, Lord Chandos is suddenly overcome by vivid images of a rat pack 
dying in a milk cellar:
It was all there. The cool and musty cellar air, full of the sharp, 
sweetish smell of the poison, and the shrilling of the death cries 
echoing against mildewed walls. Those convulsed clumps of 
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powerlessness, those desperations colliding with one another in 
confusion. The frantic search for ways out. The cold glares of 
fury when two meet at a blocked crevice. (Hofmannsthal 2005, 
123–24)
After the Second World War, Werner Kraft called this scene a “rationally 
inexplicable premonition of the gas chambers” (Kraft 1977, 22). Even if 
one prefers to avoid any claim for prophetic qualities for either world 
war, one can acknowledge that Hofmannsthal’s text attempts what the 
military strategists studiously avoided even after the first war. Lord Chan-
dos imagines the lethal consequences of the “sweetish smell of the poi-
son” from the inside of the cellar. By comparing the horrific cellar scene 
to catastrophic events in human history, from the destruction of Alba 
Longa to the erasure of Carthage, Lord Chandos blurs in his letter the 
boundaries between humans and animals. His vision communicates some 
of the horror of mass murder perpetrated on humans. Such empathetic 
blurring of boundaries between human and animal suffering coincides, 
however, with the establishment of another boundary that allows Lord 
Chandos to enjoy the experience of horror aesthetically. Even though he 
transports himself imaginatively into the midst of the catastrophe, he as-
sumes the safe position of someone who cannot be affected by the poison. 
Lord Chandos ignores in his vision not only the fact that he had ordered 
the poisoning, but he transforms himself into an innocent and powerless 
witness whose life is never at risk. He writes that he observed the dying 
around him like the “slave standing near Niobe in helpless fright as she 
turned to stone” (Hofmannsthal 2005, 124). As Niobe’s slave he is right 
next to the mass murder but also exempted from the aim of Apollo’s 
and Artemis’s poisoned arrows. They point and shoot these arrows exclu-
sively at Niobe’s children. With his mythological reference, Lord Chandos 
secures for himself the position of an unthreatened witness, not unlike 
the spectator who watches a shipwreck from the safety of the shore—the 
paradigmatic situation to experience a catastrophe as an instance of the 
sublime (Blumenberg 1997). As such a spectator, Lord Chandos experi-
ences the mass death first and foremost aesthetically. Hofmannsthal’s fic-
tive letter thus resists Kraft’s reading of it as a premonition of the horrors 
of the Holocaust and gassing. Instead of forcing him to confront the full 
extent of the human capacity to murder and destroy, the rats’ painful 
death afforded Lord Chandos the experience of “the present, the fullest, 
most sublime present” (Hofmannsthal 2005, 124). To make such aes-
thetic experience safe and possible, he transforms the indiscriminate le-
thal power of the sweet-smelling poison back to the linearity of bows and 
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arrows, the far more traditional weapons that Apollo and Artemis used 
to kill Niobe’s children. The whole environment of the milk cellar is not 
affected by sweet smelling poison, only the rats. While Hofmannsthal’s 
early imagination of mass killing bears some resemblance to gassing, its 
aesthetic representation depends entirely on ignoring the particular char-
acteristics of poison gas.
After the First World War writers were less preoccupied with the aes-
thetic appreciation of mass death as sublime spectacle. And not many 
authors shared Douhet’s and Liddell Hart’s expectation that chemical 
weapons would make future warfare more humane. Exposing propo-
nents of a “chlorreichen Offensive” (a wordplay describing the military 
attack as rich in glory and chlorine), the Austrian satirist Karl Kraus 
warned already in 1918 against having hopes for more humane warfare 
(Kraus 1978, vol. 7, no. 474–83, 41). Instead of considering the new 
weapons as a chance to limit the destructive impact of warfare on so-
cieties, Kraus read them as emblematic of the failure of a catastrophic 
imagination. “The mankind that exhausted its imagination in inven-
tions can no longer imagine their effectiveness—otherwise it would use 
them to commit suicide out of remorse” (45).8 In the epilogue to his play 
The Last Days of Mankind (1918–19), Kraus exposed this exhausted 
imagination in the figure of a chemical engineer. Appropriately named 
Dr. Siegfried Abendrot, this modern engineer promises his audience to 
develop a gas that would achieve once and for all peace through victory 
(Siegfried). But only at the price of a red dawn (Abendrot) to mankind’s 
existence.
To cook up a substitute death I’d be willing,
And market it under my name—what a killing!
The gases that we have deployed in the past
affected our own men—that method can’t last.
From now on we’ll slaughter whomever we please
By means of our own substitute lung disease!
No need any longer to make any sound,
As we turn the whole earth to a burial ground.
It’s easy to strengthen our front if we try.
Whole armies will perish without knowing why.
One press on the button’s enough to expunge
hundreds of thousands of enemy lungs.
We don’t need to shout now, we just hold our breath,
And our victims will silently go to their deaths. (Cited in Timms 
2005, 72)
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The cheerful Dr. Abendrot exemplifies the challenge that the new pos-
sibilities of chemical warfare posed to a catastrophic imagination after 
the war. How could the technological ease with which the imperceptible 
threat of chemical warfare could suddenly suffocate whole cities be por-
trayed and registered in all of its horrors?
In his article “The Weapons of Tomorrow: Battles with Chlorazetophe-
nol, Diphenylaminchlorasin and Dichloräthylsulfid,” Benjamin offered a 
first glimpse of the new challenge. While “weapons of tomorrow” conveys 
an ominous danger, the actual names of the poisonous gases, gases with 
varying degrees of lethality and very different demands for dispersion, are 
so technical and opaque to the nonspecialist that one receives little indica-
tion of their deadly powers. To the layman these names are as colorless as 
the gases themselves. Like Douhet and Liddell Hart, Benjamin expected 
that the next war had to be all attack and no defense. A surprise aerial 
attack against the civilian populations of Paris, London, or Berlin would 
decide the conflict almost instantaneously. Unlike the military experts 
(and Dr. Abendrot), however, Benjamin placed his readers not on the side 
of the victors but among the victims of such an aerial assault.
On a beautiful, radiant day in spring a scent as if of violets spreads 
throughout the streets of Berlin. This will last a few minutes. Then, 
the air becomes suffocating. Whoever fails to escape its reach will 
in a few more minutes fail to perceive, will momentarily lose his 
orientation [Gesicht]. Should he not succeed in fleeing . . . he will 
suffocate. All this could occur one day, without any airplane in the 
air visible or the buzz of any propeller audible. (Benjamin 1972–91, 
vol. 4, 474)
The poison gas would have the same faint sweet smell that already proved 
its lethal potential to the rats in Chandos’s milk cellar. But this time the 
gas would not be contained to a single basement, and it would spare no 
observer. These newly developed weapons created a situation to which the 
previous distinctions war and peace, air and poison, soldier and civilian 
no longer applied. From the perspective of a potential victim, the mo-
ment of attack looks no different than a peaceful summer day. From the 
perspective of a bomber pilot releasing his poisonous cargo above Berlin 
no distinction between combatant and noncombatant can be made. The 
weapons of tomorrow would be used along a “ghostly frontline” that 
might suddenly materialize on any street in Europe (473). How could 
one perceive, represent, and communicate what it meant to live in such a 
radically new risk situation?
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With the exception of Weimar cinema, the desire to make the im-
perceptible but ubiquitous risk of mass death comprehensible began to 
preoccupy the mass media, literature, and arts after the war. Most of 
these attempts became, however, evidence for the inability to expand the 
limits of a catastrophic imagination. But analyzing these less successful 
attempts to imagine the next war—the last example leads to the genre 
of satire—allows a reader to notice to what high degree Benjamin’s and 
Canetti’s models of destructive satire respond to the challenge posed to a 
catastrophic imagination in the age of weapons of mass destruction.
Even war narratives that experimented with new representational 
strategies tended to fall back on traditional storylines of redemption and 
closure when they attempted to envision the consequences of the new 
technologies of mass death. In (CHCl = CH)3As (Levisite), oder, Der 
einzig gerechte Krieg (1926), Johannes R. Becher imagined the next war 
as a global civil war. Partially written in an overtly expressionist style 
and filled with revolutionary proclamations, Becher’s novel regards the 
next war as no particular challenge to the imagination. Even though he 
anticipates the use of chemical weapons, his account of war and violence 
remains rather traditional in its promise of purification and rebirth for 
its (communist) participants. The poison gas remains in Becher’s novel 
a means and metaphor for the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism. 
The “only just war” to which its title refers, the war between the working 
class and the military-industrial complex, finds its redemptive conclusion 
in the founding of a “Soviet-Europe.” Safely embedded in a narrative of 
political progress, Becher can imagine chemical warfare in every gory 
detail but without a sense of fundamental risk and disorientation be-
cause such warfare is viewed as another step toward a better future. His 
revolutionary novel presents death and dying as just as meaningful and 
welcome as Musil had anticipated it for the German nation in August 
1914: “Because one thing is incontestably true today: even if the indi-
vidual dies, the whole, the proletarian class is victorious!” (Becher 1926, 
255). Becher’s utopian novel converts the dystopian potential of modern 
warfare into fuel for the revolutionary process.
Peter Martin Lampel’s play Giftgas über Berlin (1929) provides an 
example of a politically ambitious dramatic text that undermines its pro-
gressive intention with its traditional aesthetics.9 Possibly following in the 
footsteps of Wilhelm Lamszus’s controversial but now lost play Giftgas 
(1925), Lampel took an actual lethal poison gas accident in Hamburg 
as his starting point (Lamszus 2003, 31). His play depicts a right-wing 
conspiracy (the Reichswehr’s plans to secretly acquire chemical weapons) 
against a proletarian uprising to foreshadow the devastations of future 
166 Chapter 5
gas warfare. Lampel’s play provoked a political éclat. But the scandal 
focused not on the dangers of chemical warfare but on the question of 
literary censorship.10 Aesthetically, even the sympathetic critic Herbert 
Jhering considered Giftgas über Berlin a failure:
[Lampel’s] achievement: that he demonstrates the terrible mass ef-
fects of chemical agents. His error: that he attempts to portray the 
impact on the collective with traditional dramatic means. (1964, 8)
Lampel’s traditional forms of representation proved inadequate for imag-
ining the effects of weapons of mass destruction on the Weimar stage.
No less conventional were the images of future chemical warfare that 
the widely popular Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung published and the popu-
lar Illustrated London News reprinted in 1930 (figs. 1 and 2).
Willibald Krain’s drawing (fig. 2) depicts the aftermath of an aerial 
attack as Benjamin had imagined it. The young woman has been sur-
prised by the poison gas during her daily activities. With no survivors 
(or victors) visible, the image possesses an eerie stillness that stems from 
Gas attacks as they have been imagined 
in widely distributed newspapers in 
Great Britain and Germany. (Left) 
Illustrated London News, February 1, 
1930, and (right) Berliner Illustrierte 
Zeitung, October 30, 1927 
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the impossibility of any further action in this postapocalyptic landscape. 
With no signs of escapees, there are no civilians left who would pres-
sure their government to surrender quickly, as in Douhet’s scenario, or 
workers ready to revolt, as in Becher’s novel and Lampel’s play. These 
illustrations employ their wholly traditional drawing technique to con-
vey a melancholic sense of futility regarding the military plans for future 
wars. Kurt Tucholsky’s short prose text “Die brennende Lampe” con-
veys a similar sense of belatedness and pointlessness but adds in addi-
tion to cynicism and misogyny a sense of distance and invulnerability 
(for the part of the narrator) that echoes Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos. 
The story consists of a conversation between a narrator and a young 
man who suffocates after an aero-chemical attack. Lying on a street, 
the young man asks with his last breath the “why” question. With great 
calm the narrator answers and blames previous generations, including 
the young man’s mother, because they never discredited the very idea of 
warfare. “What are you gasping there—? ‘Mother?’ Oh, no. Your mother 
was first a woman and then mother. And because she was a woman she 
loved the warrior and murderer for the state [Staatsmörder] and the flags 
and the music and the slim and tall lieutenant” (Tucholsky 1975, 9:219). 
Just like Lord Chandos, Tucholsky’s narrator acknowledges no respon-
sibility for the mass murder that he blames on everyone else, and he re-
mains completely unharmed by the poison gas even though he sits right 
next to the dying man. The widely distributed images from the Berliner 
Illustrierte Zeitung could have served as well as illustrations for Erich 
Kästner’s poem Das letzte Kapitel (The Last Chapter). As a truly final 
chapter, Kästner placed his satirical poem on chemical warfare at the 
very end of Ein Mann gibt Auskunft (A Man Explains Himself) (1930). 
At first, Kästner seems to portray the destructive potential of these new 
weapons in the most drastic and urgent manner. The aero-chemical at-
tacks in his poem annihilate not just London or Berlin but all life on 
earth. But then the reader realizes that just like Tucholsky’s narrator none 
of Kästner’s initial readers had to fear for their lives. Kästner moved the 
date of the gas attack far into the future, well beyond his life expectancy. 
The Weimar satirist diminished the risk potential of chemical warfare 
even further by excising any signs of hostility from this apocalyptic vi-
sion. No nation or terrorist group but the united world government dis-
patches one thousand bombers on July 13, 2003. Their mission is guided 
by a desire for eternal peace.
To finally bring peace to the world,
nothing else was possible,
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the world government explained,
but to poison all humanity. (Kästner 1997, 76)
The poem’s mood echoes the calmness of the Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung 
drawings. Everyone will suffocate in the far future of 2003, including 
those who ordered the global destruction: “Everyone thought he could 
escape death. / No one escaped death” (76). While Kraus’s The Last Days 
of Mankind was written by a human for a Martian theater since no hu-
man audience should be able to bear its truth, Kästner’s final chapter to 
the history of mankind is written from an extraterrestrial perspective. The 
finally peaceful earth is observed from outer space: “But all earth was 
finally quiet and at peace. And continued steadily on its elliptical path” 
(77). With no Krausian Nörgler surviving long enough to comment on 
the human catastrophe, Kästner’s satire positions itself in a truly secure 
posthuman existence.
Missing from these stories, poems, and images by Kästner, Tucholsky, 
Krain, and others, including almost all of Weimar cinema, is a sense of 
risk, urgency, and vulnerability. The horrors of chemical warfare are ei-
ther placed in the past of the recent war or in the undetermined future of 
the next war. Actual representations of attacks focus on their aftermath, 
when it is too late, and are portrayed from a safe perspective that remains 
unaffected by the poison gas.11 Missing from these representations is what 
Benjamin attempted in his first article on chemical weapons: to experi-
ence in today’s scent of violets not just a beautiful spring day but also the 
immediate threat of gas warfare. How could one develop a catastrophic 
imagination capable of anticipating, sensing, and perceiving the destruc-
tive potential of these new, imperceptible weapons of mass destruction?
Benjamin’s question was taken up, however, by a writer who was a 
trained chemist as well. In 1936, Elias Canetti delivered his first public 
speech, a speech in honor of Hermann Broch’s fiftieth birthday. And in 
this speech he defined the task of a contemporary writer as imagining new 
forms of destruction. Canetti praised Broch for achieving what Benjamin 
attempted in his article: “sensing”—making available to the senses—the 
next catastrophe. In 1929 Canetti received his doctorate in chemistry 
from the University of Vienna. As he writes in his memoirs Torch in My 
Ear (1982), Canetti never intended to work professionally as a chemist 
but had expected at that time that chemistry would play an even more 
important part in future warfare (1982, 110). By the time of his speech in 
honor of Broch, Canetti had already completed central works of his liter-
ary oeuvre, the plays The Wedding (Die Hochzeit) (1932) and Comedy 
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of Vanities (Komödie der Eitelkeiten) (written in 1934, first published in 
1950) as well as his novel Auto-da-Fé (Die Blendung).
As Canetti told his audience in 1936, Broch possessed a highly recep-
tive “sense of breathing” (Canetti 1979, 9). This rather unique sense al-
lowed Broch to perceive what others took for granted, air, and he experi-
enced fully the “defenselessness of breathing” (13). Air, Canetti observed, 
was the last shared property that truly belonged to everyone.
To nothing is man so open as to air. He moves in it as Adam did in 
Paradise, pure and innocent and unaware of any evil beasts. [. . .] 
And this last thing, which has belonged to all of us collectively, shall 
poison all of us collectively. We know it, but we do not yet sense it, 
for breathing is not our art. (13)
As a master of the rare art of breathing, Broch suffocated on the destruc-
tive smells that his contemporaries continued to mistake for the scent of 
violets.
Hermann Broch’s work stands between war and war, gas war and 
gas war. It could be that he still somewhere feels the poisonous par-
ticles of the last war. But that is unlikely. What is certain, however, 
is that he, who knows how to breathe better than we do, is already 
choking on the gas that shall claim our breath—who knows when! 
(Canetti 1979, 13)12
Throughout his career, from this speech in 1936 to his Nobel Prize speech 
in 1981, Canetti defined the sensing of the next catastrophe as the most 
urgent task of literature. In another lecture delivered shortly after the dev-
astations of the Second World War, Canetti had already turned his eyes 
toward the next catastrophe, insisting that “all destructions are of the 
future, as all relics are of the past” (Canetti 2005a, 12). Among modern 
writers it was now Franz Kafka and not Broch who served as his model 
for sensing future destructions. Kafka, Canetti declared in 1948, was “the 
only one who feels the futures if we could say so, in his shaking limbs” 
(12). Canetti’s literary idols were always writers who seemed to perceive 
and experience coming destructions.
Benjamin and Canetti were contemporaries who never met or com-
mented on each other’s works. But a parallel reading of both writers is 
nonetheless instructive since they worked in the late 1920s and early 
1930s on comparable projects. Starting from a similar diagnosis of a 
crisis of perception and imagination in postwar society, they searched 
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separately for ways to prepare the public imagination to recognize new 
possibilities of man-made catastrophes, first and foremost the impercep-
tible threat of chemical weapons. Each of them took an interest in the 
genre of satire, and particularly, in the same contemporary satirist: Karl 
Kraus. Both identified in Kraus’s satirical writings elements that trans-
formed the genre of satire. In his hands the deeply conservative genre of 
satire, a genre that relied on traditional values and decried their corro-
sion in contemporary society, became a medium capable of responding 
better than any other genre to the new risks of the postwar situation. The 
Krausian satire demonstrated to them unique possibilities of preparing a 
catastrophic imagination that would be up to the challenge of contempo-
rary threats of man-made mass death.
Analyzing Kraus’s writings, both Benjamin and Canetti question fa-
miliar understandings of satire from Aristotle to Schiller to Adorno. 
They no longer share Schiller’s expectation that satire only had to rouse 
(erwecken) the higher reality of the ideal from its dormant state in the 
public’s mind.13 They no longer presuppose the presence of such com-
munal ideals. Instead of premising their concepts of satire on the criti-
cal force of widely accepted but sadly unrealized ideals, Benjamin and 
Canetti seek a new form of satire that originates from the destruction 
of the very foundation that satirist and audience still shared in Schiller’s 
theory of satire. The solid ground on which most theories position the 
satirist to launch his or her attacks—the firm belief in socially shared but 
unfulfilled ideals—crumbles under the satirist’s feet. As I argue, Benjamin 
and Canetti develop models of destructive satire to dismantle patterns of 
perception that render emerging threats and risks imperceptible. But they 
reach fundamentally different conclusions. Benjamin’s revision of satire is 
more radical and political than Canetti’s. His extremism comes, however, 
within reach of justifying indiscriminate physical destruction. Benjamin’s 
theory of satire is tied to a politics of destruction that remains at risk of 
losing sight of any limits in its advocacy of political violence.14
Canetti’s practice of satire is more subversive, extremely focused, but 
also strangely aimless. Although his diagnosis of a crisis of experience bears 
close resemblance to Benjamin’s more detailed analysis, Canetti refused to 
proclaim an end to communicable experience, storytelling, and the role of 
tradition per se in the new age of weapons of mass destruction. Like Musil 
and in contrast to Benjamin, Canetti acknowledged the persistence and re-
emergence of seemingly outdated traditions, the “few dozen cake molds of 
which reality consists” (MwQ 645). The only common ground Canetti pre-
supposes for the destructive satirist and his audience is the very ground the 
satirist seeks to destroy: the reader’s distorted constructions of reality. The 
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destructive substance of his satire is directed against those preconceived 
notions of the reader’s reality that prevent him or her from perceiving the 
most urgent risks to modern society. After the war and anticipating another 
man-made disaster, Canetti’s satire no longer presupposes that satirist and 
audience share a set of common values and ideals. His destructive satire 
anticipates only the common ground of preconceived notions of realities, 
from misogynist and racist stereotypes to class and educational prejudices, 
and focuses its destructive force against these traditional forms of under-
standing and imagination that preclude the formation of a catastrophic 
imagination on par with new risk potentials of modern society. Since Ca-
netti’s satire offers nothing beyond its extremely distorted forms of percep-
tion, the Canettian approach to satire risks being read as either a mere 
chorus of mad voices or as producing texts that share and reinforce these 
rigid views of the world. Its refusal to allow either its fictional characters 
or its readers to position themselves outside of its distorted universe is both 
the necessary precondition for this form of satire—otherwise it would re-
establish the sense of perceptional and experiential safety and coherence it 
aims to subvert—and, as we will see, its limit.
Benjamin, the Postwar Crisis of Experience, and the  
Great Satirist
Benjamin’s scenario of a poison gas attack reflects his oft-repeated claim 
that the catastrophic imagination was unprepared to confront the new 
technologies of mass death. Especially writers who experienced the war 
firsthand, Benjamin asserted, had no sense of what the next war might 
look like. Reviewing in “Theories of German Fascism” (1930) the ac-
counts of a few such veterans, he noted their inability to comprehend the 
significance of their own experiences and speaks of “the utterly thought-
less obtuseness with which they view the idea of future wars without any 
conception of them” (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 313). Benjamin found 
it revealing that the contributors to Ernst Jünger’s anthology Krieg und 
Krieger (1930) demonstrated “conspicuously little interest” in gas warfare. 
Instead of analyzing how the new technologies would change the conduct 
of future warfare these veterans cultivated the idea of a never changing 
“‘eternal’ war” (314). They refused to acknowledge what seemed inevi-
table to Benjamin: When chemical weapons of mass destruction decide 
about victory or defeat, the ethos of heroic conduct will be substituted 
by record setting mass killings; “Gas warfare will rest upon annihilation 
records” (313). In the next war soldierly qualities would displace ath-
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letic ones. The perceived inability of veterans to comprehend their own 
war experience intrigued Benjamin throughout the 1930s. While he dealt 
in “Theories of German Fascism” with specific authors who had been 
soldiers, Benjamin generalized soon thereafter his critique of Jünger and 
applied it to the war generation as a whole. Jünger’s apparent failure to 
anticipate future warfare as gas warfare came to stand for Benjamin’s 
much more far-reaching claims of a general inability to learn from the 
war experience, and his proclamation of the demise of experience itself.
In “Experience and Poverty” (1933) and “The Storyteller” (1936), 
Benjamin famously pronounced the war generation’s lack of communi-
cable experience (Erfahrung).15 Returning from the trenches, the veter-
ans seemed to stay silent; they returned “not richer but poorer in com-
municable experience” (1996–2003, vol. 2, 731; vol. 3, 144). Dismissing 
the widely popular war memoirs as inadequate, Benjamin explained the 
perceived silence of veterans with the vanishing of a common ground of 
tradition, a fount of shared experience that allowed stories to be under-
stood by the entire community. Johann Peter Hebel (1760–1826), Benja-
min’s favorite storyteller and the author of Schatzkästlein des rheinischen 
Hausfreundes (The Treasure Chest) (1811), could still begin stories like 
“Der Wegweiser” und “Der kann Deutsch” with the word bekanntlich 
(meaning “as it is generally known”) and endow his stories with the au-
thority of tradition. Hebel’s stories were based on the assumption of a 
mutual understanding between author and readership. For Benjamin, 
such presumptions of a common basis of knowledge and experience had 
lost all their power in times of unprecedented mass violence.16 The wis-
dom of tradition in the storyteller’s tales, passing from mouth to ear and 
from generation to generation, no longer offered insight for a radically 
changed postwar situation. Anyone relying on these stories of the past, 
Benjamin warned, would learn painfully that their value had expired. 
Listening to stories was replaced by the reading of novels. Unlike the 
storyteller, however, the novelist dispenses neither counsel nor wisdom.17 
Rather than bemoaning the novel’s popularity or mourning the loss of 
social and cultural stability that led to his thesis of the disappearance of 
storytelling, Benjamin endorsed in his essays a new poverty of experience 
(Erfahrungsarmut). With an emphatic “yes,” he welcomed the perceived 
break in the chain of tradition, wishing to get rid of the ruins of tradition 
(Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 734). The satirist became for Benjamin a 
model for an agent of destruction who could clear away the rubble and 
make way for a new mankind. At a time when the storyteller could no 
longer communicate experience, Benjamin did not turn to the genre of the 
novel but to satire.
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But he made a clear distinction between the great satirist—a unique 
figure of destruction—and satirists whose seemingly radical critique of 
the changing conditions of modern society he considered as no more than 
a pretext for inaction. Benjamin made a clear distinction between Karl 
Kraus, his model for a great satirist, who alone gained firm ground in 
the moment of social and political crisis, and popular left-wing satirists, 
the representatives of a “new German satire” (Benjamin 1972–91, vol. 3, 
172). Continuing prior attacks against satirists like Hermann Kesten and 
Walther Mehring,18 Benjamin used his essay “Left-Wing Melancholy” 
(1931), a review of Erich Kästner’s Ein Mann gibt Auskunft, to launch 
his most far-reaching attack against Germany’s most renowned living sat-
irists (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 423–27). Rather than revisiting the 
question of whether the new German satirists had indeed been afflicted by 
leftist melancholy, I will read Benjamin’s polemic as his attempt to lay the 
groundwork for his alternative theory of satire, his theory of destructive 
satire. Even though this approach discloses some of Benjamin’s misrepre-
sentations of these satirists—he transforms Kästner and Tucholsky into 
pseudo-revolutionary satirists, an assessment that fits neither their theory 
nor practice of satire—I am less interested in siding with either side of 
this controversy. Neither a (belated) defense of Kästner and Tucholsky 
nor an attack on Benjamin is intended. Instead, “Left-Wing Melancholy” 
will be read as one of Benjamin’s most intriguing realizations of his defi-
nition of a critic’s task. Three years earlier, he had posited in One-Way 
Street (1928), “The critic is the strategist in the literary struggle” (Benja-
min 1996–2003, vol. 1, 460). In his battle to reshape a literary genre to 
expand the catastrophic imaginary, a battle in which he pitted Kraus and 
Brecht against Tucholsky and Kästner, Benjamin followed his own recipe 
and never hesitated to take sides or to sacrifice cumbersome concepts 
like objectivity and impartiality: “‘Objectivity’ must always be sacrificed 
to partisanship, if the cause fought for merits this” (460). The point of 
reading Benjamin’s attacks is therefore less to correct his misrepresenta-
tions of these new German satirists than to understand better the cause in 
whose name he made these misrepresentations. In other words, to better 
understand the principles and tasks of Benjamin’s great satirist and his 
destructive satire.
Looking at this controversy surrounding the genre of satire in the 
1920s and 1930s reveals the originality of Benjamin’s (and Canetti’s) un-
derstanding of satire. Benjamin and Canetti stand out not only among 
their contemporaries, but their notions of satire break with traditional 
understandings that have linked theories of satire from Aristotle to Schil-
ler to Adorno.
174 Chapter 5
What justifies the term destructive satire for Benjamin’s and Canetti’s 
approaches to satirical writing? Is not all satire destructive? Consider one 
of the most famous programmatic statements on satire in German litera-
ture, Tucholsky’s essay “Was darf die Satire?” (“What Is Satire Allowed 
to Do?”) (Tucholsky 1975, 2:42–44). Starting with the observation that 
on hearing a political joke half of Germany will pout and sulk on the 
sofa, Tucholsky sought to defend satire’s right to offend. And he answered 
in 1919 his own question as succinctly as possible, leaving no room for 
equivocations and second thoughts. What is satire allowed to do? “Every-
thing” (44). If one adds to this proclamation of satirical limitlessness the 
title of another of Tucholsky’s essays on satire, “We Negative Ones,” pub-
lished as well in 1919, then one might indeed assume that Tucholsky’s 
satires were meant to be highly aggressive and not afraid to exude mere 
negativity. Such an impression of Tucholsky’s writings would fit with 
Kästner’s cold vision of global gassing at the end of Ein Mann gibt Aus-
kunft. And it would fit with Kästner’s notorious answer to a disgruntled 
audience that demanded a more positive and redemptive approach to its 
social and political realities—
Und immer wieder schickt ihr mir Briefe,
in denen ihr, dick unterstrichen, schreibt:
“Herr Kästner, wo bleibt das Positive?”
Ja, weiß der Teufel, wo das bleibt. 
[And again and again you send letters to me / in which, heavily un-
derlined, you write: / “Mr. Kästner where is the positive?” / Yes, the 
devil might know, where that is.] (Kästner 1998, 170) 
The new German satirists appear as driven by highly destructive im-
pulses. They seem to be so radical that, as Benjamin argues in “Left-Wing 
Melancholy,” no political action could correspond anymore to such radi-
calism.
In short, this left-wing radicalism is precisely the attitude to which 
there is no longer, in general, any corresponding political action. It 
is not to the left of this or that tendency, but simply to the left of 
what is in general possible. (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 425).
By adopting a radical attitude that removes itself from all concrete politics—
as far removed as Kästner’s extraterrestrial position from which his poem 
details the future apocalypse—these new German satirists transform, 
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Benjamin argues, political resistance into articles of consumption. They 
feed their already overfed audience, a bourgeois audience they pretend to 
despise. As Benjamin protests, these satirists produce constipation instead 
of subversion:
The rumbling in these lines [of Kästner’s poems] certainly has more 
to do with flatulence than with subversion. Constipation and mel-
ancholy have always gone together. But since the juices began to 
dry up in the body social, stuffiness meets us at every turn. Kästner’s 
poems do not improve the atmosphere. (426)
But Benjamin’s group portrait of Weimar satirists is hardly accurate. 
First, he creates a rather misleading impression of their political extrem-
ism and then accuses them in a second move of insincerity, of being com-
plicit with the targets of their satirical attacks. The beat of their poems 
follows, as Benjamin claims, “the notes according to which poor rich folk 
play the blues” (426). Revealing such hidden complicity between satirists 
and bourgeois audience is meant to shatter their reputation. But Benja-
min’s critical assault on their left-wing melancholy is little more than a 
polemical rehashing of their elegiac self-characterizations. These satirists 
were well aware that they were not agents of radical political change. 
Their satires were not meant to destroy the current political order but to 
function as safety valves for civil society. In 1923 Tucholsky imagined, for 
example, his own funeral in Die Weltbühne, one of Weimar Germany’s 
leading political journals in which Benjamin published as well. Tucholsky 
was such a frequent contributor, and since 1927 also one of its editors; he 
published his poems, reviews, and essays under five different pseudonyms, 
creating five distinct personae. In his “Requiem” for his own funeral, he 
united all five names to “Kaspar Theobald Peter Kurt Ignaz Wrobel” 
when he mourned their collective death. This Mr. Wrobel did not die the 
death of a political martyr but passed away peacefully in his sleep. At-
tending his own funeral, which he imagines not as a political rally but as 
a “sublime festivity,” Tucholsky notes the symbiotic relationship that the 
deceased kept with the targets of their satirical attacks (Tucholsky 1975, 
3:331). He admits freely to the numerous texts he wrote for those “he 
pretended to despise; with one hand he criticized them and with the other 
he siphoned off the champagne from them” (Tucholsky 1975, 3:332). 
And with a shrug of his shoulders he judges himself in his obituary a 
“problematic nature” instead of radical idealist (Tucholsky 1975, 3:332).
Tucholsky never quite took the revolutionary pose that Benjamin at-
tributed to him. In a series of essays from 1919, he outlined the satirical 
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program that he would follow throughout the Weimar Republic. Accord-
ing to Tucholsky, satire is a nonviolent outlet for otherwise volatile so-
cial energies. He did not understand it as a weapon for radical political 
change, as Benjamin’s portrait of Weimar satirists suggested. In “What Is 
Satire Allowed to Do?” Tucholsky defined the satirist as an “offended ide-
alist: he wants the world to be good, it is bad, and now he runs up against 
the bad” (Tucholsky 1975, 2:42). But the satirist runs against the bad in 
the name of reform and not revolution. Repeatedly, Tucholsky pictured 
satire as society’s lightning rod, as a safety valve that vents potentially ex-
plosive steam, or as a blood-cleansing procedure that promises its clients 
a healthier complexion (2:171, 93, 44). In the same spirit, Erich Kästner 
compared the satirist’s work to that of a stern and exacting teacher (1966, 
383).19 The ground, on which Tucholsky, the offended idealist, stood, his 
belief in the republican ideals, remained unshaken until the last days of 
the Weimar Republic. Such firm convictions allowed him to become, as 
Peter Jelavich writes, the most influential satirist of his generation: “Per-
haps more consistently than any other person, he [Tucholsky] contrasted 
the ideal of the Weimar Republic with its social and political realities; 
thus he became the premier satirist of the age” (1993, 131).
Rather than focusing on signs of Tucholsky’s feigned radicalism, Ben-
jamin could have focused on his very traditional notion of satire, because 
Tucholsky’s trust in the traditional role of the satirist as a defender of 
the unrealized ideals of a society contributed to the failure of his satiri-
cal project, an effective defense of a democratic Germany. And it is the 
outdatedness of his concept of satire and its battles that differs, as will 
be seen, most drastically from the notion of Benjamin’s great satirist and 
his work of destruction. A look at the metaphorical combat zone into 
which Tucholsky drafted himself as a German satirist indicates Tuchol-
sky’s outmoded notions of war and conflict. His satirist and his weaponry 
are throwbacks to the middle ages. Tucholsky’s battlefield of satire never 
witnessed the new weapons of mass destruction. Not tanks, airplanes, 
and chemical weapons, but clubs, bows, and arrows remain his weapons 
of choice:
[The satirist] protects the noble innocents with cudgel blows and 
bow and arrows. He is the lansquenet of the spirit. His position is 
prescribed: he can do no different, may the Lord help him. Amen. 
(Tucholsky 1975, 2:172)
His reliance upon the critical force of democratic ideals (as well as out-
moded images of the satirist’s position in the battle for democracy) might 
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have led Tucholsky first to success and popularity, as Jelavich points out, 
but it led him as well into resignation and silence once he had to realize 
that these ideals and satirical weapons proved inadequate. At the end of 
the Weimar Republic, Tucholsky realized that his satire with its expecta-
tion of an existing set of ideals that satirist and society shared had no 
weapons against the forces that threatened such society.
Satire has an upper limit: Buddha eludes it. Satire has a lower limit 
as well. The ruling fascist powers in Germany for example. It is not 
worth it—one cannot aim so low. (Tucholsky 1975, 10:49)
Rather than pretending to be an extremist, as Benjamin alleged, a new 
German satirist like Tucholsky placed the political and the spiritual ex-
tremes well beyond the reach of his satire. Tucholsky published this last 
comment on the limited reach of his satire one year before Hitler’s chan-
cellorship. After Auschwitz, Adorno generalized Tucholsky’s assessment 
of satire’s ineffectiveness in Minima Moralia (1951). In “Juvenal’s Er-
ror,” he observed that it became impossible to write satire since its me-
dium, “the difference between ideology and reality,” had disappeared 
(Adorno 1978, 211). From Adorno’s point of view, satiric interjections 
against “the deadly seriousness [den blutigen Ernst] of total society” 
have become utterly ridiculous. They raise nothing but an “impotent 
objection” against totality (212). Following in the footsteps of Schiller 
and Hegel who defined satire as dealing with the “contradiction be-
tween actuality and the ideal” (Schiller 1966, 117) and who demanded 
that the satirist should have a “knowledge of the good and the virtuous 
and a will to achieve it” (Hegel 1975, 513), Adorno argued that such 
knowledge of the good had vanished in Auschwitz. The tension between 
ideal and reality that might propel satiric missiles from the realm of the 
ideal against the bad actuality no longer existed in a world that made 
the Holocaust possible. Once and for all satire could no longer presume 
that shared ideals lend it a solid position from which it could voice its 
objections effectively.
By calling the satirical effort itself ridiculous, Adorno sent out an in-
verted echo of Aristotle’s definition of satire and comedy. In his Poet-
ics Aristotle defined comedy as dealing solely with “the ridiculous” and 
insisted that it “causes no pain” (1449). He conceived of laughter and 
harming as mutually exclusive. And Tucholsky still followed such a tra-
ditional understanding of satire that sought to expose social and political 
deformations but never intended to harm or kill its targets. Even when he 
seemed to reject any limits to his satire in 1919, Tucholsky insisted that 
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no one should get seriously hurt in satirical exchanges. He challenged his 
opponents not to mortal combat but to a chivalrous joust.
It would be no real man or group of professionals that cannot bear 
to suffer a proper blow. The attacked might defend himself by the 
same means; he might strike back—but he shall not turn his head 
away in pain, fury, or offense [aber er wende nicht verletzt, empört, 
gekränkt das Haupt]. (Tucholsky 1975, 2:44)
Adorno’s rejection of such satire as harmless and ridiculous is consequent. 
No worthwhile purpose should remain for such a feeble literary genre 
after Auschwitz. And since Adorno’s notion of satire follows the long-
standing tradition from Aristotle to Hegel and from Juvenal to Tucholsky, 
one might be tempted to assume that his dismissal comprises all versions 
of satire. But as I argue, Benjamin’s and Canetti’s alternative notions of 
satire broke well before the Holocaust and in anticipation of chemical 
warfare with an understanding of satire that depended on a community 
based on shared ideals and perceptions and with satirists unwilling to 
inflict pain on their audiences.
Benjamin’s and Canetti’s versions of destructive satire challenge central 
tenets of traditional theories and practices of satire. Their concepts of de-
structive satire are no longer conceived as openly pedagogical. Instead of 
grounding their understandings of satire on the continued existence and 
critical force of widely shared but not fully realized ideals, they searched 
for a satire that could thrive even when the very foundations on which 
satirist and society were supposed to stand together crumbled under their 
feet. If the difference between ideal and reality had ever truly been sat-
ire’s medium, then it had disappeared well before the Second World War. 
Benjamin and Canetti drew on Karl Kraus, the satirist who probed the 
challenges of the new catastrophic possibilities for satiric representation 
more persistently than any of his contemporaries.20 In Kraus, Benjamin 
discovered a truly destructive character, a satirist who had no intention 
of jousting with his audience but who excelled in the art of annihilatory 
criticism, an art Benjamin sought to practice in his literary criticism as 
well.21
In the first issue of his journal Die Fackel (1899–1938), Kraus an-
nounced not what he intended to publish (“Was wir bringen”) but what 
he intended to kill (“was wir umbringen”) (Kraus 1978, vol. 1, no. 1, 
1). Rather than aligning laughter with harmless ridicule, he equated in 
1915 “die Lache” (laughter) with “die Lache” as in “Blutlache,” the pool 
of blood (vol. 7, no. 405, 20). Playing the role of judge and executioner, 
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Kraus handed down his verdicts in articles and during public readings. 
The judgment, usually a death sentence, was never reversed but only re-
iterated. Whenever Kraus took another look at the tried and sentenced 
delinquents, he reported no survival or resurrection but described an un-
expectedly drawn-out death and the slow decomposition of the executed 
bodies left behind to rot. The murderous intent of Kraus’s satire is exem-
plified in the titles of articles he directed against Alfred Kerr (1867–1948), 
one of the most influential literary critics (and the discoverer of Robert 
Musil). Like Kraus, Kerr published his own journal, Pan. From March to 
July 1911, Kraus entitled his satirical attacks against Kerr as “The Little 
Pan Is dead” (vol. 5, no. 319–20, 1–6), “The Little Pan Is Still Gasp-
ing” (no. 321–22, 57–64), “The Little Pan Already Stinks” (no. 324–25, 
50–60), and finally “The Little Pan Still Stinks” (no. 326–328, 28–34). 
Kraus’s satirical practice of dressing up his victims in their own blood, of 
destroying them with their own words, led to Benjamin’s claim that the 
satirist is “the figure in whom the cannibal was received into civilization” 
(Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 448).
In contrast to lesser figures like Tucholsky, Kästner, and the other new 
German satirists, Kraus represented to Benjamin “the great type” of the 
satirist (448). Only his satire seemed to correspond to a world armed with 
chemical weapons. In his essay “Karl Kraus” (1931), Benjamin wrote that
the great type of the satirist never had firmer ground under his 
feet than amid a generation about to mount tanks and put on gas 
masks, a mankind that has run out of tears but not of laughter. In 
him civilization prepares to survive, if it must, and communicates 
with him in the true mystery of satire, which consists in the devour-
ing of the adversary. (448)
Traditional satire, with its reliance on shared ideals, would not survive 
the age of chemical warfare. Like Tucholsky or any other satirist, Kraus 
might have started out as an offended idealist but he made, as Benjamin 
argued, a decisive next step.
Kraus transformed into what Benjamin called the Unmensch, the inhu-
man or as the English translation prefers, the “monster” (447–57). As an 
inhuman, Kraus abandoned all expectation that satire should function as 
a societal safety valve. Rather than seeking to reform civil society, Benja-
min’s great satirist turned toward its relentless destruction:
All the martial energies of this man are innate civic virtues; only in 
the melee did they take on their combative aspect. But already no 
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one recognizes them any more; no one can grasp the necessity that 
compelled this great bourgeois character to become a comedian, 
this guardian of Goethian linguistic values a polemicist, or why this 
irreproachably honorable man went berserk. This, however, was 
bound to happen, since he thought fit to change the world by be-
ginning with his own class, in his own home, in Vienna. And when, 
admitting to himself the futility of his enterprise, he abruptly broke 
it off, he placed the matter back in the hands of nature—this time 
destructive not creative nature. (455)
Benjamin’s great satirist gains firm ground by executing a program of un-
relenting destruction, and the ground remains firm as long as the satirist 
runs berserk on it.22 It is therefore significant that Benjamin declared he 
was staking out his own position in his analysis of Kraus’s satire. Benja-
min intended “to indicate the place where I stand and where I no longer 
collaborate” (Benjamin 1972–91, vol. 2, 1093).
Benjamin’s appropriation of destructive satire as his own ground is 
central and fateful for his theory of satire as well as his understanding of 
Germany’s political crises during the early 1930s. As conceived by Ben-
jamin, destructive satire no longer legitimized its attacks as measures to 
realize ideals that the wide majority of contemporaries were assumed to 
share. He legitimized its relentless destruction with a far higher (but much 
more allusive) authority. Kraus, the inhuman, is illuminated by no less 
than the light of creation. From this divine light the great satirist emerges 
as the inhuman.
But the actual Kraus is not fully congruent with the inhuman, the fig-
ure of destruction. To Benjamin, Kraus is not just divinely inhuman but 
also dangerously ambiguous. Parts of him and his satire are caught in the 
twilight of a demonic Vorwelt.
The dark background from which Kraus’s image detaches itself is 
not formed by his contemporaries, but is the primeval world [Vor-
welt], or the world of the demon. The light of the day of Creation 
falls on him—thus he emerges from this darkness. But not in all 
parts; others remain that are more deeply immersed in it than one 
suspects. (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 441)
Because of this light from above, Kraus, the inhuman, could take his place 
on the throne of judgment and attack opponents from his position of 
superiority. The ties to the demonic world, however, rendered important 
aspects of the Krausian satire suspect to Benjamin. His sharp distinc-
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tion between Kraus, the demon, and Kraus, the inhuman, will demarcate 
as well critical differences between Canetti’s and Benjamin’s versions of 
destructive satire. While Benjamin distanced himself from these de monic 
qualities of the Krausian satire but sided with the inhuman, Canetti 
would move away from the inhuman—as we will see below and if one 
accepts for the moment Benjamin’s terminology—but adopt the demonic 
practices of Kraus’s destructive satire.
With his separation of demonic and inhuman elements in Kraus’s 
satire, Benjamin remains tied to traditional satire’s presumption of a 
higher justification for its existence. Since no one, as Benjamin writes, 
could still recognize the formerly trusted ideals in Kraus’s work of de-
struction (and who would dare to make the claim of perceiving the light 
of creation?), his assertion of divine legitimation provides anything but 
a stable foundation. Only because he postulates, however, the divine 
illumination of the great satirist can Benjamin be confident that the 
inhuman quality of destructive satire clears the way and leads “concrete 
humanity [reales Menschentum] to victory” (448). In Kraus, the inhu-
man, Benjamin meets “the messenger of a more real humanism” (456), 
of a humanism of destruction and not creation. Charting the destructive 
qualities of satire, Benjamin’s theory transgresses the limits of traditional 
and Marxist humanism, the source of his terminology. By endorsing 
the model of a “humanity that proves itself by destruction” (456) and 
by dismissing those who fetishize creative existence, Benjamin inverts 
the traditional relationship between creativity and destruction. From 
Kraus’s cannibalistic satire to Brecht’s poetry, Benjamin searched for 
writers with an “iron jaw,” strong enough to chew up everything that 
exists (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 4, 230). In his “Commentary on Po-
ems by Brecht” (1939), he applauded authors who took a perspective 
from which the “world is immensely simplified if it is tested less for the 
enjoyment it gives than for the destruction it deserves” (230). What 
remains for these destructive characters and for Benjamin is the disci-
pline of destruction.23
As Derrida argued in his analysis of Benjamin’s Critique of Violence 
(1921), such advocacy of radical destruction approximates the celebra-
tion of violence by right-wing writers from Jünger to Schmitt (Derrida 
1990). Benjamin’s contemplation of destruction draws, of course, on a 
different tradition than these militant nationalists. But the position from 
where Benjamin believed that the destruction could be overseen and le-
gitimized, the standpoint of redemption, had itself become “the utterly 
impossible thing,” as Adorno said at the end of Minima Moralia (Adorno 
1978, 247).24 With regard to his advocacy of destruction, one could turn 
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Benjamin’s argument against the new German satirists against him as 
well. Benjamin’s conception of destruction lost contact with political re-
ality and moved beyond all concrete politics. But this was Benjamin’s own 
point: no other firm ground is available but the one of destruction.
The impasse of Benjamin’s theory of satire and of his advocacy of po-
litical violence stems from his decision to sever entirely its ties to higher 
powers and ideals. This decision is reflected in his distinction between 
demonic and inhuman elements of Kraus’s satire. In Kraus, the inhuman 
illuminated by divine light, Benjamin courted a potential ally on the po-
litical battlefield, a warrior clad in armor and equipped with weapons 
able to annihilate his political enemies. How much Benjamin set his hopes 
on the inhuman (and how much he feared the demon) became obvious 
when Kraus supported the authoritarian Dollfuß regime in 1934. Ben-
jamin judged Kraus’s exercise in realpolitik as an unexpected fall and a 
profound betrayal: “Who is actually left who can still give in? A bitter 
comfort; but there will be no other casualty on this front even worth 
mentioning in the same breath as this one” (1994, 458). At this moment, 
Benjamin’s construction of the great satirist as the last man standing tall, 
as a monumental figure, a “Kriegerdenkmal,” collapsed.25 Not surpris-
ingly, Benjamin blamed the betrayal on Kraus, the demon. In a letter to 
Werner Kraft he returned to the typology of his major essay on Kraus. 
“The demon has been stronger than the person [Mensch] or the nonper-
son [Unmensch]: he was unable to remain silent thus he discovered the 
downfall of the demon—in self-betrayal” (458).
What then are these qualities of the demon? In contrast to the inhu-
man, the demon required no firm ground of ideals; he belonged in Ben-
jamin’s account to the swamp of the Vorwelt. Rather than judging and 
a destroying its targets from above and the outside as the inhuman did, 
Kraus, the demon, attacked from within. In the twilight of the demonic 
world, a world lacking the clarity of the day of creation, everything is 
dangerously in flux. Such flux includes the blurring of sharp distinctions 
between the satirist and his targets. This world of ambiguity is inhabited 
by Kraus, the mimetic genius, the impersonator of countless voices, who 
is being possessed by a demon. As a demonic actor, Kraus transformed 
himself into his satirical targets, or as Benjamin describes it, “the expo-
sure of inauthenticity [. . .] is here performed behavioristically” (Benja-
min 1996–2003, vol. 2, 443). Instead of fighting openly and in direct 
confrontation like the inhuman, the demonic Kraus crawled like a worm 
inside his opponents. Benjamin perceived this slithering and penetrating 
movement as the lowliest and most ambiguous aspect of Kraus, the de-
mon: “‘To creep’—this is the term used, not without cause, for the lowest 
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kind of flattery; and Kraus creeps into those he impersonates, in order to 
annihilate them” (442). Benjamin abhorred Kraus’s demonic way of de-
stroying from the inside so passionately that he described these mimetic 
attacks sometimes as if they were performed not from the inside but the 
outside: “[Kraus] imitates his subjects in order to insert the crowbar of his 
hate into the finest joints of their posture. This quibbler [Silbenstecher], 
probing between syllables, digs out the larvae that nest there in clumps” 
(442, my emphasis). But the demon relinquishes the outside and the pros-
pect of a stable locus of certainty—be it the seemingly universal ideals of 
the traditional satirists or the divine light that illuminated the inhuman. 
In his demonic satire Kraus nests inside the foe’s soft body: “in this zone, 
too, ambiguity, the demon, is manifest: self-expression and unmasking 
merge in it as self-unmasking” (441). The demon keeps full control of its 
malleable self and destroys its opponents only after having first become 
just like them.
Like Benjamin, Elias Canetti expected in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
that only a great satirist could prepare a catastrophic imagination for an 
age of weapons of mass destruction. And in further agreement with Ben-
jamin, Canetti’s portrait of Kraus is just as split and divided. He praised 
Kraus as “the greatest satirist of the German language” (Canetti 2005a, 
115) and denounced him as “the most sublime literary murderer” (Har-
tung 1992, 6). When Kraus sided in 1934 with a lesser evil, the authori-
tarian Dollfuß regime, to prevent a greater evil, Austria’s Anschluβ to the 
Third Reich, Canetti was just as shocked and disappointed as Benjamin 
(Hanuschek 2005, 219–21). In a letter to George Canetti, his brother, 
he denounced Kraus the same year as “something like a Hitler for in-
tellectuals” (Canetti 2009, 19). Just like the politician Hitler, Kraus, the 
satirist, had been able “to mold” his audience into “a mass of believers” 
(19). Although facetious and disproportionate the comparison expresses 
the depth of Canetti’s frustration with Kraus’s new politics.26 But Kraus’s 
fall in 1934 did not change Canetti’s appreciation, for Kraus, the satirist, 
would remain his most important literary influence.
Canetti’s divided judgment on Kraus could be traced back to Ben-
jamin’s figures of the inhuman and the demon. Only Canetti admired 
Kraus, the demonic impersonator, and came to reject Kraus, the inhuman 
executioner. But the relation between Benjamin’s and Canetti’s evalua-
tions of Kraus and their concepts of satire is more complicated than a 
mere reversal of preference between the inhuman and the demon. To 
grasp Canetti’s concept of destructive satire one would have to add a 
third of Benjamin’s sharply distinguished figures, the storyteller. In Ben-
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jamin’s writings the storyteller and the great satirist are placed in strict 
chronological sequence. After the war the storyteller disappeared while 
the great satirist fully emerged. The storyteller was an integral part of 
tradition, communicating experience from one generation to the next. 
According to Benjamin’s account, the war broke this chain of commu-
nication, and the great satirist was tasked with the destruction of its last 
remnants, the last remnants of tradition.
In Canetti’s account, the relation between the great satirist and the 
storyteller is more complex and lacks Benjamin’s neat chronological 
sequence. In 1936, the year of Benjamin’s storyteller essay, Canetti ad-
dressed in his speech on Broch the question of war, experience, and tra-
dition. Are traditional works of art and literature still up to the task of 
communicating experience in the age of man-made mass death? At first, 
Canetti seems to share Benjamin’s doubts that past experiences could pre-
pare anyone for the new risk situation.
The man in the street feels, all in all, more horror for the remote 
Middle Ages than for the World War, which he has experienced per-
sonally. One can sum up this insight in a single shattering sentence: 
Today it would be harder to condemn one man publicly to be burnt 
at the stake than to unleash a world war. (Canetti 1979, 12–13)
For centuries public burnings have been represented in art and literature. 
The horrors of such executions became a vivid part of the public imagi-
nation. And cinema, the new mass medium that demonstrated so little 
interest in anticipating future warfare, produced after the war a series of 
important films with public burnings at their center, from Murnau’s Faust 
(1926) and Lang’s Metropolis (1927) to Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of 
Arc (1928) and Day of Wrath (1943). As masterful as each of these films 
remains, these representations of early modern forms of violence offered 
little preparation for the risks and dangers of modern warfare. In his 
speech on Broch, Canetti urged that “people are defenseless only when 
they have no experience or memory. New dangers may loom as vast as 
they like, but people will be only poorly and at most outwardly prepared” 
(13). Art and literature had the task, Canetti insisted, of creating works of 
memory that communicate the threat of these new dangers. And in 1936 
Canetti considered chemical weapons as “the greatest of all dangers ever 
to emerge in the history of mankind” because they exposed “the defense-
lessness of breathing” (13).
Unlike Benjamin, Canetti did not interpret such crises of experience 
and memory as evidence for tradition’s complete breakdown. He steered 
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clear from declaring all prewar representations of violence as irrelevant 
to the task of imagining and experiencing the imminent risks of modern 
warfare. While writing Auto-da-Fé in 1930, Canetti surrounded himself 
with reproductions of Grünewald’s Isenheim Altar, an artwork he consid-
ered as a “reminder of the dreadful things that people do to one another” 
(Canetti 1982, 230). Grünewald’s gruesome depiction of Christ’s dead 
body remained effective because of the recent war experience: “Back then 
. . . war and gassings were still close enough to make the painting cred-
ible” (230). And just as the experience of the world war could lend credi-
bility to a sixteenth-century painting, so new works of art could create 
a memory of this world war that might help to deter the unleashing of 
another world war.
In contrast to Benjamin, Canetti never perceived a complete break in 
the history of experience, a break that would render the task of story-
telling impossible. Like Benjamin, he noted the marginalization of tradi-
tional storytellers in modern society, but never drew the conclusion that 
therefore an end of communicable experience and of storytelling had to 
be assumed. Listening to the storytellers in Marrakesh’s markets in 1954, 
Canetti acknowledged them as his “elder and better brothers” and not as 
remnants of an irretrievable past (Canetti 1995, 65). Their tales and sto-
ries of ancient times retain for him the potential of becoming once more 
critical for an understanding of the present. In Crowds and Power (1960), 
Canetti collected his own canon of stories and drew on them as indis-
pensable sources to understand the destructions of the twentieth century. 
Most of these stories are distinctly premodern: myths from all continents; 
historical narratives by Thucydides, Plutarch, Burckhardt, and Lefebvre; 
medieval travelogues from Africa and Asia written by Arabian and Euro-
pean explorers. Quoting them frequently in their entirety, Canetti demon-
strates reverence for these often astonishing stories.
But the way Canetti employs these stories in his work is different from 
traditional storytelling as Benjamin had described it. Ranging from nar-
ratives of the self-destruction of the Xosa to moments from the secret 
history of the Mongols, Canetti’s selection of stories does not depend on 
Hebel’s (and Benjamin’s) bekanntlich. These stories and Canetti’s audi-
ence were never embedded in the same cultural-historical tradition. No 
unbroken generational chain ever connected them. In Crowds and Power, 
Canetti replaces the familiarity of traditional lore with strange and un-
known tales from all around the globe. One could argue that the opening 
paragraph of Crowds and Power formulates not only Canetti’s anthropo-
logical premise but also a core principle of his poetics:
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There is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the un-
known. He wants to see what is reaching towards him, and to be 
able to recognize or at least classify it. Man always tends to avoid 
physical contact with anything strange. In the dark, the fear of an 
unexpected touch can mount to panic. Even clothes give insufficient 
security: it is easy to tear them and pierce through to the naked, 
smooth, defenseless flesh of the victim. (1984, 15)
By touching his readers with the unknown and the unexpected of these 
strange stories, Canetti confronts his audience with common but usually 
hidden and unwelcome phenomena: particularly the human desire to sur-
vive others at all costs.
Several of these narratives are so outrageous, that one might prefer to 
read them as tales of the barbaric other and to refuse to recognize the 
similar in the unfamiliar. But as Canetti writes toward the end of Crowds 
and Power, even though stories of African kings seem
so strange and unfamiliar that one is at first tempted to dismiss 
them as exotic curiosities, or, if one lingers over accounts of them 
such as those which follow, to give way to a feeling of superiority. 
But one is well advised to show a little patience and humility and 
wait until one knows more about them. It is not for a European of 
the twentieth century to regard himself above savagery. His despots 
may use more effective means, but their ends often differ in nothing 
from those of these African Kings. (1984, 411)
Canetti analyzes twentieth-century mass violence indirectly through these 
most obscure, exotic, and extreme stories. He presents these stories nei-
ther as depictions of the barbaric other nor does Crowds and Power argue 
that the devastations of the two world wars and the Holocaust should be 
understood as modernity’s atavistic aberrations. Instead of starting from 
the assumption of a shared tradition, Hebel’s and Benjamin’s bekanntlich, 
Canetti inverts the direction of recognition. He begins his analysis with 
sudden encounters of the strange and unknown and then demonstrates 
how uncomfortably familiar these stories become to their Western mod-
ern audience.
Just as Canetti posited no clear break between past storytelling and the 
understanding of modern violence so he discerned for modernist litera-
ture no single unified approach to experience, memory, and the represen-
tation of looming catastrophes. Shortly after the Second World War, Ca-
netti discussed in a lecture three main proponents of European modernist 
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literature: Proust, Joyce, and Kafka. Instead of proposing a single rupture 
in the history of experience after the First World War, Canetti mapped 
out the variance of modernism’s relations toward past, present, and fu-
ture. Proust created, according to Canetti, a science of his own memory. 
Thanks to his practice of “subjective memory,” Proust became an “intel-
lectual master of the past,” who discovered a unique way of “dealing with 
the past as a whole” (Canetti 2005a, 10). A different concept of time and 
experience is at work in Joyce’s Ulysses. His novel displays less interest 
in the past or future but is preoccupied with the present, with “a simulta-
neity as though nothing before or afterwards mattered” (11). In Kafka’s 
writings, Canetti discovered a third paradigmatic approach to time and 
experience in modernism, one focused on the future, on future destruc-
tions. In the same way that Proust’s writings turned toward the past and 
Joyce’s to the present, so Kafka’s writings became to Canetti attempts to 
feel and imagine looming catastrophes.
With such divergent approaches to time, experience, and memory in 
modernist literature, Canetti did not doubt that works of memory could 
be created to communicate the threat that the new weapons of the last 
war came to pose from now on to anyone’s survival. Canetti turned to 
Kraus and his destructive satire not to destroy the last remnants of tradi-
tion, as Benjamin had proposed, but because he found in Kraus’s satire 
the most successful attempt to create a full memory of the war. From 
Canetti’s point of view, the great satirist continued the work of the story-
teller. Searching for a destructive force that would hold up to war, for “a 
hatred befitting even the world war,” Canetti discovered Kraus’s The Last 
Days of Mankind (Canetti 1979, 217).
There was not one voice that he did not hear, he was possessed 
with every specific timbre of the war and rendered it compellingly.  
[. . .] The world war entered The Last Days of Mankind completely, 
unsparingly, uncomfortingly, without embellishment, without re-
duction, and above all and most important, without habituation 
[Gewöhnung]. Whatever was repeated in that play remained hor-
rifying through every single repetition. (217)
The play succeeded for Canetti where other accounts had failed: it created 
the most accurate memory of the war and the new risk potentials this 
war had released. Kraus’s satire afforded its readers the unique opportu-
nity to encounter the unfamiliarity of the war’s terrors. To read Kraus’s 
play could provoke an experience of angst that Canetti deemed necessary 
for any attempt to prevent another war. The memory of the war gained 
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shape and constancy in Kraus’s play. In his satire the war became and 
remained “unforgettable,” and its readers might have become more per-
ceptive and therefore less defenseless against the new threats of modern 
warfare (217).
Kraus proved to Canetti that satire could create representations that 
were befitting even a world war. But based on his experiences as one of 
Kraus’s disciples, Canetti could not follow Kraus’s model of satire. He 
had to separate, to use Benjamin’s terminology, the inhuman elements 
from the demonic ones and to develop his own version of a destructive 
satire. After attending in April 1924 a first public reading, Canetti turned 
into a fervent Kraus admirer (Hanuschek 2005, 107). For five years he 
attended these spectacles of satirical mock trials and executions, and be-
came part of Kraus’s baiting crowd. Kraus acted as infallible judge and 
executioner and taught Canetti what it meant to be a great satirist. For 
Canetti, Kraus turned out to be “the greatest German satirist, the only 
one in the literature of this language whom one has the right to name 
next to Aristophanes, Juvenal, Quevedo, Swift, and Gogol” (Canetti 
1979, 216). These exceptional satirists shared the one ingredient that 
lesser ones lacked: “a very definite kind of substance, which I would 
simply call ‘murderous’” (216). This murderous substance enabled the 
lethal aspects that Benjamin detected in Kraus, the inhuman, who runs 
berserk and does the work of destruction, giving rise to Benjamin’s hope 
that Kraus would be an irresistible and irreplaceable ally on the cultural 
and political battlefields. These great satirists, Canetti writes, “attack 
whole groups of people, but also individuals, with a hatred that would 
otherwise—i.e., if they were not capable of writing—lead to murder” 
(216). Throughout his life, Canetti kept Kraus in highest esteem as a 
satirist. In his address during the Nobel Prize awards ceremony, he 
named Kraus as one of three writers who influenced him and should 
have received the award if were they still alive. But as the only great 
satirist whom he observed firsthand, Kraus also taught Canetti how his 
destructive satire had to be different.
Benjamin rejected Kraus, the demon, who lives in the twilight of ambi-
guity, always ready to creep inside his opponents to destroy them by be-
coming their precise copies. This demonic Kraus, the malleable performer 
who could render every voice compellingly, remained, however, the central 
influence on Canetti’s writings. Canetti came to reject Kraus, the inhuman, 
the satirist who gains firm ground as the last man standing, the judge and 
executioner who rules from a position of absolute certainty, after having 
lived for five years under his undisputed rule. His “experience with that 
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dictatorship,” Canetti writes in one of his essays on Kraus, “has forever ru-
ined for me the deplorable custom of accusing others” (Canetti 1979, 38).
Canetti’s satire, as it is most pronounced in his plays and particularly 
in his novel Auto-da-Fé (written 1930–31, published 1935), transforms 
the murderous substance into a destructive one. It targets not public fig-
ures, as Kraus did, but rigid patterns of perception, from racist stereo-
types to prejudices of class, gender, and education. In Canetti’s version, 
the figure of the satirist as infallible executioner no longer has a central 
position inside of the text. The distance to Kraus’s and Benjamin’s model 
of the great satirist could not be greater. Turning to satirical writing, Ca-
netti eliminates the figure of the traditional satirist, who assumed the firm 
ground of his community’s shared ideals, and the great satirist, whose 
ground remained firm only as long as he ran berserk and issued his death 
sentences. Canetti’s response to the postwar crisis of experience and per-
ception, a crisis for which the imperceptible threat of gas warfare became 
emblematic, was not a search for one last secure position from which to 
issue satirical missives against a disintegrating world or to offer direct 
representations of looming catastrophes. Instead, Canetti’s satire seeks a 
different form of storytelling, a different form of communicating experi-
ence, one that attempts to expose to its readers their own rigid forms of 
perception and, hopefully, destroy them.
To Canetti, no light of creation, no standpoint of redemption was ac-
cessible. Satire should not assume an extraterrestrial position, as in Käst-
ner’s poem The Last Chapter, or dedicate itself to an imaginary Mar-
tian theater, like Kraus’s play. Canetti’s destructive satire stays inside the 
world, every breath exposed to the risk of a poison gas attack, a world 
without safety zones. Satire should no longer address the world from the 
perspective of a judging satirist or an all-seeing narrator.
The world should not be depicted as in earlier novels, from one 
writer’s standpoint as it were; the world had crumbled, and only if 
one had the courage to show it in its crumbled state could one pos-
sibly offer an authentic conception of it. (Canetti 1979, 210)
Starting on his novelistic project in fall 1929, Canetti realized that repre-
senting a disintegrating world required—to use Benjamin’s terminology 
one last time—a demon and not an inhuman, and a storytelling that finds 
new forms to communicate experience. The ability of Benjamin’s story-
teller to share experiences in direct communication with others has no 
place in Auto-da-Fé. But stories are told nonetheless in ways that affect 
the novel’s reader.
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Canetti’s new structure of a destructive satire can be best understood 
if one first analyzes the protagonist of Canetti’s novel, Peter Kien, as 
a satire on storytelling that seeks to communicate experience in direct 
communication. The narrative structure of Auto-da-Fé will be analyzed 
in a second step to demonstrate how especially its demonic aspects 
convey experience in indirect and violent communication to the reader. 
In 1929, Canetti set out to write eight novels, a Human Comedy of 
Madmen (206). Each novel would present the inner perspective of an 
extreme figure: a religious fanatic, a technological visionary, a book-
man, an enemy of death, a collector, a cosmic man, a truth seeker, and 
a spendthrift.
A writer had to invent extreme individuals with the most rigorous 
consistency, like the individuals the world consisted of, and he had 
to place these extreme individuals next to one another in their sep-
arateness. (Canetti 1979, 210)
For a year, Canetti made notes for each of these radically different indi-
vidual worlds, eight separate spotlights that were meant to shed light on 
a rapidly disintegrating world. After one year, Canetti focused solely on 
the bookman, Peter Kien, as the protagonist of Auto-da-Fé would eventu-
ally be called.
Canetti created Peter Kien through his stance toward tradition, as 
someone to whom his “connection to books was far more important than 
he himself” (Canetti 1979, 203). Spiritually and even physically, Kien lives 
inside the Western and Eastern traditions. He has rebuilt his apartment 
on the top floor of 24 Ehrlich Strasse into a library, the “most important 
library in the whole of this great city.”27 Having total recall of every book 
he ever read, Kien carries a precise replica, a “Kopfbibliothek,” in his 
mind (A 20, B 18). Hebel’s bekanntlich would be an accurate description 
for Kien’s relation to major cultural traditions of world history. Equally 
well versed in Greek, Latin, French, German, and Japanese cultures, the 
forty-year-old Kien claims particular expertise in Chinese history, litera-
ture, and philosophy. When in need of advice in his private affairs, the 
world’s foremost sinologist summons the spirits of wise masters of the 
past, and speaks face to face with Confucius, Gautama Buddha, or Im-
manuel Kant (A 46, 95). The knowledge of the past is anything but past 
for Kien.
But Kien’s perfect recall of past wisdom is no help when it comes 
to making decisions in the present. His disastrous decision to marry 
his housekeeper, the event that sets his downfall in motion, was the re-
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sult of a conversation with “Confucius, The Matchmaker,” (A 36–48). 
A ghostly Confucius appears in his library, answers Kien with several 
well-known quotes, and Kien applies them to his present quandary on 
how to deal with Therese Krumbholz. When Confucius quotes from 
Analects, “To err without making amendment is to err indeed. If you 
have erred, be not ashamed to make the fault good,” Kien knows ex-
actly what Confucius had in mind 2,500 years ago (A 47). He has to 
marry the housekeeper.
It shall be made good, cried Kien. I will give her back her eight 
lost years! I will marry her! She is the heaven-sent instrument for 
preserving my library. If there is a fire I can trust in her. Had I con-
structed a human being according to my own designs, the result 
could not have been more apt for the purpose. (A 47)
Kien’s direct communication with tradition leads to disastrous advice. 
(And if Kien, whom Canetti named Kant in the novel’s manuscript, would 
have recognized the Kant reference in Therese’s family name, he might 
have remembered that the crooked timber of humanity was not the mate-
rial to carry out impeccable designs and blueprints.)28
Soon after the wedding Kien knows what a mistake he made and 
wants to marshal the forces of tradition—all the voices in his library—
to defend his home against the wife and enemy Therese Krumbholz. But 
the moment he hopes to mobilize the voices of tradition with a rousing 
speech, Kien learns that they will not follow his command into battle. 
Pacifists like Buddha irritate him with “the pinprick of their silence” 
(A 95), the French section of his library mocks his absurd figure, the 
English are willing to go to war but object to his sympathies for the 
Chinese: “Why had he taken the word for the day from the speech of 
a coloured race?” (A 97). German philosophers have only a few objec-
tions for going to war but their internal strife renders them useless for 
his army.
Schopenhauer announced his will to live. Posthumously he lusted 
for this worst of all worlds. In any case he positively refused to fight 
shoulder to shoulder with Hegel. Schelling raked up his old accusa-
tions and asserted the identity of Hegel’s teachings with his own, 
which were the older. Fichte cried heroically, “I am I!” Immanuel 
Kant stood forth, more categorically than in his lifetime, for Eter-
nal Peace. Nietzsche declaimed all his many personalities, Dionysus 
anti-Wagner, Antichrist and Savior. Others hurried into the breach 
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and made use of this moment, even of this critical moment, to pro-
claim how much they had been neglected. At long last Kien turned 
his back on the fantastic inferno of German philosophy. (A 96)
An exhausted Kien can marshal the voices of tradition only by silencing 
them and stripping them of all individuality. After he turned them all 
around on their shelves, spines to the wall, they finally have the unifor-
mity of an army.
Even though Kien is deeply embedded in philosophical and literary 
traditions, Auto-da-Fé presents Kien as a precise opposite to Benjamin’s 
storyteller. Although he is a comprehensive repository of stories and 
philosophies, he rarely understands their meaning. Unlike Benjamin’s 
storyteller, Kien spurns any direct contact with his contemporaries. To 
house all of his twenty-five thousand books, he walled up the windows 
in his apartment. Thanks to this remodeling, Kien gained a fourth wall 
space in each room for his bookshelves and something even more im-
portant: “The temptation to watch what went on in the street—an im-
moral and time-wasting habit—disappeared with the side windows” (A 
23). Just as he avoids as much as possible the distractions of city life so 
he shuns the social networking of professional gatherings. Always the 
first to be nominated as keynote speaker, Kien rejects regularly all invi-
tations to conferences. Instead of communicating directly with people, 
he seeks the undisturbed solitude of work and silence: “The greatest 
danger which threatens a man of learning is to lose himself in talk. 
Kien preferred to express himself in the written rather than the spoken 
word” (A 17). Rather than meeting other scholars, he writes to a se-
lect few of them. In his letters and articles he disseminates irrefutable 
knowledge but not wisdom or advice. Besides replacing wisdom with 
information and the spoken with the written word, Kien goes to even 
greater length to live his life as an antithesis to Benjamin’s storyteller.
Carefully regulating his daily life, Kien seeks to avoid all personal expe-
riences, the very source of a storyteller’s stories (Benjamin 1996–2003, 
vol. 2, 162). Early every morning, he takes his only walk, usually to look 
at the bookstore displays. Should anything happen by accident during 
these walks, Kien conceived of an ingenious method to forget such per-
sonal experiences immediately. He jots down any eventful experience 
in a special notebook, entitled Stupidities: “Everything he would have 
preferred to forget he put down in this book” (A 21). Once recorded 
the personal experience is forgotten. Kien’s mastery at preventing or 
eliminating personal experiences is equaled only by his ability to repro-
duce scholarly information. Consequently, he is not praised as a genius 
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of Erinnerung, like the storyteller, but as a genius of Gedächtnis. Kien 
cites with unfailing accuracy from the library he carries in his head: “He 
could not remember any single occasion on which his memory had been 
found at fault” (A 20).
Ensconced in his library, Kien seeks protection from personal experi-
ences because he fears they would threaten the unity and solidity of his 
self. He fears the malleability of the self even more than Musil’s young 
Törless. Any contact with the world bears the risk of dissolving the 
self’s precious unity. Even the confines of the library are not entirely 
safe. Although Kien acknowledges literary fiction as an integral part of 
mankind’s cultural heritage, its seductive pleasures exert corrosive pow-
ers on readers. He warns that novels “undermine the finest characters” 
(A 42):
[Novels] teach us to think ourselves into other men’s places. Thus 
we acquire a taste for change. The personality becomes dissolved in 
pleasing figments of imagination. The reader learns to understand 
every point of view. (A 42)
By identifying themselves with fictional characters, by learning to view 
reality from a variety of perspectives, readers transform themselves, as 
Kien fears, momentarily into others. Fiction teaches metamorphosis, and 
once a taste for variability is acquired the previously unified self discovers 
its malleability. Kien is horrified by malleable selves that welcome their 
transformative powers and change perspectives without fear.
As if echoing Benjamin’s warnings against the demonic Kraus, Kien 
fears that readers of fiction creep inside of these fictional identities. Even 
the metaphors Kien uses to describe the novelist’s method resemble those 
of Benjamin. The novelist’s wedge has the same function as the satirist’s 
crowbar.
Novels are so many wedges which the novelist, an actor with his 
pen, inserts into the closed personality of the reader. The better he 
calculates the size and the wedge and the strength of the resistance, 
so much the more completely does he crack open the personality of 
his victim. Novels should be prohibited by the State. (A 42)
While attacking the dangerous temptations offered by all fiction, Kien 
offers a first insight into the workings of Canetti’s destructive satire. But 
while all fiction invites the reader to perceive human relations from posi-
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tions that are not his or her own, destructive satire follows its own meth-
ods to crack open the personality of its readers, to rephrase Kien.
Any reader of Crowds and Power is well aware how vital the con-
cept of transformation is to Canetti’s poetics and anthropology (Canetti 
1984, 337–84). In his speech “The Writer’s Profession” (1976), Canetti 
defined the writer famously as the “keeper of metamorphoses” [Hüter der 
Verwandlungen] (Canetti 1979, 241). He is such a keeper in a twofold 
sense. A writer makes mankind’s literary heritage his own, a heritage rich 
in metamorphoses. With his knowledge of the literatures of the world, 
Peter Kien could be a keeper of metamorphoses. But the second sense of 
Canetti’s definition stands in direct opposition to Kien’s denunciation of 
novelists. The writer, Canetti demands,
should be able to become anybody and everybody, even the small-
est, the most naïve, the most powerless person. His desire for ex-
periencing others from the inside should never be determined by 
the goals of which our normal, virtually official life consists; that 
desire has to be totally free of any aim at success or prestige, it 
has to be passion in itself, the passion of metamorphosis. (Canetti 
1979, 242)
As the titles of two influential scholarly collections of essays indicate, 
it has become customary to refer to Canetti as the Hüter der Verwand-
lungen, the keeper of metamorphoses (1985), and to read his oeuvre as an 
Invitation to Transformation (Krüger 1995). Most likely Canetti already 
had a positive concept of the malleable self, of a self that lives the pas-
sion of metamorphosis, while writing Auto-da-Fé in 1930–31. But read-
ing Auto-da-Fé is a rather painful experience and nothing like accepting 
a benign invitation to transformation.
Canetti’s destructive satire is linked to the concepts of transformation 
and the malleable self. But it forces its readers to undergo transforma-
tions that are meant to break open rigid patterns of perception in its 
audience. Canetti developed the structure of his destructive satire while 
drafting the volumes for his Human Comedy of Madmen but pushed 
it even further once he started focusing on his sole novel, Auto-da-Fé. 
While one extreme figure was supposed to stand at the center of each 
novel, the protagonist of Auto-da-Fé is now joined by a whole cast of 
excessive characters, all living in their own worlds. Among them are 
Therese Krumbholz, Kien’s housekeeper in a blue starched skirt, his fu-
ture wife and nemesis; the greedy humpbacked dwarf Siegfried Fischer, 
a grotesque embodiment of antisemitic stereotypes; the murderous care-
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taker Benedikt Pfaff, who assaults beggars, killed his wife, and sexually 
abused his daughter; and Kien’s brother, George, the famous Parisian 
psychiatrist who envies the rich worlds of his delusional patients. Even 
smaller parts are embodied by extreme figures like Jean, the former vil-
lage blacksmith who forever searches for his wife Jeanne; or Johann 
Schwer, Siegfried Fischer’s blind and brutal murderer; or even Mr. Gross, 
the frightfully insecure owner of a furniture store. All of them are “live 
one-man rockets,” as Canetti once wrote, that either fly by or, more of-
ten, crash into each other with fatal consequences for everyone involved 
(Canetti 1982, 323). Such an accident-prone dynamic pushes the innova-
tive radicalism of Auto-da-Fé far beyond the initials plans for Canetti’s 
Human Comedy of Madmen. Its eight novels were conceived as “eight 
spotlights to illuminate the world from the outside” (Canetti 1979, 210). 
The figures in Auto-da-Fé lack the stability and perspective of such firm-
ly positioned spotlights. Instead of viewing the world from a single posi-
tion, Canetti’s novel disorients its readers with its many characters who 
point their flashlights in as many directions.
Avoiding a single unified narrative perspective, the novel is told from 
a multitude of narrow perspectives. Without establishing a hierarchy of 
reliability among these voices, the author Canetti followed the demonic 
principle of his destructive satire and transformed himself while writing 
into each of these characters.
I had accustomed myself to moving simultaneously and leaping 
about in various worlds that had nothing in common, that were 
separated from one another down to their last details, down to their 
languages. This benefited the consistent separation of the characters 
in Auto-da-Fé. What was earlier the separation between novels now 
became the separations within a single book. (Canetti 1979, 211)
Leaping from figure to figure, Canetti stayed inside his characters, never 
leaving these strange inner worlds to assume a nonsubjective narrative 
position. Every character in Canetti’s novel—and his plays The Wed-
ding (1932) and Comedy of Vanities (1950, written 1933)—speaks and 
thinks in such unique ways that they can be known by their linguistic 
physiognomies. For each of them Canetti created an “acoustic mask” 
(Canetti 2005a, 138). These rigid patterns of speech and opinions allow 
the reader to recognize every figure of the novel’s cast even when the 
narrative provides no direct identification.
This perpetual movement between never fully reliable and always 
extreme perspectives made Auto-da-Fé a severe book, “ruthless towards 
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both myself and the reader” (Canetti 1979, 211). In an essay on his 
novel, Canetti described the strain he felt while writing Auto-da-Fé (Ca-
netti 1979, 203–13). But he does not explicate how the novel inflicts its 
particular cruelty on its readers. The descriptions of beatings, rape, and 
murder are certainly part of the novel’s cruelty toward the reader. But 
the novel’s particular destructive quality lies not in these representations 
of violence themselves but in the way Canetti’s novel communicates 
with its readers.
Auto-da-Fé does not offer its readers an invitation to transform but 
forces metamorphoses upon them. It is unlike any novel Peter Kien ever 
read and feared as a threat to the unified self. Kien hinted at a far-
reaching difference that separates Auto-da-Fé from other novels when 
he said that a reader’s “personality becomes dissolved in pleasing fig-
ments of imagination” (A 42). In the German original, Kien is more spe-
cific when he says “man löst sich in die Figuren auf, die einem gefallen” 
(Canetti 1994, 42). One dissolves into figures one likes. Auto-da-Fé’s 
bizarre collection of extreme and often repulsive individuals does not 
seduce its readers to transform into likable characters. But because of 
the absence of a narrator and the constant leaping between extreme 
points of view, the novel’s reader is left with frustratingly few means of 
orientation. Reading Auto-da-Fé is a cruel experience because it forces 
its readers to move inside the paranoid Kien, the murderous Pfaff, the 
deluded Therese Krumbholz, and so on. One has to perceive the world 
through their strange minds. Since the novel moves quickly and often 
unannounced from perspective to perspective, the reader has to follow 
just as quickly into one world after the other. To recognize these voices 
the reader has to share and inhabit the misogynist, antisemitic, para-
noid, or murderous distortions of Kien, Krumbholz, Pfaff, Fischer, and 
others.
In his essay on writing Auto-da-Fé, Canetti mentions but does not ex-
plain why his novel provides such an unpleasant reading experience. He 
came closest to an explanation in an interview with Friedrich Witz. In 
1968 Canetti accounted for the novel’s apparent cruelty as follows:
Possibly, this is what seems so cruel about the book, that I leave 
every figure completely in its world, adding nothing from the out-
side—there is really never anything there that exists outside of 
these characters, the author is never there, he never speaks, he never 
thinks, he disappears completely, he is neither below the figures nor 
above the figures, one can say, he is a victim here because he divided 
himself completely among them. (Canetti 2005a, 209)
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It might be somewhat disingenuous when an author declares himself a 
victim of his creation. For the reader, however, who is forced to repeat 
the author’s self-dismemberment among these characters, Canetti of-
fers a useful approach to the particular cruelty of Auto-da-Fé. Without 
such self-dismemberment the reader would be without orientation in-
side the novel’s crumbling world. Only when the reader duplicates the 
author’s transformations can he or she follow the novel’s twists and 
turns.
The novel’s first chapter provides an example of this added sense of 
disorientation. And typically for the novel’s sense of humor, the episode 
deals with a question of directions. During his early morning walk, Kien 
hears a man asking for the way to the Mut Strasse. Tightly secluded in 
his world of selective perception, Kien, and with him the reader, does not 
notice that the man has addressed him. In his thoughts Kien applauds an 
imaginary pedestrian for staying silent and refusing to give directions to 
the lost man. Knowing no higher praise, Kien considers this silent pedes-
trian as a man of character. Only once the increasingly aggravated ques-
tioner begins to hit Kien, does he (and with him the reader) realize that 
Kien had been asked for directions to the Mut Strasse.
The episode gains wider significance when Kien decides to consign 
this personal experience to oblivion and enters it into his book Stu-
pidities. This episode is the reader’s first and only occasion to compare 
Kien’s written observations with his inner experience of the event. Kien 
writes:
September 23rd, 7.45 a.m. In Mut Strasse a person crossed my path 
and asked me the way to Mut Strasse. In order not to put him 
to shame, I made no answer. He was not to be put off and asked 
again, several times; his bearing was courteous. Suddenly his eye 
fell upon the street sign. He became aware of his stupidity. Instead 
of withdrawing as fast as he could—as I should have done in his 
place—he gave way to the most unmeasured rage and abused me 
in the vulgarest fashion. Had I not spared him in the first place, I 
would have spared myself this painful scene. Which of us was the 
stupider? (A 21)
Kien views himself as an omniscient and empathetic observer. Instead 
of recording his initial failure to note that he had been asked for direc-
tions, Kien becomes in his written account a keen expert of human psy-
chology, someone who considers the feelings of embarrassment, shame, 
and anger of his fellow citizens who lack Kien’s superior intellectual and 
198 Chapter 5
observational competency. A comparison of the two versions of the Mut 
Strasse incident leaves the novel’s reader in a state of uncertainty. Kien’s 
written account could easily fit with everything the reader has learned 
in the novel about Kien, the superior mind of his generation. But the 
same reader knows firsthand that this account does not line up with 
Kien’s initial inner experience of the event. Should the reader no longer 
trust all previous claims for Kien’s unerring judgment? Is Kien really 
a world-renowned sinologist? The novel offers the reader no indepen-
dent perspective to decide which of these irreconcilable versions bears 
greater similarity to the actual event. In a satirical novel with a clear 
authorial presence, a novel like Heinrich Mann’s Professor Unrath, the 
reader observes from a position of epistemological safety the downfall 
of an absentminded professor. Canetti’s Auto-da-Fé differs because it 
leaves the reader in a frustrating state of uncertainty and disorientation. 
Just like the lost man searching for the Mut Strasse, the reader receives 
no helpful answers to his questions.
The effect of such sliding between unreliable focalizers in Auto-da-
Fé is one of “almost ubiquitous ambiguity” and, as David Darby notes, 
“undermines the authenticity of the information discoursed throughout 
the novel” (Darby 1992, 27). Voices seeming to have authorial authority 
are always in the process of becoming those of the novel’s crazed cast. 
The novel withholds from the reader any stable and reliable source of 
information and satirizes the desire for achieving certainty in the work of 
interpretation. And Kien is supposed to be renowned for authenticating 
and establishing the true meaning of texts.
Meticulously cautious, he weighed up the alternatives month after 
month, was slow to the point of exasperation; applying the severest 
standards to his own conclusions, he took no decision, on a single 
letter, a word or an entire sentence, until he was convinced it was 
unassailable. (A 17–18)
Kien’s colleagues accept his readings as “decisive and binding” (A 18). To 
do the same interpretative work for novel’s voices is, however, an impos-
sible task for any reader. The praise for Kien’s infallible judgment could 
belong to a narrator, authenticating its truth, or belong to a delusional 
Kien, indicating his losing grasp on reality.
Every reader has to confront a series of such breakdowns of commu-
nication in Auto-da-Fé (Hanuschek 2005, 233). None of the novel’s con-
versations lead to mutual understanding among its participants. Written 
shortly after the Auto-da-Fé’s publication in 1935, Canetti described in 
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a letter to his brother the inability to communicate as the novel’s central 
premise:
perhaps the most important thing about the book for me is the 
way the characters talk past each other. It may seem exaggerated 
sometimes, but that is only because old, bad novels have gotten us 
used to people understanding each other. That, however, is one of 
our silliest illusions. In reality, no one understands anyone else. It 
amounts to a miracle if once in a great while it happens after all. 
The nonstop mutual understanding that goes on in old-fashioned 
novels is kitsch. (Canetti 2009, 45)
The miracle of this novel of miscommunications is, however, something 
entirely different and something that has rarely been addressed: the 
novel’s lucidity. Despite the characters’ constant failures to understand 
each other, despite its lack of an authorial presence, despite the constant 
leaping in-between narrative perspectives, Auto-da-Fé enables its readers 
nonetheless to follow its storyline without all too many difficulties. Any-
one reading this analysis of Auto-da-Fé who never read the novel will be 
surprised the moment he or she opens the book.
After what has been said, one expects a chaotic novel, a book filled 
with ambiguities that leave its reader disoriented and caught in a whirl 
of strange voices. But Auto-da-Fé is an immensely readable and acces-
sible novel (as long as one does not equate readability with joyful enter-
tainment). The novel achieves this seeming paradox for three reasons: its 
careful structure, its brisk pacing, and because it found a replacement for 
traditional satire’s firm foundation, the ideals shared by the community of 
its readers. Auto-da-Fé replaces the assumption of a presence of universal 
(even if slumbering) ideals in every individual with its near opposite, a 
presence of stereotypes and other rigid patterns of perception.
Auto-da-Fé is structured as a tripartite novel. The titles of its three 
parts indicate closely knit interconnections: “A Head Without a World,” 
“Headless World,” and “The World in the Head.” The first part intro-
duces Peter Kien and his library and tells the story of his disastrous deci-
sion to marry the housekeeper Therese Krumbholz, a misogynist’s greedy, 
lusty, and almost illiterate nightmare. At the end of the first part Therese 
Krumbholz manages to take from Kien everything he valued: his silence, 
his apartment, his books, and the possibility of work. The novel’s second 
part follows the suddenly homeless Kien’s Odyssey through the city’s un-
derworld, with Kien accompanied by the grotesque figure of Siegfried 
Fischer, the delusional Sancho Panza to his Don Quixote. Thanks to the 
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sudden arrival of his brother Georges, a famed psychiatrist, Peter Kien 
is restored to his apartment and library in the novel’s third part. But de-
spite Georges’s certainty about having helped his brother, Kien’s paranoid 
delusions have progressed too far. Auto-da-Fé ends with the burning its 
English title promises. Peter Kien sets fire to his library, and when “the 
flames reached him at last, he laughed out loud, louder than he had ever 
laughed in all his life” (A 464).
The novel’s three-part structure and brisk plot, interrupted by equally 
fast-paced side stories, help to prevent a reading experience of chaotic 
disorientation. But it is the third, more intriguing reason for its lucidity 
that sets this novel apart. As mentioned before, the genre of satire relied 
traditionally on shared communal values and ideals. Even though the au-
dience might no longer live up to these ideals—and Aristophanes charac-
terized his age as the debased descendent of a better past—satirists were 
believed to rouse the dormant ideals in their readers. The satirist expected 
his audience to enjoy and sympathize with his attacks against corruption 
and depravity because he assumed that the ideals can always be called 
up in the minds of his audience. The Nörgler, “Kraus’s spokesperson” in 
The Last Days of Mankind, an ever grumbling critic of the Austrian war 
effort, presents himself as a figure meant for identification (Timms 2005, 
62). A reader is far more likely to side with him and his scathing judg-
ments than with his counterpart, the Optimist, or any other of the play’s 
characters.
The reader of Auto-da-Fé is no longer invited to sit with the satirist in 
judgment.29 Instead of facilitating an alliance between reader and judge-
satirist, Auto-da-Fé has excised such a superior position and any identifi-
able authorial presence from its pages. The novel compels its readers to 
transform momentarily into one of its extreme figures after the other. The 
former alliance between reader and satirist was based on shared ideals 
and values; the reader’s forced identification with Auto-da-Fé’s characters 
is based on shared stereotypes, prejudices, and other rigid patterns of 
perception. Auto-da-Fé presupposes the existence of a strong and steady 
compass in all of its readers that will guide them through all of its rapid 
and disorienting shifts in perspective. Because the reader shares to some 
degree all of the clichés and stereotypes of the novel’s figures, he or she 
never loses orientation completely. While former satirists roused the read-
er’s ideals, Canetti’s satire exposes the reader’s perceptual, ethical, and 
intellectual limitations.
Canetti’s destructive satire is insidious because the reader has to use 
these stereotypes as vital means to perceive and understand the novel’s 
separate worlds. Without them the reader would often not recognize the 
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novel’s voices. As William Donahue observed in his reading of Auto- 
da-Fé:
We must continually rehearse and deploy anti-Jewish, misogynistic, 
and other cliché and base conceptions just to read the novel. Per-
haps in so doing, we are unpleasantly reminded of the fact that, as 
Sander Gilman argues, we routinely employ such stereotypes in our 
everyday thinking. (Donahue 2001, 40)
Donahue’s insight into the novel’s use of stereotype has to be pushed well 
beyond the status of an unpleasant reminder. The clarity and cruelty of 
the reading experience stems from the fact that the reader proves to be all 
too capable of employing a wide variety of such base concepts and thus 
encounters little difficulty in leaping from one monstrous figure to the 
next without ever really getting lost in the novel’s storyline. The novel’s 
lucidity is directly linked to the reader’s capacity and readiness to employ 
a wide variety of elitist, anti-intellectual, misogynist, antisemitic concep-
tions and other stereotypes.
The aim of Canetti’s satire is not to preserve but to destroy its bi-
zarre epistemological foundation (or, at least, to expose its continued ex-
istence). In a world of imperceptible threats of mass destruction, Canetti’s 
destructive satire seeks to destroy patterns of perception that make it even 
less likely that the new risk situation will be recognized in its full cata-
strophic potential. But how could one measure whether Canetti’s satire 
fails or succeeds in its work of destruction? Close readings of the novel 
from Darby (1992) to Donahue (2001) have established the constant 
sliding between focalizers as well as the use of vicious stereotypes and 
clichés. The most fascinating demonstration of this sliding between focal-
izers, occurring sometimes even within a single sentence, is done by Ca-
netti himself. Listening to his performances of excerpts from Auto-da-Fé, 
particularly his reading of the chapter “The Kind Father,” one can hear 
the sudden shifts in narrative perspectives in his voice (Canetti 2005b). 
However, even if one would demonstrate that a reader could identify 
a particular figure by its use of prejudicial stereotypes, such a demon-
stration would not attest to a cruel and potentially destructive effect on 
the reader’s own dependence on stereotypes. Answering the question of 
whether Canetti’s destructive satire is effective seems to be beyond the 
limits of literary analysis. One can point to examples like François Bon-
dy’s response to Auto-da-Fé. He considered the novel an “extraordinarily 
unpleasant book; I think of it with great admiration and I never want 
to read it again” (cited in Hanuschek 2005, 229). Although Bondy is far 
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from alone in his reaction to Auto-da-Fé, even a large number of similar 
responses to the book would rise only to the level of anecdotal evidence.
The most persuasive strategy to test the novel’s destructive quality is to 
analyze not only the novel but also some of its most accomplished schol-
arly readings as well—not to collect general assessments of the novel or 
the reading experience but to establish where these interpretations exhibit 
patterns of resistance against Canetti’s destructive satire. Even among 
such expert readers two schemes can be detected for how readers shield 
themselves from the novel’s cruelty and its potentially destructive impact. 
The first and foremost strategy is to identify a safe authorial position in 
Canetti’s novel. Refusing to accept the absence of an authorial presence in 
Auto-da-Fé, one of the novel’s characters is established as Canetti’s reli-
able spokesperson. Once a safe and sane position of epistemological au-
thority is found in the novel’s universe, readers side with him or her and 
observe all the other figures from a seemingly secure distance. The second 
strategy concentrates on the role of pernicious clichés and base concep-
tions for understanding Auto-da-Fé. Such readings tend to deflect from 
the active presence of such stereotypes in the reader’s mind and accuse 
Canetti of affirming, reinforcing, and disseminating hateful prejudices. As 
I argue, both strategies fail but provide indirect evidence for the novel’s 
destructive impact on its readers.
Pathbreaking studies by Dieter Dissinger (1971), Dagmar Barnouw 
(1979, 1996), and David Roberts (1975) sought to identify which of the 
novel’s characters spoke for the author and formulated core ideas of Ca-
netti’s later works. Is it Peter Kien, the renowned sinologist, who lives in 
a world of books, as Barnouw suggested?30 Or did Canetti speak through 
Georges Kien, the psychiatrist who espouses theories of crowd psychology 
that bear striking similarities to what Ernst Fischer remembered as Ca-
netti’s initial ideas on these topics (Fischer 1994, 273–74, 305–8)? Ernst 
Waldinger, one of the novel’s first reviewers, in 1936 named Georges Kien 
as the protagonist “who symbolically represents—as we easily guess—the 
writer himself with his interpretations and solutions” (Waldinger 1987, 
299). Subsequent readers from Walter Sokel to Russell Berman and Kris-
tie Foell ground their readings of Auto-da-Fé on this identification of 
Georges Kien as Canetti’s voice in the novel.31 Being the most likeable 
character among the usually mad and violent cast, the equation of him 
with Canetti is tempting but misguided, as Dagmar Barnouw argued 
(1979, 28–29).
Rather than showing professional insight into the madness around 
him, Georges Kien, the acclaimed specialist of the human mind, is too 
impatient to withhold judgment and jumps persistently to the wrong con-
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clusion. He enters the novel’s storyline by receiving an unsigned telegram 
that calls on him to help his brother. Georges Kien immediately mistakes 
his brother as the author of a telegram that had been sent by the delu-
sional Siegfried Fischer. Although he knows its wording sounds nothing 
like Peter Kien, Georges does not even consider the possibility that Peter 
might not be its author. Once he meets Peter, Georges misdiagnoses him 
with his own fear of blindness. His inability to read others continues until 
the novel’s end. Georges Kien describes, for example, the murderous care-
taker Pfaff as “crude, but refreshing” (A 422). A rare exception to his mis-
judgments concerns himself: “he had left his wits at home” (A 426). Most 
importantly, Georges Kien’s attempts to understand and treat his brother 
Peter fail disastrously (Donahue 2001, 72–75). Canetti tempts the read-
ers’ craving for a positive figure only long enough to encourage them to 
question this very desire for identification and reliable information.
The second strategy to shield oneself from the novel’s cruelty and de-
structive impact focuses on the role of rigid patterns of perception in 
Auto-da-Fé. One can distinguish here three different approaches: the oc-
currence and function of stereotypes in the novel is simply ignored, or its 
use is justified while their effects on the reader are downplayed, or the 
author Canetti is accused of affirming and disseminating prejudices and 
clichés. Strictly formal readings of Auto-da-Fé tend to follow the first ap-
proach. David Darby’s masterful formal analysis disregards its racist and 
misogynist elements. Consequently, his analysis finds no convincing way 
to account for the novel’s clarity and accessibility despite its immensely 
complex narrative model. In a recent study of Auto-da-Fé, Donahue ar-
gues persuasively against Darby that the narrative structure of Auto-da-Fé 
is “far from offering comforting structure” (Donahue 2001, 37). Exposed 
to the constant gliding of the narrative perspective, the reader is forced 
to draw on these stereotypes to recognize who is speaking: the greedy 
Jew Fischer, the randy but uptight Therese Krumbholz, the murderously 
subservient caretaker Pfaff, or the self-important intellectual Peter Kien. 
The reader has to use his or her knowledge of these stereotypes “to make 
sense of the voices which variously inhabit the narrator” (37).
But Donahue’s reading then follows the second approach and down-
plays the effects these rigid patterns of perception might have on the 
reader. The moment Donahue focuses the attention on the novel’s most 
disturbing aspects, he seeks to reestablish a safe position for the readers. 
While these stereotypes are supposed to provide the crucial link between 
the cultural climate in which Auto-da-Fé was written and the novel’s cast, 
Donahue envisions the reader as remaining unaffected by them, simply 
laughing about the foolishness of the novel’s protagonists: “the novel’s 
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remarkable humor depends to a great extent on the reader’s epistemic 
sovereignty over the distorted and limited worlds each character takes 
to be utterly real, natural, and universally valid” (45). Reading the novel, 
“we do not shudder in self-recognition”; no reader could ever be drawn 
into the novel or be tempted to share any of the hateful prejudices that 
pervade the novel: “the broad experience of readers indicates a continual 
‘falling out’ of the story rather than the experience of being comfortably 
buckled in” (Donahue 2001, 188, 45). As in the most traditional satire, 
the reader is offered a chance to laugh at the exposed faults of others 
from the safety of his or her own superior position. Such reclaiming of the 
reader’s safe distance from the novel’s pernicious stereotypes is, however, 
self-contradictory. On the one hand, the reader uses the stereotypes to 
identify the novel’s voices; on the other hand, the same reader is thought 
to be immune to them: “After all, overidentification, misidentification, 
and self-projection are the sins of the characters we recognize because 
we have as readers (at least until the introduction of Georg) been held 
at arm’s length” (Donahue 2001, 188). Since the novel’s narrator offers 
readers no clear distance from the novel’s other voices, as Donahue agrees 
with Darby, and since Donahue rejects, correctly, Darby’s solution of an 
implied author as supplementing a comforting structure to the audience, 
it remains unclear to whom this arm belongs that keeps a reader at a safe 
distance. But before I can show in Donahue’s own reading experience that 
this arm exists only in a last defensive gesture against Canetti’s destruc-
tive satire, against the experience of being pulled into the novel—and 
how can one speak of a “continual ‘falling out’ of the story” if there is not 
also the continual experience of being pulled into the novel?—it is neces-
sary to take a look at a feminist reading of the novel, a reading that does 
not share the “broad experience” of laughing at the content of the novel 
from a safe distance.
Kristie Foell accuses Canetti of disseminating and affirming misogyny, 
of playing “into the myth that women deserve what they get, whether 
rape, poverty, or murder” (1994, 186). Such a reading depends to no 
small degree on the position that Donahue declares impossible: the iden-
tification with a character in the novel. While previous readings have 
identified with Peter or Georges Kien, Foell chooses Therese Krumbholz. 
Although her initial desire to recognize the housekeeper as an “emanci-
pated or proto-feminist woman” is quickly thwarted, she preserves for 
her analysis “identification and solidarity” with the novel’s main female 
character (Foell 1994, vi). From this perspective, she finds misogyny not 
only inside the novel but understands it as a pernicious message that the 
novel delivers to the reader (vii). One particular scene carries, according 
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to her, the “unfortunate message [. . .] that women want to be raped and 
make accusations of rape out of a sense of frustration” (186). Laying in 
bed, Therese Krumbholz, hears her husband, Peter Kien, undressing in the 
dark next to her:
When he suddenly fell on top of her, she made not a sound, she 
was afraid he might go away again. He lay on top of her for only a 
few moments; to her they felt like days. He did not move and was 
as light as a feather; she scarcely drew breath. Little by little her 
expectation gave way to bitterness. When he got up, she knew that 
he was escaping her. Like a creature possessed, she hit out at him, 
while she poured down upon him the foulest abuse. (A 151)
Because Kien fails in the act, Krumbholz beats him almost to death. This 
scene can be read, as Foell does, as a woman who desires to be raped—and 
at no point is the novel interested in explicitly rejecting such a view. At the 
same time, the whole scene of the incompetent husband being beaten by 
his disappointed wife is also a laughing matter. Taken together, however, 
this scene undermines both Foell’s and Donahue’s proposed readings.
Neither Foell’s nor Donahue’s approach to stereotypes can account 
for the complexity of these few sentences. How is one supposed to read 
the second sentence, “He lay on top of her for only a few moments; to 
her they felt like days”? If one is as sympathetic to Krumbholz as Foell, 
one might think that these few moments of sudden attack are so horrific 
that they seem like days. Her silence and her breathing noted in the next 
sentence lend credibility to this reading. In that case, one could, however, 
no longer claim that the novel simply portrays women as desiring rape. 
The second sentence allows for the kind of identification with a character 
that Donahue categorically denies but that also contradicts Foell’s larger 
point regarding the novel’s and especially this scene’s alleged misogyny.
On the other hand, the same sentence can be interpreted as originating 
from the perspective of a completely deranged Therese. The few moments 
become days for Therese because they are filled with the prospect of bliss. 
She hardly breathes because she does not want to scare her suddenly 
active husband away. Only slowly, seemingly after days of unrewarded 
hope, she turns in violent frustration against her husband. Angered be-
cause he fails miserably, she reveals herself as a woman obsessed with sex 
and violence.
The same scene can be read with pity or at least with understanding 
for Therese or with absolute ridicule for her irreparably unhinged mind. 
Although the stereotypes provide the reader with clarity as to which one 
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of the characters speaks at any given time, the same stereotypes do not 
offer the reader a safe distance from the madness of the novel. Again and 
again, the reader has to employ—and therefore witness—his or her own 
stereotypes to construct the meaning of the novel. Repeatedly, and even 
at its most vicious moments, the novel does not allow for the objective, 
distanced position of “epistemic sovereignty” that Donahue envisions for 
the reader.32 Instead, the novel grabs the reader by his or her expectations 
regarding the meaning of whole scenes, images, or words and pulls him 
or her into the novel to make sense of them. Rather than watching a spec-
tacle from the outside, the reader has to come out of the novel through 
an examination of his or own preconceptions. The novel constantly ques-
tions the reader. Rather than skipping the impact of the insidious deploy-
ment of these stereotypes on the reader, one needs to recognize them as 
part of the destructive game that Canetti plays with his readership.
Let me return one last time to Kraus and Benjamin to emphasize this truly 
innovative feature of Canetti’s destructive satire. As devastating as The Last 
Days of Mankind remains, the play still allows its audience to identify with 
the views and opinions of the Nörgler, the embodiment of Kraus’s ethi-
cal positions. The murderous substance of his satire stems from his insis-
tence on staying inside his texts and to issue right there the death sentences 
against his enemies. Kraus never wavered in his judgments. Be it because 
of a paradisiacal light that still shone on Kraus and to which Benjamin 
traced the Krausian certainty, or Kraus’s belief in the revelatory power of 
language, both versions allowed for a small parcel of firm ground amidst 
a disintegrating world. On this ground the audience might join the author 
in much the same way that Kraus’s audience joined him with murderous 
laughter when he exposed and disposed of another of his victims during the 
public readings in Vienna. From the first issue, Die Fackel, in which Kraus 
did not announce what he intended to publish but what he intended to kill, 
the audience could find shelter inside of the “we.”
Canetti did away with satire’s last shelter. His destructive satire elimi-
nates the satirist as a moral instance. And he dispenses with the assump-
tion that the reader could be relied upon as a moral authority, as someone 
who really knows better and whose slumbering ideals satire could always 
stir up once more to fight depravity and corruption. Although the novel’s 
narrative voice keeps joining the violent madness of its characters with 
great exuberance and offers no stable narrative perspective, Canetti’s sat-
ire provides its readers nonetheless a lifeboat to navigate safely through 
its universe. This lifeboat is built of the reader’s preconceived notions of 
reality, stereotypes, and clichés that are no longer contrasted to a Benja-
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minian paradigm of pure, angelic communication. Canetti’s novel relies 
on the reader’s distorted views of reality. Without the reader’s misogynist, 
antisemitic, classist, and educational prejudices, Auto-da-Fé would be in-
comprehensible, an odd assembly of mad voices, as Enzensberger once 
suggested (1963, 48–49).
The ease with which a reader recognizes the novel’s voices stems from 
his or her ability to creep inside of these figures of hate and madness and 
adapt to their destructive views of the world. In this confrontation with 
the reader lies the destructive substance of Canetti’s novel. As a destructive 
satire, Auto-da-Fé does not, as Canetti claimed for Broch’s novels, smell the 
gas of future attacks. Its destructive force is aimed at rigid forms of percep-
tion while at the same time these encrusted views of the world are the only 
stable ground from which Canetti’s reader can understand the novel.
Because of the radical reliance on preconceived notions of reality, such 
destructive satire opens itself up to readings that perceive the novel’s hate-
ful features as its intent. Consequently, Auto-da-Fé has been repeatedly 
criticized for its misogynistic characters and antisemitic imagery. The 
novel’s long failure to find a wider audience—written in 1931, only its 
third edition in 1963 received wider notice in Germany—and the read-
er’s continued search for the author’s reliable voice in the novel point to 
the strength and weakness of Auto-da-Fé as a destructive satire. Even if 
one acknowledges the great significance of this radically different and 
destructive model in the history of satire, one has to acknowledge that 
unlike Edgar Hilsenrath’s very similar but much more focused novel The 
Nazi and the Barber (1971), aimed almost exclusively at the reader’s anti- 
and philo-Semitic stereotypes, Canetti’s novel pursues such an abundance 
of targets that its insidious effects risk being discarded as bad writing 
(Enzensberger’s view) or as a well-intentioned but harmless parody of 
outdated constructions of reality. In view of the novel’s reception, the 
success of Canetti’s version of destructive satire remains for the foresee-
able future an open question. But that might not be the worst situation 
for a novel written to prepare the perception of looming threats of an 
uncertain future. Rather than being a remnant of past modernist experi-
ments, Canetti’s satire might still communicate the impending but never 
fully noticeable risks of a near future. “All destructions are of the future, 
as all relics are of the past,” Canetti said in his lecture on Proust, Joyce, 
and Kafka, praising the latter as the “only one who feels the futures if we 
could say so, in his shaking limbs” (Canetti 2005a, 12). Canetti’s satire 




The representation of violence is of central importance for any under-
standing of German modernism. Musil, Kafka, Benjamin, and Canetti 
achieved through their examinations of physical violence new concep-
tions of the self, of communication, of society, and of history. By focusing 
on their reflections on and representations of violence, this study presents 
new readings of central works of modernism.
Musil’s discovery and analysis of the malleable self marks not only a 
turning point in his own writings, but also a turning point in our under-
standing of the works of Franz Kafka and Elias Canetti. The confronta-
tion with this concept of the self could become of similar importance 
for new approaches to the works of authors as varied as Robert Walser 
and Hans Henny Jahnn or Alfred Döblin and Hermann Broch. The dis-
orienting shock triggered by the mere possibility of a malleable self and 
its apparent lack of a response to the experience of physical violence re-
verberates deeply in Musil’s first novel. Because of it, The Confusions of 
Young Törless became a novel on violence in more than one sense. On 
its most explicit level, the novel analyzes and propagates violence against 
the other, perceiving and constructing the effeminate boy Basini as the 
perverse other. It is a novel about violence but also a violent novel. With 
its construction of the perverse, the novel creates a situation in which 
three different instrumental uses of violence compete: violence as an ele-
ment of a theory of sacrifice, as an integral instrument for a rational 
theory of power, and as Törless’s blunt tool to examine the structure and 
consistency of the self. Acts of violence are justified as means to achieve 
particular ends, and the novel’s narrator adds a fourth justification for 
Basini’s torture and rape: Törless’s aesthetic education. As a novel about 
violence, The Confusions of Young Törless is one of the more disquieting 
masterpieces of German modernism.
Exploring these four instrumental approaches and the novel’s repressive 
advocacy of violence against the effeminate boy makes The Confusions 
of Young Törless equally disturbing and remarkable. Even though these 
pursuits dominate the plot of Musil’s first novel, it is, as I have argued, 
another, almost transient, moment in the narrative that has a transforma-
tive impact not just on Musil’s oeuvre. The failure of Törless’s experiment 
in torturing and humiliating Basini until his sense of self shatters led to, 
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for Törless and his narrator, the unbearable possibility of a malleable self. 
This initial encounter with the malleable self connects and distinguishes 
Musil’s radically different concepts of violence from before and after the 
world war. While perceiving the ubiquitous presence of the malleable self 
during the war and in postwar society and exploring its relation to a 
sense of possibility, Musil analyzes these phenomena as responses to the 
experience of modernity that carry inherently risky potentials for modern 
society. From a position of radical ambivalence, Musil’s postwar essays 
and his unfinished novel, The Man Without Qualities, argue for discard-
ing linear models of reality construction while exposing the risks to the 
malleable self of living a life shaped by a sense of possibility. Musil shifts 
from a concept of violence that presupposes its instrumental character 
to an antireductionist understanding of violence that no longer searches 
for violence’s origins and causes, but that acknowledges the variability 
of situations that could but did not have to erupt in violence. A central 
aspect of The Man Without Qualities is its satirical demolition of our ex-
pectation of being able to identify the causes of war and violence in order 
to prevent their further occurrence in modernity.
Musil’s critique of causal analyses of violence and his affirmation of 
the malleable self and the sense of possibility do not propose that the mal-
leable self and the sense of possibility are necessarily successful responses 
to the experience of modernity. They are not causes of violence but bring 
their own particular attractions to violence. Violence holds the promise of 
escaping briefly from the undecided openness of social and political situa-
tions in modernity, as well as from the shapelessness of the malleable self. 
During the general mobilization in July 1914, Musil welcomed the pros-
pect that war would undo the experience of ambivalence in modernity, 
and offer an all-too malleable self clearly defined shapes and destinations. 
The availability of such “cake molds”—rigid patterns of perception and 
firm constructions of reality—offers a self that experiences its malleability 
as a burden and not as a relief the chance of an escape from the experi-
ence of ambiguity and uncertainty in modernity.
Kafka’s exploration of violence focuses precisely on the experience of 
ambiguity in modernity. With unparalleled intensity in modernism, Kaf-
ka’s writings offer radical interrogations of the relationship between am-
bivalence, truth, and violence. His story In the Penal Colony exposes the 
ambivalences inherent in the discourses on violence and truth, language 
and communication. By recognizing the penal colony’s officer as a figure 
of radical ambivalence, someone who belongs to the new and the old or-
ders, someone who defends and mistrusts the workings of the apparatus, 
my reading argued for paying particular attention to the role of language 
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and communication in Kafka’s poetics. Kafka’s story represents the fail-
ure to communicate directly (the officer’s failure to persuade the traveler 
that communication will not establish truth) and performs the failure to 
communicate indirectly (the traveler’s inability to notice and understand 
the gaps, lies, and inconsistencies in the officer’s direct speech). According 
to Kafka, language itself does not preclude truth from coming to the fore 
but rather, as he called it once, the self’s “morass-like” lack of inner clarity 
and unity does. Using language, any speaker has to encounter the unin-
tentionally revealing character of his or her words, words that turn like 
knives against the speaking self. Kafka recognized the search for truth in 
communication and in violence as equally futile, and the continuation of 
any such search as a form of self-deception, but at the same time he of-
fered no escape, no alternative to such deceptive discourses on pain and 
truth. Kafka’s story moves back and forth between the promise to reveal 
truth through communication and/or violence, and the renunciation of 
any hope for success.
Informed by Musil and Kafka, Canetti’s model of satire combines a 
positive notion of the malleable self and a trust in specific modes of indi-
rect communication to subvert, disrupt, or even destroy the “few dozen 
cake molds of which reality consists” for its own readership (MwQ 645). 
Traditional satire depends on direct communication, a communication 
that presupposes the existence of shared ideals in its audience that could 
be roused from its dormant state in the public’s minds with satire’s de-
nunciations of moral depravity and decay. Canetti’s destructive satire no 
longer assumes the presence of such shared ideals but the stubborn per-
sistence of Musil’s “cake molds” of reality. As I have argued, the destruc-
tive force of Canetti’s satire is aimed at these rigid forms of perception 
while at the same time these encrusted views of the world are the only 
stable ground from which Canetti’s reader can understand the novel. As 
in Kafka, words and patterns of perception are turned against the speak-
ing self, but by going beyond Kafka’s practice Canetti aims them against 
the reader as well. Canetti’s satire communicates via an indirect and vio-
lent struggle with the reader. Anticipating the next war as chemical war-
fare won by weapons that defy perception, a wide range of authors and 
theorists, from Kraus to Benjamin, feared that the ubiquitous presence of 
outdated modes of perception would prevent societies from even noticing 
the new threats of modern warfare. Canetti’s satire is meant to attack and 
destroy inflexible patterns of perception that block the view to modern 
societies’ most urgent risks. By seeking to burst its audience’s molds of 
perception from the inside, Canetti develops a satire that inflicts harm on 
its readers. With such a work of destruction, satire seeks to prepare the 
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ground for a sustainable concept of the malleable self, a self that lives the 
passion of metamorphosis, and might be capable of perceiving and as-
sessing the new threats of mass violence.
This study has argued for the central role of war, violence, and catas-
trophe for any understanding of German modernism as well as for Ger-
man modernism’s role in transforming our understanding of the impact 
of war, violence, and the threat of future catastrophes on our conceptions 
of language and communication, the self and society, modernity and his-
tory. Such a break with prevalent pacified notions of German modernism 
offered at times deeply disturbing assessments of modernism’s relation 
to and advocacy of violence. But it allowed, I hope, new and instructive 
readings of some of the most familiar and canonical texts of German and 
Austrian modernism as well as insights into the recent history of violence 
that warrant further investigations into the immense richness of modern-
ism’s provocative exploration of war, violence, and the anticipation of 
total destruction. Such investigations might still raise awareness about 





1. W. G. Sebald’s lecture “The Air War and Literature” initiated in 1997 
the most significant recent controversy on the representation of physical 
destruction in German literature. Sebald claimed that in German postwar 
literature the bombardment of German cities “remained under a kind of taboo, 
like a shameful family secret, a secret that perhaps could not even be privately 
acknowledged” (2004, 10). While German postwar literature acknowledged 
the German responsibility for the Holocaust, it failed in Sebald’s view to 
account for the suffering inflicted on the Germans during the war. Robert 
Moeller (2005) and Gilad Margalit (2010) have analyzed the Sebald debate as 
an important moment in the resurgence of a German sense of suffering since 
the reunification.
2. Hanno Ehrlicher examined in Die Kunst der Zerstörung: Gewaltfantasien 
und Manifestationspraktiken europäischer Avantgarden (2001) the violent 
revolutionary fantasies of the avant-garde movements between the two world 
wars. In Der Barbar (1997), Manfred Schneider follows the cultural construct 
of the barbarian in literature, theory, and history.
3. Even though one finds indeed moments in Améry’s writings when he was 
firmly convinced that anticolonial violence could have a transformative quality 
for its perpetrators, his temporary defense of anticolonial violence is a far cry 
from Žižek’s demands for a truly emancipatory violence (Améry 1971). Even 
during his most radical phase Améry in his defense of revolutionary violence 
never went so far that he would subscribe to the provocation that concludes 
Žižek’s treatise on violence: “If one means by violence a radical upheaval of the 
basic social relations, then, crazy and tasteless as it may sound, the problem 
with historical monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not 
violent enough” (2008, 217).
Chapter 1
1. My translation. Except when otherwise indicated, the translations in this 
study will be mine.
2. After the failed bourgeois revolution of 1848, the dominance of political 
conservatism went hand in hand with a rejection of representing violent and 
pathological individuals in realist literature: “The interest in pathological 
behavior comes to an end in extra-medical discourses around 1850. The 
romantic dialogue between medicine and philosophy winds finally down. 
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Literary representations of organic and psychic illnesses became rare. The 
exclusion of psychopathology which programmatic realism implemented is all 
the more surprising since psychologism is inherent in the realist way of writing 
and the exploration of complex psychological cases of extreme behavior would 
seem to be therefore in the ‘logic’ of its approach” (Thomé 1993, 21). The 
realist exclusion of otherness and difference has been observed by critics like 
Russell Berman and Robert Holub. Not disputing the programmatic desire to 
exclude the exceptional and extreme from realist representation, Eric Downing 
offers nevertheless a more conflictual model of German realism. He reads realist 
texts also as “decisive and highly self-conscious failures of the realist projects,” 
emphasizing the “double exposure” of repetition of but also resistance to the 
dominant discourse in realist fiction (Downing 2000, 13, 261).
3. A different image emerges when one compares Fontane’s claim to the 
actual crime reporting in German newspapers. The newspapers of imperial 
Germany shared German realism’s disinterest in writing about crime and 
homicide. Across the political spectrum, murder and other forms of violent 
crime were not the stuff newspapers were made of while Fontane published 
his novels. Neither the socialist nor the conservative press devoted much 
attention to crime reporting. The liberal press demonstrated similar disinterest 
before 1900 and began to focus its attention on violent crime only in the last 
decade before the First World War. As Eric Johnson writes in Urbanization and 
Crime: Germany 1871–1914: “In the early years of the Reich, one could read 
a liberal paper for weeks and not find one article on a court case of homicide 
in the Vossische Zeitung. In November 1902, the ‘Court News’ section carried 
articles on seven cases, and in June 1908, it carried articles on fifteen ongoing 
or recently completed court cases of murder or manslaughter” (1995, 85). This 
increase in the reporting of murder cases was balanced by a decrease in the 
reporting of assault and battery charges. The total amount of articles dedicated 
to violent crime remained more or less the same and rather small. “Hence, 
it might be argued that liberal papers like the Vossische Zeitung may have 
reserved a certain portion of their crime news for news of violent criminality, 
and the form of that criminality may have changed but the volume was not all 
that different” (86). As in the German realist novel, extreme and pathological 
behavior was of little concern to German newspapers between 1870 and 1914. 
German realism and German newspapers treated crime as a “foreign” concept 
(Johnson 1995, 53–107).
4. For an assessment of the visions of war in Germany around 1900 that 
avoids seeing them through the prism of August 1914, see Schumann 2000.
5. Here I read again the figure of Pastor Lorenzen in Der Stechlin as one 
focalizer of Fontane’s views on history and politics: “Eine neue Zeit bricht 
an. Ich glaube, eine bessere und eine glücklichere. Aber wenn auch nicht eine 
glücklichere, so doch mindestens eine Zeit mit mehr Sauerstoff in der Luft, 
eine Zeit, in der wir besser atmen können. Und je freier man atmet, je mehr 
lebt man” (Fontane 2001, 324). For the possibility of such a reading, see 
Zimmermann (2000).
6. One of the more recent statements of this generally accepted assessment 
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of the impact of violence in the twentieth century is the starting point of 
Ferguson’s last book: “Significantly larger percentages of the world’s 
population were killed in the two world wars that dominated the century 
than had been killed in any conflict of comparable geopolitical magnitude” 
(Ferguson 2007, xxxiv).
7. Excellent examples of the invocation of twentieth-century mass violence 
when discussing the phenomenon of representations of violence in twentieth-
century German literature are Hüppauf (1997) and Nieraad (2003). Anton 
Kaes’s recent study on Weimar cinema makes this assumed causal link between 
the experience of war and a modernist film aesthetic explicit in the title of his 
study, Shell Shock Cinema: Weimar Culture and the Wounds of War (2009).
8. See, for example, the debate on Jünger’s modernism between Berman 
(1988) and Huyssen (1995).
9. Despite previous studies by Jameson (1981), Herf (1984), and more 
recently Breuer (1995), the notion of fascist modernism remains provocative 
and far from generally accepted. The idea that National Socialism was not 
solely a premodern and disastrous escape strategy from modernity, but also 
a response to modernity, perhaps even a force of modernization, a political 
movement that embraced central features of modernization as especially Herf 
and Breuer have demonstrated—such an acknowledgment still encounters 
among literary scholars more resistance than among historians, sociologists, 
and political scientists.
10. Freud told Andreas-Salomé that “I do not doubt that mankind will 
survive even this war, but I know for certain that for me and my contemporaries 
[Altersgenossen] the world will never again be a happy place. It is too hideous. 
And the saddest thing about it is that it is exactly the way we should have 
expected people to behave from our knowledge of psychoanalysis. [. . .] My 
secret conclusion has always been: since we can only regard the highest present 
civilization as burdened with an enormous hypocrisy, it follows that we are 
organically unfitted for it. We have to abdicate, and the great Unknown, He or 
It, lurking behind fate will someday repeat this experiment with another race” 
(Freud and Andreas-Salomé 1972, 21).
11. Such people could not resist the opportunity that presented itself during 
wartime “to withdraw for a while from the constant pressure of civilization 
and to grant a temporary satisfaction to the instincts which they had been 
holding in check. This probably involved no breach in their relative morality 
within their own nations” (Freud 1957, 284). In 1919, shortly after the war, 
Freud observed in his introduction to a volume on psychoanalytical approaches 
to war neuroses that “when war conditions ceased to operate, the greater 
number of the neurotic disturbances brought about by the war simultaneously 
vanished” (Freud 1955, 207). In February 1920, Freud concluded again in a 
memorandum submitted to the Austrian War Ministry that “with the end of the 
war the war neurotics, too, disappeared” (Freud 1955, 214).
12. For an analysis of this persistence of such “old wisdom” in Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s study, see Reemtsma (2003, 202–19).
13. In her famous speech “On Humanity in Dark Times” (1959), Arendt 
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values the collapse of tradition as an “advantage, promoting a new kind of 
thinking that needs no pillars and props, no standards and traditions to move 
freely without crutches over unfamiliar terrain” (Arendt 1968, 10).
14. For a comprehensive analysis of these debates, see Jay (2005).
15. Compare, for example, Braese (1998 and 1999) and for a more polemical 
account Briegleb (2002).
16. Hobsbawm himself qualifies the certainty and comprehensiveness of this 
statement when he contrasts in the next paragraph “the huge popular revulsion 
against the mass killing of the First World War” with the “emergence of a 
relatively small, but absolutely numerous, minority for whom the experience of 
fighting, even under the conditions of 1914–18, was central and inspirational” 
(1995, 125). Michael Mann demonstrates in his study Fascist that the majority 
of those who planned and enacted the mass violence of the Second World War 
were not brutalized by any direct war experiences between 1914 and 1918 
but belonged to the postwar generation. “Thus, though first boosted by the 
wartime experience of a particular generation, fascism conquered (as it did 
Germany) by its ability to socialize a second generation in paramilitary nation-
statism through the interwar period” (2004, 213).
17. One of the pathbreaking studies on the war experience is Ziemann 
(1997). See also Bourke (1996, 124–70) and Schumann (2004). For a recent 
review of the literature on the war experience and the legacy of the First World 
War, see Davis (2003, 111–31).
18. In his research report on social-historical approaches to violence—a 
report that intends to contribute to the inauguration of the new discipline: 
“Historische Gewaltforschung”—Dirk Schumann locates the main obstacle 
for such a new and necessary discipline in the difficulty of distinguishing the 
inherently heterogeneous phenomenon of violence from other forms of force 
and power (Schumann 1997, 366). The problem is exacerbated by the German 
language since in addition to the meaning of the English word “violence” the 
German word “Gewalt” refers to nonviolent notions of force and power as 
well. Although recent studies insist that violence should be understood more 
narrowly as physical violence—Physische Gewalt is also the title of one of 
the pioneering anthologies in violence research—such specification helps 
very little in answering the questions as to what one should understand as 
(physical) violence and how one might approach it in history and in literature 
(Lindenberger and Lüdtke 1995). Derrida offers a highly intriguing reading of 
the limits and possibilities of the German term “Gewalt” as compared to the 
French and English equivalents (1990, 927–29).
19. Elias argues, for example, in “Civilization and Violence” that one should 
not ask how terrorism is possible inside contemporary modern societies since 
this question puts already too much emphasis on the role of violence in modern 
societies. One should instead ask, “how is it possible that so many people can 
normally live together peacefully, without fear of being attacked or killed by 
people stronger than themselves, as is nowadays largely the case in the great 
state-societies of Europe, America, China or Russia?” (1996, 174). In the 1980s, 
Elias was confident that the European nations had once and for all abandoned 
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war and violence as means for conflict resolution. “Nobody threatens war in 
Europe anymore. We should consider this as an advantage. We have learned 
our lesson” (Elias 1988, 188). Even though the civilizing process is far from 
over Elias had no doubt about the direction of its progress. “We are in early 
modernity, or said differently: we are the late barbarians. In 300 or 400 years it 
will be completely incomprehensible to our descendants why we prepared for 
war with arsenals of nuclear weapons” (190).
20. As Hans Joas writes: “In fact, sociology developed with the certainty that 
military and war were irreconcilable with the advance of industrial societies; 
from an evolutionary perspective they were sentenced to extinction” (1989, 
182–83). Herbert Spencer foresaw already the replacement of the “militant 
society” with a “industrial society.” Classic Marxism predicted as well a future 
society in which war and military were obsolete phenomena. The advance 
toward such a socialist-industrial society seemed to be in the 1890s within 
reach and inevitable.
21. Like Arendt, Niklas Luhmann (1975) sets the terms of power and violence 
in opposition to each other and offers an extremely subtle analysis of power 
while setting the phenomenon of violence onto the course of extinction—at 
least for the analysis of autopoetic processes.
22. For overviews of the recent debate, see Trotha (1997 and 2000) as well 
as Imbusch (2004).
23. Wolfgang Sofsky’s Traktat über die Gewalt (1996) has become the most 
influential and controversial example of the use of thick description in the 
analysis of acts of violence.
24. The already mentioned research by Ziemann and Schumann is directly 
influenced by Popitz. One encounters similar interests and approaches in historical 
works that make the case for the importance of physical violence and the act of 
killing in history. An early, influential study is Keegan (1976). Especially interesting 
in the German context are programmatic writings by the historian Michael Geyer 
who conceptualizes a history of war that acknowledges the centrality of violence 
and death for writing history (1992, 1995, 2000, and particularly 2006).
25. Berman defines teleology, identity, and fictionality as the three central 
features of the bourgeois aesthetics of autonomy, and every form of modernism 
proposes its own alternative to them. Modernists like Mann, Broch, and 
Musil favor seriality over teleological development, ambivalence over a 
clearly defined notion of identity, and “the objectivity afforded by essayism” 
over fictionality (Berman, 1989, 67). Fascist modernism offers its own 
clearly distinct set of alternatives. It emphasizes perpetual repetition of the 
same instead of development, the spectacle instead of identity, and a fascist 
modernist like Jünger dismisses bourgeois fictionality as escapism, claiming 
for his often autobiographically inspired texts “a curious pseudodocumentary 
status” (Berman, 1989, 67).
26. More recent studies that emphasize the propensity toward violence 
among writers who could be grouped under Berman’s term of epic leftism do 
not escape this fallacy. If one would replace the term “fascist modernism” with 
“totalitarian modernism” (and it seems to be only a matter of time before such 
218 Notes to Pages 33–41
a proposal for renaming will be made) one would still continue to ignore the 
fascination with the infliction of violence onto others in modernist writings in 
general. Regarding the infatuation with violence and destruction in epic leftism, 
Walter Benjamin has become the target of choice for revaluations of structural 
similarities between left- and right-wing writers. See, for example, Bolz (1989), 
Derrida (1990), Werckmeister (1997), and Lange (1999).
27. Even Karl Heinz Bohrer, who made the best case for Jünger as a great 
modernist writer, based his argument almost exclusively on one particular text, 
The Adventurous Heart (1929), and only on its first edition and not the later 
one that Jünger considered the definitive text (Bohrer 1978).
28. In his response to Frantz Fanon, Améry argued not only that the formerly 
oppressed revolutionary transforms himself through his acts of violence again 
into a human being but also that the target of his violence, the former oppressor, 
is given the opportunity to become human again when he falls victim to this act 
of violent retribution (Améry 1971, 147–63).
29. Karl Heinz Bohrer has taken this approach recently. For his concept of 
“aesthetic negativity,” Franz Kafka alone survives Bohrer’s scrutiny of the writers 
and theorists of the twentieth century. Ernst Jünger is no longer mentioned, Benjamin 
is pushed aside, and Bohrer singles out Adorno for harsh criticism because his 
negative dialectics initially promised but finally undermined the aesthetic negativity 
that Bohrer advances as a truly modernist aesthetics (Bohrer 2002).
Chapter 2
1. Not only is the essay absent in the English edition of Musil’s essays but 
brilliant English studies of Musil’s writings offer rather euphemistic summaries 
of the text. David Luft presents “Europäertum, Krieg, Deutschtum” in 
his influential study as an analysis of war enthusiasm and not as one of its 
expressions (Luft 1980, 122–23). Stefan Jonsson leaves in his references to the 
essay the impression that Musil voiced no more than a careless compliance to 
the zeitgeist (Jonsson 2000, 254).
2. For the autobiographical aspects of Törless, see Corino (1972, 2003). The 
autobiographical background of the story can be misleading since such readings 
tend to overemphasize the oppressive and militaristic atmosphere of Törless’s 
institute. As Berghahn noted, Törless’s education is feudal while Musil’s was 
“unteroffiziersmäßig.” Törless and his friend move freely in the institute while 
Musil and his classmates were held like “inmates” (Berghahn 1973, 29). Volker 
Schlöndorff’s adaptation of The Confusions of Young Törless (1964) offers 
a prominent example of a militaristic reading. Hanna Hickman argued that 
Musil’s book is “one of the first novels of adolescence in Western literature” 
(1984, 28–29). After pointing to Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werther as 
a classic precursor for representing adolescence in German literature, Luserke 
classifies Törless instead as a late example of the popular genre of school and 
boarding school stories and novels (Luserke 1995, 16). Mattenklott (1982) 
analyzed the novel’s social criticism, and Goldgar claimed that Törless is “the 
earliest novel of any sort in any language to show specific Freudian influence” 
(Goldgar 1965, 118). More recent scholarship agrees, however, that Musil 
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probably lacked any specific knowledge of Freud’s work while writing his first 
novel. The interest in questions of sexuality was rather ubiquitous in Vienna at 
the turn of the century—one thinks of authors like Bahr, Schnitzler, Wedekind, 
and Weininger—and are not necessarily dependent on Freud (Pott 1984, 
11). Karl Otten praised Musil’s novel as an important influence for German 
expressionist literature (1957), and Howald (1984) conducted a fascinating 
analysis of the novel’s aestheticism.
3. Following the lead of one of Musil’s later diary entries, several com-
mentators declare the novel a critique of violence ahead of its times. Facing the 
rise of Stalinism, fascism, and National Socialism, Musil recognized Beineberg 
and Reiting in retrospect as prototypes of the dictators dominating Europe in 
the 1930s (Musil 1983, 834, 914). These comments do not move analytically, 
however, beyond pronouncements, and they never ask who Törless might be in 
such scenarios (Arntzen 1980, 99).
4. The success of such diversion tactics appears as well in an otherwise 
excellent article by Tim Mehigan. Törless’s attacks against Basini are acknowl-
edged, but he is not held responsible since his acts of violence furthered his 
intellectual development. As Mehigan writes, someone as self-reflective and 
sensitive as Törless should “not be measured by the standards of conventional 
morals” (Mehigan 1995, 234). At the same time the novel receives praise for 
exposing society’s hidden fascination with violence.
5. As we will see, however, Ulrich’s reaction to the war is already foreshad-
owed in published sections of the novel.
6. Translation modified. The German reads “Jede Perversität läßt sich 
darstellen. Sie läßt sich darstellen durch ihren Aufbau aus Normalem, da man 
die Darstellung sonst nicht verstünde” (Musil 1978, 982).
7. Such a defense of the aesthetic, its right to deal in its own area with 
otherwise socially marginalized behavior, was the initial purpose of Musil’s 
essay. He published the essay in the journal Pan, whose previous issues had 
been confiscated by the government in Berlin because its content, excerpts 
from Flaubert’s diaries, was deemed indecent. In his debut as an essayist, Musil 
supports not only artistic freedom but also his benefactor, Alfred Kerr, the 
journal’s chief literary critic. Kerr’s enthusiastic review of The Confusions of 
Young Törless proved critical for novel’s positive reception in 1906 (Corino 
1970).
8. As Cascardi observes, the modern state forces this division between 
inside and outside onto the subject: “Inevitably, the citizen-subjects come into 
conflict with an autonomous State that narrowly circumscribes the morality 
of conscience and the principles of virtue and that establishes an abstract 
understanding of the nature of legitimacy and law. The political subject is in 
turn divided against itself: outwardly, its actions must comply with a set of 
formally instituted rules, while inwardly its mind remains at liberty, ‘in secret 
free’” (1992, 181–82).
9. Taking a look at Törless’s nonfictional peer group one recognizes Törless’s 
aesthetic development as no small achievement. In his encounters with the 
opposite sex, he starts with an absolutist division between prostitutes and 
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angels, between Božena and his mother, an opposition that fueled, as Theweleit 
has argued, the violent fantasies and actions of the prefascist soldatischen 
Mann (Theweleit 1977, 133–41). Thinking of Božena, Törless recognizes her 
as the opposite of his revered mother: “This woman is, for me, a tangle of 
everything that is sexually desirable, and my mother is a creature who has until 
now walked through my life at a cloudless distance, clear and without depth, 
like a star beyond all desire” (YT 34; VZ 33). While the members of Theweleit’s 
subgroup could not reconcile their mutually exclusive icons of femininity with 
reality, Törless overcomes his initial shock that there might be more depth to 
his mother’s sexual identity than to a cloudless sky.
10. In Améry’s continuation of Musil’s novel the torture leaves no lasting 
impact on its victim, Basini, but changes the life of the voyeuristic perpetrator, 
Törless (Améry 1971, 193). Améry’s story envisions that Herbert Törless joined 
the Austrian Nazi Party well before the Anschluß. The adult Törless became a 
failed writer of some genius who published mediocre and hateful articles in Nazi 
journals. But the story retains a more sympathetic version of Törless as well. He 
emerges as Ulrich’s less fortunate doppelganger who searched for “moonbeams 
at day time” and never abandoned the ideal of the other condition (195).
11. In his reading of the Inferno’s fifth canto, Teskey characterizes the failed 
transformation of Francesca da Rimini into an allegory as an attempt to force 
meaning onto a being by emptying it of life. Conceived as an allegory of vice 
(adulterous love), Dante allows Francesca nevertheless to object to her harsh 
punishment in her own voice. Listening to her, Dante faints. “The tension 
in the canto is marked by these extremes of punishment and passion, where 
the former is in the service of a project of meaning that never succeeds in 
emptying Francesca to the point where she is nothing more than a sign of 
vice. In other words, Dante is revealing in this episode the failure of allegory 
to accomplish, to adapt Nietzsche’s phrase, a total expulsion of life” (Teskey 
1996, 25). By incessantly heaping abuse and stereotypes onto him, The 
Confusions of Young Törless submits Basini to such a process of emptying. 
Unlike Dante, Basini’s narrator never faints. To him as well as to most critics, 
Basini requires no further explication as an allegory of perverse sexuality. He 
becomes nothing more than a sign of vice. Corino’s search for the “real” Basini 
in Musil’s life serves as an example of the power that Basini’s transformation 
into an allegory exerts on his readers. Despite the lack of any concrete evidence, 
Musil’s alleged model for Basini is identified as a homosexual as well. One of 
Musil’s classmates was named Fabini. To support his case beyond the evidence 
of an alliteration that connects the two names, Corino searches for documents 
that proved Fabini shared “the homosexual component of the figure Basini” 
(Corino 1986, 62). Corino relies on school records that describe Fabini as a 
lazy student whose conduct gave rise to serious complaints. Eventually, Fabini 
transferred to another school (Corino 1986, 62). Such evidence hardly suffices 
to prove homosexual acts or desires on Fabini’s part. Once linked to Basini, 
however, everything seems obvious and the unanswerable question of Fabini’s 
sexuality answered.
12. A young prince played the role of Basini’s predecessor, as another 
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effeminate boy who has to suffer from Törless’s aggression. His classmates 
dismissed the prince’s gestures and behavior as “affected” and “effeminate” 
and the narrator notes that he walked in “soft, lithe movements” (YT 7; VZ 
10–11). The social distance between them allowed temporarily for an intimacy 
that otherwise would be forbidden. For a short while, the prince became 
“a source of refined psychological pleasure” to Törless (YT 8; VZ 11). Its 
enjoyment became permitted since he felt the prince’s “essence [. . .] to be so 
dissimilar to his own as to be beyond comparison”(YT 8; VZ 11). The idyll 
ends soon because of Törless’s “fear of excessively subtle sentiments” (YT 9; 
VZ 12), and Törless gathers reason and virility for a violent attack against the 
refined prince. The irreligious Törless finds himself one day in an argument 
with the devout prince, and his intellect erupts like a self-igniting mechanism 
that runs its destructive course. He assaults the prince with “the wooden ruler 
of rationalism,” and “like a barbarian he smashed the filigree structure in which 
the boy’s soul was housed” (YT 9, 8; VZ 12). Soon thereafter, the prince left 
the boarding school.
13. Finding “effeminophobia” not only prevalent in society at large but also 
in gay theory, Sedgwick warns against the continuation of the marginalization 
and stigmatization of the effeminate boy and man: “To begin to theorize gender 
and sexuality as distinct though intimately entangled axes of analysis has been, 
indeed, a great advance of recent lesbian and gay thought. There is a danger, 
however, that that advance may leave the effeminate boy once more in the 
position of the haunting abject—this time the haunting abject of gay thought 
itself” (Sedgwick 1993, 157).
14. On the trials of Oscar Wilde, see Foldy (1997); on the newspaper Vorwärts, 
the SPD, and Krupp, see Stümke (1989) and zur Nieden (2005); on Bismarck, 
Harden, and the Liebenberger Tafelrunde, see Sombart (1991) and Bruns 
(2005). Rumors about Krupp’s sexuality circulated previously and socialist 
papers in Italy published accounts of the events on his yacht, but no German 
newspaper had dared to connect the name of Germany’s powerful industrial 
dynasty and the close friend of the emperor with homosexuality (Mayer 
1975, 179). Although the Vorwärts newspaper claimed good intentions— 
exposing one of the most influential members of the German elite the paper 
hoped to embarrass into reforming Article 175 against homosexual behavior—
the attempt failed completely. Friedrich Krupp died just one week after the 
newspaper’s accusations, and the government could blame the Social Democrats 
for his death and leave the legislation unchanged (Stümke 1989, 40–41).
15. For a discussion of the transitive and separatist tropes of homosexuality and 
its dynamic impasse, see Sedgwick (1990, 87–90). For a recent account of the early 
debates in the German gay liberation movement, see Keilson-Lauritz (2005).
16. Karl Heinrich Ulrichs (1825–95) had coined the term Urning. In his 
fight against the discrimination of male to male sexuality, he sought to replace 
contemporary terms like “Konträrsexueller” or “Homosexueller.” “Urninge” 
and “Dionings,” his terms for heterosexuals, were derived from Greek 
mythology and thus thought to provide a more dignified terminology (Steakley 
1975, 3–5; Stümke 1989, 16–18).
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17. The importance of this image for Törless and for his author Musil can be 
seen if one understands it as a metaphor for the structure of the novel itself. The 
novel’s two piers, its opening and its end, are as solid as they are traditional. 
But between Törless’s arrival at and his departure from the institute lay dizzying 
experiences, doubts, and a loss of orientation. The structure of Musil’s novel 
reassures the reader that such centripetal force exists and that it will keep the 
traditional order together. Decades later, after World War I, Musil’s next novel 
would abandon any such illusion.
18. In a world that believed in the strict separation between heaven and 
earth, the dead body of the saint was the only place where the two spheres 
joined. On judgment day, body (relic) and soul of the saint would reunite, 
and those buried in close proximity to the saint hoped that the saint would 
then speak out for them. By storing the bodily remains in the midst of it, the 
community acknowledges the saint’s praesentia as a double presence—in 
the tomb in the midst of the community as well as in the presence of God. The 
saint’s praesentia embodies the ultimate desires of oral communities as well as 
Western metaphysics: living in the presence of absolute truth. Not only does the 
saint remain present inside the community, not only does he or she still speak 
to them with the materiality and immediacy of the body—an immediacy that 
disappears in literate communication—but the community knows that the saint 
dwells at the same time in the presence of God. For the concept of praesentia in 
late Roman Christianity, see Brown (1981, 86–105).
19. The narrator insists that the sexual relationship with Basini should be 
understood as an aberration, reminding the reader that Törless “inherited 
from his parents a powerful, healthy and natural constitution” and assures 
that Basini stirred no true feelings or desire in Törless (YT 123; VZ 109). The 
narrator edits Törless’s feelings until no trace of homosexual desire remains. 
Rather than sharing any “perverse” traits with Basini, Törless continued his 
sexual relationship with Basini only “because [Törless’s] spiritual situation was 
temporarily aimless” (YT 129; VZ 114).
Chapter 3
1. As we will see toward the end of this chapter, the same claim cannot be 
made for the unpublished sections of Musil’s novel.
2. At first the novel’s narrator defines the sense of possibility as the ability to 
perceive reality without any notion of causality and necessity. “Whoever has [a 
sense of possibility] does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, 
will happen, must happen: but he invents: Here this or that might, could, or 
ought to happen. If he is told that something is the way it is, he will think: 
Well, it could probably just as well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility 
could be defined outright as the ability to conceive of everything there might 
be just as well, and to attach no more importance to what is than to what is 
not” (MwQ 11; MoE 16). At the end of the last chapter that Musil prepared 
for publication, Ulrich rejects the idea that all possible realities should be 
considered of equal importance and validity. Working on his diary, he returns 
initially to the narrator’s conclusion: “Many things are capable of reality and 
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the world that do not occur in a particular reality or world” (MwQ 1302; 
MoE 1195). But then Ulrich stops writing and paces back and forth in his 
study because “he did not want it to appear as if all these possibilities were 
equally justified” (MwQ 1303; MoE 1195). While no causal sequence can ever 
fully explain the occurrence of a historical situation, Ulrich refuses to substitute 
necessity with coincidence. One should be able to distinguish reality and its 
alternate possibilities according to probabilities. “Something was still missing, 
some kind of distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘full reality,’ or the distinction 
between ‘reality for someone’ and ‘real reality,’ or in other terms, an exposition 
of rank was missing between the claim to the validity of reality and world” 
(MwQ 1303; MoE 1195).
3. Jonsson presents this strong utopian thesis in the introduction and toward 
the conclusion of his study. In between the study’s bookends, he offers a more 
nuanced reading of the novel’s relationship toward World War I and speaks 
of the “double articulation” of Musil’s narrative. “All the situations anchored 
in the time and space of the story by means of indicative clauses will function 
within two registers at once. In the indicative universe of the story, they are 
inserted as links in a chain inevitably ending in war. But the same events and 
acts also provide material for an imagination working in the subjunctive mood 
[. . .], which subordinates the factual and referential world rendered in the 
indicative mood” (Jonsson 2000, 143–44). As I will argue, even on the level of 
the indicative there is no sense of inevitability, the novel becomes no “virtual 
time bomb, inexorably ticking away toward the war” (142). The Man Without 
Qualities presents neither on the indicative level a causal necessity for the war, 
nor does it render on the subjunctive level a world order that would have made 
the war unnecessary. Musil does not fall prey, as we will see, to modernity’s 
dream that a world order could be created, in which war would become a 
necessity of the past.
4. Žižek called the second group recently “liberal communists” and 
“the enemy of every progressive struggle.” He fully subscribes to Brecht’s 
recommendation in “The Interrogation of the Good” (1935) about what one 
should do with these “good” people: 
Hear us then: we know
You are our enemy. This is why we shall
Now put you in front of a wall. But in consideration of your merits 
and good qualities 
We shall put you in front of a good wall and shoot you
With a good bullet from a good gun and bury you
With a good shovel in the good earth. (Quoted in Žižek 2008, 37–39)
5. Jonsson’s analysis of Musil’s representation of subjectivity in The Man 
Without Qualities remains groundbreaking and is persuasive in its critique of 
traditional readings of the novel that interpret it as Musil’s attempt to reconstruct 
a centered notion of identity amidst the modern condition of alienation. He 
demonstrates masterfully how Musil’s novel presents “an early instance of 
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the historical paradigm within which current discussions of subjectivity and 
identity are articulated, and, further, that the novel actualizes this paradigm 
in such uniquely variegated ways that present-day theory has only recently 
caught up with it” (2000, 3). Musil’s rejection of the expressivist paradigm 
and, as Jonsson demonstrates, Musil’s attempt to think the subject without 
an inner core of identity shows correspondences to contemporary theories of 
subjectivity, from Kristeva to Agamben and from Adorno to Ricoeur. While 
I fully agree with and rely upon this first crucial part of Jonsson’s argument, 
I fail to find the evidence for the equally important second, utopian part of 
his argument. Jonsson argues that Ulrich as the Musilian subject in The Man 
Without Qualities realizes that a person’s identity is not the expression of a 
human essence, not an expression of a timeless personal truth, but the result 
of particular historical and social configurations. Identity becomes therefore 
for Ulrich a “procession of masks” and not the unfolding of one true self 
(162). According to Jonsson, such knowledge of the social constructedness of 
identity allows the Musilian subject to break completely with its particular 
social and political situation. This subject becomes another version of the 
avant-garde’s new man: “Rejecting cultural roots and social roles, the Musilian 
subject liberates itself from all conditions of belonging” (9). As I will argue, 
Ulrich’s awareness that an individual’s identification with nation, class, or 
profession is never the expression of an inner human nature but always the 
result of particular situations does not imply that a person can therefore 
distance him- or herself completely from such conditions of belonging. Such 
awareness liberates from rigid prescriptions of tradition and it might open 
space for maneuver in the private and the public sphere, but it does not secure 
a position outside of its historical situation, it does not provide a radical break 
with the past and its resulting present. In his postwar essays as well as in his 
novel, Musil stresses always—on the level of emotion and experience, of the 
self, of narration, and of history—the irresolvable interaction between inside 
and outside. Embedded in particular historical situations, the subject can never 
fully free itself but remains interwoven (although never fully determined) by its 
social, political, and cultural circumstances. There is no indication that Ulrich 
would have resisted the national euphoria in August 1914; instead, Musil’s 
drafts and notes clearly indicate that Ulrich would have welcomed the war in 
defense of collective notion of “Germandom” even though he would be fully 
aware of its status as a social construct.
6. Only Musil’s choice of narrative perspective fits the literary postwar 
discourse that perceives the violence strictly from the point of view of potential 
victims, not perpetrators (Reimann 2004, 312). In Musil’s case, however, this 
perspective fashions no community of heroic (or traumatized) survivors bonded 
together by an incommunicable front experience but, like in Young Törless or 
Tonka, an individual with a heightened sensibility.
7. For an overview of the debate, see Imbusch 2004.
8. Popitz starts his discussion of violence by calling it the most direct form 
of power (Popitz 1992, 44). Von Trotha recently published an overview of new 
emerging structures of global violence (Trotha 2005).
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9. Cacciari offers a fascinating analysis of the importance of this Swedenborg 
quote for Musil’s explorations of emotion, mood, and essayism (1996, 196–
206).
10. In July 1905, during the completion of The Confusions of Young Törless, 
Musil made a whole series of notes insisting with references to Leibniz, Spinoza, 
Goethe, Schiller, Nietzsche, and Carlyle on the subject’s duty to preserve one’s 
“innermost individuality, the origin of personal life” [die innerste Eigenart, das 
Ursprüngliche des persönlichen Lebens] (T 155). Reading these notes after the 
war, Musil interjected questions like “Does this exist?” and he rejected the idea 
that each soul should and could perfect its own possibilities into reality as 
“another false definition” (T1, 155, 161).
11. For an interesting recent summary of Europe’s slide toward World 
War I, see Michael Mann’s chapter “Empirical Culmination—Over the Top: 
Geopolitics, Class Struggle, and World War I” (1993, 740–802). Not unlike 
Musil, Mann argues that neither the identification of sufficient causes nor the 
assumption of irrationality or the absence of causality can explain how Europe 
moved toward war in 1914. Rather than detecting a lack of causalities, he 
identifies a multiplicity of counteracting rationalities and motivations. “The 
problem was not a general irrationality of European society. Rather, two sets 
of rational calculations were interacting in two unpredictable ways. First, 
domestic and geopolitics entwined in all states, though in different, volatile 
fashion in each. Thus, second, it became difficult to predict the reactions of 
other Powers to one’s own diplomacy. The problem was not irrational actors 
but plural actors with plural identities pursuing diverse strategies whose 
interactions were unpredictable and eventually devastating” (757).
Chapter 4
1. The documents of this intervention can be found on the supplementary 
CD-ROM for KKAS, pp. 860–63.
2. The recommendation is among the materials published on the 
supplementary CD-ROM for KKAS, p. 864.
3. Menninghaus’s chapter “The Angel of Disgust: Kafka’s Poetics of ‘Innocent’ 
Enjoyment of ‘Suphuruous’ Pleasures” offers the most exhaustive compilation 
of the use of knives in Kafka’s writing, but he is less interested in their use as 
instruments of violence and more in the disgusting wounds and effects they 
produce in Kafka’s texts (1999, 427–52).
4. Translation modified. Kaiser and Wilkins (Kafka 1991, 95) and Hofmann 
(Kafka 2006, 86) translate Kafka’s peculiar term “Hilfskonstruktion” with a 
more elegant but less precise “motivation.”
5. The heavy epistemological price Tucholsky paid for retracting his idea 
explains the popularity of allegorical interpretations. Tucholsky proposed to 
read the story without hermeneutic interest and expectations. “You don’t have 
to ask what this is supposed to mean. This is supposed to be nothing. This 
means nothing” (Tucholsky 1979, 96).
6. Müller-Seidel (1986) still remains central for the first group of readings—
followed by Gilman (1995), Piper (1996), Berman (1998), and most recently 
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Honold (2008). The media-oriented readings include Koelb (1982), Deleuze 
and Guattari (1986), Kittler (1990), Anderson (1992), Mladek, (1994), and 
Corngold (2004).
7. Analyzing the traveler’s seduction by the apparatus, Rolleston argues 
for the performative quality of his assumed detachment from the procedure. 
Rolleston notes the paradox of the traveler’s need to remind himself of his 
detachment, thus revealing his active detachment as nothing but involvement 
(Rolleston 1984, 90).
8. In his cultural history of Kafka’s Prague, Scott Spector reaches a very 
different conclusion about Kafka’s stance toward intercultural mediation and 
portrays Kafka as a mediator between conflicting languages, nationalities, 
and cultures. Analyzing the rising interest in translation among Prague Jewish 
authors—he looks at Brod, Kafka, Pick, and Rudolf Fuchs—Spector shows 
how these writers made the project of mediation their own. Unlike their Czech 
and German colleagues, they remained in-betweens, belonged to no national 
territory, but were “strange, uncomfortable, or unwelcome embodiments of 
unresolved issues below the surface of Central European life” (Spector 2000, 
233). Rather than closing the ranks and sealing porous boundaries—the 
ideological projects of their nationalist counterparts—these Prague Jewish 
writers resisted the desire for territorialization and represented themselves 
“as the mobile, ungraspable tension between identity and otherness, as the 
non-space between self and other. As mediation” (233). Reading In the Penal 
Colony, Berman argues that the hope for interpretative mediation is the main 
point of Kafka’s story. When the story ends with the traveler’s flight from the 
colony, “the text itself” exposes his anticolonialism as one that seeks to maintain 
“global cultural segregation” (1998, 232, 233). While the story ends clearly 
with the traveler’s gesture of separation, it remains unclear which cultures he 
seeks to segregate. The cult of the apparatus is undone, and the traveler always 
considered the new commandant as culturally like-minded. Which two cultures 
does the traveler keep apart in his final gesture?
9. Rather than noting the traveler’s “absolute lack of receptivity for the 
Officer’s ‘message’” (Gray 2002, 232), Rolleston traces the traveler’s very real 
receptivity to the officer’s rhetoric. Even though the traveler remains firm in his 
rejection of the execution apparatus, he exhibits over the course of the story 
ever more signs of sympathy for the officer (Rolleston 1984, 88–100).
10. Translation modified because Hofmann dropped the last clause of the 
German sentence.
11. In German the officer speaks of past audiences when he tells the traveler 
“wie damals, Hunderte wie Fliegen um die Grube sich versammeln” (DzL 227). 
In Hofmann’s translation the humans seem to have become actual flies: “there 
were then, hundreds of flies collected round the pit” (M 166).
12. For such a dismissal, see Murphy 1998, 180–201. Mark Anderson 
ironically summarizes the current assessment of Lukács’s critique of Kafka: 
“Despite its aesthetic and ethical misconceptions, however, Lukács’ description 
of the ‘decadent’ features of Kafka’s work is basically accurate” (Anderson 
1992, 11).
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13. Hofmann does not translate this expression (M 150).
14. To indulge in positivism: the officer’s speech takes up 42 percent of 
Kafka’s story. Of these 4,326 words spoken by the officer, Müller cuts 3,414, 
almost 80 percent. He reduces the officer’s speech to a mere 912 words.
15. As a defender of the officer David Pan holds the traveler responsible for 
the officer’s death: “The voyager’s condemnation of the apparatus leads to the 
execution of the officer, but since this execution is not ordered by the officer but 
by the voyager, it does not proceed according to the justice of the former but 
of the latter” (Pan 1994, 24). But the traveler has neither the intention nor the 
power to execute the officer. He never knows what is at stake until the officer 
reaches his silent decision. The responsibility for the self-execution act resides 
solely with the officer.
Chapter 5
1. Already the first German attack on April 22, 1915, was far from successful. 
Even though the front ahead of them collapsed because of the surprise attack, 
the German soldiers followed the first gas cloud only hesitantly. Patches of gas 
on the ground further delayed their advance. Since the cylinders were opened 
late in the afternoon, the soon ensuing darkness allowed the French to regroup. 
The next day the German troops were ordered to advance, but they were met 
with strong resistance and gained no strategic advantage (Haber 1986, 22–40).
2. Blinded by the gas, Hitler heard the news of the German Revolution in 
November 1918 in a hospital in Pasewalk. Confronted with the collapse of 
everything he had believed in, Hitler described how his feelings of shame and 
disgrace turned into the hatred that would become the driving force of his 
political career. “What was all the pain in my eyes compared to this misery? 
[. . .] In these nights hatred grew in me, hatred for those responsible for this 
deed.” He reached the conclusion that there is “no making pacts with Jews; 
there can only be the hard: either-or,” and he made a decision: “I, for my part, 
decided to go into politics” (cited in Kershaw 1999, 102–3).
3. On Liddell Hart’s significance in military theory, see Gat (2001, 643–823). 
For a masterful account of the disturbing history of aerial bombing in history 
and fiction, see Lindqvist (2001).
4. In June 1925, immediately after the failure of his academic career, Benjamin 
set out to become one of the most important cultural critics in the Weimar 
Republic. The article “The Weapons of Tomorrow” (1925) is significant not 
only for its anticipation of the gas attack, but also because it marks Benjamin’s 
transformation into a public intellectual. Sections of this lesser known—and so 
far untranslated—article reappeared in 1930 in his signature essay “Theories 
of German Fascism” (Benjamin 1996–2003, vol. 2, 312–21).
5. One encounters the possible end to such endless war in one of the strangest 
masterpieces of German modernism. A character in Hans Henny Jahnn’s 
Perrudja (1929) anticipates the invention of a gas that would function as a 
catalytic agent able “to transform our atmospheric air into lethal poison gas” 
(Jahnn 1985, 453). Only total global destruction might end a war that would 
do away with the distinctions between combatants and civilians, between war 
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and peace. Even though such visions of global destruction never go beyond the 
stage of “confused and ice-cold speeches” in Jahnn’s novel, such speeches are 
held in the presence of a Mr. Grigg, the CEO of a multinational conglomerate 
(Jahnn 1985, 598). And in drafts for a third volume this Mr. Grigg takes action. 
His researchers experiment with invisible walls of poison gas. Mr. Grigg intends 
to use them to create a new man and establish a new world order. Couching his 
plans for mass murder in the language of utopia, Mr. Grigg plans “to run ahead 
only once in the course of history. To exterminate only one generation except 
for a sublime rest. To repeat what myth reports as god’s deed, the drowning of 
mankind and all animals” (Jahnn 1985, 805).
6. See especially the sections 103–76 in Lundqvist (2001) as well as the 
chapter on gas war in Encke (2006, 195–218).
7. Pol mentions in his article an exception, Martin Berger’s film Freies Volk 
(1925). He had just watched the film in Berlin’s Groβen Schauspielhaus. In 
the film’s final moments Berger depicted future gas warfare: “At the end a few 
pictures from a future world war: airplanes that drop gas bombs, collapsing 
walls, fleeing people, suffocating people. Only a few seconds—but they were 
really enough. With one jolt these few seconds took the breath away from us 
3,300 in the Groβen Schauspielhaus” (Pol 1925, 812). No copy of Berger’s film 
seems to have survived the Third Reich and the Second World War.
8. In his essay, published before the end of the First World War, Kraus focused 
especially on the absurdity of leading twentieth-century chemical warfare with 
notions of war, power, and honor that belonged on horseback. His observation 
of such synchronicity of the nonsynchronous, of the simultaneity of premodern 
notions of honor and heraldry with the realities of twentieth-century warfare, 
would lead Kraus to an understanding of the apocalyptic potential of technology 
that Günther Anders would develop in Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (1980), 
in the aftermath of the next use of (nuclear) weapons of mass destruction.
9. Although largely forgotten today, Lampel was renowned as a socially 
engaged writer who exposed in his most successful play, Revolte im 
Erziehungshaus (1929), the mistreatment of young adults in the welfare 
system. The same year Georg Asagaroff’s film adaptation of Lampel’s play 
was prohibited in Germany. For material on this affair, see the website of the 
German Institute for Film (http://www.deutsches-filminstitut.de/filme/f015211 
.htm). Sergej Eisenstein’s collaborator Mikhail Dubson adapted Giftgas über 
Berlin in 1929 for the screen. Nowadays Lampel is best known for his work 
as screenwriter for G. W. Pabst’s Westfront 1918 (1930) and Kameradschaft 
(1931).
10. Berlin’s police president Zörgiebel ordered that the premiere could take 
place only in a performance closed to the public; after attending the premiere 
at the Theater am Schifferbauerdamm, he promptly prohibited any further 
performances (Rinke 2000, 42–44, 154–60). The story of Lampel’s play 
echoes thus the one of Becher’s novel in the Weimar Republic. Partly because 
of his poison gas novel, Becher had been accused of literary high treason, an 
accusation that was dismissed only in 1928. A new edition of Levisite could be 
published only after the Second World War (Dwars 1998, 258–69).
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11. The anxiety of living in a moment of history when imperceptible death 
might destroy everyone at any time is, however, represented in some paintings 
and drawings of the interwar period. Examples are Edgar Ende’s Die Gefahr 
(Die Posaunen) (1931), Paul Klee’s Angst (1934), Hannah Höch’s Angst 
(1936), and especially Lea Grundig’s cycle of ten drawings called Krieg droht 
(1936–37). But Grundig’s images could only be distributed among friends 
during the Third Reich and reached no wider audience. For more information, 
see Heckmann and Ottomeyer 2008.
12. Canetti might have projected this sense of breathing onto Hermann 
Broch. To his disappointment, Broch never acknowledged having such a unique 
sense and never commented on Canetti’s theory of breathing (Hanuschek 2005, 
208). But Canetti’s continued identification of Broch with the art of breathing—
half a century later he portrayed Broch once again in The Play of Eyes (1986) 
through his art of breathing (18–30)—and the centrality he placed on new and 
otherwise imperceptible threats as urgent challenges to literary representation 
testify to Canetti’s own understanding of the task of the writer. Upon receiving 
the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1981, he invoked during the awards ceremony 
the “breath-shadow” that weighed heavily on Europe and declared once more 
his particular debt to Broch (Canetti 2005a, 115). In his short banquet speech, 
he named four writers who, if still alive, should have received the prize instead 
of him: Kraus, Kafka, Musil, and Broch. He identified the first three writers as 
important literary influences but not Broch. Instead, Canetti thanked Broch for 
inspiring his own lifelong reflections on breathing, of confronting him with the 
task of preparing an imagination for a seemingly imperceptible catastrophe 
(115).
13. As Schiller argued in Naive und Sentimental Poetry (1795–96): “In satire, 
actuality is contrasted with the highest reality as falling short of the ideal. It 
is, moreover, quite unnecessary that this be articulated, provided only that the 
poet is able to intimate this to the mind; but this he absolutely must do or it 
will not function poetically at all. Actuality is therefore a necessary object of 
antipathy; but—and this is all-important—this antipathy must itself necessarily 
arise out of the opposed ideal” (1966, 118).
14. For an analysis of Benjamin’s deeply disturbing concept of a humanity 
that will realize itself in a politics of destruction, see especially Werckmeister 
(1997, 19–57) and Hanssen (1998, 114–26).
15. The influence of Benjamin’s claim of a crisis of experience based 
on his observations of the returning soldiers of World War I can hardly be 
overestimated. From Hannah Arendt and Theodor W. Adorno to Giorgio 
Agamben and Hayden White, many theorists have taken Benjamin’s claims 
as a starting point for their own reflections on the catastrophic events of the 
twentieth century. For a recent discussion of the debates on the notion of 
experience, see Jay (2005).
16. Benjamin published two essays on Hebel in 1926 that celebrated the 
popular but often underrated Hebel as one of the few master storytellers in 
German literature, “Johann Peter Hebel: On the Centenary of His Death” 
(1996, 428–31) and “Johann Peter Hebel: A Picture Puzzle for the Centenary 
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of His Death” (1996, 432–34). Alexander Honold offers an admirable reading 
of Hebel’s crucial role for Benjamin’s understanding of storytelling in his essay 
“The Voice of the Story-Teller: Johan Peter Hebel” (Honold 2000, 159–206).
17. In a comment that anticipates the darker sections of Canetti’s Crowds 
and Power, Benjamin explains the audience’s turn toward novels not with a 
desire to learn from the protagonist’s fate but with the expectation to observe 
someone’s death. Like a baiting crowd, the readers participate from the 
distance and safety of their homes in the protagonist’s all but certain demise. 
As Benjamin writes, “what draws the reader to a novel is the hope of warming 
his shivering life with a death he reads about” (1996–2003, vol. 3, 156).
18. In a 1929 review of a Kesten novel, Benjamin declared his intention to 
explain the “sudden upswing” and success of the genre of satire by identifying 
“the ideological position of the entirely new German satire” (Benjamin 1972–
91, 3:172). To offer a first indication of what he thought of these new satirists 
he placed their names next to the one great one. “[The German satire] presents 
with such vastly different minds like Polgar, Kästner, Mehring, Peter Panter, 
Kesten a very specific stance of the intelligentsia and what is significant of it 
says the confrontation with the one and only Karl Kraus” (172). Benjamin 
offers one more hint of his critique when he repeats Tucholsky’s aphorism that 
German intellectuals stand always to the left of themselves. Only by adding 
Peter Panther, one of Tucholsky’s pseudonyms, to the targeted satirists, Benjamin 
included Tucholsky among these less than genuine German intellectuals. In his 
review of Mehring’s poetry, published as well in 1929, Benjamin continued 
his attack against the new German satire, an attack that would culminate 
two years later in his essay “Left-Wing Melancholy.” Comparing Mehring’s 
poems unfavorably to those of Brecht, Benjamin already made the point that 
he would make two years later again against Kästner’s and Tucholsky’s satires. 
“The things have no force to change anything; they will cause no regrouping. 
Because they are inspired by the masochism of its bourgeois audience and not 
its perfidy” (Benjamin 1972–91, vol. 3, 184).
19. After the Second World War, when he was in doubt that the Germans 
were in dire need of political reeducation, Kästner defined satirists first and 
foremost as pedagogues and not artists. “As I said, the satirist is only in his 
means something of an artist. He is something else entirely with regard to the 
purpose he pursues. [. . .] Judging from the point of view of its purpose, satire 
does not belong to literature but to pedagogy. Satirists are teachers” (Kästner 
1966, 383).
20. Beginning with Benjamin’s first major book review, Alexander Honold 
outlines in an elegant and detailed essay Benjamin’s debt to Kraus (2000, 201–
76). For Kraus’s influence on Benjamin, see also Reemtsma (1991, 104–15).
21. When he realized in 1925 that the Trauerspielbuch would not open the 
doors to an academic career to him, Benjamin turned to literary criticism, 
beginning with a very Krausian review of Fritz von Unruh’s Flügel der Nike. 
Benjamin dissected this popular travel account of a former soldier and war 
propagandist with two goals in mind. He set out to become one of the leading 
literary critics of the Weimar Republic, and he intended to resuscitate a form of 
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criticism that had fallen out of favor, a criticism that delighted in the destruction 
of the book and the author. In a letter to Siegfried Kracauer, Benjamin defined the 
intention behind his Unruh review programmatically. In contrast to the current 
“wilting of our customs of criticism” he wanted more than the “annihilation” 
of a single book; he wanted to destroy an “authorship” (Benjamin 1997, 169). 
As he explained to Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the Unruh review constituted “the 
conscious attempt of an ‘annihilation,’ the destruction of a public person” (176). 
Three years later, in One-Way-Street (1928), Benjamin elaborated this approach 
to literary criticism in “The Critic’s Technique in Thirteen Propositions” (2009, 
71–72). While posterity either celebrates or forgets, the critic judges in the face 
of the author, and as Benjamin writes, he “picks up a book as lovingly as a 
cannibal prepares a baby” (72).
22. In “Some Motifs on Baudelaire” (1939), written long after his break with 
Kraus, Benjamin continued to insist on a correspondence between the failure 
to experience and the destructive impulse. Benjamin avoids mentioning Kraus, 
but the reference to Archilochus, the father of lethal satire, and to Timon, one 
of Kraus’s favorite Shakespearean characters, remains so Krausian that the 
berserk-running Baudelaire appears in this passage as a placeholder for Kraus. 
“For someone who is past experiencing, there is no consolation. Yet it is this 
very inability to experience that explains the true nature of rage. An angry man 
‘won’t listen.’ His prototype, Timon, rages against people indiscriminately; he 
is no longer capable of telling his proven friend from his mortal enemy. Barbey 
d’Aurevilly very perceptively recognized this habit of mind in Baudelaire, 
calling him ‘a Timon with the genius of Archilochus’” (Benjamin 1996–2003, 
vol. 4, 335).
23. Benjamin quotes himself almost verbatim in this commentary to Brecht’s 
poem “Vom armen B.B.” Eight years earlier, Benjamin wrote about the “The 
Destructive Character” (1931) that “only the insight into how radically the 
world is simplified when tested for its worthiness for destruction leads to such 
an Apollonian image of the destroyer. This is the great bond embracing and 
unifying all that exists. It is a sight that affords the destructive character a 
spectacle of deepest harmony” (1996–2003, vol. 2, 541).
24. Adorno insists that philosophy has no alternative to the perspective of 
redemption: “Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption” 
(1978, 247). To admit the necessity of this perspective does not imply for 
Adorno its possibility. To gain such a possibility “is also the utterly impossible 
thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s 
breadth, from the scope of existence” (247). Anyone who insists that this line 
to the redemptive beyond can be crossed plays a destructive game inside the 
existing world. “The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for 
the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it 
is delivered up to the world” (247). Rather than claiming the paradisiacal light 
already, as Benjamin does for Kraus, Adorno refers to it only in the subjunctive 
of a distant future: “Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange 
the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as 
it will appear one day in the messianic light” (247).
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25. Under the title “Monument to a Warrior” Benjamin offered an early 
snapshot of Kraus in One-Way Street (1928)—picturing him “in ancient armor, 
wrathfully grinning” (1996–2003, vol. 1, 469).
26. The Kraus-Hitler comparison was, however, more than a rash first 
response. More than thirty years later, Canetti described in 1965 his initial 
dependency from Kraus as living in a dictatorship. “Any foe of Karl Kraus’s 
was a corrupt, an immoral creature. And even though it never reached the 
point, as was customary in subsequent dictatorships, of exterminating the 
alleged vermin, I nevertheless had what I must confess, to my shame, I had 
what I cannot term any differently, I had my ‘Jews’—people whom I did not 
deign to look at, whose lives did not concern me, who were outlawed and 
banished for me, whose touch would have sullied me, whom I quite earnestly 
did not count as part of humanity: the victims and enemies of Karl Kraus” 
(Canetti 1979, 37–38).
27. The unnamed city of Auto-da-Fé bears the same striking similarity to 
Vienna as the equally nameless capital of Musil’s The Man Without Qualities.
28. In Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), 
Kant wrote “aus so krummen Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann 
nichts ganz Gerades gezimmert werden” (Kant 1912–22, 4:158), and Kant 
found the metaphor so fitting that he used it a decade later again in Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) (Kant 1912–22, 6:245). Isaiah 
Berlin used Kant’s metaphor as the title for one of his most influential collection 
of essays, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (1991), and translated the phrase 
as “out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made, nothing entirely 
straight can be carved” (Berlin 1991, xi). As Avishai Margalit writes with 
reference to Kant and Berlin: “The crooked timber, then, is a metaphor against 
the shaping of human society according to a blueprint” (Margalit 2001, 156). 
And Therese Krumbholz will not bend and reshape herself according to any of 
Kien’s designs.
29. Decades after completing Auto-da-Fé, Canetti analyzed the pleasure one 
gets from judging others in Crowds and Power and spoke of judgment as a 
“disease” (Canetti 1984, 297). In this chapter “Judgment and Condemnation” 
one easily recognizes once more the “murderous substance” of satire that 
Canetti found at the core of Kraus’s performances as judge and executioner. 
Behind the constant activity of arranging and rearranging the people one knows 
into different groups, Canetti detected not merely a passion for classification 
but for the creation of hostile tensions between these groups. “At the root of the 
process lies the urge to form hostile packs, which, in the end, leads inevitably 
to actual war packs” (297). The judge’s function is not to arrive at an impartial 
and objective decision. “For it is only in appearance that a judge stands between 
the two camps, on the borderline dividing good from evil. In fact, he invariably 
reckons himself among the good; his chief claim to his office is his unshakable 
allegiance to the kingdom of the good, as though he had been born a native of 
it” (297). In a more Benjaminian phrasing, one might say that the judge always 
acts as if the light of creation shines on him.
30. Barnouw writes that “Peter Kien is the informant with whose weak 
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help the author has to orient himself in the strange world he records in his 
book” (Barnouw 1979, 22). While such a judgment of Peter Kien seems rather 
questionable, as could be seen in the analysis of the incident on the Mut Strasse, 
Barnouw made already the observation that “there is in Auto-da-Fé not a single 
positive figure, but also, in contrast to [Heinrich Mann’s] The Loyal Subject, no 
figure whose weaknesses would be excusable” (Barnouw 1979, 22).
31. Compare Sokel (1974, 181–90), Berman (1986, 195–204), and Foell 
(1994).
32. Occasionally, Donahue notes the annoying uncertainty into which the 
reader is plunged when he tries to determine whether a hateful speech comes 
from the narrator or a protagonist of the novel. The notion of epistemic 
sovereignty does not capture this reading experience: “Reading, and rereading, 
is so annoying because just when we hope to pin some execrable assertion 
on the narrator, we discover that hiding in an apparently objective narrative 
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